The development of solar-neutrino astronomy: The theoretical-experimental nexus and the social deconstruction and construction of knowledge. by Pinch, Trevor
        
University of Bath
PHD
The development of solar-neutrino astronomy: The theoretical-experimental nexus and








If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Sep. 2021
(i)
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOLAR-NEUTRINO 
ASTRONOMY: THE THEORETICAL-EXPERIMENTAL 
NEXUS AND THE SOCIAL DECONSTRUCTION 
AND CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE
Submitted by TREVOR PINCH 
for the degree of Ph.D. 
of the University of Bath 
1982
COPYRIGHT
"Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis 
rests with its author. This copy of the thesis has been supplied 
on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise 
that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation 
from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published 
without the prior written consent of the author".
This thesis may not be consulted, photocopied or lent to other 
libraries without the permission of the author for 5 (five years) 




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest U641688
Published by ProQuest LLC(2015). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
U N I V E R S I T Y  OF 8ATM  
L IB R A R Y
II 1 8 MAY 1982
(ii)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research could not have been accomplished without the 
help of the respondents. I would like to thank all those scientists 
who have given up their time to talk and correspond with me. Their 
help and hospitality has made the research a pleasure to carry out. 
I would also like to thank my supervisor. Dr. Harry Collins, for 
his continual support, criticism and enthusiasm.
The research was made possible by means of a University of 
Bath Research Fund Studentship, 1977-80.
The fieldwork trip to the U.S. was funded by the School of 
Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath.
Some of the findings of this research have been presented 
already in Pinch (1980 a,b, 1981a).
(iii)
SUMMARY
This thesis is a study within the sociology of knowledge. It 
takes as its focus developments in solar-neutrino astronomy. The 
empirical material presented is drawn from interviews, correspondence 
and scientific articles.
Solar-neutrino astronomy is still in its infancy, and much 
of the attention over the period covered (1958-78) is centred upon 
the activities of one e:q>erimental cind one theoretical group.
The detailed study of the interaction of these two groups in their 
efforts to get a solar-neutrino detector built cind in their efforts 
to interpret and understand the results produced by this detector 
forms the core of the thesis. Detailed processes of the social 
construction of scientific knowledge and, in particular, the roles 
played by theory and experiment, are outlined. An attempt is 
made to explain how particular pieces of knowledge became accepted 
as 'true'. In other words,the social processes whereby consensus 
emerged over the validity of particular scientific findings are 
investigated.
As well as attempting to show how scientific knowledge gets
constructed it is also shown how what is taken to be 'true  /
knowledge*can be deconstructed such that its roots in the social 
world rather than the natural world can be recovered. The 
interpretative flexibility at the heart of both experimental results 
and theoretical predictions in the domain of solar-neutrino astronomy 
is revealed. It is shown that scientific knowledge is thoroughly 
socially constituted.
In addition to attempting to provide some understanding of 
the social processes of science^ the study presents much rich 
descriptive material on how this particular area of science developed. 
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PREFACE
The work presented within this thesis falls within a body of 
research which can broadly be termed 'relativist'. In such 
research scientific findings are treated as if they are not con­
strained in any way by the natural world. Several caveats about 
the nature of the relativist position being argued here may be 
helpful.
Firstly, the research has been carried out in the spirit of 
'normal science'. That is, it has been assumed that the relativist 
position has been defended adequately enough in the literature for 
there to be no need to undertake further defensive exercises. In 
other words, it is maintained that relativism is not self­
contradictory, and that this has been shown to be so.
Secondly, just as relativism cannot be proved to be false, 
neither can it be proved to be true. It is difficult to see how 
any position in epistemology could be proved by empirical work.
Thus, this piece of work is not intended as a proof of relativism.
It is a further exemplification of how relativism might give us 
increased understanding of the social processes of science.
Although not intended as a proof, it is hoped that this work 
does carry some convictiCh. It is claimed, for instance, that the 
relativistic position adopted here is consistent. That is, in 
principle, every piece of scientific knowledge could be deconstructed 
such that it would appear to have no constraint placed on it by the 
natural world. This argument is made on hypothetical grounds. In 
other words, it could be shown that results which seem to stem 
unproblematically from Nature can be interpreted differently if 
actors were sufficiently ingenious. Although the hypothetical 
argument could be made in every case and hence would ensure 
consistency, it would be worrying if this was the type of argument 
upon which we always had to rely. Thus, the relativist position 
would engender a sense of unease if the main experimental knowledge 
claim encountered in this thesis - Davis's solar-neutrino results - 
could only be deconstructed by hypothetical arguments. However, 
as will be seen in Chapter 7, Part II, Davis's results can be
(Vl)
deconstructed, not by hypothetical arguments but by the consideration 
of the actual technical arguments made by participants (and, in 
particular, one participant). Although it is not logistically 
feasible to investigate all the knowledge claims encountered in 
this research - each claim would require a major study in its Cvvn 
right - the deconstruction of Davis's claims means that at least 
the work may carry some conviction. It cannot, of course, be a 
proof.
In common with other peices of work carried out within the 
relativist programme it is conventional to refer to most scientific 
facts encountered in the course of the study in the same unreflective 
way in which they are described by participants. That is, such 
facts are described as though they seem to have arisen unproblematically 
from the natural world. This use of realist language should not be 
misconstrued as evidence of any fundamental inconsistency as in 
principle each such fact could be redescribed within the relativist 
vocabulary of social deconstruction.
1.
CHAPTER ONE
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
In this chapter the aims and methods of the research are 
introduced. The sociological approach taken in the study, which 
falls within the empirical programme of relativism, is outlined 
and some of its origins in the philosophy of scienck Lriefly traced.
The goals of the empirical programme of relativism are formulated
by reference to the notions of social 'deconstruction' and'construction'
of scientific knowledge. Attention is drawn to the importance
of the differing methods which can best be used to achieve these
goals. Some recent studies in the sociology of science are
reviewed and placed in the context of the social deconstruction
and construction! of knowledge. It is argued that the development
of solar-neutrimo astronomy is a suitable location for the
research given its aims and methods. The major sociological
issues raised by the study and how they eure approached in
subsequent chapiters are outlined.
Introduction
The piece of research presented in this thesis is an empirical 
study within the sociology of knowledge of an area of modérn 
culture - specifically scientific culture. The location of the 
study within the purview of the sociology of knowledge and 
culture more generally implies that there is nothing special 
about scientific knowledge. For the purposes of this research 
scientific knowledge is to be treated in the same way as any 
other cultural product.
The case for establishing scientific knowledge as a legitimate 
part of the wider sociology of knowledge, was argued by Mannheim
(1936).^ However, for many writers (for example, Merton, 1973) 
the sociology of science has been restricted to the study of the 
normative behaviour of scientists and the institutional organisation 
of science rather than the technical products of scientific 
activity. It is only with modem writers,such as Kuhn (1971), 
Barnes (1974), Collins (1975) and Bloor (1976),that the full 
potential of a sociology of scientific knowledge has started to be 
realised.
The assumption that there is nothing special about scientific 
knowledge means that it cannot be said to be better or worse than 
other types of knowledge in terms of, for instance, rationality, 
correspondence with reality, or truth content. To make such an 
assumption is, of course, to embrace epistemological relativism.
That is it implies that no knowledge whatsoever, including the 
knowledge produced by the sociology of knowledge, can be grounded 
in absolute criteria of rationality, reality or truth. The 
apparent self-defeating nature of relativism and the effect that 
it produces of seeming to undermine scientific knowledge as the 
canonical authority for all knowledge,have meant that some writers 
(notably Kuhn) have backed away from the relativistic consequences 
of the new sociology of science. For others, however (notably 
Barnes, Bloor and Collins), relativism has been taken to be a 
central tenet of the new sociological approach to science. Such 
writers,rather than drawing back from relativism,are often self­
consciously relativist. The issue of relativism has now become 
so central, that for one author anyway (Collins, 1981a) relativism 
is the defining characteristic of the new work on science.
The sociological approach followed in this study falls within
such an explicit form of relativism. However, it is not the inten­
tion here to yet again defend relativistic sociology of scientific
knowledge as a viable sociological enterprise. Enough has been
2said elsewhere on this topic. It is clear that the relativist 
approach has already generated several major sociological studies 
of scientific knowledge (see below) and it is this body of empirical 
work and the possibility of carrying out further work within the 
relativist programme which should now be the major focus of 
attention. What is envisaged in this study is, pace Kuhn, a
I
piece of 'normal' relativism.
Although the work presented here is first and foremost a
contribution to the relativistic sociology of scientific knowledge,
it is intended to be more than just another demonstration of the
relativist thesis. The major interest (and perhaps novelty) of
the study lies in the detailed social processes of modern science
which are documented. In particular, the interaction between
theorists and experimenters in the construction of scientific
knowledge^ which forms the core of the empirical findings, is of
great interest in terms of our understanding of the connection
between theorising and experimentation in science. Indeed, the
research location was deliberately chosen in order to investigate
such microprocesses of knowledge construction.
Relativistic Sociology of Scientific Knowledge - The Impact of
Philosophy of Science
The origins and aims of the relativist programme have recently
been outlined by Collins. The origins lie in modern philosophy
of science; as he notes:
Modem philosophy of science has allowed an extra dimension - 
time - into descriptions of the nature of scientific knowledge.
4.
Theories are now seen as linked to each other, and to 
observations, not by fixed bonds of logic and correspondence, 
but by a network, each link of which takes time to be 
established as consensus emerges and each link of which 
is potentially révisable - given time. (Collins, 1981a:3).
The failure of correspondence theories of truth and the lack 
of compulsion of the natural world in settling scientific disputes 
has, as Collins states, been increasingly recognised by philosophers 
of science. For instance, the Popperian school, and in particular 
Lakatos (1970), have granted that no experimental claim can un­
problematically establish a fact of the natural world. This is be­
cause accompanying every experimental claim is a ceteris paribus clause 
which contains all the unstated assumptions made in the experiment.
In principle, the decision what to include and what not to include 
in the ceteris paribus clause is arbitrary and there is nothing 
to stop anyone challenging an esq^erimental claim on the grounds 
that they did not accept the ceteris paribus clause. This has become 
known as the Duhem-Quine thesis and it has drawn increasing 
attention to the theory-ladenness of observations (we shall return 
to the Duhem-Quine thesis below). Theoretical interpretation 
and experimental evidence seem to be inseparable. The theory­
laden character of observations is a familiar theme from the work 
of Feyerabend (1975) and Hesse (1974) also.
Although these philosophers of science have opened the door for 
a sociological analysis of science, their own approaches do not take 
us very far in terms of a relativistic sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Lakatos, for instance, claimed, that in the last analysis, 
there were rules of scientific rationality whereby the progress 
of one research programme over another could be determined 
objectively.^ Hesse too, seems to be closer to the traditional
concerns of philosophy of science when she attempts to formulate 
rules of inductive inference and talks, in her network model of 
science, about the 'coherence' of the networks of theory and 
observation. Feyerabend is more radical, but ultimately his rela­
tivism degenerates into an anarchistic individualism which leaves 
very little room for social processes.
Perhaps the most influential writer in modern philosophy of
4science has been the historian of science,Thomas Kuhn. Both in
his paper,'The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science'
(Kuhn, 1962),cuid his seminal book,The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Kuhn, 1971),Kuhn outlined ideas which seemëd to imply
that science was similar to other areas of social and political
life. He also seemed to endorse a relativist position in respect
to scientific knowledge. Statements such as the following one,
concerning Dalton's work in chemistry, seemed to imply very little
compulsion to the natural world:
But it is hard to make hature fit a paradigm... after accepting 
the theory they had still to beat nature into line......When it
was done... The data themselves had changed. That is the last 
of the senses in which we may want to say that after a 
revolution scientists work in a different world. (Kuhn,1971:135)
Despite the clear resonance with the goals of relativism and
his explicit embrace of sociology of science,it has turned out to
be difficult to develop Kuhn's ideas systematically (but see Collins
and Pinch, 1982) . This is not only because of a certain lack of
rigor in the original ideas but also because Kuhn himself has
frequently reinterpreted his earlier ideas (Pinch, 1979;
1981b). Furthermore, Kuhn has recently made it explicit that the
sociological consequences of his ideas are not particularly
radical,^ and, as mentioned earlier, he now seems to renounce
6.
relativi sm altogethe r.^
The impact of this philosophical tradition, and Kuhn in
particular, has probably been greatest on British sociologists
of science.^ Of particular interest are the sociologists who have
interpreted Kuhn in the light of their own phenomenological,
ethnomethodological, and Wittgensteinian-Winchian leanings.
As mentioned in the introduction, the work of Barry Barnes (1974)
and David Bloor (1973, 1976) has been particularly influential
here in terms of setting out the terrain for a fully fledged
relativistic sociology of knowledge. Barnes and Bloor have not,
in the main, however, set about showing how such a programme could
be carried out empirically - especially for the study of modem 
8science.
The empirical work on modern science carried out within the 
relativist approach has largely been initiated by Collins (1975,
1976) and others following similar methods (e.g.,Harvey, 1980,
1981; Pickering, 1980, 1981a; Travis, 1980 a,b,1981). Collins 
(1981a) has recently brought the goals of these studies together 
in terms of an 'empirical programme of relativism'. It is this 
programme which forms the starting point for considering the 
goals of the present research.
The Empirical Programme of Relativism - The Three Stages
In his paper setting out the 'Stages in the Empirical Programme 
of Relativism', Collins argues that revealing the lack of influence 
of the natural world in settling knowledge claims is only the first 
part in a three-stage programme. The second stage involves the 
demonstration of the mechanisms by which the potentially endless 
debate over knowledge claims is limited. Such mechanisms are the
social processes whereby consensus is reached that a certified fact 
of the natural world has emerged. As we shall see below, I have 
few quarrels with the first two stages of Collins's programme, 
although I prefer to talk about the two stages in a slightly 
different language. However, Collins goes on to suggest a third 
stage of the programme - a stage which no case study of modem 
science has yet addressed. This is the need to relate essentially 
local debates over knowledge claims in science to wider social and 
political structures and processes. Furthermore, Collins argues 
that it would be most satisfying to see this third stage carried 
through for a piece of knowledge belonging to mainstream science 
with substantial institutional autonomy.
Whilst agreeing with Collins that recent case studies carried
out within the relativist programme have shown that the 'consensual
interpretation of day-to-day laboratory work is only possible
within constraints coming from outside that work' (Collins, 1981a:7),
I would disagree with his implication that such constraints are
ultimately to be found in the wider political and social structure.
Such constraints,! would argue, are located mainly, although not
exclusively, within the internal workings of science. That is
consensus is usually reached by social processes within science
which are to a degree autonomous of the wider social and political 
9structure. Whilst wider social and political factors may have 
impinged directly on scientific knowledge more often before the 
professional autonomy prevalent in modern science emerged, to show 
the influence of such factors on a concrete piece of knowledge 
within an area such as modern physics is a very unpromising task.
This is not to deny that such cases might, in principle, be found.
but it would be foolish to orientate research around the search 
for such f a c t o r s . I n  other words,Collins's third stage is 
largely redundant for the study of an area such as modem physics. 
There is, of course, always the possibility of some weak sense of 
external constraint in that science as an institution is dependent 
upon the wider social and political structure. This last point, 
however, is largely uncontentious and presumably is not what 
Collins had in mind.
The position being advocated here is thus very similar to that
favoured by Kuhn (1971) who suggests that, once a mature science
is set upon its developmental cycle of paradigms, then it is
largely immune to extraneous social f a c t o r s . I  am somewhat
more of an externalist than Kuhn, however, and reserve the
possibility that new fields of scientific endeavour and present
areas of science, earlier in their history, could be permeated
by wider social and political factors. Modern physics, though,
is not the area where such factors are likely to be found to be
12important,except perhaps in exceptional circumstances.
The argument against the relevance of the third stage of 
the empirical programme in the context of a study of modern physics 
places more emphasis on the second stage - that is the demonstration 
of the mechanisms which limit scientific debate in the absence of 
external social and political constraints. In other words, these 
mechanisms alone should usually be sufficient to explain the 
emergence of a consensual fact of the natural world. The new 
emphasis on the second stage leads to a reformulation of the 
programme in terms of a slightly different vocabulary from that 
favoured by Collins. I prefer to describe the aims of the first
stage as the task of social deconstruction of knowledge. That is 
the sociologist must ’deconstruct' what appears to be an immutable 
fact of the natural world and show that it is socially contingent.
In the second stage ,the aim is to show how this socially contingent 
fact has been socially constructed as a seemingly immutable 
scientific fact.^^
These new terms of 'social deconstruction' and 'social con­
struction' are the language with which I shall describe the tasks 
of the first two stages of the empirical programme in the relativ­
istic sociology of knowledge. The terms will be elaborated upon 
further below but first it will be explained why it is convenient 
for the purposes of this research to reformulate the first two 
stages of Collins's programme in this way.
The Different Methodological Imperatives of the First and Second 
Stages
The shift in vocabulary indicates a different emphasis in the 
way that science is to be approached methodologically within the 
relativist programme. The importance of methodology can be seen 
from a closer examination of the first two stages of Collins's 
programme. One of the paradoxes of the programme (which seems, 
thus far, to have gone unnoticed) is that the first two stages are 
best carried out with the use of different methodologies.
In order to show the lack of compulsion of the natural world - 
the task of stage one - there is little doubt that the most powerful 
methodology is that of the contemporaneous study. For instance, 
by going out in the field and interviewing scientists as they argued 
over knowledge claims, Collins, and others, have been able to show 
that experimental outcomes are socially contingent. However, the
lo.
second stage of the progranme - the investigation of the mechanisms 
whereby thie potentially endless debate is settled - is, 1 would 
claim, better suited to the historical, rather thcin the contempora­
neous studly. This is simply because, as Collins himself points out, 
each link (in the network of scientific theories and observations)
' takes time to be established as consensus emerges and each link 
of which i.s potentially révisable - given time' (Collins 1981a: 3). 
In other words, consensus takes time to form, and if we wish to 
elucidate the mechanisms whereby this consensus has been arrived 
at, then i.t seems inevitable that we should look at a time span of 
scientific events - that is we should do history.
Now clearly the division between historical methods and con­
temporaneous sociological methods implied here is not absolute.
For instance, the contemporaneous study might produce significant 
clues as to what the relevant historical processes were and anyway 
could be repeated every few years so that, in effect, chronological 
cuts along the path of some scientific development were taken.
In this waiy the mechanisms whereby consensus was reached could be 
elucidated as they emerged with each new set of data (this seems
to be the method which Collins himself has employed in the gravity- 
14wave casdi i Indeed, such a series of cuts would actually entail 
a historical method for, by the time consensus emerged, the 
earlier interview data would constitute historical records in their 
own r i g h t . H o w e v e r ,  since most investigators do not possess 
the resources for such repeated surveys (or cannot wait around long 
enough for consensus to emerge) it is perhaps methodologically 
more parsimonious to rely on other historical evidence which covers 
the period of interest.
IL.
The two stages of the programme can be said to display the 
traditional tension between history of science and sociology of 
scientific knowledge. The standard criticism made against the historian of 
science is that his/her methods fail to reveal the interpretative 
flexibility of scientific knowledge because, by the time the historian 
arrives on the scene, consensus has already emerged. On the other 
hand, the historian's riposte to the sociologist is that sociological 
methods are not capable of elucidating the historical processes 
(processes which occur over a period of time) which shape scientific 
knowledge. In view of this tension within the empirical programme 
we need to be careful about which stage of the programme any 
particular piece of research addresses, and how best the aims of the 
research may be achieved given the available methods.
The argument presented earlier was that the second stage of 
the programme was the part to which greatest emphasis should be 
attached in the context of the present research. The identification 
of the mechanisms of consensus formation is probably the outstanding 
problem of the relativist programme. And, as argued immediately 
above, the goals of the second stage are best suited to investigation 
with the use of historical methods. However, this does not mean that 
we should embrace orthodox history of science with the attendant 
danger of losing sight of the aims of stage one of the programme.
In order to avoid such a danger, we should, it is claimed here, 
self-consciously choose a particular type of historical method 
suited to the overall concerns of the relativist programme. As it 
is not a type of history which has been carried out by traditional 
history of science, and indeed most historians of science would 




Inevitably any real research involves ccanpromise, including 
compromises in methods. It has already been pointed out that the 
first stage of the programme is best suited to contemporaneous 
methods. The claim here is that a feasible compromise between con­
temporaneous and historical methods can be reached such that neither 
task of the relativist programme is neglected. This compromise 
depends on the choice of a particular location for the research.
In order to see where such research can best be located let 
us first ask what condi tLons must be met in order to carry out 
research on the social construction of scientific knowledge (i.e., 
the goal of stage two) - which is the primary aim of the present 
research. Then, having seen what restrictions this places on 
the choice of the research site, we can see how such a study 
might also approach the social deconstruction of scientific 
knowledge.
There seems to be only one important condition to be met in
choosing the location for research on the social construction of
knowledge and that is that we must choose a case sufficiently distant
(in terms of time) for consensus to have e m e r g e d . I f  such a
consensus has not yet emerged, then it seems difficult to see
how we could make any compelling statements about the processes of
knowledge construction, since we will not know how the consensus
we wish to explain has turned out.^^
If this is the only constraint then there is nothing to stop
us locating the research in the immediate past. This is because
18consensus (in modern physics,anyway) can emerge very quickly.
It seems to be at the most a matter of years or one or two decades.
13.
This means that if we choose to limit the study to around the period 
from when the knowledge claim was first put forward to the moment 
when consensus emerged, then it is possible to locate the research 
in the recent past rather than distant history.
The advantage of focussing on the recent past in terms of the
deconstruction task (i.e., the first goal of the relativist programme)
is that the period of interpretative flexibility is sufficiently
recent for there to be some hope that it can be recaptured. Perhaps,
for instance, it is possible for the scientists to relive the
episode in the context of an interview. Although consensus has emerged,
it may have emerged sufficiently recently for the scientists to be
used as an interpretative resource for the purposes of showing the
deconstruction of scientific knowledge. Of course the usual
historical records (e.g., correspondence) and publications are
available as well, and these, if interpreted with care, can also
19be used to deconstruct knowledge. In other words, with the
choice of this particular location it is to be hoped that enough 
material can be gathered to deconstruct scientific knowledge.
It is the focus on the recent past which makes this type of
history novel for historians of science. Even the most modern
period studied within the oral-history tradition seems to be pre-
1960 (in physics, a n y w a y ) . H o w e v e r ,  here we are talking about
events of the 1960's and 1970's. The lack of interest shown by
historians of science in the very recent past is surprising for
it would seem that there are greater amounts of primary material
available than for more distant episodes. For instance, nearly
all the scientists involved are still alive and can be interviewed
21and their correspondence files copied. Also individuals, who,
in hindsight, might be seen to have a key role to play in the social
14.
processes of consensus formation, but who are not themselves important
22enough to leave historical records behind, can be interviewed.
Other historical records which might soon be discarded or destroyed
can be recovered, and scientists' memories can be tapped for
23information as to where the relevant records are located. All in
all, more, and better, data can be gathered than for a more distant
• X, 2 4  episode.
25These advantages in terms of materials are, however, just 
a bonus; the real purpose of focussing on the recent past, as 
emphasised above, is that it facilitates the task of social 
deconstruction.
The reason for the new terminology of 'social deconstruction'
and 'social construction' should now be apparent. It has been argued
that the emphasis that I wish to place on stage two of the
empirical programme is best suited to historical methods. This
means that scientific knowledge is approached after consensus has
emerged and the task is to show how what appears to be a solid
piece of knowledge can be 'deconstructed' in order to recapture
its interpretative flexibility. Once this deconstruction has
been achieved, the social processes whereby a socially contingent
piece of knowledge becomes 'constructed' as a hard-and-fast fact
27of the natural world can be shown. With the adoption of this
terminology and the above methods there seems to be no insurmountable 
difficulty to carrying through a piece of research addressed mainly 
to stage two of the programme but which, nevertheless, does not 
neglect the first stage of the programme.
Before the location for the present research is considered, 
the concepts of social deconstruction and social construction of
15.
knowledge will be further illustrated by discussing them in the 
context of other recent work in the sociology of scientific knowledge. 
Social Deconstruction and Construction of Knowledge A Review of 
Some Empirical Studies and Approaches
The empirical study carried out within the relativist programme 
which is of most relevance to the present research is Collins's (1975) 
study. I will briefly review this piece of work in terms of the 
notions of social deconstruction and construction.
In his 1975 study,Collins monitored the attempts by scientists 
to establish a new fact of the natural world. This purported fact 
was the claim made by Joseph Weber in 1969 to have detected large 
fluxes of gravitational radiation. When the claim first appeared, 
other experimenters also built detectors to search for gravity waves.
By interviewing most of the scientists involved in this experimentation, 
Collins was able to show that the experiments alone did not seem able 
to offer a conclusive outcome as to whether or not large fluxes of 
gravity waves existed. In short, it was found that different experi­
ments were interpreted in different ways by the different scientists 
involved. This led him to conclude:
As far as can be seen there is nothing outside of 'courses of 
linguistic, conceptual and social behaviour' which can affect 
the outcome of these arguments, and yet this outcome decides
the immediate fate of high fluxes of gravity waves.....
(Collins,1975: 220).
Collins's article was essentially an empirical verification of 
the Duhem-Quine thesis. He showed that what philosophers of science 
had considered to be an abstract problem was actually encountered 
by scientists in their efforts to establish new knowledge. The 
vehicle used to carry the argument was that of 'experimental 
replication'. He shewed that what counted as 'competent' replications
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of an experiment varied amongst different scientists. This can be 
seen to stem directly from the Duhem-Quine thesis. Inevitably 
all experiments differ in some respects from each other. For 
instance, they are often carried out at different times and places 
by different experimenters. Part of the ceteris paribus clause 
attached to experimental claims is that such factors which differ 
between experiments are assumed to be irrelevant. However, as 
pointed out by Duhem and Quine, in principle the ceteris paribus 
clause can be challenged. Hence scientists can deny that any 
experiment is a competent replication of another because they can 
claim that such-and-such a variable, assumed under the ceteris 
paribus clause to be irrelevant, is actually very important. As 
an extreme example take mind-over-matter; clearly all modern 
physics experiments assume ceteris paribus that psychokinetic 
effects are unimportant. However, if another assumption is made 
and such effects are considered to be real, then all experiments 
which do not control for such effects can be deemed 'incompetent'.
Collins's argument was that, when experimental activity at the 
frontiers of science is monitored, then scientists can actually 
be seen to be challenging ceteris paribus clauses. Definitions 
of competence could be shown to be based on assumptions about how 
the natural world works. It is Collins's view that these assum­
ptions are embedded in the web of scientific culture. In other 
words, experimental outcomes do not demonstrate the compulsion of 
the natural world but rather reflect cultural presuppositions.
(Culture here is interpreted in the Wittgensteinian-Winchian sense - 
see Collins and Pinch ,1982).
Collins's study showed the lack of compulsion of the natural
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world in settling experimental claims and it suggested that the 
arguments over experiments were settled in terms of 'linguistic, 
conceptual and social behaviour'. However, it did not spell out 
any of the social processes whereby certain sorts of linguistic, 
conceptual and social behaviour became sanctioned. Collins's 
1975 study was an exemplary case of the social deconstruction 
of knowledge but he did not take the task of social construction 
very far. That is he did not have much to say about the mechanisms 
whereby consensus emerged.
This method for the social deconstruction of knowledge has
now become familiar from a number of other studies (e.g., Collins,1975;
Wynne, 1976; Travis, 1980a,b, 1981; Harvey, 1980, 1981; Pickering,
1980, 1981a; Collins and Pinch, 1982). Although the findings
of these studies often differ in matters of emphasis and detail,
they all tend to deconstruct knowledge by showing the variety of
interpretations of knowledge claims which are available. The
production of scientific knowledge has, in a number of cases now , 
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been shown to|^ v ^ y  little constraint imposed on it by the
natural world.
The approach to the social deconstruction of knowledge followed 
in the above studies is most fruitfully located within the arena 
of scientific controversy. Examples of the interpretative flexi­
bility of scientific knowledge seem to be relatively easy to come 
by during a period of controversy. However, in principle, the 
approach can be pursued into less controversial areas, although 
interpretative flexibility is much harder to recover in such 
cases. One development in this type of analysis for non-contro- 
versial areas has been the use of what might be called the 'hypothetical
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argument' (Collins, 1981b; Harvey, 1981). In such cases, scientific 
arguments of a hypothetical nature are constructed by the socio­
logist which could, with some plausibility, have been proposed by 
the real actors studied. These arguments are designed to show that, 
even when consensus has started to develop against a particular 
knowledge claim, it is possible to defend the claim on a hypothetical 
basis. That is, with the use of such arguments, it is possible to 
recover some of the interpretative flexibility of knowledge.
There are other sociological approaches which also deconstruct
scientific knowledge. For instance, one such approach is that
followed in 'anthropological' or 'constructivist' studies whereby
the production of scientific knowledge is followed through in one
setting, such as a particular laboratory (Latour and Woolgar, 1979;
Knorr, 1977). Others have followed more traditional ethnomethodological
concerns and have analysed the processes whereby scientific knowledge
is produced through the vehicle of discovery accounts (Woolgar, 1976,
281980; Garfinkel et al., 1981) . Another approach which achieves
the social deconstruction of scientific knowledge is that of 'dis­
course analysis' (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1980; MuIkay, 1981; Mulkay 
and Gilbert, 1981).
These approaches, although often following divergent goals and 
methods, can be said to share the theme of the deconstruction of the 
natural world facticity of scientific knowledge. They do this by 
virtue of their focus on interpretative features common to all 
human activity such as 'reading', 'accounting' and 'talk'. Their 
emphasis on these interpretative procedures leaves no specially 
reserved place for the natural world. Scientific facts are socially 
constituted because the processes of science are fundamentally
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interpretative ones. Whether the processes involve the interpretation 
of 'literary inscriptions', 'discovery accounts' or 'available 
repertoires of discourse' they are essentially social processes.
The studies referred to immediately above have one methodol­
ogical factor in common. They choose to research individual and 
isolated parts of the scientific process, such as the laboratory 
(Latour and Woolgar, Knorr), the 'discovery account' (Woolgar, 
Garfinkel et al.) or the 'interview transcript' (Gilbert and Mulkay). 
This chosen location is often ideal for the acquisition of the 
detailed data needed in order to shew the richness of science's 
interpretative processes. However, such locations are unsuited 
to carry through the second task of the relativist programme - the 
social construction of knowledge. As will be argued below, such 
locations are not suitable for showing the processes of social 
construction of knowledge as such processes are not to be found 
in any single laboratory, or discovery account. Neither are they 
to be found in interview transcripts - at least not in interview
transcripts which are obtained for the purposes of discourse
, . 29analysis.
Of course, in arguing that the restricted location of the above 
studies makes them unsuitable for the purposes of showing the 
processes of social construction of knowledge, I am implying that 
the place where such processes are to be found known. It seems 
clear from studies carried out thus far within the empirical programme 
of relativism (see below for details) that the appropriate location 
for the identification of these processes is the group of scientists 
who make experimental or theoretical contributions to the area 
of knowledge being investigated. Collins has usefully termed such
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groups as Core-Sets (Collins, 1981c). The Core-Set are a group 
of scientists who, in a controversy, are 'actively involved in 
experimentation or observation, or make contributions to the theory 
of the phenomenon, or the experiment such that they have an effect 
on the outcome of the controversy'. I would agree with Collins 
that it is the Core-Set who decides; however, we should not neglect 
the point that the social processes of relevance are also located 
in the institutions of science, and, in particular, in the insti­
tutional resources which the Core-Set scientists have at their 
command (this will become clear in Chapter 10).
Given this location for the consensus-forming mechanisms,it 
would seem that the 'constructivists' 'ethnomethodologists' and 
'discourse analysts' have not drawn their net wide enough to give 
any definitive account of such m e c h a n i s m s . A l t h o u g h  their 
studies, if reinterpreted, can perhaps fill in details and supply 
valuable leads, they are in themselves too narrow in their focus 
to be used for the second task of the relativist programme.
However, it can be seen that the location chosen for the 
studies of the deconstruction of knowledge mentioned earlier (e.g., 
the Collins et al. studies) , which focus on controversies and in which all 
the relevant scientists are interviewed, is more promising for the 
study of consensus-forming mechanisms. This is because it is 
amongst these same scientists that consensus develops. In other 
words, the scientists Collins interviewed for his gravity-wave 
study are the same scientists who decide whether gravity waves 
are or are not facts of the natural world. These studies take us 
further than the constructivists, ethnomethologists and discourse 
analysts because they at least look in the right place.
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Although stage two of the empirical programme has often not
been the prime goal of the controversy-type studies,they hâve made
important contributions towards elucidating mechanisms of social
construction of knowledge. In this section,I will be reviewing
those consensus-forming mechanisms which have been identified in
32empirical studies of modem science, and, in particular,physics.
There is, of course, no shortage of theoretical ideas on the topics.
Some of this work will be discussed in Chapter 10, but here I wish
to maintain the empirical 'feel' and momentum of the relativist
programme as it has been applied to modern physics.
One of the earliest studies of relevance was that made by
Wynne (1976) of the reception of Barkla's J Phenomenon. Wynne's
main concern was social deconstruction and,in particular,to show
the lack of compulsion of attempts to find scientifico-rational
grounds for rejecting Barkla's claims. The study ,however, is also
instructive in that Wynne identified specific social factors which
led to Barkla's ultimate rejection. He pointed to Barkla's
failure to meet 'localised social interests', namely ' a systematic
programme of obviously attractive and promising questions' for
research (Wynne, 1976: 36). Wynne also pointed to the importance
of ritualised forms of rationality in 'scientifically' rejecting
Barkla's claims.
The theme of social interests is developed further by
Pickering (1980) in his study of the acceptance of the charm model
in high energy physics and the demise of the colour model. Pickering's
main explanatory vehicle for consensus formation is the 'interest
model'. This is a notion which has been found to be useful in some
33historical (distant-history type) case studies. Pickering's
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argument is that the charm model was more successful than its rival 
because it was more closely aligned with the pre-existing theoretical 
interests and expertise of groups of scientists. These interests 
could be connected with the work of the charm and colour proponents 
by the exemplary achievements of their different models. The charm 
protagonists managed to construct exemplars which intersected with 
the theoretical interests of these groups whilst the colour 
protagonists could not.
Pickering's study is important for its focus on theoretical 
developments. However, it does have one weakness to which Pickering 
himself draws attention. It neglects altogether the activities of 
experimenters. Clearly in terms of gross materials (i.e./noney) « 
experiments require far more resources than theory and, if con­
sensus-forming mechanisms are connected with the attempts to 
procure such resources, then experimental activity will also be 
an important place to look for the relevant mechanisms.
The criticism of the lack of emphasis on experiment cannot be 
levelled at Pickering's (1981a) study of the debate over the 
detection of magnetic monopoles, for this was primarily an experi­
mental controversy. Again it is the mechanisms of closure of the 
debate which are at the centre of attention. Pickering's conclusion 
is consonant with that of his earlier study in that ultimately it 
is theoretical concerns which dictate how the consensus emerges.
In particular, prior agreements as to what constituted acceptable 
experimental practice, which is in itself underpinned by theory, 
can be seen as the constraint on the closure. However, as Pickering 
himself again stresses, before we are convinced of his conclusion 
it needs to be shown in detail how theoretical interests win out
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also the processes whereby rival theories are rejected need further
investigation. Perhaps it is the case that rival theories cannot
generate a successful experimental practice,in which case experiments
would seem to be more important than granted by Pickering.
Another study of modem physics which is of great relevance
to the present concerns is that carried out by Harvey (1980, 1981)
of the local hidden-variables experiments in quantum mechanics.
Harvey showed that, despite the lack of overt controversy over
the interpretation of these experiments, the experimental claims
could still be deconstructed by considering hypothetical arguments.
Harvey (1981) also pointed to the key consensus-forming mechanism
being the monopoly of plausibility. As he puts it:
The suggestion is that the winning side does not possess 
truth but rather that it has monopolised plausibility .
(Harvey, 1981: 124).
Plausibility is to be located, not only in the predominant theory 
(the orthodox version of quantum mechanics, in this case), but also 
in such factors as 'access to experimental equipment' and 'the 
support of prestigious scientists'. Also, Harvey showed that the 
plausibility of one particular theoretical hypothesis increased 
once it became possible to mount a feasible experimental test of 
the hypothesis. In other words, Harvey suggests (unlike Pickering) 
that experimental activity, independent of its theoretical credi­
bility, can in its own right act as a significant motor in the 
shift of scientific consensus.
There is one other aspect of Harvey's study which is of 
significance in the context of the present concerns. This is where 
he draws attention to the point that two sides in a controversy do 
not start off with equal amounts of plausibility. This means that
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it is important to look at consensus-forming mechanisms which 
exist prior to the knowledge claim ever being launched. In other 
words, it is not enough to study scientific action after the point 
where the knowledge claim appears, we must also look at pre-existing 
factors. This draws attention again to the importance of historical 
studies with their greater flexibility in the time-span chosen for 
analysis.
Closely linked to the notion of plausibility developed by 
Harvey, and Pickering's notion of interests, is the notion of 
'credibility' developed by Latour and Woolgar (1979) and Law (1980). 
Instead of monopolising their plausibility scientists are seen as 
maximising credibility. Successful knowledge claims are seen to be 
ones which produce credible information, that is information which 
serves others' interests. As this scheme has not been followed 
through in detail for the social construction of a modern piece of 
physical knowleage,it receives only brief mention here. A more 
elaborate discussion is presented in Chapter 10.
One final study, which I wish briefly to consider, is Collins's 
recent (1981b) paper on the gravity-wave episode. The prime 
purpose of this paper was to show that the experimental claim for 
the detection of large fluxes of gravity waves could by assiduous 
sociological work, be deconstructed even at the stage when consensus 
had emerged that the claim was false. However, Collins also eluci­
dates one consensus-forming mechanism. This is in connection with 
the activities of an experimental group who played an important 
part in the demise of the original experimental claim of Weber. 
Collins shows that this group's activities were orientated around 
the purpose of killing off Weber's claim. Their experiment was
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designed with this in mind and this group attached great importance 
to publicly exposing 'mistakes' made by Weber. It seems, as Collins(1981bs48; 
writes, 'as though he [the leader of this group] did not think that 
the simple presentation of results with only a low key comment 
would be sufficient to destroy the credibility of Weber's results.'
This finding seems to be consonant with Wynne's study where he 
also showed that experimental replications were often ritualised 
attempts to discredit the original claim. Collins's stress on 
the public humiliation of Weber which this group sought and the 
ad homines nature of their criticism seems to fit in with the 
findings of the study made of the rejection of parapsychology
(Collins and Pinch, 1979). There it was shown that publicising
and hominem arguments, or what we referred to as 'contingent
forum'-type activity, are key elements in the social construction 
or destruction of knowledge.
In summary then,it can be said that a variety of recent studies 
of modem science and, in particular, physics have started to 
eludicate mechanisms of consensus formation. Such studies seem 
to indicate the importance of knowledge claims falling in with 
pre-existing interests or investments in experimental 
and theoretical techniques. Attention has also been drawn to 
the importance of publicising, manipulation of resources and 
ritualised forms of scientific rationality. Inevitably as these 
case studies have been carried out over the years they have tended 
to focus on different aspects of the processes. As we have seen, 
such case studies have also raised questions; such as the relative 
importance to be attributed to theorising and experimentation in 
closure mechanisms.
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What is needed now is an attempt to bring some of these factors 
together to try and answer these questions within one study. It is 
hoped that the present study will go some way toward this. It 
thus has to be shown why the solar-neutrino field is a suitable 
location for such a study given the above goals.
The Development of Solar-Neutrino Astronomy - A Suitable Case for 
Research Within the Empirical Programme of Relativism
It will be recalled that ideally to meet the methodological 
prescription outlined earlier we require a case in recent physics 
where there has been a controversy over a piece of scientific 
knowledge which has now been settled and where consensus has emerged. 
Unfortunately the social world rarely throws up examples to fit 
the neat categories of methodologists. However, the solar-neutrino 
case has many of the attributes sought after. In order to introduce 
the study I will give a very brief potted history of the field (a 
more detailed history of the origins of solar-neutrino astronomy 
and the scientific issues touched upon in the work as a whole 
are presented in Chapter 2).
Neutrinos are massless, chargeless particles produced as a 
by-product of nuclear reactions. Such etherial particles are very 
difficult to detect, and billions upon billions pass unnoticed through the Earth 
every day. Solar neutrinos are neutrinos produced in the core of 
the Sun as a result of hydrogen fusion. The detection of such 
neutrinos is of great importance to the field of nuclear astrophysics 
because neutrinos, unlike photons (which are produced in the core 
of the Sun approximately one million years before they reach the 
surface) can be observed almost directly they are produced. Because 
neutrinos interact so little with matter they pass straight through
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the Sun. They hence provide direct information on what is happening 
in the Sun's core. Furthermore,the whole discipline of stellar- 
evolution theory and our understanding of the origin of the elements 
is founded upon the assumption that nuclear synthesis occurs in 
stellar interiors - yet this process has never been directly 
observed. The detection of solar neutrinos would provide direct 
evidence of nuclear burning in the Sun.
The possibility of detecting solar neutrinos and thus confirming 
nuclear fusion as the Sun's motor, first became a realistic enter­
prise in 1958, when it was pointed out by nuclear astrophysicists 
that a rare nuclear reaction occurs in the Sun which produces neutrinos 
whose energy spectrum is sufficient for them to be detected on Earth.
It became clear, after detailed theoretical work at the Kellogg 
Radiation Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology 
(Caltech), that a feasible experiment would have to be very large 
and costly. Raymond Davis, Jr., of the Chemistry Department of 
the Brookhaven National Laboratory, had developed a suitable 
experimental technique and, in 1964, he received $600,000 of 
funding from the Atomic Energy Authority (AEC) to build such a 
detector. The detector was based on a large (100,000-gallon) 
tank of perchloroethylene (containing chlorine-37 atoms) with which 
incoming neutrinos would interact to produce radioactive argon-37.
This argon could be extracted from the tank and the amount formed 
measured from its characteristic radioactive decay. By August 1967 
Davis had built a suitable detector in a gold mine in Lead, S. Dakota 
(a mile of rock shields the tank from cosmic rays which can also 
produce argon-37).
When Davis reported his first result in August 1967 there was
28,
immediate consternation amongst the theorists as Davis seemed to 
have reported a result much lower than theoretical predictions 
had indicated. At this stage there was much discussion as to 
whether Davis's experiment was working correctly and whether or not 
his results were in conflict with theory. By 1972, with ever- 
increasing refinements in his experimental technique, Davis reported 
results which were even lower. This led to what seemed to be a 
crisis in nuclear-astrophysical theory with the appearance of 
many non-standard theoretical schemes that were produced in order 
to explain what was now widely referred to as the 'solar-neutrino 
problem'. However, with the problem becoming more serious, nuclear 
astrophysicists began to have more doubts about whether Davis's 
experiment was working correctly. These doubts could only be 
cleared up by exhaustive testing by Davis of his own experimental 
procedures as no other group embarked upon experimental replication 
(apart possibly fron a Russian group who appear still to be con­
structing the necessary apparatus). It was not until 1978 that Davis 
had mostly satisfied his critics and consensus emerged that his 
experimental result was most likely a fact of the natural world. 
However, by this time the gap between theoretical prediction and 
experimental result had again narrowed and arguments were once 
more starting to emerge as to whether or not there was a real 
contradiction between theory and experiment. Finally, in 1978 
new experimental approaches to the detection of solar neutrinos 
were developed.These experiments are expected to cost several 
millions of dollars and construction should be under way in the 
1980's.
Although the title of this thesis refers to the development of
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solar-neutrino astronomy, it can be seen that, as an area of 
astronomy, the field is still in its infancy (especially in comparison 
to other areas of modern astronomy). Throughout the period of interest 
measurements have only been made by one experimental group.
Comparisons between this field and other areas studied by sociologists 
working on the development of scientific specialties are thus 
likely to be misleading (the locus classicus for comparison, the 
field had taken off, would have been, of course, the Edge and Mulkay 
(1976) study of the development of radio a s t r o n o m y . I n  view of 
only one experimental knowledge claim being the centre of attention, 
the area falls naturally within the province of the relativistic 
sociology of science tradition. However, it is hoped that some 
of the material presented in this thesis will be useful to future 
workers in the specialty tradition, especially if the field does 
take off in the 1980's.
The first thing to be said about the solar-neutrino case is 
that it clearly satisfies the methodological criterion, of being 
sufficiently recent - all the major events have occurred in the 
last three decades and most of the significant events in the last 
twenty years. Secondly, and more importantly, it seems that con­
sensus has emerged that Davis's experimental result is a certified 
fact of the natural world. Although one or two scientists still 
have reservations,by and large Davis has convinced his critics.
Thus the case seems suitable for the study of the social processes 
of consensus formation. In addition, it appears that there was a 
controversy over the theoretical consequences of the result when 
it first appeared. This controversy was, it seems, settled in 
1972 with the consensus view being that there was a contradiction
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between theory and experiment. The occurrence of this controversy 
should enable research to be carried out on some of the processes 
of knowledge construction especially in relation to the comparison 
of a theoretical prediction with an experimental result. Further­
more, the reappearance of this controversy in 1978 (when the field 
work was undertaken) means that the methodological bonus mentioned 
earlier (note 26) of carrying out a historical study and a contem­
poraneous study at the same time, is possible for this case.
What is not possible in this study, is the complete delineation 
of the consensus-forming mechanisms in the theoretical arena as, 
thus far, there is no consensus as to what the solution to the solar- 
neutrino problem (if there is such a problem) is. None of the 
proposed theoretical solutions have been widely accepted. This 
means that although data can be obtained on the social deconstruction 
of the standard theory it is not yet possible to make definitive 
statements about the social construction of theoretical knowledge, 
since we do not know yet what the accepted theoretical solution (if 
one is needed) will be. However, the continued use of the standard 
solar theory and rejection of non-standard theories does make it 
possible to comment a little on the social processes of construction 
of the standard theory and the social destruction of the non-standard 
theories.
This case thus seems to be suitable in terms of general criteria 
for the social deconstruction and construction of knowledge which 
were outlined earlier. Furthermore, the case seems to be a 
particularly fruitful one since it involves both experimental and 
theoretical knowledge claims.
There are, however, certain peculiarities presented by this
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case which in some ways make it harder to research and in other ways 
provide unexpected sources of insight. Firstly, on the minus side, 
the social deconstruction of Davis's knowledge claim will be 
especially difficult to achieve. This is largely because Davis's 
experiment, is, thus far, the only one capable of measuring 
the expected neutrino fluxes. Since there are no other experi­
mental groups to report possible disconfirmations of his results, 
it is not possible to makd a study of an experimental controversy 
in the Collins mould. There are no warring factions of experimental 
groups with different interpretations of the experiment as in 
the Weber case. However, as we will see, it will be possible to 
deconstruct Davis's knowledge claim to some extent by the consider­
ation of arguments concerning, in particular, tests of his own 
experimental procedure.
Some compensation for the difficulty in the deconstruction 
of Davis's experimental result has, however, been provided for by un­
expected developments in the arena of solar-neutrino theory.
One of the most fascinating aspects of the theoretical developments 
studied has been the change in magnitude of the theoretical pre­
diction over the years. The various predictions in SNU (Solar 
Neutrino Units) are shown chronologically in Fig. 1.1. It can be 
seen that there was a peak in the prediction around 1964 which 
coincided with the funding of Davis's experiment. Also there was 
a significant drop in the flux around 1968 when Davis's low results 
were first reported. If the view is taken that the theoretical 
prediction itself is socially constructed,then it is possible 
that wider factors than pure theoretical considerations may have 


























is that events in the experimental arena and, in particular, the 
need to find funding for Davis's experiment in 1964 and the 
appearance of his results in summer 1967, are closely connected 
with the predictions at those times. As the possibility of such 
a connection developed during the research, the scope of the invest­
igation was widened to include data on the funding of Davis's 
experiment. Certain key figures in the funding of the experiment 
were located and interviewed.
The especially close links between theory and experiment and, 
in particular, the links between the Caltech group of theorists 
and Davis the experimenter is one of the striking aspects of this 
particular case study. The development of solar-neutrino astronomy 
seems to have been at the same time the development of a special 
relationship between theoreticians and experimenter. These links 
are important,not only for the understanding of the social con­
struction of the theoretical prediction,.but also for understanding 
the reception accorded Davis's result by the theoreticians (in 
other words, part of the social construction of the Davis result).
In view of the importance of the links between theoreticians and 
experimenter, these links are traced from their emergence in 
1958. Thus,the starting point for the historical processes of 
greatest interest to this work is 1958.
The material presented in the various chapters is arranged in 
a broadly chronological manner. This reflects the historical 
orientation of the work. Although, at times, the minudag, of 
historical description might seem rather tedious, the tracing 
of the historical processes is, it seems, in its nature slow and 
painstaking. The processes do not appear suddenly on the canvas 
but emerge slowly over a period of about twenty years. The
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description of the unwinding of the processes is I hope justified 
to some extent by the narrative style which history permits.
Brief Resume of Chapters
Chapter 2 is a naive historical reconstruction of the back­
cloth from which the events described in later chapters emerged.
The history of neutrino-detection physics and the history of 
nuclear astrophysics are outlined - it was from the marriage of 
these two scientific fields that solar-neutrino astronomy emerged.
It is hoped that this chapter is also useful in introducing some 
of the scientific concepts encountered in later chapters.
The detailed description of experimental activity commences 
in Chapter 3. The starting point is 1958 when solar-neutrino 
detection, for the first time, became a feasible enterprise.
The account finishes with the funding of Davis's experiment in 
1964.
Chapter 4 mirrors the time span of Chapter 3 with attention 
being placed on the activities of the theoretical nuclear astro­
physicists. It is shown in detail how these activities and, 
in particular,an accurate prediction of the expected flux of 
neutrinos led to the funding of Davis's experiment.
Chapters 5 and 6 are both short chapters which pursue the 
description of experimental and theoretical activity respectively 
from the moment the experiment was funded until the apparatus was 
ready to make measurements in the summer of 1967. As well as 
details of the construction of the apparatus, the close relationship 
between one Caltech theorist - John Bahcall - and Davis is described. 
It was Bahcall who made most of the detailed predictions for 
Davis's experiment.
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Other methods of solar-neutrino detection, with less sensit­
ivity than the Davis experiment, which were undertaken during 
this period, are also described (Chapter 5).
Chapter 7 is one of the most important sociological chapters 
in the thesis. In Part I,Davis's experimental activities between 
1967 and 1978 are described. The publication of his results and 
the subsequent experimental refinements and tests are outlined. 
Particular attention is focussed on the reception accorded to 
his result by other experimenters and by the theoreticians. It is 
argued that, by 1978, consensus had emerged that Davis's result 
was essentially correct. In Part II, the social deconstruction of 
the facticity of Davis's result is attempted. In particular the 
arguments made by one astrophysicist, that Davis's results were 
an artefact of his chemical procedures, are reviewed. It is 
shown that these arguments, although rejected by nearly everyone 
by 1978, could, nevertheless, be 'rationally' defended. Some of 
the social processes whereby these arguments were defeated are 
discussed.
Chapter 8 is also an important chapter in terms of the 
overall aims of the study. It too has two parts. In Part I, the 
immediate response of the theoreticians to Davis's results is 
outlined. The attempts made by Bahcall to accommodate the result 
within standard theory are described. It is shown that, in the 
aftermath of Davis's results, the theoreticians were in considerable 
disarray with some arguing that there was no conflict between theory 
and experiment and others arguing that there was a serious discrepancy. 
This suggests that 'contradiction' and 'consistency' between theory 
and experiment are socially constructed. In Part II, the remaining
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theoretical developments which take us up to 1978 are described.
By 1970 all the leading theorists were agreed that there was a 
contradiction between theory and experiment. However, by 1976 the 
discrepancy had again narrowed and arguments once more appeared 
as to whether or not theory and experiment were in conflict (the 
analysis of these 1978 arguments is extended in Pinch, 198oa - in 
Appendix II).
As a result of Davis's measurement a number of non-standard 
theoretical proposals have emerged. These are briefly reviewed in 
Chapter 9. Particular attention is focussed on one non-standard 
theory and it is argued that, although universally rejected, this 
approach can be seen to be as scientifically plausible as the 
standard theory. Some of the social processes of rejection of 
this non-standard theory are discussed.
Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter and brings together the 
main sociological findings of the research and compares them with 
other similar work. The social processes of the deconstruction 
and construction of scientific knowledge which have been encountered 
are delineated. An attenpt is made to account for some of these 
social processes within an over-arching explanatory scheme.
Appendix I contains a summary of the main sources of data 
for the study.
Appendix II contains two papers relevant to the study which 
have been presented elsewhere. One paper, published already (Pinch 
1981a), is an account of the contemporaneous negotiations encountered 
in 1978, over which scientific field was most likely to be the culprit 
for Davis's anomalous result. The paper illustrates some of the 
interpretative flexibility which can be recaptured even from
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seemingly solid scientific fields. The other paper (Pinch, 1980a) 
was presented at a conference. This paper examines the contem­
poraneous argument over whether or not there is a contradiction 
between theory and experiment. In other words, it continues the 
analysis developed in Chapter 8. In particular, attention is 
focussed on the use of statistical criteria in the assessment 
of the significance of an experimental result vis-à-vis a 
theoretical prediction. This paper thus extends the process of 
social deconstruction of knowledge into the arena of statistical 
argument.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE
1. A useful review of the origins of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge can be found in Mulkay (1979).
2. For an exposition of many of the relevant arguments and how
they can be addressed, see Collins and Cox (1976).
3. Whether such rules can be successfully applied is another matter.
Since Lakatos thinks it possible that a degenerating research 
programme can always make a come-back at a later stage it
seems difficult to say definitively when it is irrational to 
maintain belief in a research programne (see Lakatos, 1970, 
for more details).
4. With the recent translation of Fleck (1979) it can be seen
that many of Kuhn's ideas were contained in Fleck's own
earlier work.
5. See,in particular his introduction to his collection of essays. 
The Essential Tension (Kuhn, 1977).
6. See Kuhn's 'Postscript - 1969', in Kuhn (1971).
7. See Pinch (1981b) for a detailed review of the influence of
Kuhn on British sociologists of science.
8 . It must be noted, however, that Barnes and Bloor and the
'Edinburgh School' have produced some exemplary historical 
studies. See, for example, Bames and Shapin (1979) .
9. Some of these social processes, as delineated in modem
physics, will be outlined below. In my own research I 
outline the key role played by funding. However, funding 
machinations can be seen as processes which occur within 
scientific institutions. By and large campaigning for funds 
for particular projects in pure physics does not involve 
much overt politicking with factions outside the scientific 
establishment. Clearly, however, the influence on science of 
the general level of funding available is a stage-three 
process. To meet Collins's goal for stage three would involve 
showing how this general funding level influenced the 
content of particular pieces of natural knowledge - and that 
is a very difficult thing to show.
10. The argument here is not one of principle but more a matter 
of which problems are researchable in the context of a study 
of modern physics. The only study which has produced somewhat 
convincing evidence of the influence of wider social and 
political influences is Forman's (1971) study of the development 
Of quantum physics in the Weimar Republic (but see Hendry, 198Q 
for some criticisms) . However, this study is located in a very 
special place and time - a revolution in physics and an era of 
historical upheaval.
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11. The view being argued here is the opposite of the 'Finalisation 
thesis'. In that thesis it is claimed that a 'mature' science 
is more likely to be guided by external factors. For a 
critique of this thesis see R. Johnston, 'Finalization : A New 
Start for Science Policy'. Social Science Information, 15,
1976, 331-6.
12. This position is not a new form of 'internalism'. This is 
because it is granted that social mechanisms and processes 
within science are important. Internalists would claim that 
scientific knowledge was free of even these processes.
The dissolution of the old external/internal dochotomy within 
the new sociology of scientific knowledge is discussed by 
Johnston (1976).
13. The 'fact' might be that such and such a phenomenon does not 
exist - in which case we might talk about the social destruction 
of knowledge rather than social construction (see Collins, 1981b)
14. A similar method (although used for a differing purpose) was 
followed by Mitroff (1974) in his study of moon scientists.
15. The essential historical character of the empirical work
in the new sociology of science has been noted by Martin Rudwick. 
See his review of the conference 'New Perspectives in the 
History and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.' The 4S 
Newsletter (available from the Sociology Department, Texas 
A & M University) Volume 5, No. 2, Spring 1980, p. 43.
Collins's method of chronological cuts is different from most
historical methods in that it is not retrospective. In the
context of doing history for a PhD dissertation, however, it 
is inevitable that some sort of retrospective method is used.
The claim is, however, that retrospection is less subject to 
the normal methodological difficulties when used for events 
which are relatively recent (i.e., within the last two decades).
16. Collins (1981c) argues that it is difficult to tell when
consensus has emerged. Although it is nearly always the case
that the originator and perhaps a few supporters for a rejected 
claim carry on the fight (sometimes until death), a round of 
interviews with those in the field plus knowledgable outsiders 
is usually enough to elucidate which way the fight has gone. 
Perhaps the retrospective bias of the methods advocated here 
is what gives the analyst the advantage in determining when 
consensus has emerged.
17. Of course, there is always the possibility that the historical 
processes of relevance only become visible many years after 
the consensus has emerged. The assumption here is that this
is not the case. The only means of testing this assumption 
is for a future historian to rework the same case and see 
whether the wider purview leads to a new and better explanation 
of the consensus-formation process.
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18. Whether this research location is only suitable for physics 
is an empirical matter. G.D.L. Travis informs me that in 
some areas of modem biology it is hard to say when consensus 
has emerged - if it ever does.
19. The very existence of the contenporaneous studies has made the 
task of historical deconstruction easier for we know which 
types of arguments to look for. Also I am encouraged by the 
existence of some excellent historical studies which also 
seem to achieve the social deconstruction of knowledge (see, 
for example, Shapin, 1979, and,Farley and Geison ,197 4 ).
20. I am thinking here of the work of thë American Institute of 
Physics, Center for History of Physics. Although they have a 
large collection of interviews in their 'Sources for the 
History of Modem Astrophysics' these deal largely with 
events pre-1960.
21. Of course, the availability of correspondence files depends 
on the individual scientists. But as a rule of thumb it is 
easier to get such material after consensus has emerged and 
the scientists consider the issue to be dead. Thus a study 
after the event does have seme advantage here over the 
contemporaneous study.
22. In the present study some interviews with funding officials 
were conducted. It is difficult to see how anything but the 
most rudimentary material on their decisions could be 
gathered in (say) even twenty years time.
23. It was not uncommon in the present study to be told that I was 
very lucky to get copies of correspondence because the 
scientists concerned were thinking of throwing such 'dead' 
material away.
24. Of course, there are many variables to be considered here.
For instance, very few modem scientists leave note books of 
the detail contained in (say) Faraday's notebooks. However, 
such notebooks are perhaps not of so much interest in the 
delineation of social processes because they are limited very 
much to individual thought processes. More of the social 
processes are revealed through correspondence. The increased 
use today of the telephone (and ccxnputer word-processer 
information exchanges) means that interviews are vital in order 
to obtain any data at all on some scientists.
25. Of course, 'more' of anything does not guarantee better history 
unless the correct conceptual problems are addressed!
26. There is one other bonus which this methodology can produce.
It was stressed earlier that one of the core assumptions
of the relativist programme is that knowledge claims are, 
in principle, révisable. This leaves open the possibility 
that what was consensual at one time may, at another time, 
become contentious. If the researcher is lucky (or opportunistic)
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enough, he/she may find contemporaneously with his/her
historical study, that knowledge, which had at one stage 
been consensual, is once more becoming controversial and that 
interpretative flexibility is again reappearing. In other 
words, two studies can in effect be carried out at the same 
time - the historical study of the previous consensus forming 
mechanisms and social deconstruction of the original claim, 
and the contemporaneous study of the ongoing controversy.
In such a case,the task of social deconstruction is made 
much easier. Furthermore the sociologist ought ideally to 
be able to use his/her historical study of the consensus- 
forming mechanisms to predict how and when consensus will 
reappear. As we shall see, such a methodological bonus 
was obtained in the current research (this bonus was not 
anticipated when the study was launched).
27. There is no necessary order in which these two tasks should
be carried out, as long as they are both carried out somewhere 
in the analysis. In the present work material relevant 
to the second task is presented first in order to produce 
a 'narrative' account.
28. It is always dangerous labelling anything as ethnomethodological 
because of the 'more holy (i.e. ethno) than thou syndrome'. 
Thus I suspect that Garfinkel would not class Woolgar's (1976) 
study as ethnomethodological, or that neither would Woolgar 
today. By using the label I mean to convey the notion
that, for the ethnomethodologists, activity is constituted 
in local settings and hence is an ongoing accomplishment.
Hence the empirical focus of their work is on the minutae of 
the 'talk' and other activities in the local setting.
29. The focus in discourse analysis as practiced by Mulkay and
Gilbert seems to be on accounts per se. These accounts are 
not meant to tell us anything about the real processes of
consensus formation. It so happens that, as Mulkay and
Gilbert's sample frame seems to have been constructed with 
the aims of carrying out the more traditional research on
a scientific controversy, their data could perhaps be re­
interpreted for the purposes of identifying social processes 
of consensus. It is puzzling why Mulkay and Gilbert have 
collected data around the focus of a controversy since, for 
the purposes of discourse analysis, it seems that any random 
interviews with scientists would have done.
The interview data in the controversy-type study and in the 
discourse-analysis-type study have very different methodological 
statuses. In the controversy-type study the sociologist 
does interpretative work whereby he imputes that the piece 
of interview data (interpreted in a particular way) is 
ultimately a reflection of scientific action. In discourse 
analysis the interview material is merely a resource from 
which a whole host of possible interpretations are to be 
drawn.
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30. Of course, the authors of the above studies would not be 
interested in such social mechanisms, anyway. The account 
of such mechanisms is, at best, yet another 'reading* or 
an example of sociologists''talk'. See, for instance,
Woolgar (1981).
31. To put it at its starkest: Woolgar's (1976) description of 
the discovery of pulsars would seem, in essence, also to 
apply to the discovery of N-rays. We cannot learn from such 
studies why pulsars are facts of the natural world and N-rays 
are not.
32. The intention is not to be parochial with regard to physics 
just for the sake of it. It so happens that most of the 
studies of interest have been of physics and by making comparisons 
between such studies it is to be hoped that we can really
learn something about the development of one area of science.
33. See, for example, MacKenzie (1978), Barnes and Mackenzie 
(1979) and Shapin (1979). For more discussion of 'interests', 
see Chapter 10.
34. The present research differs from the research on specialties 
in that it does not make the firm distinction between the 
social and cognitive growth of science which seems to be 




EARLY HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Solar-neutrino astronomy provides the meeting place for two 
specialist fields of science - neutrino-detection physics and 
nuclear astrophysics. The first mentioned area, neutrino-detection 
physics, is, as its name suggests, largely an experimental field. 
Nuclear astrophysics, on the other hand, although not without its 
own experimental component, is dominated by theoretical concerns.
In this chapter a brief historical outline of the two areas is 
presented. This historical account will form a helpful background 
in preparation for the material of later chapters. It will also 
serve as a useful guide to the central technical issues in the field.
The reconstruction presented in this chapter is largely a naive 
descriptive history, based mainly on scientists' own accounts.
That is to say most scientists working in the area of solar-neutrino 
astronomy would probably have few quarrels with this reconstruction. 
No claim is made to cover the subject matter exhaustively; neither 
is it claimed that the pitfalls of internalist historiography have 
been avoided.^ The two areas are taken in turn.
NEUTRINO-DETECTION PHYSICS
The neutrino was first postulated by Pauli, in 1930, as a
hypothetical particle needed to maintain energy and momentum
2conservation in nuclear beta-decay. Such decays are characterised 
by one nucleus spontaneously changing into another one which 
differs by one unit of electric charge. Either an electron or 
positive electron (positron) is emitted in the decay. Pauli 
postulated that every emission of an electron or positron was 
accompanied by the emission of a massless chargeless particle which
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carried off the excess energy and momentum. Fermi, in 1933, named 
this particle the neutrino (little neutral one), and developed a 
theory of beta-decay to account for its existence.
Symbolically,nuclear beta-decay can be described by the equation
[a,z] [a , Z ± Ij + B + V
where A is the number of neutrons plus protons in the nucleus, Z is 
the number of protons in the nucleus, and 3 and v refer, respectively, 
to the emitted electron and neutrino. An example of such a 
reaction is the decay of carbon eleven into boron eleven with the 
emission of a positive electron and a neutrino:
^ + e^ + V
The neutrino is unique amongst nuclear particles in that, not 
only is it massless (although claims have been made that it has
a small finite mass) and chargeless, but also it only interacts
via the weak . interaction (onê  of the four fundamental forces of 
Nature). This means that it hardly interacts with matter at all and 
hence is very difficult to detect. It has been estimated that a 
neutrino will on the average pass undeviated through 20 million, 
million miles of lead before it takes part in a reaction.
For a long time the main evidence for the existence of the 
neutrino was circumstantial. The neutrino hypothesis was consistent 
with all the available experimental evidence obtained in beta-decay 
measurements (such as those made on the recoil momentum of the 
nucleus - see below). Its existence was also explained adequately 
by Fermi theory. However, it was still possible that some other 
unknown systematic effect accounted for all the experimental 
evidence. As Crane puts it in a highly influential review published 
in 1948:
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All of the evidence about the neutrino is, as already pointed 
out, indirect in character, since neutrinos have not yet 
been caught after leaving the nucleus (Crane, 1948: 280).
Most of the experimental evidence for the existence of the neutrino 
at this time came from 'recoil' experiments. These were experiments 
in which the momentum of the nucleus undergoing beta-decay was 
measured. The results indicated that the excess momentum must be 
taken off in discrete amounts. However, in a way such experiments 
begged the question because they took the assumption of energy 
conservation, and therefore momentum conservation, for granted.
If such conservation laws no longer held then there would be no 
need to postulate an unobservable particle to explain the dis­
crepancy in energy and momentum. As Crane commented:
...of all the pieces of evidence the measurement of the recoil 
of the nucleus seems to be the most appealing, at least 
to our pictorial senses. It can, of course, be argued on 
very general grounds that, if energy is not conserved between 
the nucleus and the electron, momentum should not be expected 
to be conserved either; and in consequence of this it has 
often been remarked that the recoil experiments add nothing 
that is really new to our knowledge. (Crane, 1948: 280).
More convincing evidence for the existence of the neutrino 
would be provided by its detection independent from the beta-decay 
process in which it was produced. But, given that the neutrino 
only interacted weakly with matter, such evidence seemed unlikely 
to be forthcoming. To most scientists at the time it seemed 
improbable that a particle thought to have zero mass and zero charge 
would ever be detected.
Inverse Beta-Decay
There is, however, one reaction which, in principle, a neutrino 
can undergo. This is inverse beta-decay - a process which is 
simply the reverse of the one whereby the neutrino is produced. 
According to Fermi theory there is a finite probability that a
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neutrino can interact with a nucleus such as boron eleven, for example, 
and produce carbon eleven. In this case an electron would also
have to be produced to maintain charge conservation:
_11 _11 V + B -> C + e
Theorists such as Hans Bethe had considered using inverse beta-
decay to detect neutrinos but their calculations indicated the
probabilities of such reactions occurring to be too low to mount
4a feasible detection experiment. As Bethe wrote in 1936:
It is indeed very unfortunate that the probability of the 
disintegration of nuclei by neutrinos is so unobservably 
small, because this disintegration is the only action of 
free neutrinos which can be predicted with certainty.
Alvarez and Pontecorvo - The Chlorine-Argon Technique
Some experimentalists, however, thought it was worthwhile taking 
up the challenge of trying to observe the 'unobservable'. Inde­
pendently, and at about the same time, the Italian-Soviet physicist 
Bruno Pontecorvo (1946), working at the Chalk River Laboratory 
in Canada, and the American physicist Luis Alvarez(1949), of the 
Lawrence Berkeley Radiation Laboratory, outlined a means of detecting
neutrinos by the observation of inverse beta-decay. As this detection
process was to become the basis for Ray Davis's solar-neutrino 
detector, it will be discussed here in some detail.
The reaction Pontecorvo and Alvarez proposed to use was the 
interaction of neutrinos with the 24.6% abundant isotope of 
chlorine, chlorine thirty-seven, to produce the radioactive
isotope of argon, argon thirty-seven:
^  0-.37 , 3 7
V + Cl -> Ar + e
The advantage of using this reaction is that argon is a rare gas
and hence is chemically inert, which facilitates its separation
from the chlorine. As argon thirty-seven is radioactive,the amount
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formed can be estimated by counting the number of decays. The 
, 37Ar decay is of a special type in which it captures its own K-shell 
electron. The emitted electron, known as an Auger electron, has a 
very short range which enables it to be easily distinguised from 
background events in a Geiger counter. Calculations made by
37Pontecorvo and Alvarez indicated that the probability of the Cl 
inverse beta-decay occurring was very small. However, they thought 
an experiment might be feasible if a very large amount of chlorine 
was irradiated with a large flux of neutrinos.
Alvarez, in particular, was aware of the possibilities in­
herent in rare-gas chemistry. He had used similar techniques to 
those which he was now proposing in his war-time work on the 
collection and purification of a radioactive isotope of krypton 
and in his later work on the identification of the isotope, 
nitrogen seventeen.^ The importance of his war work in leading 
him to develop the chlorine-argon radiochemical neutrino detection 
process was stressed to me by Alvarez during interview. As this
«.Ainformation has just be^declassified,it is worth quoting at some
length what Alvarez had to say on the topic:
The question was posed to me by General Groves who ran 
Manhattan District ....'You know we don't know whether the 
Germans have a reactor or not, can you think of some way 
to find out if they have?' So I thought about it for a few 
days and concluded that there was a krypton radio-isotope 
that is emitted frcm reactors. It comes out of the smoke­
stack, would get mixed with the air and had a short enough 
life time. So if you flew around over Germany in an airplane 
that had a concentrator for krypton you could detect this 
radioactivity. And so the General gave me a carte blanche 
to get this thing built....You flew over Germany in a light 
bomber. It brought in the air; the air went through active 
charcoal that was cooled to a temperature that wouldn't 
soak up the oxygen and nitrogen, but would get all the krypton 
which has a much higher boiling point...So when you get home 
you...warmed that up, and then you got off the krypton, and 
then you could purify the krypton...We didn't find any over 
Germany; they didn't have a reactor.
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The radiochemical method of detecting neutrinos using chlorine
37thirty-seven bears close parallel to this. In this case the Ar
(rather than krypton) is purged from a large tank containing the
chlorine target (equivalent to the air over Germany) by sweeping
with helium gas. The gases are then passed over active charcoal
cooled to a temperature where the argon condenses out. Upon heating,
37the concentrated Ar comes off and is then purified before being 
detected by its radioactive decay (it has a half-life of 35 days).
By this means, a tiny amount of rare gas can be separated from an 
enormous volume of liquid. It is interesting that the roots of the 
neutrino-detection process which was to form the basis of Davis's 
solar-neutrino detector should lie in the war effort. In this 
respect, solar-neutrino astronomy is similar to that far better known 
scientific 'spin-off from the war - radio astronomy.
37The proposed detector was to be based on a large Cl target.
Alvarez first considered using salt water which would provide
the necessary Cl^^ in the form of sodium chloride.^ In order to
obtain a sufficient volume the ocean itself would have to be the
target and the source of neutrinos would be the nuclear processes
in the Sun. Alvarez went as far as to contact the Dow Chemical
Company, who were, at the time, processing considerable amounts
of sea water to produce commercial supplies of bromine and magnesium.
37The idea was to search for Ar during this processing. $100,000 
of facilities for such an experiment were even offered by Dow, but 
Alvarez did not take this up because calculations indicated that 
natural radioactivity in the sea would 'swamp' any likely signal 
from neutrinos.
Eventually Alvarez, like Pontecorvo before him, considered that
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a large tank of carbon tetrachloride, CCl^ - better known as cleaning
fluid - would make the most suitable detector. The cleaning fluid
had the advantage of being fairly cheap and was also rich in
37chloride, and hence Cl . The exact amount of target material
needed depended on the size of the cross-section for the interaction
37of a neutrino with Cl . There seems to have been some slight 
ambiguity as to what the size of this cross-section was and 
Pontecorvo used one value and Alvarez-another.^ According to 
Pontecorvo a cubic metre of cleaning fluid would be sufficient, 
whilst Alvarez's calculations indicated that a tank-car-sized 
amount (about 40 metric tons) would be needed.
Although both Pontecorvo and Alvarez considered the neutrinos 
produced in the core of the Sun by hydrogen fusion as a possible 
source for such an experiment, both rejected the possibility as 
it was considered that the flux was likely to be too weak and the 
energies of the neutrinos were in general not high enough. The 
most promising source was thought to be a nuclear reactor. However, 
there was one possible difficulty inherent in the use of a nuclear 
reactor as a source. It produced antineutrinos rather than 
neutrinos. The chlorine-argon reaction is the inverse of a 
neutrino producing reaction and hence strictly needs neutrinos 
rather than antineutrinos to trigger it.
The antineutrino, v, is the anti-particle of the neutrino.
Antineutrinos are emitted in a beta-decay in which a negative 
electron is also emitted. Neutrinos, on the other hand, are 
produced in association with positrons. As both the neutrino 
and antineutrino were thought to have the same zero mass, spin 
one-half and zero charge, it was hard to see in what physical
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way they differed. Indeed, for most purposes, the formal difference 
was ignored and both were frequently referred to as 'neutrinos' (as 
was done earlier in this chapter when the concept of beta-decay 
was introduced). The formal equivalence of neutrinos and anti­
neutrinos had been postulated by Majorana, as a modification to
Fermi theory. There was also an important experiment by Fireman
0
which supported Majorana. Thus it seemed, at the time, that there 
was a good possibility that the chlorine-argon process would be 
triggered by the antineutrinos produced by a nuclear reactor 
and, further, that such an experiment could be used to confirm 
Majorana's theory. That is it could confirm that there was no 
physical difference between the neutrino and antineutrino. This 
aspect of the proposed experiment was stressed by Alvarez in 
particular.
Pontecorvo, having first proposed such a detector during a
lecture at the Chalk River Laboratory, did not attempt a
detailed investigation of the experimental feasibility of
bringing it to fruition (although colleagues of his at Chalk River
may have tried some small-scale experiments using the Chalk River 
9nuclear pile). Alvarez's proposal was, on the other hand, 
much more detailed and was published as a University of California 
Radiation Laboratory Report (it remained classified for many years). 
As can be seen from Alvarez's interaction with the Dow Chemical 
Company, he was interested in following the proposal through with 
a view to building a working detector.
Once Alvarez had decided that a tank of cleaning fluid provided 
the most suitable target and that the best source of neutrinos 
was a nuclear reactor, he contacted a colleague at the Atomic Energy
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Commission with responsibility for the design of a new nuclear
reactor at Savannah River. This reactor was to produce tritium
for the hydrogen bomb. He persuaded his colleague to include in
the design an underground vault suitable for housing such an
experiment. This plan was, however, to be short-lived. Alvarez
became aware of new measurements made on the cosmic-ray background
underground.^^ These showed that the background did not fall off
underground as previously expected. It seemed that cosmic-ray
muons had much greater penetrability than had been previously
estimated. This meant that, at the depth at which Alvarez planned
to perform the experiment, there would be too many cosmic-ray
induced argon-37 transitions for neutrino events to show up (cosmic-
ray muons produce proton secondaries which trigger the detector
37 37via the reaction Cl + p ->■ Ar + n) . With this new information, 
Alvarez abandoned the project and told his friend at the AEC to 
forget the plans for the extra underground chamber at Savannah 
River. However, it seems the new information on cosmic-ray 
backgrounds came too late to be included in Alvarez's written 
proposal for such an experiment. The proposal was never amended, 
and, as we shall see, the result was that Ray Davis went ahead and 
built such a detector unaware of why Alvarez had himself given up 
any such hopes. By the time Davis became involved, Alvarez's 
interest had lapsed and he was pursuing his career in particle 
physics.
The Reines and Cowan Experiment
The next important step in the field of neutrino detection 
was taken by Frederick Reines and Clyde Cowan of the University of 
California, Los Alamos Laboratory. They too saw the need to find
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evidence of the neutrino's existence at a location different from
the source of the beta-decay. The method they devised was
simply to scale up the liquid scintillator detectors that were
increasingly a part of the nuclear and particle physicist's range
12of detection techniques. Scintillator fluid usually consisted
of a combination of liquid hydrocarbons which would produce a 
burst of light when irradiated by gamma radiation. In combination 
with an array of photomultiplier tubes, which detected the light, 
it provided a very sensitive detector of nuclear processes.
The reaction with which Reines and Cowan planned to observed 
the neutrino was the inverse beta-decay process produced by the 
interaction of a neutrino (actually an antineutrino) with a 
proton:
The significance of this reaction for neutrino detection was that 
both decay products, the positron and the neutron could be observed. 
The positron is soon annihilated after production and produces a 
burst of gamma radiation which can be detected by the scintillator. 
The neutron slows down and then is captured by cadmium dissolved 
in the detector, again with a resulting burst of detectable gamma 
radiation. The two bursts of radiation happen one after the other at 
a fixed interval and the signal produced (known in the jargon as 
'the signature') is referred to as a delayed-coincidence event.
The occurrence of the two events one after the other with a fixed 
delay signifies the arrival of a neutrino. Because two events 
are being detected in sequence it is much less likely that the 
cosmic-ray background will produce a spurious signal. The proton 
target was provided by the hydrocarbons of the scintillator. Thus
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the detector and target were combined into one and the same piece 
of apparatus.
The main novelty of the Reines-Cowan plan to detect neutrinos 
was the sheer size of the detector. Although modest by present- 
day standards, there were worries at the time that the ninety 
photomultiplier tubes needed would exhaust the available supplies. 
Overall it was planned to use 75 gallons of scintillator solution.
After first exploring the possibility of using an atomic bomb 
as a neutrino source. Reines and Cowan eventually took their 
experiment to the Hanford nuclear reactor. They made some initial 
measurements in the spring of 1953 but were discouraged by an 
unexpectedly large background. This was none other than the cosmic- 
ray background which Alvarez had predicted would make the success 
of such an experiment very unlikely. However, careful analysis of 
their experimental data back at Los Alamos gave evidence of a hint 
of a neutrino-induced signal, and Reines and Cowan were able to
14publish a paper claiming the first detection of the free neutrino
(actually the antineutrino). They reported a cross-section of 
-44 2(12 ± 6) X 10 cm which agreed well with beta-decay theory.
In order to verify their observations. Reines and Cowan 
improved on the sensitivity of their experimental apparatus. They 
did this by the separation of the target material from the 
scintillator. This meant that spatial coincidence, as well as 
delayed-temporal coincidence, would be the hallmark of the neutrino's 
presence. Using a detector consisting of a 'club sandwich' of target 
material (water with cadmium dissolved in it) and scintillator.
Reines and Cowan were able to provide definitive evidence of the 
neutrino's existence The reactor they used was at the
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Savannah river nuclear pile - the same source of neutrinos which 
Alvarez had earlier planned to use in his experiment. The in­
herent difficulties of neutrino detection are illustrated by this
13 - -2 -1experiment. Despite the reactor producing a flux of 10 v cm sec , 
Reines and Cowan on average only detected 3 neutrino events/hour 
and needed to run their experiment in all for a period of 2085 
hours:
Although, as we have seen, Alvarez never carried out his 
proposed experiment, at the same time as Reines and Cowan were 
confirming their observations at the P-reactor at Savannah River, 
a chlorine-argon experiment based on Alvarez's ideas was being 
carried out at the R-reactor. This experiment was operated by 
Ray Davis of the Brookhaven National Laboratory. It is he who 
is the pioneer of solar-neutrino astronomy.
Davis - The Early Brookhaven Experiments
Davis's interest in neutrinos had been provoked earlier, in 
1949, when he had read the above-mentioned review by Crane. He 
had commenced work on a series of the 'recoil experiments'^^.
Having confirmed the existence of the neutrino by this indirect 
method he decided, as Crane, Pontecorvo, Alvarez and Reines had 
before him, that the next step was to attempt to detect neutrinos 
separate from their source of production. He had read the earlier 
proposals of Pontecorvo and Alvarez, and, being trained as a 
c h e m i s t , h e  found the radiochemical-detection technique very 
appealing. Also, as he worked at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
with its emphasis on nuclear and particle physics (the first nuclear 
reactor for research purposes and the first high-energy accelerator 
built (the Cosmotron) were both coming into operation at BNL at
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about this time), Davis, with the encouragement of his department 
chairman, Dick Dodson, was looking for a way of making his 
chemical expertise relevant to nuclear problems. The detection 
of the neutrino by radiochemical methods seemed to offer an 
appropriate challenge.
With this project in mind Davis and a colleague at BNL,
Seymour Katcoff, in 1954, investigated the feasibility of several 
inverse beta-decay processes upon which a radiochemical neutrino 
detector could be based. They found that the most favourable reaction, 
both in terms of the chemistry and the cross-section, was indeed 
the chlorine-argon reaction suggested earlier by Pontecorvo and 
Alvarez. Thus, five years after Alvarez had completed his 
proposal, Davis started planning how to construct a detector based 
on this reaction (he did this without consulting Alvarez with whom 
he had no formal contact until a decade later).
Davis decided that the only feasible source of neutrinos for 
the experiment were those produced by a nuclear reactor. And he 
did not have tq go far to find such a reactor since there was one 
at Brookhaven. However, such a reactor would produce antineutrinos 
rather than neutrinos so unless the two particles were identical 
Davis would not expect to see anything . The first working experi­
ment consisted of a fifty-five-gallon tank of carbon tetrachloride. 
This small-scale experiment indicated the feasibility of the
project and was also used to set an upper limit on the neutrino
-42 2cross-section (a value of <2 x 10 cm as opposed to a theoretical 
-45 2value of 10 cm - calculated with the assumption of neutrino- 
antineutrino equivalence). It was already clear that the large 
cosmic-ray background which Alvarez had forecast would determine
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the ultimate sensitivity of the experiment. Davis attempted to 
measure the likely effect of this background by exposing his tank 
at various altitudes.
Davis next built a 1,000-gallon tank, which he again tested 
at the Brookhaven reactor. However, he was not able to set a much 
better upper limit on the neutrino cross-section as he continued to 
encounter a large cosmic-ray background. Clearly, scaling-up the 
size of the experiment alone would not solve the problem, because 
a larger tank, although capable of detecting more neutrino events, 
would also detect more cosmic-ray induced events.
It did not seem that the experiment in its present form and 
with this source of neutrinos would be sensitive enough. However, 
there was another type of measurement for which the apparatus 
could be used. This was to set an upper limit on the flux of 
neutrinos coming frcm the Sun. The possibility of using solar 
neutrinos as a source, had, as we noted above, been considered 
by Pontecorvo and Alvarez, who rejected the possibility because 
it seemed the flux would be too small. Also, Crane (1948) in 
his well-known review paper, had considered solar neutrinos as 
a means of setting an upper limit on the neutrino cross-section.
If a significant number of solar neutrinos were captured by 
the material of the Earth then the planet would heat up beyond 
its present temperature. By assuming the magnitude of the 
neutrino flux from the Sin, and knowing the present temperature 
of the Earth, Crane was able to set an upper limit on the neutrino 
cross-section. What Davis in effect did was to turn this argument 
on its head. By assuming a value for the cross-section (derived 
from theory), he used his experiment to set an upper limit on the
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neutrino flux from the Sun. He did this by measuring the neutrino
flux when his tank was buried under 19 feet of earth - a sufficient
depth to shield out a large component of the cosmic-ray flux.
With the assumption that the Sun was producing neutrinos by the
CN-cycle (one of the cycles of hydrogen buring in the Sun - see
14below for details)^ he set an upper limit of <1 x 10 neutrinos 
-2 -1cm sec (40,000 SNU in today's units - 1 SNU (Solar Neutrino
— 36 —1 — 1Unit) is equivalent to 10 captures sec target atom ). This
was not a terribly useful result as the theoretical flux of solar
neutrinos was expected to be many orders of magnitude less than
lO — 2 — 1this (6 X 10 neutrinos cm sec or 24 SNU) . But nevertheless
this measurement represented the first result of solar-neutrino
detection astronomy.
Davis published these early results in 1955, in Physical Review.
Perhaps the difficulties he faced in his attempts to detect neutrinos
can be seen in the wry comment which his paper evoked from one of
19the reviewers, who wrote:
...Any experiment such as this, which does not have the 
requisite sensitivity, really has no bearing on the question 
of the existence of neutrinos. To illustrate my point, 
one would not write a scientific paper describing an 
experiment in which an experimenter stood on a mountain 
and reached for the moon, and concluded that the moon was
more than eight feet frcan the top of the mountain!
As if the difficulties Davis was encountering with the cosmic-
ray background were not enough, there was always the possibility
that, in the end, he would not see anything because his detector
might not be sensitive to the antineutrinos produced by nuclear
reactors. This possibility had become more likely in 1952, with
the collapse of the earlier experimental evidence which supported
Marjorana's theory of the physical similarity of the neutrino and
18
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a n t i n e u t r i n o . I n  addition,Reines and Cowan had by this stage 
already reported their tentative results. It thus seemed unlikely 
that Davis would be the first to detect free neutrinos, if he 
detected them at all.
The Savannah River Experiment
In order to achieve better sensitivity Davis needed to find a 
stronger source of neutrinos and a location which would provide 
more cosmic-ray shielding. Both these assets were to be found at 
the Savannah River nuclear pile with its powerful reactors and 
massive concrete shielding. Also this was where Reines and Cowan 
were in the process of setting up their detector. As there were 
two suitable reactors at Savannah River, it made sense for Davis 
to continue his project by joining Reines and Cowan.
There was an additional reason for Davis to move to the same 
location as Reines and Cowan. If Davis's detector turned out not 
to be sensitive to reactor neutrinos (antineutrinos) and Reines 
continued to get a positive result then at least Davis could use 
the Reines result to provide a definitive interpretation of his 
own experiment. A negative result with Davis's detector could 
mean one of two things; either Fermi theory was incorrect and 
there were no neutrinos or antineutrinos to detect, or else the 
antineutrino and the neutrino were different. To choose between 
these possibilities required a detection process that was known 
to be sensitive to antineutrinos - and Reines and Cowan had such 
a process. If Reines and Cowan got a positive result, then Fermi 
theory was correct and Davis's negative result would mean that the 
neutrino and antineutrino were indeed different. Thus, even if 
Davis detected nothing, his experiment would serve some purpose.
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Thus it came about that, in 1955, the two main neutrino-detection ex­
perimenters (Reines and Davis)were both to be found at the Savannah 
River nuclear pile, both attempting to provide the first definitive 
evidence for the existence of the neutrino.
Davis's apparatus was essentially the same as he had used 
at Brookhaven - the 1,000 gallons of target material being contained 
in two 500-gallon tanks of carbon tetrachloride. It soon became 
clear that he was not detecting a significant flux of neutrinos.
At the same time,Reines and Cowan obtained their confirmatory
positive result. However, since Davis's new upper limit for the
-45 2neutrino cross-section (0.9 x 10 cm ) was lower than that
reported by Reines and Cowan it did seem that Davis had provided
definitive evidence that the neutrino and antineutrino were
21physically different. Thus, Davis had a small consolation for
his efforts.
Although it now seemed unlikely that the neutrino and anti­
neutrino were identical, events in nuclear physics in 1957 placed 
a fresh emphasis upon finding out how exactly they differed. This 
new significance for Davis's experiment arose from the discovery of 
the non-conservation of parity. In order to explain the breakdown
of parity, Lee and Yang had introduced their two-component theory 
22of the neutrino . According to this, the neutrino had an 
opposite helical spin from the antineutrino. Not all theorists 
were happy with the two-component theory and some favoured a 
four-component theory in which parity was still conserved. (In
23this theory each neutrino has a mixture of the two types of spin).
Indeed there was some (short-lived) experimental evidence in favour
24of the four-component theory. One consequence of the four-component
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theory was that there might be a measurable antineutrino cross-
section for the inverse beta-decay Davis used. The exact value
of this cross "section would depend on how the two spins were mixed.
Thus Davis's detector might serve to test the four-component theory
if he could search for an even smaller upper limit on the
25cross-section than he had set already. Pauli, who had developed
a four-component theory himself, wrote to Davis and suggested
that this new experiment might settle the issue.
An increase in size to 3,000 gallons could conveniently be
carried out at Savannah River and in the spring of 1958 Davis, with
the assistance of a chemical engineer, Don Harmer, commenced new
measurements. He was able to show that the antineutrino cross-
-45 2section must be less than 0.25 x lO cm , a factor of twenty 
below the cross-section calculated with the assumption that the 
neutrino and antineutrino were i d e n t i c a l . I t  thus seemed very 
unlikely that the four-component theory was correct.
This was another small success for Davis, but again he had 
not found a positive result. As before, he had managed to show 
that a theory of doubtful plausibility was incorrect. However, 
by this stage an event had occurred in another field, which enabled 
Davis to abandon his largely fruitless reactor-neutrino detection 
programme.
The event that was to prove so significant for Davis and
heralded the dawn of solar-neutrino astonomy occurred at a meeting
of the American Physical Society in early 1958. Two nuclear physicists
reported new measurements of a nuclear-physics cross-section. Their
measurements indicated a result that was of the order of a thousand
27times greater than expected. In order to see the relevance of this
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to Davis's experiments we will have to trace briefly developments 
in nuclear astrophysics - the other branch of science from which 
solar-neutrino astronomy emerged.
NUCLEAR ASTROPHYSICS
The interdisciplinary field of nuclear astrophysics,which 
combined the concerns of nuclear physics and astronomy, was born 
out of the attempt to find an energy source in the Sun sufficient 
to maintain its luminosity for a period at least equivalent to 
the age of the Earth. At the turn of the century it had been shown 
by Helmholtz and Kelvin that release of gravitational potential 
energy would provide some tens of millions of years of solar 
luminosity, but this fell well below the age of many of the Earth's 
rocks as determined by geologists. It was then suggested that the 
Sun derived its energy from the disintegration of heavy elements 
such as uranium and thorium, but this theory, in turn,seemed 
unlikely when it was found that the Sun consisted mainly of 
hydrogen. It was Eddington and Jeans who, in the early 1920's, 
were the first to suggest what is now accepted as the solution to 
the problem. The source of solar energy, according to them, must 
lie in the conversion of mass into energy, possibly through the 
transformation of hydrogen into heavier elements.
It was known from Aston's mass spectrographic work that the 
fusion of four hydrogen atoms to make one helium atom could release 
a considerable amount of energy. However, there was some doubt 
as to whether temperatures in the Sun were hot enough to produce 
a sufficiently fast reaction rate. The situation was clarified 
by Atkinson and Houterman, in 1928, when they showed that there
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was a small, but finite, probability of charged particles pene­
trating Coulomb potential barriers (the force wall surrounding a 
nucleus due to its charge). This meant that the nuclear reactions 
could proceed at stellar temperatures. The specific nuclear 
reactions were not identified until the late 1930's, by which time 
nuclear physics had become an established discipline in its own 
right.
The use of nuclear physics to explain astrophysical phenomena, 
such as the process of energy production in the Sun, forms the
basis of nuclear astrophysics. The aim is to provide an under­
standing of astronomy, not with the use of telescopes, but by the
study of nuclear reactions . As nuclear processes are thought to
be the energy sources of stars, and the elements and their isotopes 
are created in stellar-nuclear reactions, nuclear astrophysics has 
a profound place in physics, chemistry and astronomy.
The Role Played by Kellogg
One of the centres for nuclear physics which has been parti­
cularly influential in the development of nuclear astrophysics 
has been the Kellogg Radiation Laboratory of the California
Institute of Technology (Caltech). This laboratory was founded
28by Robert Millikan with the support of W.K. Kellogg in 1931.
The nearby Mount Wilson telescope, which produced many of the key 
astronomical observations of the period, made this a particularly 
suitable location for the study of nuclear astrophysics. Many 
investigations of nuclear reactions relevant to stars and, in 
particular, the determination of nuclear cross-sections for such 
reactions, have been carried out at Kellogg.
The start of Kellogg's involvement in nuclear astrophysics
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was the discovery of radiative capture by Lauritsen and Crane in 
1934. They found that, after a carbon target had been bombarded 
with protons, there Was a ten-minute period of radioactivity.
This was the first time a radioactive material had been made arti­
ficially by bombarding a substance with particles. The radiative
capture reaction thought to occur was:
^12 13C + p N + Y
Subsequent work at Kellogg and elsewhere showed that radiative
29capture of protons occurred for many other target nuclei. The 
significance of this discovery for nuclear astrophysics was that 
it led Bethe (1939) to postulate one of the series of reactions 
whereby nuclear fusion in the Sun and other stars could occur.
He suggested that hydrogen was converted into helium by a cycle 
of catalytic reactions (the CN-cycle) involving isotopes of 
carbon and nitrogen which underwent radiative capture. The 
first reaction of the cycle was the radiative capture of a proton 
by carbon twelve. This was followed by similar captures by 
carbon thirteen and nitrogen fourteen. Subsequently, it has been 
shown that certain oxygen isotopes can also play a (small) role 
in the cycle. The complete cycle of reactions of what has become 
known as the CNO-cycle is shown in Fig. 2.1.
By means of the CNO-cycle hydrogen (protons) is converted 
into helium (alpha particles) with the various isotopes of 
carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen acting as catalysts and not themselves 
being consumed in the cycle. The net result can be represented
symbolically by the simple formula:
1 4 +4H He + 2e + 2v
In addition to this cycle of reactions, Bethe and Critchfield (1938)
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Fig. 2.1. The CNO Cycle
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Fig. 2.2 The Proton-Proton Chain
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suggested another series of reactions by which hydrogen could be 
converted into helium. This series was named the proton-proton 
(pp)-chain. The full proton-proton chain is shown in Fig. 2.2.
The basic reaction is the combination of two protons 
to form deuterium. Deuterium,in turn,combines with
hydrogen to form helium three. The helium three is consumed in 
one of two ways. Either two helium three atoms combine together 
to form helium four directly, or helium three combines with 
helium four to form beryllium seven. Beryllium seven can be 
consumed by either proton or electron capture. If beryllium 
seven electron-captures it forms lithium seven which, in turn, 
combines with a proton to form helium four. If beryllium seven 
proton-captures it forms boron eight. This decays into beryllium 
eight which is unstable and forms helium four.
As in the CNO-cycle, the net result of the proton-proton 
chain is the conversion of hydrogen to helium four. Which of the 
competing branches of the proton-proton chain predominates depends 
on the details of the cross-sections and reaction rates for.the 
various reactions.
Of these two processes, it was thought at the time they were 
proposed, that the CNO-cycle was dominant in the Sun and that the 
pp-chain was more important in cooler stars. It has subsequently 
emerged (in the late 1950's) that it is more likely that the pp- 
chain is the predominant means of energy generation in the Sun.
The important thing was that,once the basic means of energy 
generation had been spelt out by Bethe and his associates,the 
details could be filled in by further calculations and by labora­
tory studies of the reactions. Much of the subsequent detail has
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been provided by work carried out at Kellogg.
The stimulus to the work at Kellogg was not only provided by
the Sun but also by the need to develop a general theory of the
evolution of stars and the origin of the elements. The difficulty
here was to explain how stars ever got beyond the stage of burning
helium in order that heavier elements might be produced. The
breakthrough came at Kellogg with the work of Salpeter, and later
12Hoyle, who both provided reasons for why the reaction 3a ^ C 
was most likely to be the source of helium burning. Experimental 
work by Lauritsen and Fowler at Kellogg, amongst others, confirmed 
this and, after two astronomers, Geoffrey and Margaret Burbidge, 
joined the team at Pasadena, a comprehensive theory of nucleo­
synthesis in stars and the production of all the elements and 
their isotopes was produced. The classic paper of the Burbidges, 
Fowler and Hoyle, in which this theory was presented, was published 
in Reviews of Modern Physics in 1957.^^ This could be said to 
be the high point of nucleeur astrophysics at the Kellogg Radiation 
Laboratory.
Testing Nuclear Astrophysics
At the same time as nuclear physicists were producing more 
and better information concerning the basic energy-preduction 
mechanisms in stars, astrophysicists and astronomers were contin­
ually improving their theories of stellar structure and stellar 
evolution. The possibility of producing detailed models of stars 
had been shown by Russel, Jeans and E d d i n g t o n . T h i s  work was 
pursued through the 1920's and 1930's by Stromgren and Chandrasekhar. 
Following on from Bethe's path breaking work on the nuclear 
reactions in stars in the late 1930's, tremendous advances were 
made in the field by scientists such as Chandrasekhar, Schonberg,
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32Sandage, Schwarzschild and Hoyle. Many of the more recent
advances in the subject were aided by the development of computers 
which facilitated the building of models of stars.
The development of stellar-evolution theory was not only made 
possible by the information which the nuclear physicists produced 
but also by the increasingly refined astronomical observations that 
were made. Developments, such as the Hertzsprung-Russel diagrams, 
in which luminosity and the colour of stars' radiation could be 
compared, enabled generalisations concerning stellar evolution 
to be drawn. The various stages of the history of stars such as 
'main sequence', 'red giant', and 'white dwarf, could be traced 
on these diagrams. Stellar-evolution theory, as well as providing 
an explanation of the history of stars, could also be used to 
account for particular classes of anomalous stars such as the  ̂
Cephides Variables (stars which have a periodic luminosity).
The undoubted successes which stellar-evolution theory had 
achieved by the late 1950's were, of course, founded on the idea 
that the primary energy source of stars was nuclear reactions. 
Despite the match between stellar-evolution theory and a large 
body of astronomical data,it could always be maintained that there 
was no direct evidence to confirm nuclear reactions as the source 
of energy. For instance, for the star for which there was the most 
detailed information - the Sun - most of the information was based 
upon observations of photons from its surface. However, these 
photons are generated one million years beforehand in the core 
of the Sun. It takes this period of time for the photons to pass 
through the rest of the material by thermal diffusion. Better 
evidence for nuclear fusion in the Sun would be provided by the
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immediate observation of the products of the reactions in the core.
One such product is the neutrino. When Bethe outlined the nuclear
reactions he thought could occur in the Sun he mentioned in passing
that neutrinos were produced. But he did not pay much attention to
them. Neither did anyone else at the time, since,as was mentioned
earlier, it was considered that they would never be observed because
of their lack of interaction.
The disinterest in astronomical neutrinos was acutely felt
by the neutrino experimenters at the time. As Davis told me;
It's an interesting thing, and maybe my view is distorted 
a little bit, but if I was Hans Bethe writing the CN-cycle 
paper, one of the foremost thoughts in your mind is how are 
you going to test all this. You would think that somewhere 
in his article he would say that this can be detected by the 
neutrino radiation...It shows me that those people were not 
thinking about the neutrinos at all. And I think it's 
psychology, you drop the neutrino because it's the hopeless 
one to detect and therefore it doesn.' t come into the 
picture at all.
An anecdote told to me by Martin Schwarzschild, one of the leading 
exponents of stellar-evolution theory, supports this view of the 
neutrino:
I remember very well on one occasion where a very bright 
graduate student, after me talking in great detail about 
the structure of more evolved stars, just asked the question 
'Why don't you take a photograph of that star in neutrinos, 
and then you can see those shells you are talking about? '
The class broke out in laughter.
The lack of interaction of neutrinos, which encouraged most 
people to neglect them, is, however, important when considering 
possible tests of nuclear fusion in the Sun. Because they interact 
so little, neutrinos pass straight through the outer layers of the 
Sun. If neutrinos could be detected they should be observable on 
Earth only eight minutes after they are produced in the centre of 
the Sun. Thus, the particle which nearly everyone chose to ignore.
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could, nevertheless, be used to test stellar-evolution theory - 
provided it could be detected.
The nuclear astrophysicists working at Caltech, and in 
particular William Fowler, were aware of the possible strategic 
importance played by the neutrino in this respect. However, it did 
not seem that there were neutrinos of sufficient energy to have a 
realistic chance of being detected. Most of the neutrinos produced 
by the pp-chain, which by the 1950's, was thought to predominate 
in the Sun, were of rather low energy. It did not seem feasible 
that such neutrinos could be detected in any numbers by experi­
ments such as those being performed by Davis. Also other astronomical 
sources of neutrinos,such as stellar collapses, did not seem to 
provide a definite enough flux of neutrinos to warrant a detection 
experiment. The nuclear astrophysicists were, nevertheless, 
keeping a close eye on developments in detection technique. At 
conferences in the 1950's, well known nuclear astrophysicists, 
such as Fowler and A.G.W. Cameron of Chalk River, used to discuss 
these matters with the neutrino experimenters. Reines, Cowan and, 
of course, Ray Davis.
Thus it came about that when two nuclear physicists^ H.D.
Holmgren and R.L. Johnston of the Naval Research Laboratory, 
reported an unexpected result at an American Physical Society 
meeting in early 1958, Fowler and Cameron immediately saw the 
consequences for neutrino detection. As Davis told me:
That was the real turning point of everything Willy 's
eyes lit up and so did Al's. Well Good God! If that 
cross-section is what they say it is then it would play 
a role on the Sun.
The cross-section measurement presented by Holmgren and Johnston was for the
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3 4 7reaction: He + He -> Be + Y
As can be seen from Fig. 2.2, this is one of the reactions of the 
pp-chain. The cross-section for this reaction had never been 
measured before, but theoretical estimates had indicated it had a 
rather low value. Consequently it was believed that the pp-chain
was mainly terminated via the competing reaction:
3 . 3  4He + He -*■ He + 2p.
The new measurements gave a result approximately one thousand
times greater than the old value. If correct, this would mean that
3 4the branch of the pp-chain through He + He would, as Fowler
and Cameron immediately saw, play a much greater part than had
previously been believed. Furthermore, it would mean that the source
of neutrinos from the decay of boron eight (see Fig. 2.2) would
be much more important. This is significant because the boron-
eight neutrinos are of very high energy (14 MeV maximum). These
neutrinos have enough energy to trigger the inverse beta-decay of 
37Cl , and hence might be expected to produce a measurable flux 
in a detection experiment such as that operated by Davis.
Although the cross-section for the reaction in the pp-chain 
immediately preceding the boron-eight decay - proton capture by 
beryllium seven - had never been measured, calculations indicated 
that it should have a sizeable value. Ralph Kavanagh, of the Kellogg 
Radiation Laboratory, immediately set about attempting to measure 
this cross-section.
33Fowler and Cameron both published papers in which they 
indicated the new possibilities for neutrino detection and they
34simultaneously wrote to Davis drawing his attention to developments.
If Davis could measure the flux of neutrinos expected from the
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decay of boron eight then he would be able to test directly one 
of the central tenets of nuclear astrophysics and stellar-evolution 
theory - that the source of energy in stars was nuclear.
With this test in mind the marriage between neutrino-detection 
physics and nuclear astrophysics was begun. It was this marriage 
which shaped the subsequent development of solar-neutrino astronomy.
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CHAPTER THREE
EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOLAR-NEUTRINO ASTRONOMY 1958-1964
In this chapter, experimental developments are described from 
the time in early 1958 when solar-neutrino detection became a 
feasible proposition until the point in November 1964 when the first 
experiment was funded. As we shall see below,the successful 
funding of such an experiment was the high point of much of the 
scientific activity over the period.
The account presented (as throughout the thesis) is based upon 
correspondence files; interviews with the main participants; and 
upon the scientific literature. Apart from the task of accurate 
historical description, this chapter is important for establishing 
the basis for certain sociological themes which are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 10. Rather than place these sociological concepts 
to the fore and order the account around them explicitly, I have 
related events chronologically, and drawn attention to the develop­
ments of sociological interest as and when they arise. This is 
because, as emphasised in Chapter 1, the social processes of 
interest - those which shape the social construction of scientific 
knowledge - are essentially temporal processes and their unfolding 
can only be noticed by following through an extended period of 
scientific development.
One of the central themes of this thesis is the exploration 
of the interaction of theory and experiment in the production of 
scientific knowledge. As will become apparent, once the prospect 
of measuring the neutrino flux from the Sun became more favourable 
in 1958, subsequent experimental and theoretical developments 
were closely linked. For reasons of presentation it is more convenient
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to deal with experimental and theoretical developments separately.
Thus a chapter on experimental developments will be followed by
a chapter on the parallel theoretical developments which occurred
over the same period. However, given the close ties between theory
and experiment, some overlap between chapters is inevitable.
For example, theoretical events will be mentioned in this chapter
which will get more exhaustive discussion in Chapter 4.
Similarly experimental events treated in great detail here will
receive brief mention again in Chapter 4.
1958-60, Davis Starts Plans for Solar-Neutrino Detection
It will be recalled from the preceding chapter that in early
1958, when Davis received letters from Fowler and Cameron informing
him that he might be able to detect solar neutrinos, he was still
making reactor-neutrino measurements at Savannah River. Before
hearing from Fowler and Cameron, Davis had been unaware of the new
developments in nuclear astrophysics. As he told me:
It first really got to me. You see I didn't know Holmgren 
and Johnston. I didntt follow nuclear physics that well.
I didn't know that much about how that fitted into the 
scheme of things.
Davis was excited about the developments in nuclear astrophysics
because they meant he could extend his research programme in a
new direction - furthermore a direction in which he was likely to
meet with more success since the Sun produced neutrinos rather
than antineutrinos. As we saw in Chapter 2, his reactor-neutrino
experiments had met with only limited success, largely because
his technique was not suitable for the detection of antineutrinos.
Although he had not yet detected anything (apart from background
counts), he was nevertheless by now an acknowledged expert in this
particular technique. As Fowler commented in his letter to Davis:^
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Permit me to conclude by expressing my great admiration for 
your beautiful work on this problem.
Davis, of course, had earlier been interested in the Sun as a
neutrino source. As we saw, in 1955 he had used his 1,OOO-galIon
apparatus to set an upper limit on the solar-neutrino flux.
However, because theory at the time indicated that he would not
detect anything, such an experiment had not been expected to
2produce any useful information. But, from Davis's point of view
it was an interesting experimental project in its own right to try
and make such a measurement, even though theoretically he might not
expect to see anything. As John Bahcall, a close collaborator of
Davis's, told me:
Now Davis very much wanted to do this [a solar-neutrino 
experiment]. He just needed a demonstration that it was 
feasible, a good theoretical underpinning. He had wanted 
for some time just to put a detector out there and look, but 
he couldn't get anyone to support that because he couldn't 
make a case that he would see anything that was interesting.
With the events of 1958 it now looked possible that nuclear astro­
physics would provide Davis with the theoretical rationale for 
which he had been looking.
It is important to note that Davis has always had an ambivalent 
attitude towards nuclear-astrophysical theory. Although it was 
obviously important to him because it gave him a justification 
for proceeding with a solar-neutrino experiment (and, as we shall 
see, enabled him to get funding for such an experiment), at the 
same time he was rather sceptical about what the theory had to 
say. As he told me:
I guess this is an experimentalist's attitude. What do you 
use the theory for? You use the theory to tell you that it 
makes sense to do the experiment, whether you take the theory 
seriously or not...For example, earlier, before Holmgren 
and Johnston...and all of that, you'd say if I do the experiment
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I would get nothing...There is no sense in doing the experi­
ment, so you don't do it. And when the theory tells you the 
Sun is different to what we thought, there are some neutrinos 
coming out, the boron-eight neutrinos; they've got a high 
cross-section and calculating these things you get kinda 
numbers that go all in the loft [i.e., a big signal predicted].
And so you say at least I've got the theoreticians telling me 
that now's a good time to do the experiment. But if you do 
the experiment you may or may not find what they say.
Davis, of course, had, by this stage, good reason to be somewhat 
sceptical towards theory. In his work at nuclear reactors he had 
seen different theories come and go.
There is it seems an element of what might be described as 
'instrumentalism' in the attitude of Davis towards the theory. For 
him the theory was a means of arguing for his own experimental 
programme. This theme will be taken up again in Chapter 10 but 
instrumentalist attitudes on the parts of both experimenter and theor­
eticians will be a recurring theme throughout the developments 
described.
Davis, upon receiving Fowler's and Cameron's letters, immediately
started to explore the new prospects for solar-neutrino detection.
Calculations indicated that he could expect a signal in his 1000-
3gallon tank. He soon wrote back to Fowler and Cameron informing 
them of his calculations. He felt that, although it was possible 
that part of the background in his experiment at Savannah River 
was produced by solar neutrinos, in order to make a more definite 
measurement he would have to move his apparatus to a mine, where 
the extra cosmic-ray shielding provided by the roof would sub­
stantially increase the sensitivity of the detector. He estimated
that for a 1,000-gallon experiment approximately 500 feet of rock
4would be needed. As he told Fowler:
If these calculations look reasonable to you we will
seriously consider moving the 1000 gallon experiment to a
mine after the Savannah River background experiments are completed,
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Given the uncertainties in the, as yet, unmeasured beryllium
seven-proton capture cross-section (known as , upon which the
flux of boron-eight neutrinos was crucially dependent, Davis felt
that a much more definitive test could be made using a 10,CKD0-
gallon tank detector. Experimentally, he felt such an increase
in size would be perfectly feasible.
Fowler's reaction to Davis's suggestion of an experiment in
a mine was very positive. He wrote back:^
The calculations given in your letter look very reasonable 
indeed and also very exciting. I do hope you will proceed 
to measure the solar neutrino flux by repeating your 
experiments in a mine.
Fowler went on to emphasise the crucial importance of the unknown
beryllium seven-proton capture cross-section, As mentioned
in Chapter 2, Ralph Kavanagh, of the Kellogg Radiation Laboratory,
was already attempting to make this vital measurement. If part of
the background in Davis's detector at Savannah River was indeed
from solar neutrinos then he could be detecting evidence for the
Be^-p reaction in the Sun before anyone else; an achievement which,
as Fowler put it, 'would be a great feather in your cap'.^
Cameron's reaction was equally enthusiastic. New calculations
0
of Ŝ .y indicated that solar neutrinos from B decay should be
detectable. His advice to Davis was:^
...you should put a 10,000 gallon tank of CCl^ in a mine to 
detect these...
Clearly, any such larger experiment would require considerably 
more resources. Davis's funding came from the chemistry-department 
budget of the Brookhaven National Laboratory. Each year the 
departmental chairman had responsibility for assessing the forth­
coming budget of his department and he would then apply to the Atomic
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Energy Commission (AEC), who sponsored Brookhaven, for the requisite 
money. Davis's work at this stage required funds in the order of 
tens of thousands of dollars and could fairly easily be accommodated 
within the overall chemistry department budget. However, any 
effort to increase the size of the experiment substantially, would 
require funding more in the magnitude of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars - an amount which would require a special application to 
the AEC to be made.
The impact of funding considerations on the development of 
solar-neutrino astronomy will be one of the main themes stressed 
in this chapter and the next. Even at this early stage the need to 
find finance for a large-scale experiment was emerging. For
g
instance, Davis, in his reply to Fowler, wrote:
I have talked to Dick Dodson about the possibilities that 
you propose.and he is very much interested in extending the 
experiment to look for solar neutrinos.
Dodson was, at the time, chairman of the Brookhaven chemistry
department, and it was he whom Davis would have to approach initially
in order to obtain funding. Davis concluded his letter to Fowler 
9as follows:
Dick would like for me to send on his best regards.
Dodson and Fowler were friends and former colleagues at Caltech.
The personal connection between them, as emphasised in Davis's 
greeting to Fowler, was acknowledged in Fowler's subsequent reply:
...please give my very best regards to Dick Dodson.
The close personal ties between Fowler and Dodson were, as we shall 
see below, to prove vital for the eventual funding of the solar- 
neutrino project.
In April 1958, Davis contacted the New Jersey Zinc Company with 
a view to moving his 1,000-gallon experiment into their Franklin,
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N.J. mine. The prospects for solar-neutrino detection at this
time were set out by Davis in a letter to Willard F. Libby, the
Nobel laureate who developed radio-carbon dating, and who was a
high-ranking official in the AEC. Libby's support would be needed
12before a larger experiment could be undertaken.
Our present plans are to move the 1,000 gallon experiment 
to a mine deep enough to remove all y-meson background 
effects. Actually a 1,000 gallon experiment is only 
marginal, however, we can do this inexpensively. It would 
be far better to perform an experiment with 10,000 or more 
gallons which would be a crucial test of Fowler and 
Cameron's calculations. A measurement of the neutrinos from 
the Sun is the only direct experimental way of testing the 
overall conclusions reached by astrophysicists on nuclear 
reactions in stars.
The importance of nuclear astrophysics to Davis's plans 
can be seen from this letter. He was able to argue that his 
experiment would be a 'crucial test' of nuclear-astrophysical 
theory.
1958-1960, Davis Moves to a Mine But the Prospects Do Not Look Good
Davis got permission from Dodson to move his thousand-gallon
detector into a mine and, by July I960, he had installed his
apparatus in a 2,300-feet-deep limestone mine in Barberton, Ohio
(operated by the Columbia Southern Chemical Company). The basic
experimental apparatus and procedure for this solar-neutrino
detector were the same as had been used in the earlier reactor
experiments. The only difference was that the less volatile
material, perchloroethylene, replaced carbon tetrachloride as
the target material. The apparatus consisted of two five-hundred-
gallon tanks of perchloroethylene (see photograph in Fig. 3.1).
The tanks were equipped with agitators and a helium-purging
system. After the exposure of the tanks for several months, by 
37which time Ar activity should have built up to a measurable





37amount, any Ar formed was removed by passing a stream of helium 
gas through the tanks. The helium gas stream, after leaving the 
liquid, was passed through condensation traps to remove perchloro­
ethylene vapours and then through charcoal cooled to liquid 
nitrogen temperatures. At this low temperature,argon is adsorbed 
on the charcoal and the helium passes through. The sample of argon 
was removed by heating the charcoal and purified. The sample 
was then placed in a small low-level counter surrounded by heavy
shielding and anticoincidence detectors, and the characteristic
37radiation from the Ar decay observed.
In addition to this basic experimental procedure, Davis ran
a check on the argon-recovery efficiency. This was carried out
by the introduction of a small amount of Ar^^ carrier gas into the
tanks before each exposure. By performing a mass analysis on the
recovered argon, he was able to show the recovery efficiency was
37of the order of 90 - 95%. Thus, any Ar formed in the tank should
be extracted along with the carrier argon. Although Davis was
37looking for only a few Ar atoms amongst the 1,000 gallons of 
liquid, in principle he should have been able to extract and 
identify such small numbers of atoms.
The first experimental run indicated a result which was 
consistent with 10 neutrino captures a day. In subsequent runs, 
the counting efficiency was improved (that is the counter's 
background was reduced) and Davis was eventually able to set an 
upper limit of MD.5 neutrino captures per day. If this signal 
came from solar neutrinos, it would correspond to approximately 
300 SNU. However, the signal was estimated by Davis to be produced 
almost entirely by the cosmic-ray background in the tank. Thus the 
most he could say was that the solar-neutrino flux was no larger
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13than 300 SNU.
As was mentioned above, even with the signal estimated in
early 1958, Davis had felt a one-thousand-galIon experiment was
only marginal and that a ten-thousand-galIon experiment would be
needed to stand any realistic chance of detecting solar neutrinos.
His estimates then had been based on Fowler's and Cameron'
calculations of the still unmeasured value of S^^. However, by
the end of 1958, Kavanagh had reported his provisional results
of the measurement of and he had found the cross-section to
14be much lower than expected. This meant that the boron-eight
flux would not be as large as it had seemed in early 1958. Indeed
Q
it looked as if the branch of the pp-chain through B was not, 
after all, very significant. Fowler wrote in an important review, 
published in 1960:
Q
...this mode of completion [via B ] of the pp-chain can 
be neglected in the Sun. . . (Fowlei; I960: 211)
There was a flurry of theoretical interest at this time in a
way of completing the pp-chain which Bethe had earlier considered
and rejected. This was a series of reactions involving the
formation of lithium four which itself decayed by producing a very
high energy neutrino ( for details see next chapter). Most
theorists thought such a possibility was unlikely. Davis was,
however, more interested in this possibility: as he told me:
[A Soviet physicist] pointed out it may be possible, you 
don't know - that kind of argument. And Willy [Fowler] 
said 'Oh Hell, lithium four can't be stable'. He talked 
about the nuclear structure...So you had these two viewpoints. 
For me it was interesting because at least someone posed 
something you could test. So if lithium four formed I would 
see something.
Davis's instrumental attitude towards theory of using it to justify
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his experiments, even if the theory itself seemed improbable, is
again reflected in his attitude to the lithium-four possibility.
If lithium four existed, Davis would expect to see a sizeable
signal (approximately 20 neutrino captures a day). As Davis's results
were lower than this limit,it seemed that he had indeed ruled out
the lithium-four possibility. Again, however, as in his reactor
experiments, he had merely used a negative result to rule out a
possibility that was not very likely in the first place. He still
had not succeeded in detecting any neutrinos. The future for
solar-neutrino detection did not look very promising at this stage.
Reines, in concluding a rèview article published in 1960, summed
up the prospects as he saw them:
...the probability of a negative result even with detectors 
of thousands or possibly hundreds of thousands of gallons 
of CCI4 tends to dissuade experimentalists from making 
the attempt. (Reines, I960: 25).
1960-1963 Davis Continues his Programme and Bahcall Commences his 
Involvement
Davis, however, having persevered for a decade with his technique,
was not easily dissuaded. Indeed, in terms of experimental goals,
his move to the Barberton mine had been successful. It had enabled
him to refine his technique and show that it worked in a mine.
And he had never really expected to detect solar neutrinos with
15.this size of detector, anyway. As he wrote at the time:
...the experiment does not represent a serious attempt to 
detect solar neutrinos. To observe the flux of solar 
neutrinos now calculated by the astrophysicists would require 
an experiment using 50 to 100 times the volume of perchloro­
ethylene we are now using, and this would be a very large 
undertaking.
If Davis wanted to continue with his programme he would just 
have to build an even larger detector. In 1961 he was starting to
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explore this possibility. Again an excerpt from his correspondence
reveals his intentions:
It is possible to scale up the detector by a factor of 100 
and I am now considering whether the large investment in 
effort and expense would be worthwhile.
Whether it would be worthwhile proceeding with such a 100,000- 
gallon experiment would depend crucially on the prediction of 
the expected solar-neutrino flux. Such information could only 
cone from the nuclear astrophysicists.
Thus far, the two nuclear astrophysicists to show interest 
in Davis's experiment had been Fowler and Cameron. Although 
Cameron continued to follow Davis's work and calculated some 
neutrino fluxes, he did not play the direct active role which Fowler 
came to undertake. Cameron's interest has been very much a by­
product of his more general astrophysical interest in stellar- 
evolution theory. Fowler's interest on the other hand, as has 
been emphasised, emerged from his background, in nuclear physics. 
Through his work with the Burbidges and Hoyle on stellar-nuclear 
synthesis, Fowler had already made his reputation by the early 
'60's. The direct test of nuclear synthesis made possible by the 
detection of solar neutrinos would be, as one solar-neutrino 
scientist told me, 'the icing on the cake'.
Fowler did make some calculations of the expected neutrino 
fluxes and got a stellar-model specialist at Caltech, R. Sears, 
to make some computations (see Chapter 4 for details) but it 
was soon clear that whether or not neutrinos were detectable on 
Earth depended on exactly what the solar model said. And working 
out the problem in the sort of detail that was needed was going to 
be a major theoretical undertaking. It was this problem that a
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young nuclear theorist, John Bahcall, tackled. If solar neutrinos
were to be Fowler's 'icing on the cake', they proved to be
Bahcall's 'bread and butter'.
Bahcall was working at the I n U ^ v W e r s i  , Bloomington,
on nuclear-decay rates in stellar interiors. Fowler drew Davis's
attention to Bahcall's work because he felt he might be able to
make accurate calculations of reactions in the pp-chain (and, in
particular, the rate of electron capture by beryllium seven) relevant
to solar-neutrino detection. Davis read one of Bahcall's articles.
However, he was not immediately enthused; as he told me:
I read this article [by Bahcall] but it was a typical 
theorist's article, all the formulation was there but 
he didn't do anything of interest, he didn't calculate 
anything. So I coudn't do much with his article. So I 
wrote to John...about his article and I described this 
business about Be?,was it foirmed in the Sun? So you would 
like to know accurately what the Be^-capture was in the Sun 
and how it related to solar neutrinos.
From Davis's point of view, theoretical articles were mainly of 
interest if they contained calculations of what he, as an experi­
menter, might expect to detect.
17Bahcall,upon receiving Davis's letter (in February 1962), agreed
to make the necessary calculations. Hq  also,considered the
proposed experiment to be a crucial test of nuclear astrophysical
theory and he wrote back to Davis describing the proposed experiment
18
as 'very important'. He wrote several further letters to Davis in
the Spring of 1962 reporting on his progress, and, by late May,
19he had the result. Although this particular calculation did
not show any great promise for the experiment (see Chapter 4 for 
details), Bahcall was now enthusiastic about the project and was 
willing to make more calculations. He was able to do this by 
virtue of a post-doc. position at Caltech, working with no less
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a figure than Fowler.
In the late summer of 1962 intensive theoretical work on the
prediction of the solar-neutrino flux was commenced at Kellogg.
By October 1962, a detailed calculation had been carried out by
Bahcall with the assistance of Fowler and two Kellogg solar-model
specialists, R.Sears and Icko Iben. The results did not look
very hopeful for Davis's experiment. Using the latest values for 
3 4the He -He cross-section, which had just been remeasured at
Kellogg by Parker and Kavanagh^^ (a value about half that found by
Holmgren and Johnston), the Kellogg group predicted a boron-eight
flux of only 3 SNU (Bahcall, Fowler, Iben and Sears, 1963). As
21Fowler informed Davis:
This is 'v.l/loOOth of the value you mentioned... as the detection 
limit for the 1,000 gallon experiment. On the face of it, 
this value looks very difficult to reach.
A copy of Fowler's letter to Davis was also sent to Fred Reines, 
who continued to have an interest in all types of neutrino detection, 
including solar neutrinos. His reaction was still the pessimistic
one which he had expressed in his I960 review. He wrote back to_ , 22 Fowler:
The solar-neutrino problem stops me cold...
Davis's reaction was more positive. He thought that although
solar-neutrino detection would be even more difficult, a larger
23experiment was not impossible. He wrote:
This looks grim, detecting a few a day in a 100,000 gallons, 
but not impossible. I would propose the following approach:
(1) Use a 100,000 gallon tank at a cost of around $250,000...
(2) Build a low level counter with a zero background, so 
that all pulses are the event sought for. This is 
possible in principle by purifying all components (chemist's 
work), and carrying out the counting underground to 
eliminate y's produced in the shield by cosmic rays.
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These improvements should give an improvement in detection 
sensitivity by a factor of lOOO that is required. It still 
appears that the inverse beta process in chlorine (cleaning 
fluid method) offers the best ultimate sensitivity for low 
energy neutrinos... This letter is just to let you know I 
haven't lost interest in the experiment and to say it still 
looks feasible.
The difficulty of any such experiment was reiterated by Bahcall
in a letter sent to Davis just four days after Davis's letter to
_ , 24Fowler:
These results suggest the experiment is extremely difficult.
Do you think it is possible? We are all very much interested 
in your comments.
After a further calculation by Bahcal^^in which he corrected
some errors made in the previous computations (see Chapter 4 for
details) things looked slightly more optimistic. Davis wrote at 
26the time:
It would be possible to observe a rate as low as this [1.6 
captures/day] with 10^ gallons of perchloroethylene, and a 
counter with an essentially zero background. However, an 
experiment of this magnitude would be quite expensive, 
a rough estimate would be $200,000...I have started some 
exploratory discussions on the^possibility of carrying out 
the experiment.
The attitude of the Kellogg group to Davis's continued optimism
was expressed by Bahcall in an important letter, dated January 
273, 1963:
We were all pleased to learn...that you have started 
exploratory discussions concerning the possibility of 
performing the solar neutrino experiment. It seems to us to 
be a fundamental experiment since it would afford the only 
direct evidence of specific nuclear reactions occurring in 
the interior of a star, namely the Sun. Please keep us 
informed of your progress and let us know if we can be of any 
help.
It can be seen that the Kellogg groiç», too, were hopeful that
such an experiment could be performed.
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1963, The Kellogg Group and Davis Co-operate to Try and Get Funding 
for a Large Experiment
Thus,at the start of 1963,we find that Davis and the Kellogg 
Radiation group (particularly Bahcall and Fowler) were moving 
towards active cooperation in getting a large solar-neutrino 
experiment under way. Davis had outlined the feasibility of the 
project based on the Caltech calculations and had initiated explora­
tory discussions to obtain funding. His enthusiasm for the project, 
in view of his efforts over the years, was clear. Similarly the 
Kellogg group were enthused by the project in view of the test 
that it provided of nuclear synthesis in stars. Their request to 
Davis for him to keep them informed of his progress and their offer 
of assistance shows the degree of their commitment to the project.
Of course, any progress to be made would depend to a large
part on whether or not Davis could get funding for a new experiment .
Davis had already made it abundantly clear that the experiment would
be expensive - of the order of $200,000. Although the general
funding climate for physics experiments was much more favourable
than today, the post-war boom of Brookhaven's sponsors, the AEC
(based on the success of nuclear weapons), was coming to an end.
The space effort of the 1960's meant that NASA was becoming the 
28prestige agency. Also it must be borne in mind that a solar-
neutrino detection experiment was an unattractive venture to funding 
agencies, as it would produce only one type of measuranent. It would
not provide the facilities for large groups of experimenters and
many different types of experiment such as could be produced by 
investment in an accelerator.
The procedure for getting support for an experiment of this size
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was first for the experimenter, Davis, to approach his departmental
chairman in the normal way and convince him of the worth of the 
29experiment. As we saw above, Davis had already made such an 
approach as far back as 1958. If the chairman gave his support 
it was then up to him (and the experimenter) to convince the 
AEC that they should put the extra funding in the departmental 
budget. As part of the process of convincing the AEC it would be 
necessary also to have the support of the director of BNL. If the 
AEC refused to fund the experiment then it might be possible for 
an application to be made to some other agency, such as the NSF 
or NASA.
As the experiment Davis was proposing to carry out was in the 
area of nuclear astrophysics and Davis was himself a chemist, out­
side assistance would be particularly useful in the bid to obtain 
funding. Bahcall's letter to Davis, offering the help of perhaps 
the most prestigious group of nuclear astrophysicists in the 
country was thus an offer of some substance. Of course, Bahcall 
as a young research fellow would have a limited influence, but 
Fowler, as an eminent Professor, was in a position to be of much 
more help. Bahcall's relationship with Fowler at the time was 
described to me by another scientist who had spent time at Kellogg:
I was certainly around in the early days when John Bahcall 
was pushing, you )cnow, making propaganda for the solar- 
neutrino experiment. And Willy Fowler was then the sorta 
big white father of, you know the sorta father confessor, 
so to speak, of both John Bahcall and me. And he was good 
at pushing what his young men were interested in and so on.
Bahcall, as Fowler's prodigy, naturally showed Fowler copies
of his correspondence with Davis. Indeed most of the correspondence
between Davis and Bahcall, and Fowler was circulated amongst other
members of the Kellogg group such as the stellar-model specialists.
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Sears and Iben, and the nuclear experimentalists Parker and
Kavanagh. I was given access to the correspondence files of
Davis, Bahcall and Fowler. At the bottom of the copy of Bahcall's
(January 3) letter to Davis (mentioned above) filed by Fowler,
there is the following handwritten note:
Write to Dick Dodson
Glenn Seaborg 
Lee Haworth.
This note, written by Fowler, indicates how he planned to help 
Bahcall, and Davis, with getting funding for the solar-neutrino 
experiment. The persons referred to in the note are all of crucial 
importance in winning support for the experiment.
Dick Dodson has already been mentioned. He was Fowler's former 
colleague and friend who was now chairman of Davis's department at 
Brookhaven. Glenn T. Seaborg was a member and Chairman of the AEC 
from 1961 to 1971, and Leland J. Haworth was also a member of the 
AEC from 1961 to 1963. We can surmise that Fowler was thinking 
of writing to these scientists at this moment because of their 
probable influence in the battle to get funding. Whether Fowler 
did actually write to Seaborg and Haworth is not known. What is 
known is that one day later he wrote to Dodson. As this letter 
is of scxne interest, I will quote extensively from it. It begins:
Dear Dick,
Greetings after a long time abroad. [Fowler had spent some 
time in Ccimbridge, England .] How time flies! I recall my visit 
to Brookhaven several years ago and your splendid hospitality 
with much nostalgia.
This opening passage re-establishes the personal links between
Fowler and Dodson. This is no cold polite letter from an eminent
Professor in one field to an unknown departmental chairman in another
field at another institution. It is a letter between two friends
93.
and former colleagues. The letter continues:
As you may have heard we have been in correspondence once 
again with Ray Davis about the possibility of solar-neutrino 
detection. The present situation is that we have completed 
our measurements of the cross sections for He^ (a,y) Be7 
and Be7 (p,y)B®, have carried out rate integrations over 
realistic solar models and come up with rates '̂ l capture/
10^ gallons-day...This is smaller than we had hoped for 
some years ago but knowing Ray and his ability, we feel it 
might be detectable. Moreover, a larger value would tell us 
that the central solar temperature is higher than we think.
In nuclear astrophysics, we really need a check on nuclear 
reaction rates and solar models so all of us here are hoping 
the experiment will be done. I hope you will agree and, if 
so, Charlie Lauritsen and I will be willing to help you with 
Seaborg, Haworth, Goldhaber al. if it is necessary.
I would welcome your reaction to this (especially a favourable 
one! )
Charles Lauritsen, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was a founder
member of the Kellogg Laboratory and a very distinguished and
influential Caltech scientist in his own right. Although, as far
as can be established, he played no direct part in funding the solar-
neutrino experiment, the backing of such a powerful ally no doubt
helped Fowler in his e f f o r t s . O f  the other people mentioned in
the letter, the only one whom we have not yet encountered is
Maurice Goldhaber. As well as being a very eminent nuclear and
particle physicist, he was the Director of the Brookhaven National
Laboratory. It can be seen that in his letter, Fowler not only
endorsed Davis's experiment for Dodson's benefit but also offered
to help with influencing these other key individuals.
The importance of this letter to Dodson can be seen from his
reply. Again the introduction reciprocates the friendly style of 
32Fowler's letter:
Dear Willy,
It was delightful to hear from you again. Best greetings, 




I was very pleased to hear your considerations on the solar 
neutrino flux and your remarks about a detection-measurement 
experiment by Ray Davis. I'm in favour of doing it - on 
the assumption, of course, that it looks like a reasonable 
scientific gamble. Your encouragement is a very strong 
consideration.
It can be seen that Dodson, anyway, by this stage seems to have
been convinced. In the final part of his letter Fowler's and
Lauritsen's offer of help in persuading others was acknowledged
and Dodson wrote that it was 'highly probable' that this would
be taken up at a later stage. Indeed he had already set things
in motion by holding informal discussions with BNL-Director,
33Goldhaber, and AEC-official, Seaborg.
By July 1963 the attenpt to get funding seemed to be moving
34smoothly. Davis, in a letter to Bahcall, was able to write:
We are planning a 100,000 g&llon experiment, and I am 
reasonably certain funds will be available to set it up 
next year...
1963, Davis Searches for a Suitable Mine
Whilst Fowler and Dodson were attempting to ensure the funding 
for the project Davis continued with his technical investigations 
of the feasibility of a large experiment. One of the major diffi­
culties to be overccttne was finding a suitable location for the 
experiment. As Davis mentioned to Bahcall in his letter of July 
1963:^5
We are now looking into deep mines in the U.S. and Canada 
but the list of possibilities is rather small, and the space 
is usually quite limited in deep mines.
The reason Davis needed a deeper mine than for the thousand-gallon
experiment was because of the greater cosmic-ray background which
he could expect to detect with a larger experiment. His calculations
95,
indicated that he would need a mine ^OOO feet deep. Also, the
rock should ideally have a low natural radioactivity (again to 
prevent spurious background counts) and should be sufficiently 
hard to support the large experimental chamber needed.
In addition to these technical problems there was the problem 
of forming a satisfactory working relationship with the mining 
canpany. Mine operators,who might be described as typically 'hard 
headed', may not necessarily see any advantage to them in having a 
large tank of cleaning fluid located in their mineI
In order to search for a suitable mine for the experiment, 
Davis and an administrative assistant of Dodson's, Blair Munhofen, 
approached the Bureau of Mines. They were given three possible 
locations, two of which they visited. The mine which appeared to 
be best suited for the experiment was the Homestake Gold Mine in 
Lead, South Dakota. This is the deepest mine in the U.S. and 
there would be no problem in meeting the cosmic-ray shielding
requirements. Also the rock is very hard, even at great depths 
(4,850 feet below the surface) and there would thus be no structural 
problems in cutting out a chamber sufficiently large to house a 
100,000-gallon tank. However, there was one major obstacle to this 
location. The Homestake Mining Company appeared to be somewhat 
cool in their attitude towards the project and gave what was felt 
to be an unrealistic estimate for the cost of excavating a suitable 
chamber and providing services - $300,000-$400, OOO - which was 
more than the total estimated cost of the tank and cleaning fluid. 
The second choice at the time was a copper mine in Butte, Montana. 
Here the mining company (the Anaconda Copper Company) were much 
more favourably disposed towards the project. The chairman of
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the company lixed the idea of an important scientific experiment 
being performed in Montana - not a part of the country noted for 
its science. However, there were technical problems with this 
location. The rock was much less stable than at Lead, and a long 
cylindrical cavity would have to be cut and lined with concrete, 
at the 4,200 feet level. This'would give space for a close-fitting 
tank but give very little additional room. Such a long thin 
cylindrical tank did not appeal much to Davis. By November 1963, 
a suitable location for the experiment had yet to be found.
The basic design Davis planned for the experiment was similar 
to that which he had used previously - except on a much larger 
scale. An early design for the arrangement of the tank and 
associated equipment at Homestake is shown in Figure 3.2.
Eventually the spherical design of the tank was changed to a cylind­
rical one as it was felt that it would be advantageous if the 
surrounding area could be flooded with water. A large diameter 
cylindrical tank would require a smaller volume than a spherical 
tank. This'water shield' would cut down the background produced by 
fast neutrons. These could arise either from the decay of alpha
particles in the rock or from spontaneous fission. The chain of
37reactions whereby fast neutrons could produce Ar is as follows;
35 35Cl + n S + p
^^37  ̂ 37Cl + p -»■ Ar + n
It is clear that the construction of a large tank underground 
would be a major engineering feat in its own right. As well as 
finding a suitable mine/ Davis had to prepare estimates of the
cost and feasibility of building such a tank. These estimates would 





1963, Bahcall*s Discovery of Analogue State Makes the Experiment 
Even More Feasible
Whilst Davis was engaged with these experimental problems there 
was a development on the theoretical front which made the prospects 
for funding the experiment much more favourable. Bahcall had 
started to prepare detailed calculations of all the likely uncert­
ainties in the theoretical prediction. As part of this effort he 
recalculated the neutrino-capture cross-section for chlorine 
thirty-seven. He presented his result at a seminar at the Niels 
Bohr Institute in Copenhagen,in the late summer of 1963. During
the seminar Nobel Laureate,Ben Mottelson ,asked Bahcall whether
37he had considered transitions from the ground state in Cl to
37excited states of Ar , and in particular one state known as 
the analogue state. These would greatly enhance the interaction 
probability of boron-eight neutrinos. The importance of these 
types of state were only just beginning to emerge in nuclear physics 
and Bahcall had not looked at this possibility. He described what 
happened next:
I got very excited about it and I learnt a lot of nuclear 
physics...how to calculate these things...I worked extremely 
hard...I went back to Caltech and calculated things very 
accurately...I gave a seminar at Caltech where I seemed to 
get off OK. The idea was OK and in fact people got very 
excited about it. So I called Davis. He then invited me to 
come to Brookhaven to give a seminar there. I think that 
was the first time we met.
Bahcall's discovery of the analogue state was important because
it boosted the predicted flux of neutrinos which Davis could
expect to detect. As Davis told me:
That was crucial in arguing for the experiment. That meant 
that if you did build the experiment then you would expect 
in those days a neutrino-capture rate of between five and ten 
a day.[in other words an 'easily' measurable rate .]
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The analogue-state discovery was also important for other
reasons,as can be seen frcan Bahcall's account of what happened when
he came to Brookhaven to give the seminar:
He [Davi s ] had arranged for us to meet the director of 
Brookhaven, Maurice Goldhaber. Ray and I talked to Maurice 
about the experiment. Ray's opinion was well we had to 
sell Maurice or else we wouldn't get the experiment. Ray's 
opinion was that this nuclear-physics trick [ the analogue 
state'] would be something that Maurice would be turned on 
about, because he was himself a very bright nuclear theorist 
amongst other things...He would think that that's a cute 
idea and get turned on about it. So we decided to sell him 
the experiment based mainly on this trick. Then more or 
less that worked.
As was stressed above, Goldhaber's backing was essential in 
order to persuade the AEG to fund the experiment. It seems that 
Goldhaber shared the scepticism which many 'hard' (nuclear and 
particle) physicists displayed towards astrophysics. As Davis 
told me:
A person like Maurice Goldhaber...most physicists of that 
type talk about hard physics, really detailed calculations, 
things you know about and so on. Astrophysics is a kinda 
looser subject. One of the obstacles was to convince 
Goldhaber that the whole thing made sense...And Goldhaber 
was never against it, but I think he had that attitude.
'I don't think I really trust these guys with their calculations'.. 
From Goldhaber's viewpoint, you spend the money for the 
experiment and [if] you don't see anything - so what? It 
doesn't really tell you anything.
Goldhaber's approval, it seems, was won by the influence of Bahcall
who was able to stress the breakthrough in the relatively 'hard'
nuclear-physics part of the calculation. Again the influence of
the Kellogg group in helping to bring Davis's project to fruition
can be seen.
Fowler, too, soon added his voice in the attempt to persuade
Goldhaber. In a letter to Goldhaber dated November 26, 1963, he wrote:
It is my feeling that the Davis experiment is now more than ever 
a promising one and I think it is worth a try at submitting a 
proposal to NASA as well as to the AEG or other agencies. If 
there is any way I can help I am at your service.
loo.
Fowler's suggestion of an application to NASA stemmed from a seminar
given by Bahcall which had been attended by several NASA officials. It
seems that they expressed interest in the project.
Goldhaber, in any case, was by this stage persuaded. In his reply 
37to Fowler he wrote:
As soon as Ray has reached a decision on the particular mine he 
wants to use, the details of the detector and the cost of the setup, 
we would like first to approach the AEG for support. I may call 
on your help at that time.
Again, Fowler's offer of help is acknowledged - an offer which may be 
taken up later.
1963 - Publicising the Proposed Experiment
Apart from convincing key individuals of the worth of the experiment
it was, of course, important to have a favourable climate of opinion for 
the project. An opportunity to inform other astrophysicists of develop­
ments arose in November 1963 when a meeting on stellar evolution was
38held at the Institute for Space Studies,New York. This meeting was
attended by Gameron (the co-organiser), Fowler,Sears,Iben,Bahcall and
Davis amongst others. Bahcall and Davis gave a presentation at the 
39meeting. One participant told me of the efforts of Bahcall at this
meeting in urging his colleagues of the need to give their support to
a solar-neutrino experiment.
The wider community of physicists would also need convincing. Fowler,
in particular, saw the special need for this as part of the drive to get
funds.Davis recalled what happened at thee meeting referred to above:
Willy Fowler was jumping on us and he said 'You've got to 
do this. You've got to write something that everyone can 
look at.' He said 'You'll never get the money to build it 
unless you publish something on this.' So I started writing 
something with John. And I remember during this meeting he
and I sat in an office and we were outlining it.
Davis (1964) and Bahcall (1964a) eventually wrote separate
articles which were published 'back to back' in Physical Review
Letters in March 1964. The format of this, their first major
loi .
39apublication stemming from their collaboration , was to be that of
all their subsequent major publications. Davis told me why they
had decided to use this format rather than producing a jointly-
authored article;
See,the topics were very different in that John's going to 
tell you something about solar-model calculations, cross- 
sections, and what kind of effect you expect to observe...
I said the thing for me to do was... to write about the 
experiment in the Barberton mine. I had a result and I could 
set a limit and then say what the possibilities were for 
building a bigger one. So that's why I wanted to write it 
separately and John too. See,I can't say anything about 
solar models, and the cross-sections, that's completely 
separate from my experience and my background. To do the 
experiment, how to do the experiment, I know all about that.
As we will see later, this publication format is of some
significance because it symbolises the nature of the partnership
that was developing between the experimental and theoretical
groups. It was a partnership which had ccamnon ends - the establishment
^ solar-neutrino experiment - but which allowed for the
separate competences and responsibilities of the two parties.
Although the papers were written separately,both partners
kept in close touch over their respective drafts, and early drafts
of both papers were circulated around the Kellogg group. The
connection between Davis and Bahcall, and Fowler in the writing
of these papers can be seen in the following comments, taken from
40a letter of Bahcall's to Davis:
Everyone here was pleased with your draft. I am enclosing one 
copy with a few minor questions on it...
As far as Willy and I are concerned, the enclosed draft of my 
part is final unless you want to make some changes...We can 
send out preprints from Kellogg to Willy's astronomy list 
(they probably don't read Phys. Rev. Letters).
This last point again shows the importance of reaching as many
scientists as possible. The network of scientific communication centred
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on the Kellogg 'Orange Aid*and'Lemon Aid' Preprint series enabled
many hundreds of scientists throughout the U.S. and worldwide to
41get speedy access to Bahcall's and Davis's papers. This was
another small step in the development of solar-neutrino astronomy 
which was helped by the resources at the command of the Caltech, 
group.
That the Bahcall-Davis articles could be important for winning
direct support, or even funding, for the experiment is evident
from the reaction of at least one scientist to them. Davis had
sent copies to Alvarez, who, as mentioned in Chapter 2, was the
physicist who had played such an important role in the original
design of the chlorine experiment. This was the first formal
contact between these two pioneers of radiochemical neutrino
detection. Davis had only asked Alvarez for his comments but he
42received, in return, a warm letter of support. Alvarez wrote:
I'm very impressed by your work to date and by your proposal 
in general. It makes me feel fifteen years younger.
I'd be happy to give my support in a more formal manner, 
as for example by being asked for an opinion by an NSF 
officer who might be thinking of funding the experiment.
With the funding application going ahead to the AEG, Fowler's 
earlier offer of help with NASA, and now Alvarez's possible inter­
cession with the NSF, the solar-neutrino project looked to be in 
a good position with respect to all the major US funding agencies.
Alvarez's response to the appearance of the Bahcall-Davis 
papers was, of course, atypical in view of his own earlier conn­
ection with the project. Most people, upon reading the papers, 
could not be expected to react by pledging their support and 
offering help with funding agencies (few would even be in a position 
to offer such assistance). The major influence of the articles was in
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bringing about an atmosphere in which the eventual funding of the
43experiment would seem appropriate.
In addition to this publication in the mainstream scientific
literature, another publication, in which Bahcall's and Davis 's
plans were outlined, may have been important. This was an article
written by Herbert Reeves of the University of Montreal, Canada,
44for the semi-popular astronomy journal Sky and Telescope. Reeves
had kept in close contact with Davis about his proposed article
throughout 1963^ and had even proposed that Davis should be a co-
45author - a suggestion which Davis turned down. The article
was eventually published in May 1964. Its expected influence
46can be seen from Davis's comment.to Reeves that:
The article is well written, and should help to draw., support 
for the experiment.
One final means of drawing attention to the project was through
the popular media and the press. In early 1964 an article appeared
in Time magazine describing the experiment and it seems that the
47New York Times also gave coverage. The Time article is reproduced 
in Fig. 3.3.
It was hintëd to me by one respondent that the press interest
had been cultivated deliberately. Ray Davis could not remember any
particular effort being made in this direction but he did remark
somewhat elliptically:
Of course, I don't know what Willy Fowler is doing:: in the 
background 1
Although he could not recall the press coverage in this particular
case, the general importance of publicising experimental proposals
was stressed by Bahcall. He told me:
I don't remember it being crucial but all of those things helpëd.
Certainly they help, popular interest and scientific recognition





At Long Island’s Brookhaven N a­
tional Laboratory, Physicist Raymond 
Davis Jr. is designing one of thfe most 
extraordinary instruments known to 
modern science. When completed, it will 
be a swimming pool full of cleaning 
fluid, and will be installed in a deep 
mine to X-ray the sun.
Scientists have long been fascinated 
by the sun’s center, where all the energy 
originates that supports life on earth. 
But the only practical way to observe 
this arcane spot is to study the neu­
trinos that are a by-product of its fierce 
thermonuclear reactions. The ghostly 
particles pay hardly any attention to 
matter. All except one in a billion of 
them pass through the sun’s dense ma­
terial and escape into space.
Rare Reaction. Dr. Davis estimates 
that about 54 billion solar neutrinos hit 
each square centimeter (.155 sq. in.) of 
the earth’s surface every second. They 
have no effect that is normally detecta­
ble, but if they happen to collide with 
atoms of chlorine 37, a small fraction 
of the collisions results in the manu­
facture of radioactive argon 37. When 
it occurs, this rare reaction gives Dr. 
Davis a chance to count solar neutrinos.
Backed by funds from the Atomic 
Energy Commission, Dr. Davis plans 
to set his 100,000-gal. tank in a mine 
at least 5,000 ft. deep to protect it 
from cosmic rays. Only neutrinos will 
reach the tank’s supply of perchlorethy- 
lene, a cleaning fiuid containing about 
one quarter of chlorine 37. D r. Davis 
estimates that out of the countless tril­
lions of solar neutrinos that will be pass­
ing through the tank, between four and 
eleven per day will react with chlorine 
37 atoms.
Firmer Figure. To detect these few 
hits, a stream of helium will bubble 
through the tank, sweeping any argon 
37 and carrying it to a charcoal filter. 
Then a special instrument will count 
the argon atoms by means of their ra­
dioactivity. Their number will be in di­
rect proportion to the total number of 
neutrinos emitted by the sun.
First thing the neutrinos will measure 
is the temperature of the core. Astro­
physicists now estimate it at 29 million 
degrees P., but the neutrino observa­
tory will give a firmer figure because 
the nuclear reaction that produces solar 
neutrinos is favored by high tempera­
ture. If  Dr. Davis counts more neu­
trinos than current formulas predict, 
astrophysicists will know that the tem­
perature of the core is higher than they 
have guessed.
TIME, JANUARY 3. 1964
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Goldhaber, who, as the director of BNL, had had many dealings with
the press was, it seems, able to advise Bahcall, who was still
a novice at this kind of thing. For instance, in a postscript to
48a letter he sent Goldhaber, Bahcall wrote:
I took your advice with respect to the Times reporter. It 
however took much time. 2 hours original interview plus 
1 hour correcting by phone most of her mistakes. Hope that 
made up for the original Snafu.
The nature of the 'original snafu' is not evident but, if nothing
else, the above comment shows that Bahcall was experiencing the
peculiar difficulties inherent in using this medium to draw attention
I
to the experiment.
It is doubtful whether press articles had much influence upon
scientists compared with the effect of the articles published in
Physical Review Letters. However,they did have some 'spin off
for Davis. It seems that the commercial companies with which he
was negotiating at the time over the construction of his apparatus
49were suitably impressed. As Davis wrote:
It is interesting that these tank people take us more seriously 
after the article in Time.
Davis Makes his Final Estimates of the Costs and Scientific Aims of
the Experiment
By the start of 1964 Davis had commenced negotiations over 
another possible location for his experiment. This was the Sunshine Silver 
Mine at Kellogg, Idaho (the coincidence in the names did not go un­
noticed) . The company chairman happened to be interested in astronomy 
and thus was keen to have the experiment. Although this mine was not 
as suitable as the Homestake Mine (the rock at the 5,400—feet 
level where the experiment would be sited, less stable, the
backgrounds from natural radioactivity higher, and the support
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facilities, such as hoists and access, less convenient) a realistic 
estimate ($121,000) had been obtained for the excavation of the 
cavity. A mine in Switzerland and one in India also beccune 
available at this time but in the circumstances Davis decided that 
the Sunshine Mine would be the most convenient location for the 
e3q>eriment. Davis had also started negotiations with three companies 
over the building of a 100,000-gallon tank. It was these ccxnpanies 
that were impressed by the Time article referred to above. It 
seemed that a suitable tank could be constructed for about 
$120,000. By March 1964 he had obtained estimates for the full cost 
of the project. The total came to $601,000 (see fig. 3*4).
By this stage the scientific objectives of the e3q>eriment could 
be clearly stated. The theoretical prediction at the time was such 
that he should expect to observe a signal of 40 SNU or lO counts 
a day. Davis claimed that he would be able to measure this to 
within 10%. Also,if the prediction was too high,he expected 
that he would be able to look a factor of ten lower. That is he 
might be able to see as little as 4 SNU; . The optimism with which 
Davis viewed the experimental possibilities can be seen in tha 
hope, expressed at the time, that he would be able to detect a 7% 
difference in the signal between measurements made at the perigee 
and apogee of the Earth's orbit. This would confirm that the source 
of neutrinos was indeed the Sun. Two years of observations would 
be needed to reveal this effect. If the measurements were success­
ful he hoped to go on to make long-term measurements with a view to
looking for correlations of the neutrino luminosity with the sun-
-, 50spot cycle.
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Budget Estimate for Solar Neutrino Observatory 
(Prepared at BNL by K.C.Hoffman, March 17, 1964.
Transcribed by R.W.Dodson, July 16, 1964.)
1. Excavation of underground chamber including transfer #130,000
of perchlor into vessel
2. Vessel, installed with supports 110,000
3. Transportation of vessel parts, equipment, and 10,000
erection personnel into mine. Including power and
supplies for erection
4. Equipment, installed in vessel (mixing jets, pumps, 30,000
internals, instrumentation and electrical
5. Analytical equipment including helium ciculator and 21,000
refrigerated trap
6. Engineering, inspection and travel 50,000
7. Equipment hook-up by BNL personnel 10,000
Subtotal #361,000
8. -Contingency (20% of #361,000) 72,000
9. Perchloroethylene (100,000 gallons) 1.68,000
TOTAL #601,000
Fig. 3.4 Estimated Cost of the BNL Experiment 
(Taken from BNL file 'Solar Neutrinos')
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The Final Push for Funding
With the main experimental details, scientific objects and costs 
of the project resettled, Davis at last set about preparing his funding 
application. As the application was initially to be made to the AECV 
who routinely funded most of the work carried out at Brookhaven.^ 
no formal research proposal was needed. At the time, funding 
decisions for individual projects which required money in 
excess of the annual departmental budget, were largely informal and 
were taken in consultation with the scientist seeking the funds and 
the chairman of his department. To this end,Davis, accompanied by 
Dodson, went to the AEG headquarters in Washington and gave a one- 
hour presentation of their plans.They also brought along various 
documents in support of the experiment,such as the detailed cost 
estimate, the plan of the experiment, the Physical Review Letters 
papers and the Reeves article.
The person in the AEG who had responsibility for making the 
funding decision was A.R. Van Dyken who was director of the Ghemistry 
Branch of the Division of Physical Research. Although his 
decision had to go higher within the AEG for ratification,this 
was usually merely a formality. Van Dyken had a very close relationship 
with Dodson. The relationship had been cemented over the years as 
Dodson and Van Dyken had together built up the BNL Ghemistry 
department. Because Dodson administered a yearly budget which 
was allocated by Van Dyken they had had many previous contacts.
Dodsonand Van Dyken would often speak to each other on the telephone 
to discuss financial matters. Thus,Van Dyken was able to keep 
Dodson informed by telephone as to how Davis's project was fairing.
The first signs were not encouraging. It seemed that the AEG was 
rather short of money and it did not look as if the necessary
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$325,000 would be added to the Brookhaven Chemistry Department 
budget for the 1965 financial year.
In response to this pessimistic news,Dodson decided to re­
establish contact with his old friend Fowler, who was spending the 
summer of 1964 at the Institute of Astronomy in Cambridge. As the 
subsequent interchange of correspondence between Dodson and Fowler 
dramatically changed the fortunes of the project, lengthy excerpts 
will be quoted below.
Dodson's letter to Fowler of July 27 reads as follows:
Dear Willy:
Sorry to bother you while you are abroad,: but the time 
has cone to take you up on your offer of a year and a half 
ago to help us get Ray Davis's solar neutrino experiment 
going. I hope you are still so inclined...
This is a tight budget year, and the indications are 
strong that the requested funds will not be forthcoming. 
However, the matter is still under consideration. During 
the considerations of the next few months it would be helpful 
to have an authoritative statement from outside our group 
on the importance of doing the experiment. Would you be 
willing to provide one for our use in presenting the case?
I suppose one can reduce, somewhat crudely, the question 
we need the answer to: why spend a substantial sum trying to 
measure something which is calculated with great confidence 
by nuclear astrophysicists- and who cares about confirming 
the central temperature of the sun anyway? You can imagine 
variations which might occur to hard pressed disbursers of 
funds. We have, of course, given answers ourselves; and now 
we need an e3q>ression of the point of view of an expert 
nuclear astrophysicist.
I hope you can back us up. I'm not suggesting that you 
review the.technical details of Ray's experiment of this time, 
because I think it would be well if you are in a position in 
the::future to be an objective referee for these aspects...
This letter is largely self-explanatory. It seems that Dodson
felt that the presentation to the AEG of a letter of support from
a nuclear astrophysicist independent from the Brookhaven group
would improve the funding prospects. As Fowler had already offer ed
such assistance^ it is natural that Dodson should turn to him for
support. The significance of the earlier interchanges between Dodson
1̂ 0,
and Fowler can now be seen.
Of course, Fowler's independence from the Brookhaven group
in the context of this experiment is somewhat illusory. As we have
seen, Fowler had as much interest as the Brookhaven group in getting
the experiment launched. Arguably he had more interest since it
8was he who had first written to Davis pointing out the B solar-neutrino 
possibility and it was he who had initiated direct contact with 
Dodson. But*to a grant awarding body,such as the AEG, his inde­
pendent institutional position would be sufficient for him to 
be granted the status of an 'independent peer'. Thus, if need 
be, he could be used as an independent 'objective referee'whose 
sii pport for the experiment could be counted upon.
In view of Fowler's previous offers of assistance and his 
own undoubted enthusiasm for the experiment, it is not surprising 
that he replied to Dodson with a glowing letter in praise of the 
experiment. In this,he reiterated the arguments for the experiment 
concerning it being a crucial test of nuclear-astrophysical theory, 
which we have encountered already. These arguments will be looked 
at more closely in the following chapter on the theoretical
prediction. The tone of his letter can be seen from the following
52extracts:
Dear Dr. Dodson
The Brookhaven solar-neutrino experiment has my enthusiastic 
support. It is good to learn that funds are being sought from 
the AEG...I do hope that these funds will be made available.
It is my firm conviction that the experiment proposed by Ray 
Davis is technically feasible and that the results will have 
far reaching significance.
The observation of solar neutrinos and the detection of the 
flux at the earth is crucial to further progress in nuclear 
astrophysics and to related efforts in thermonuclear research 
and the space sciences...
It will be clear that I place the Brookhavensolar-neutrino 
experiment in the forefront of the significant research efforts 
of the present time. The results of the experiment are eagerly 
awaited by those involved in astrophysical, thermonuclear and 
space research.
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Accompanying this formal letter was a hand-written note:
Dear Dick
I hope the accompanying 'formal' letter will be useful.
If you need more (or less) please let me know.
Dodson immediately sent a copy of Fowler's formal letter to Vein
Dyken at the AEG. At the same time he wrote back to Fowler thanking
him for his 'fine l e t t e r W i t h i n  a very short time (approximately
two weeks) Dodson heard by telephone from Van Dyken that the extra
money for the neutrino experiment had been placed in his budget
allocation for the forthcoming year. Soon afterwards Davis broke
54the good news to Bahcall:
There has been some very encouraging news lately on funds for 
our experiment...
Willy wrote an excellent letter to Dick Dodson supporting the 
experiment, and this helped get us over the hump.
The importance of Fowler's letter can be seen from this remark.
Dodson also drew my attention to the role of Fowler's letter. As he 
55informed me:
The reason I believe Fowler's July 31, 1964 letter to me was 
of crucial importance is that before we had it the funding 
prospect was doubtful and after I had used it to strengthen 
our request for funds to the AEG the prospect improved 
dramatically.
Van Dyken, who made the funding decision, stressed to me : 
the importance of his personal interaction with Dodson. No formal 
peer-review process was initiated (it was not standard AEG practice 
at that time). There are no reviews of the e3q>eriment or letters 
of support, other than Fowler's to be found in those AEG files 
to which I was given a c c e s s . M a u r i c e  Goldhaber told me that 
it was possible that he also wrote a formal letter of support, 
but this letter, if written, has not been traced. In any case,
Davis would not have been able to proceed at all without the support 
of Goldhaber. It would seem that Fowler's letter sufficed for
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the purposes of peer review as it came from a noted authority not 
directly connected with the Brookhaven group.
Finally, in connection with the funding of the experiment, it 
is worth noting that the money was eventually transferred to the 
'operating costs' part of the BNL chemistry budget, rather than the 
'capital costs' part where such a major investment in equipment 
would normally have gone. The precedent for such a move had been 
set by the funding of certain thermonuclear experiments which, for 
security reasons, could not appear in the budget as separate' items 
under 'capital costs'. In general, the operating costs part of the 
budget was more flexible and money could be allocated to it 
more easily. This not only made the funding of the neutrino 
experiment easier but also had a beneficial effect on the chemistry 
department as a whole. This was because it meant, in effect, that 
the budget would remain at least at that level of 'operating costs' 
for subsequent years, even after the neutrino e3q)eriment needed 
less money! The benefit which the neutrino experiment brought 
to the chemistry department as a whole was stressed to me by 
Dodson. It enabled him to counter the grouses of other chemists 
in the department who felt that the neutrino experiment was taking 
the 'lion's share' of the budget.
There was to be one more cause for celebration at Brookhaven 
in 1964. Bahcall had, over the previous nine months,:, been trying 
to get nuclear experimentalists interested in making calcium 
thirty-seven. The decay of this isotope by emission of a 
positron was expected to be very similar to aspects of the chlorine 
thirty-seven neutrino capture reaction and it could be used to 
tefet indirectly Bahcall's calculations concerning the analogue state.
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Bahcall had even attempted to get Maurice Goldhaber and his wife
Gertrude Schaff-Goldhaber, a notable nuclear experimentalist, to
look for this isotope. Calcium thirty-seven was finally produced
in November 1964 by a group at Brookhaven. The experiment was
carried out by Arthur Poskanzer, who had beaten the Goldhabers
to the discovery. Bahcall's calculations of the analogue state
were largely confirmed and Bahcall sent a bottle of champagne,
on behalf of the Kellogg group, to Brookhaven in order to celebrate.
This was to be consumed when the solar-neutrino experiment went 
59underground but, in the event, it was opened in Goldhaber's office
60on the occasion of a visit by Fowler on November 17.
As Fowler, Davis and Goldhaber toasted the solar-neutrino 
experiment, they had good reason to celebrate. The partnership 
between the nuclear astrophysicists of Caltech and the Brookhaven 
group had enabled them to secure the necessary funding for then 
experiment. This, of course, was only the first stage in bringing 
the joint venture to fruition. The detector had yet to be built. 
Only then would it be possible to find out just how well the nuclear 
astrophysicists understood the Sun, and whether Davis would at 
last manage to detect some neutrinos.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOLAR-NEUTRINQ ASTRONOMY, 1958-1964
The theoretical developments which underpinned the experimental 
project between 1958 and 1964 forms the subject matter of this chapter. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, it was developments in nuclear-astrophysical 
theory and the intercession of the nuclear astrophysicists Fowler 
and Cameron which first made solar-neutrino detection a feasible 
proposition in 1958. Also, as we saw in Chapter 3, it was the con­
tinuing interest and involvement of theoreticians, and in particular 
the nuclear astrophysicists at Caltech, which eventually led to 
the successful funding of the Davis experiment. To reiterate a 
point that will be made throughout this thesis: the history of 
solar-neutrino astronomy is the history of the interaction between 
experimental and theoretical endeavours.
In this chapter the various changes in the predicted neutrino 
flux are examined more closely. Particular attention is paid to 
the theoretical prediction of 1964, which was so important for 
the funding of the experiment. In terms of the graph of theoretical 
predictions over time shown in Fig.l.1, the focus is on the period 
leading up to the 1964 prediction of 40 SNU.
Much of this chapter, like the preceding one, is descriptive, 
and again, much of the sociological relevance will only become 
apparent later (in Chapter 10 particularly).The material presented 
here is somewhat sparser than that given earlier on experimental 
developments. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, there was not much fundamental theoretical activity 
going on over the period of interest. The main theoretical developments
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in nuclear astrophysics (as outlined in Chapter 2) were, by the 
start of this epoch, already largely complete. By 1958 the basic 
principles of stellar structure had been laid down cind the nuclear- 
energy generation mechanisms of stars were considered to be well
understood, especially for a main-sequence star like the Sun. The
central theoretical concern of the time was the development of 
a detailed solar model using the most recent input data in order to 
produce an exact numerical prediction of the expected neutrino fluxes. 
Although, as fig. 1.1 clearly shows, the precise value of this 
prediction did change over the years, this was caused not so much 
by developments in the underlying physical theory, but rather by 
more mundane changes in the values of the input parameters (such 
as the nuclecir cross-sections) upon which the detailed calculation 
was based. Much of this chapter, therefore, is concerned with how 
values of various key pieces of input data were derived.
A second reason for the dry appearance of parts of this chapter
has to do with the difference between the description of theoretical
and e:q>erimental activity from the point of view of historical
reconstruction. The production of a theoretical prediction does
not usually leave the rich trail of artefacts which accompanies
the construction of a large and expensive experiment. As we have
seen, the need to raise funding and find a suitable location for
the experiment led to many letters being exchanged amongst the.
interested parties. On the other hand, in order to produce a
theoretical prediction all that is required is, at a minimum,
2a pencil and the back of an envelope. And, since most scientists 
dispatch their envelopes to the litter bin, there is not much left 
for the historian to recover!
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It so happens that the generation of the solar-neutrino 
predictions did involve some more visible activity than this.
For instance, several different types of theoretical competence 
were called upon and this led to interactions and correspondence 
between different sorts of theoretician. In addition, the colla­
borative nature of the venture required the theoreticians to keep 
the experimenter informed of their progress. The correspondence 
amongst theoreticians and between theoreticians and experimenter 
provides much interesting material in this case. Interviews with 
theoreticians in which they recalled their work over the period 
also provide a further informative source of data. Nevertheless, 
despite all the advantages which this particular theoretical 
episode presents, theorising is, on the whole, a less visible 
activity than experimentation. Often,all that remains for the 
historian or sociologist to work with is the final theoretical 
result, as reported in the scientific literature. The hazards 
of basing an account purely on what is to be found in the scientific 
literature are too well-known to need reiteration here.^
^34 ^17
The first attempt to produce a concise prediction of the flux
of neutrinos expected in the chlorine-argon experiment was made in
1958. The event which prompted this calculation was, as has been
stressed earlier, the discovery by Holmgren and Johnston that the 
3 4He -He cross-section was much larger than expected. Before that 
discovery there had been little point in calculating the number of 
neutrinos which could be detected in a Davis-type experiment, since 
there were thought to be no neutrinos produced of sufficient energy 
to trigger the detector.
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As can be seen from Figure 2.2, where the full pp-chain is 
3 4outlined, if the He +He reaction takes place then the pp-chain can
be completed by the branch which goes through the decay of boron
eight.The neutrinos emitted by the decay of boron eight - the so-
called 'boron-eight neutrinos' -have sufficient energy to be detected
4by a chlorine-argon experiment. The number of these neutrinos
produced will depend on the comparative rate of He^ consumption by
3 4 3 3the He + He reaction vis-à-vis the He +He reaction (this com­
parative rate is known as the branching ratio). In addition, the 
rate of the Be^+p reaction will also affect the number of boron- 
eight neutrinos produced. The larger the cross-section for this 
reaction, the faster it will proceed and the greater will be the 
number of neutrinos produced.
3 4Before Holmgren's and Johnston's measurement, the He +He cross- 
section for solar energies (known as had been calculated to
have a value of 0.6 eV-bams. This was too small to produce any 
significant amounts of beryllium seven and hence any boron-eight 
neutrinos. Holmgren's and Johnston's measured value was much 
larger (1.2 keV-bams) and held out much more promise for the 
production of beryllium seven. In the light of this experimental 
result, theoreticians re-examined the He^+He^ reaction.^ They 
found that, by describing the reaction mechanism in a different 
way, they could obtain a result of the same order of magnitude 
as that obtained, experimentally, by Holmgren and Johnston.
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, once it became clear that 
there might be a flux of neutrinos to detect, Davis, encouraged 
by the letters he received from Fowler and Cameron, made an 
estimate of the number of events he should expect from boron-eight
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neutrinos. He estimated the boron-eight neutrino flux at the 
Earth's surface to be (J>̂ 8 = 4.3 x 10^^ neutrinos cm ^sec ^ (equiva­
lent to 3,900 SNU , or a capture rate of 7.7 events per day in a 
one-thousand-galIon tank)
Whether this number of neutrinos would be emitted in full
7depended crucially on the, as yet, unmeasured value of the Be -p
cross-section (S^^). Although there were theoretical estimates
of S^^ available these were rather uncertain. The importance
of was pointed out by Fowler^ in his letter to Davis in response
to Davis's initial calculation and elaborated on in his (1958)
article in the Astrophysical Journal. Fowler found that, for the
most probable internal temperature of the Sun and with S^^ > 10 keV-
barns (a value suggested by some calculations^, 4>̂ 8 = 2 x 10^^
“2 —  1neutrinos cm sec . If, on the other hcind, < 10 keV-barns,
then he estimated the flux to be negligible. He noted that the 
'probability that S^^ exceeds 10 keV-bams is rather low' (Fowler, 
1958: 556). Thus a very large flux of neutrinos seemed unlikely.
Cameron (1958) also calculated the likely flux of boron-
9 -2 -1eight neutrinos and obtained >̂̂ 8 = 4 x 10 neutrinos cm sec
The discrepancy between this value and the slightly larger value 
obtained by Fowler seems to have stemmed from Cameron's preferred 
choice of Ŝ .̂  = 1.5 keV-barns (which he estimated from his own 
calculations). As we shall see throughout this chapter,and other 
chapters on the theoretical prediction (6 and 8), different pre­
dictions of the neutrino fluxes can be obtained by different choices 
of nuclear parameters . The discrepancy between Fowler's and 
Cameron's estimate of the boron-eight flux does not seem to have 
been significant enough to have warranted attention at the time.
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In any case, the exacb numerical value of the prediction was of 
little consequence at this stage given the large uncertainties in 
the values of
Although, as we saw in Chapter 3, Davis went ahead and moved 
his 1,000-gallon detector into a mine, any immediate hope of detecting
boron-eight neutrinos vanished in late 1958 when Kavanagh reported
7 8his initial measurements of the Be -p cross-section. He found
9to be only 0.02 keV-barns. With this value the boron-eight
7 -2 -1flux only amounted to 'v̂ lO neutrinos cm sec - an amount considerably
lower thcin both Fowler's and Cameron's previous estimates.
4The Li Possibility
The only other theoretical hope for neutrino detection at the
4time seemed to reside in the Li possibility (discussed briefly in
4Chapter 3). Li could be formed by the reaction chain:
3 4He + p Li + Y
.4 4 +Li He + e + V
The neutrinos emitted would be very energetic and should be detected
by Davis's experiment. However, frcan the theoretical point of
4view the formation of Li seemed unlikely since it was thought to
be particle unstable. AÊ Fowler commented in his 1960 review:
Cogent theoretical arguments based on the empirical 
systematics of light nuclei can be advanced against the 
stability of Li^ to such decay (Fowler, I960: 212).
However,it seems that theoretical arguments alone could not settle
the issue, for Fowler went on to remark:
In spite of these theoretical arguments ggainst the existence 
of Li^...it is clear that more conclusive experimental evidence 
on the matter is urgently needed. Theoretical arguments based 
on specific models cannot be trusted too far. (Fowler, 1960:214, 
his emphasis).
124,
One potential source of experimental evidence was solar-neutrino
12ejqjeriments. As Fowler remarked in a letter to Reines , written
at about the same time as the above comment appeared:
All of this astrophysical uncertainty (over the formation 
of Li'̂  J can be swept away even by a negative [solar- 
neutrino] experiment.
If neutrinos were not detected.in a solar-neutrino experiment it would 
4suggest that Li was indeed particle unstable.
The importance of experiments in settling such issues reflects
the relative lack of precision of nuclear theory. Although the
general properties cind mechanisms of nuclear reactions were well
understood and predictions for simple nuclear systems were reasonably
accurate, predictions for reactions involving conplex systems (i.e.
many-body systems) could not be trusted (as indicated by the
revisions noted above in the theoretical calculations of and S^^).
As it turned out, the new experimental evidence on the stability 
4 'of Li which Fowler hoped for caime, not from solar-neutrino experi­
ments, but from more conventional nudear-physics experiments.
Fowler added a note in proof to his 1960 review pointing out that
Bashkin, Kavanagh and Parker^^ (working at the Kellogg Laboratory)
4had unsuccessfully searched for the formation of Li by the reaction
3 4He + p -»■ Li + Y-
Although Davis's measurement with his 1,000-gallon tank was
thus not needed to set a limit on the particle stability of
lithium four, it later became clear that his results could be used
to rule out the formation of lithium four by another process - a
low energy resonance in the He^ + p reaction (a resonance is a sudden
peak in the cross-section). This possibility was noted by Parker,
Bahcall and Fowler; they wrote:
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...the only experimental limit that can be placed at present 
on the astrophysical importance of the Li^ termination 
derives from the solar neutrino measurements of Davis.
(Parker, Bahcall and Fowler, 1964: 613).
The failure of Davis to detect any lithium-four neutrinos in his
lOOO-gallon experiment (as mentioned in Chapter 3), thus indicating
the absence of lithium four in the Sun, can be seen to be one of
the first significant contributions made to nuclear astrophysics
by solar-neutrino astronomy.
The I960 Solar Model - Sears Becomes Involved
At the same colloquium at which Fowler presented his afore­
mentioned review in 1960, a leading stellar modeller, R. Sears,
14presented his latest solar model. Before going on to discuss
the significance of this particular model a few wor ds must be said 
about solar models in general(a more detailed discussion will be given 
in Chapter 8).
Solar models provide a means of accurately determining the 
temperature-density profile of the interior of the Sun. As the 
temperature and density at different points in the solar interior 
govern the rates at which the nuclear reactions proceed, solar 
models are important in the calculation of neutrino fluxes.
The solar model consists of certain fundamental equations (of a 
partial-differential type) which describe the basic physical 
processes of the Sun. Given an initial chemical composition for 
the primaeval Sun, a series of models can be constructed which 
represents the evolution of the Sun. The solar model is the one 
that matches certain observed properties of the present Sun, 
after the correct period of evolution (4.7 billion years). It is 
this model which gives a picture of the temperature and density 
throughout the current solar interior. The model requires many
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input parameters, such as nuclear-reaction cross-sections and 
opacity tables (these give the distribution of elements throughout 
the Sun). The production of such a model is a complex mathematical 
operation and the problem can only be solved with the aid of a large 
computer programme.
Sears's model used all the latest values for the input parameters 
and was the first to include the new value of As such ,
his model was considered to be the most accurate thus far constructed.
With this model newly available, Davis made a fresh calculation 
of the boron-eight neutrino flux. He estimated that he should observe 
a signal of approximately 50 SNU - a signal which, as we saw 
in Chapter 3, he hoped might be detected with a much larger (100,000- 
gallon) experiment. The calculation was at this stage, however, 
still highly provisional, bearing in mind the variety of uncertainties 
in the array of inputs fed into the solar model. If a large (and 
costly) experiment was to be performed, a much more detailed and 
elaborate calculation would have to be undertaken. Davis, up until 
this point, had been able to make his own highly approximate 
calculations from the information which theorists such as Fowler, 
Cameron and Sears had provided. However, a more detailed calculation 
would have to be carried out by a specialist theorist. With this 
aim in mind, Davis, with the encouragement of Fowler, wrote to 
the one specialist who might be capable of carrying out such a 
calculation in all its gory detail^J Thus Davis got in contact 
with John Bahcall, who, as we have mentioned already, was to play 
a pivotal role in subsequent developments.
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The 1962 Caltech Calculation ,
Bahcall was expert in the calculation of beta-decay rates in
stellar interiors. His calculations were more refined than those
previously attempted. In particular, he took into account the special
physical conditions peculiar to stellar interiors and the effect
of these on nuclear processes. As a result, Bahcall had been able
to suggest some modifications in the Burbidges-Fowler-Hoyle schema
18for the synthesis of the elements.
The particular calculation which Davis hoped Bahcall would be
able to work on concerned the reaction
7 - .7Be + e -+ Li + v
This reaction ccxnpetes with the consumption of beryllium seven by
proton capture (see Figure 2.2). The faster that the electron-
capture reaction proceeds, the fewer will be the number of beryllium-
seven atoms available for proton capture. And, since the proton
capture eventually produces the boron-eight neutrinos, the fewer
will be their number too. Thus knowing the rate of electron capture
accurately is important in the estimation of the magnitude of the
boron-eight neutrino flux.
Bahcall had not calculated this reaction rate when he received
Davis's letter in February 1962. In view of Bahcall's role in
subsequent development, it is worth documenting here why he decided
to work on the solar-neutrino computations at all. Bahcall described
to me his reaction upon receiving Davis's letter:
It was certainly the beginning of my interest and I would 
say in a certain sense was the first thing which led to the 
sequence of events that got the experiment funded. Because 
what actually happened was I had not calculated that rate 
^Be? capture^, that rate involved me in learning some nuclear 
physics of a slightly different kind than I had done until 
then.
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His decision to go ahead and do this calculation was taken in the 
following way:
For me I think the turning point, the reason I decided to 
work on it, is the result of a conversation with a 
theoretical physicist at the University of Indiana...We got 
into a discussion about this letter I got from Davis, and 
I had to decide whether I would spend the time, once I saw 
that it was some time to calculate....So we got into a 
discussion about how unique or fundamental the experiment 
would be...As a result of that conversation I became 
convinced that it was...really a unique way of testing an 
otherwise very fundamental theory.
It can be seen that Bahcall, like the other nuclear astro­
physicists, was attracted by the prospect of a crucial test of the 
theory of nuclear synthesis in stars. In the sense that Bahcall 
was not interested in the detection of solar neutrinos per se, 
but in the theoretical consequences of their detection, then his 
interest in the experiment can be said to be an 'instrumental' one. 
The role of instrumental interests in science in general will be 
discussed in Chapter 10.
Once he became convinced of the worth of the project Bahcall 
started to calculate the rate at which beryllium seven captured 
electrons. By May 1962 he had completed the calculation. His 
results were more precise than previous work because he took into 
account the attractive electron-nucleus interaction (an electro­
magnetic interaction which perturbed the density distribution of 
electrons in the vicinity of the nucleus). Bahcall found the rate
of electron capture by beryllium seven to be slightly less than
19previous estimates. Although this calculation alone did not
throw up any surprises, it was important because it demonstrated 
Bahcall's commitment to the solar-neutrino project, a commitment 
which he was able to pursue by virtue of his fellowship at Caltech 
working with Fowler's group. It was at Caltech,in the summer of
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1962,that other fine computational details that were likely to be 
important for the expected numbers of boron-eight neutrinos were 
investigated.
In order to make a sufficiently detailed calculation, several
types of expertise were needed. It first of all required someone
with a theoretical nuclear physics background who could calculate
all the relevant nuclear-reaction rates (both in the Sun and in the
experiment) - this was Bahcall's particular expertise. In addition,
knowledge of the latest experimental values of the nuclear-physics
cross-sections was needed. This was provided by Fowler and those
nuclear physicists working with him in the Kellogg Laboratory.
Lastly, it was necessary to have a detailed solar model which used
all the latest input parameters and from which the neutrino fluxes
could be calculated. This model was provided by two astrophysicists
who were working at Kellogg at the time, R. Sears (whose work we
encountered above) and Icko Iben. Sears and Iben were two of the
leading specialists in the construction of computer models of stars.
Bahcall knew of the work of Sears and Iben before he joined
the Caltech group; as he told me:
I had in mind organising those guys to help me calculate 
the neutrino flux accurately; that was the project I 
had in mind.
The stellar-model specialists, and in particular Iben, were, however, 
not as keen on the project as Bahcall. They were more interested 
in the late stages of stellar evolution and could see little point 
in making a very detailed calculation for the Sun, which was con­
sidered to be well understood anyway. The situation was described 
to me by one respondent, familiar with the Kellogg group, as follows:
You see most astrophysicists are interested in stellar 
models in general, and what you would like to do is to 
develop the theory of the understanding of the evolution
i?o.
of stars, so they are interested in the general case. So 
what John |fBahcall] said was *1 want you to calculate 
the Sun, the best you can, because you know all about the 
Sun.' The replies were 'Why do that? The Sun is just 
one star, you know it's a typical star but why do you have 
to know that much about the Sun? There is no need to 
calculate that well.'
Eventually it seems Bahcall persuaded Sears to help him. However,
Sears needed to use Iben's cœiputer programme, which was the best
for the job. What happened next was described to me by Bahcall
as follows:
Icko was very unwilling to do that, he thought it was a 
'boon docker' Clow-status problem]. He wasn't really 
interested in that. He wanted to find out how stars 
evolve, that was his thing...He didn't want to bother 
to use his code for this purpose. So it required some 
intervention from Willy Fowler...He agreed to use his 
administrative control to get Icko to let Dick Sears 
use his programme, and I think that what happened was 
he taught Dick how to use his programme in a few hours and 
Dick punched the cards.
Bahcall told me his role was:
I sort of told them what we wanted out, what we wanted to 
calculate, and we calculated it with some improved reaction 
rates.
The most important of the new values for the reaction rates used 
3 4was that for the He + He reaction, the cross-section of which had 
just been remeasured by Parker and Kavanagh at K e l l o g g . T h e i r  
result, S^^ =0.5 keV-barns, was smaller than the previous value 
obtained by Holmgren and Johnston (1.2 keV-barns).
The result of the Kellogg calculations of the boron-eight
7 - 2 - 1flux (4>g8 = 3.6 X 10 neutrinos cm sec ) was communicated to
21Davis by Fowler. This flux still seemed to be too small to
warrant an experiment. One thing the computation did reveal,
0
however, was the acute temperature dependence of the B flux.
Fowler pointed out that, if the temperature of the Sun (T^^^) was 
actually higher by ten or twenty percent of tne standard value, then
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the B neutrino flux would be increased by factors of seven and forty
respectively. The possibility of such an error in the temperature
seemed unlikely but a new rationale for the Davis experiment was
now apparent - it would constitute a very sensitive thermometer.
Although it might not detect any neutrinos, it could be used to
set an upper limit on the solar temperature. As Fowler wrote to 
22Davi s:
We feel that the probability for such an error in T^^^ is 
very small. On the other hand, the positive detection of 
high-energy neutrinos from the Sun would certainly shake up 
the astronomers and nuclear physicists and this might be a 
good thing! A negative result would also be valuable in 
that it would provide an upper limit for the central temperature 
of the sun. All valid solar models must have a central 
temperature below this limit.
Davis, whose main aim, as we have seen, was to detect something,
was naturally disappointed when he heard of the results of the
23latest calculation. As he wrote to Fowler:
g
It appears that the harder one looks at the B neutrino 
flux the lower it gets.
Beryllium-Seven Neutrinos
Davis, however, also drew the attention of the Kellogg group
to a point which they had neglected - a point which made the
prospects for his proposed experiment slightly more encouraging.
He noted that the neutrinos produced by the electron capture of
beryllium seven (see Figure 2.2) had sufficient energy (just)
24to trigger his detector. Indeed,Davis estimated that he would 
see more neutrinos from this reaction than from the decay of 
boron eight. He calculated that with a predicted flux, =
3.2 X 10^^ neutrinos cm ^sec he should expect 2.2 captures/day 
in a loo,OOO-gallon tank whilst only 0.05 captures/day would result 
fran the boron-eight flux. Davis felt that these calculations meant
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25the 100,000-gallon experiment 'still looks feasible'.
The Kellogg Group soon wrote back to Davis acknowledging the
importance of the beryllium-seven flux. As Bahcall commented:
this is a very nice point, one which we had overlooked 
completely.
However, Bahcall was not as optimistic over the contribution made 
by the beryllium-seven flux to the overall number of events to be 
detected. This was because he estimated the cross-section for 
beryllium-seven neutrino capture by chlorine thirty-seven to be a 
factor of twenty less than the value upon which Davis had based 
his calculation. (It must be remembered that the number of events 
detected depends on the capture cross-section as well as the flux).
It seemed to Bahcall that there would be little hope of detecting 
beryllium-seven neutrinos.
Bahcall's pessimism over the importance of the beryllium-seven 
flux was, however, to be shortlived. Within a week he had dis­
covered an error in his estimation of the capture cross-section
(this was because he had used an incorrect value for one of the 
27parameters). His revised estimate was in close agreement with
the original value quoted by Davisi Thus it seemed beryllium-seven 
neutrinos could be detected after all.
Bahcall immediately wrote back to Davis pointing out his mistake 
He concluded his letter by drawing Davis's attention to yet
28another error (this time made by Davis) in the calculations. He wrote:
I am now leary of suggesting another result in contradiction 
to yours, but I obtain 0.5 captures per day per 100,000 
gallons for B® neutrinos rather than the 0.05 captures per 
day which you give...
Davis, upon reworking the calculation, agreed that Bahcall's pre­
diction of the number of events due to the boron-eight flux was in 
29fact correct. He had made a simple numerical error in his earlier
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calculation. However, he was still not certain that he was in 
agreement with all Bahcall's predictions. In particular he was
puzzled as to why Bahcall had used a beryllium-seven flux of
10 -2 -1 (t>ĝ 7 = 2 X 10 neutrinos cm sec in his letter setting out the
10 -2 -1 results, but preferred a value of ^^^7 = 1 x 10 neutrinos cm sec
in a preprint he had co-authored with Fowler, Iben and Sears (Bahcall,
Fowler, Iben and Sears, 1963). Davis felt the higher value (i.e.
the one given in the letter) seemed 'reasonable'. Davis concluded
his letter by tabulating the various results that had been obtained
(see Fig. 4.1). It was this prediction which convinced Davis that
a 100,OOO-gallon experiment would be feasible.
Figure 4.1 Theoretical Predictions 1963
Source . -2 -1 Ç cm sec 20 cm Captures/10^ gallons SNUs
Be’ 2.0 X 10^° 2.7 X 10-46 1.1 5.4
b 8 3.6 X 10^ 6.5 X 10-44 0.5 2.34
Total 1.6 7.7
The anomaly over the differing values for the beryllium-seven
flux was cleared up by Bahcall in his next letter to D a v i s . H e
indicated that his earlier value of d> 7 = 2.0 x 10^^ neutrinosBe
-2 -1cm sec was actually a guess made before the detailed work carried 
out by Iben and Sears and that the preferred result was the smaller 
value given in the paper. With this flux the total signal became 
5 SNU. Bahcall, at this point, felt able to express agreement 
with the rest of Davis's figures.
It was this letter by Bahcall to Davis which spurred Fowler
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into writing in support of getting the experiment funded (see Chapter 
3, p.92 ) .Thus this particular calculation played an important 
part in the development of the project.
Discussion of the Caltech Calculation and Davis's Response
The above description of the minutiae of the negotiations between 
Bahcall and Davis as different results were exchanged has not been 
included solely for the sake of historical exegesis. Something of 
the messy character of making a theoretical prediction is reflected 
in this episode. This messiness is not normally visible by the 
time such predictions appear in the literature. The production of a 
theoretical result in science seems to be no more straightforward an 
activity than the production of an experimental result.
Most of the discussion between Bahcall and Davis over the 
result concerned the standardised numerical part of the calculation, 
and most disagreements could quickly be put down to 'mistakes' or 
'errors', which were readily acknowledged as such by both parties.
It is as if two scientists had been discussing an experimental result 
and one of them realised that the other had forgotten to switch on
32part of the apparatus. Such a mistake would be quickly acknowledged. 
However, it is not clear that the disagreement between Bahcall and 
Davis over the preferred value of the Be^ flux could be settled quite 
as easily. In this case, Davis seems to have been content to accede 
to Bahcall's views - and after all Bahcall was the theoretician: 
However, as we shall see later, there are aspects of the theoretical 
calculation where theoreticians can disagree amongst ; themselves, 
and where the production of a consensus is much more problematic.
Interestingly enough, the possibility that the above prediction 
of the neutrino fluxes might contain a further 'error', unrecognised
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at the time and of no consequence today, was pointed out to me in 
passing by one of the participants in the above calculation. This 
scientist told me that when the error was discovered, the pre­
diction was later jokingly referred to as FIBS (Fowler, Iben 
Bahcall and Sears). He went on to say:
I think we made a mistake in calculating the age of the model, 
and thought it was-.four and a half billion years old, and it 
was only three billion. It turned out two or three years 
later...that was 'FIBS' because we had told a lie about the 
age of the Sun.
Whether this error would have had a significant effect on the neutrino
34flux is an open question. However, the above comment does serve
to remind us that theory is no more a guarantee of immutable 
scientific truth than experiment. It seems likely that most theore­
tical results, like experimental results, are uncontentious and thus 
there is often little emphasis placed upon checking them.^^
The Precision of the Prediction
Once Bahcall and his colleagues at Caltech had estimated the 
magnitude of the neutrino fluxes' they set about assessing the
error in the predictions due to possible uncertainties in the input
36parameters upon which the solar model was based. Four areas of 
uncertainty were investigated. These were: (1), composition un­
certainties (uncertainties in the amount of hydrogen, helium and 
heavy metals which make up the Sun), (2), solar age uncertainties,
(3), opacity variations (the opacities describe the distribution 
of elements throughout the Sun and are crucial in the determination 
of the rate of flow of energy out of the Sun), and (4), nuclear- 
physics uncertainties. The detailed work on the problem was carried 
out by Sears (1964, 1966). He confuted several different models 
(referred to in more detail below) in order to see how the neutrino
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fluxes varied with the choice of different input parameters. His 
conclusion was:
All models predict nearly the same neutrino fluxes, within a 
factor of two, so we can have some confidence in the neutrino 
fluxes predicted from these models (Sears, 1966: 248).
Bahcall was even more confident of the certainty with which the
37
prediction was known. He informed Davis:
You will be encouraged to know that we can't find uncertainties 
in the model or the parameters (1) - (4) [those referred to 
abovej that lower the predicted fluxes by more than 40 percent. 
Moreover, the biggest uncertainty (relative to the v fluxes) 
is probably the S^ for He^-He^ [i.e. S^^] and this raises 
somewhat the predicted fluxes.
This comment by Bahcall reflects the particular concern over 
uncertainties which might reduce the neutrino fluxes. As the 
experiment could easily detect a larger flux,it was of more importance 
to explore the lower limits of the predicted value. Thus Bahcall 
was encouraged that the largestuncertainty, which was in the value 
of would probably lead to an enhanced flux.
The Case of
The uncertainty in the He^-He^ cross-section had first been 
noticed by the Caltech nuclear physicist, Peter Parker, when he was 
carrying out a detailed review of all the nuclear-physics data 
relevant to the pp-chain (this review was eventually published 
as Parker, Bahcall and Fowler, 1964). As this cross-section plays 
an important part in events described later (in this chapter and 
in Chapter 6) the nuclear-physics issues it raises will be gone into 
at some depth.
The key point about most of the nuclear cross-sections that 
are used in the solar-neutrino calculations is that they are measured 
in the laboratory at much higher energies than pertain in the Sun.
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This is because the reactions proceed too slowly to be studied in 
the laboratory by the use of energies comparable to those found in 
the Sun. The cross-sections are studied at much higher energies 
(several hundreds of keV) in the laboratory and then the results 
are extrapolated down to low energies (a few keV). The main energy 
dependence of the cross-section at low energies comes from the 
Coulomb field (a repulsive electromagnetic field which exists 
between like-charged particles). The usual procedure is to factor 
out an exponential factor (corresponding to the Coulomb field) 
from the cross-section data in order that a straight line extra­
polation can be made. The remaining cross-section (known as the 
S-factor) is assumed to be constant or else to vary linearly with 
energy. Thus,the extrapolation to low energies is carried out 
simply by a straight-line extension of the S-factor plot against 
energy.
In practice the S-factor may display some non-linear energy
dependence. In such cases it is often not clear which is the best
extrapolation to take and nuclear-theoretical considerations and
'parsimony' often combine to produce an 'educated guess'. The
arbitrary element in the extrapolation procedure is well exemplified
3 3by the case of the He +He reaction data.
In Fowler's early reviews of the stellar nuclear-physics
data (e.g. ,1954, I960), the value of S  ̂was given as 1100 keV-barns.
This value was derived from such cross-section measurements made by
38a group at Oak Ridge in 1954. The plot of S-factor versus
energy obtained from the Oak Ridge data is shown in Fig. 4.2.
It can be seen that the cross-section seems to vary linearly with 
energy before tailing up at about IlOO keV-barns. is obtained
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Fig. 4.2 Cross-Section Factor S33
Data of Good, Kunz and Moak.








from this plot by extrapolating down to zero energy (i.e., the point 
where the S-factor axis is intersected - known as the zero-energy- 
intercept). It seems that Fowler's value for S^^f 1100 keV-barns, 
was obtained by drawing a horizontal lihe across to the S-factor 
axis from the lowest point in the S-factor curve (dotted line 'a'
in Figure 4.2). When Parker re-examined the data in 1963 it became
clear'that another extrapolation was possible. This is the con­
tinuation of the downward trend in the data until it intercepts 
the S-factor axis at about 200 keV-barns (dotted line 'b' in 
Figure 4.2). With the possibility of this alternative extrapolation, 
Parker, Bahcall and Fowler wrote in their review article that:
The correct value...may be as much as a factor of 5 or even
10 different from the value quoted above [1100 keV-barns].
(Parker, Bahcall and Fowler, 1964: 615).
Although they noted that the available data was also 'not inconsistent' 
with an intercept of IlOO keV-barns, they felt that this value 'may
have been determined by the limitations of the Oak Ridge experiment'
(Ibid: 615). In other words, it was felt that the upward
trend of the last two points (those at lowest energy) could be 
caused by experimental errors (such as beam straggling) which 
were known to be more severe at lower energies. In any case,
Parker et al.urged that further experimental measurements be 
attempted. With this in mind, Kellogg nuclear physicists Bacher 
and Tombrello eventually ccxmnenced work on this reaction in an 
attenpt to get better low-energy cross-section measurements (Bacher's 
and Tombrello's results will be discussed in Chapter 6.)
The significance of all this for the neutrino-flux predictions 
can be seen from Figure 2.2. A lower value for the cross-section
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for the He +He reaction would mean that the competing He^+He^ 
reaction would take place more often and hence would lead to more 
beryllium-seven and boron-eight neutrinos being produced. Thus 
Bahcall, as we saw above, was not greatly worried by the uncertainty 
in the extrapolation, as the uncertainty suggested an increased 
signal.
As Peter Parker, who shared Bahcall's view that the cross-
section would probably be lower, told me:
Whenever you do scientific measurements I think to some 
extent they are coloured by our own prejudices and what 
you'd like kinda to see happening and so on. I think to 
some extent in those days looking at solar neutrinos 
was something we were really looking forward to and 
wouldn't it be nice if the He^-He^ cross-section was lower, 
then we will have a much more predominant neutrino flux. And 
I think to some extent that one probably expected that 
was what was going to happen. And to some extent it's also 
true that if you look at the cross-section factor it makes 
a downward trend and then it turns up. So one would 
suspect that the turning up is probably suspect, because 
they're going to lower energies and therefore your measurements 
are really getting pretty erro"~neous at that point.
And maybe really the trend is downward rather than upward 
and therefore one would expect this to go down.
To check the exact effect of a lower value of on the
neutrino flux. Sears (1964), at the urging of Bahcall, computed a
solar model with S^^ = 200 keV-barns. He discovered that, with this
value for the cross •'section, larger fluxes were indeed predicted
7 -2 -1 10(^g8 = 4.5 X 10 neutrinos cm sec and ({).ĝ7 = 1.7 x 10 neutrinos
-2 -1 \ cm sec ) •
Other Work on the Theoretical Prediction - Pochoda and Reeves
In addition to the efforts of the Caltech group, two other 
physicists produced a detailed calculation of the expected neutrino 
fluxes at this time.This work was carried out by a Princeton stellar- 
model specialist, P. Pochoda, and a nuclear physicist at the 
University of Montreal, H. Reeves. As we saw in Chapter 3, Reeves
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was keeping a close eye on developments in solar-neutrino detection, 
and had been in contact with Davis. Pochoda and Reeves constructed
a solar model using all the latest input parameters. Their neutrino-
7 -2 -1flux predictions (<l>g8 = 2.6 x 10 neutrinos cm sec ; ^^^7 =
10 -2 -1 1.2 X 10 neutrinos cm sec ) were in agreement with those of
the Caltech group to within 30%. This was, as Pochoda and Reeves
noted, 'well inside the model uncertainties' (Pochoda and Reeves,
1964; 120). They also attempted to make a more exact estimate
of the uncertainties in the prediction. However, this was a
difficult problem as it was not clear how all the various uncertainties
interacted with each other and back on the model. They wrote:
It is very hard to estimate quantitatively (percentage-wise) 
the accuracy of these values. At though the uncertainties 
attached to the experimental parameters used to build stellar 
models are known to be rather small (usually less than 10 per 
cent), their effect on the models would be extremely difficult 
to estimate. The mathematical framework is indeed far too 
complex. (Pochoda and Reeves, 1964: 119).
Thus they were not able to make a precise quantitative estimate of
the error. Indeed,the detailed treatment of the various uncertainties
in the theoretical model is still a source of contention even today
(see Pinch, 198Cétin Appendix II) .
One of the areas of uncertainty which Pochoda and Reeves
looked at was the error in the nuclear-reaction rates; they noted
in passing that:
The energy generation rates are known to about 10 per cent, 
but the (Be?,p) rate (negligible for energy generation but 
important for neutrino fluxes) is known to be only 50 per 
cent. Much larger uncertainties come from the model itself. 
(Pochoda and Reeveg ,1964:125) .
It will be recalled that the Be^+p reaction cross-section had 
been measured by Kavanagh in 1958. He had made measurements at 
only two energies and hence the extrapolation to solar energies for 
this reaction was rather uncertain.
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Despite the uncertainty in S^^^and the earlier noted uncertainty 
in the reasonable agreement between the Pochoda and Reeves 
calculations and those of the Caltech group gave grounds for 
confidence that the nuclear astrophysicists could predict the 
solar-neutrino flux and that the uncertainties in the prediction 
were not sufficient to prejudice the viability of Davis's proposed 
experiment.
The Importance of the Analogue State
The next important step in the prediction of the expected 
neutrino signal concerned the physicS of the detector rather than 
the Sun. Bahcall, as part of his research into the uncertainties 
in the prediction, had made detailed calculations of the chlorine 
thirty-seven cross-section for various neutrino fluxes. He presented 
his results at a seminar at the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen 
(where he was spending part of the summer of 1963). At this seminar, 
Nobel Laureate ,Ben Motelsohi ,pointed out that there was the possi­
bility of an enhanced cross-section for the energetic boron-eight 
neutrinos because of 'excited state' transitions in the chlorine 
thirty-seven-argon thirty-seven system. In particular, there was 
an excited state of argon thirty-seven known as the 'cinalogue 
state' which would play a dominant part. Transitions are part­
icularly likely to go to this state because it is a similar nuclear 
state to the ground state of chlorine thirty-seven. The much 
higher probability that this state would be excited greatly 
enhanced the cross-section (by a factor of approximately twenty).
The importance of this breakthrough in terms of the funding of the 
experiment was discussed in Chapter 3.
Bahcall's calculations, as presented to the conference on
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'Stellar Evolution' held in New York in November 1963 (Bahcall and
Davis, 1966) and as given in his paper in Physical Review Letters ,
in March 1964 (Bahcall, 1964a) /indicated a substantial detection
39rate for Davis's experiment (40 ± 20 SNU ). As we saw in
Chapter 3, it was with an expected detection rate of this magnitude 
that the solar-neutrino experiment was funded in July 1964. Thus 
it seemed in July 1964 that the solar-neutrino flux could be pre­
dicted with confidence and furthermore that the signal would be of 
sufficient magnitude to warrant an experiment. The confidence felt 
by the nucleeir astrophysicists is reflected in Fowler's letter of
support which, as we saw in Chapter 3, was important in convincing
40the AEC to fund the experiment. Fowler wrote:
...All of the solar reactions suggested theoretically have 
now been studied extensively in the laboratory, directly or 
indirectly, but at energies considerably greater than the 
effective energy of the sun. Extrapolation to solar energy 
involves very large reduction factors which are thought to 
be given quite accurately by current theories of nuclear barrier 
penetration. Detailed analysis of resonance effects is required 
in some cases. The position has been reached where little 
more can be done in the study of the nuclear reaction rates 
either theoretically or experimentally...With our present 
knowledge the neutrino flux at earth can be precisely 
predicted and it will not be a coincidence if the predicted 
value is shown to be correct. In that case it will berpossible 
to proceed with great confidence in further thermonuclear 
and astrophysical researches. On the other hand if a dis­
crepancy is established it will be necessary to review the basic 
ideas as well as the detailed calculations involved in the 
relevant nuclear and atomic physics. The ramifications, in 
this case, are endless and I need not belabor the point.. (My 
emphasis) .
Bahcall's 1964 Prediction - its Relationship to Sears's Predictions
In view of the importance of Bahcall's prediction for the develop­
ment of the experiment it is of interest to ascertain in more detail
how he obtained his result. In Bahcall's 1964 paper, the boron-
7 -2 -1eight flux (4>g8) is given as (2.5 ± 1) x 10 neutrinos cm sec
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and the beryllium-seven flux ((|)ĝ 7) as (1.2 ±0.5) x 10^^ neutrinos 
-2 -1cm sec . Sears's work is cited as the source for these particular 
values. Unfortunately, however, there is no indication of how, in 
detail, these fluxes were derived. A closer examination of Sears's 
work throws light on this issue.
It will be recalled that Sears (1964) computed a variety of 
solar models (ten in all, labelled A-J) with different choices of 
input parameters and derived neutrino-flux predictions for each of 
them. Sears felt that one model in particular (model J) was the 
best one. That is all the parameters were set at their optimum 
for this model. As he wrote in conclusion to the published account 
of his work;
We regard Model J as being most nearly consistent with the 
available data for the Sun at the present time. This model 
has been used as a basis for theoretical calculations (Bahcall,
1964 a,b) on the solar-neutrino detection experiment currently 
being undertaken by Davis. (Sears, 1964: 482).
The main feature of Model J was that it had a lower value of Z (the 
heavy-element content of the Sun) than other models. Sears preferred 
this value because it matched the most recent rocket data on the 
composition of the Sun.
In view of the above statement by Sears concerning the relation­
ship between his work and that of Bahcall,and Bahcall's own 
citation of Sears's work, it would be reasonable to expect the 
neutrino fluxes predicted by Model J to match those used by Bahcall. 
However, if the fluxes predicted by Model J are examined, they are
found to be somewhat lower than those given by Bahcall - (1)̂8 =
7 -2 -1 10 -2 -11.9 X 10 neutrinos cm sec and d> 7 = 0.82 x 10 neutrinos cm secBe
7 -2 -1for Model J, compared with ((>̂8 = 2.5 x 10 neutrinos cm sec and
4>ĝ 7 = 1.2 X lO^^ neutrinos cm ^sec  ̂given by Bahcall. On the
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basis of the fluxes for Model J, a detection rate of 30 SNU 
is obtained as opposed to Bahcall's preferred rate of 40 SNU .
My attention was first drawn to this discrepancy by Sears himself.
He told me;
If you want a bit of history, Bahcall had taken my paper
and had not taken my best model but an average over several
models. My thinking was that I have this very best model £jJ.. 
John's point of view was perhaps 'Well there is a variety 
of uncertainties in this game and Sears has done all this 
great work in showing all these 6 or 8 different possibilities 
and so why not take some average as being a representative 
number?' In other words, he didn't have the faith...that I 
did that my model was absolutely the best. I did because I 
had worked so hard on this thing and I really had the ultimate 
result. But it may also be that John wanted to predict 
as large a number as possible in order to get a sufficiently 
high flux for the AEC to support the whole business, but I 
don't know.
This last intriguing possibility volunteered by Sears, that Bahcall 
may have hoped to make the flux as large as possible in order to 
make the experiment look as attractive as possible will be discussed 
below, and in some detail in Chapter 10. For the moment, the key 
point of interest is that it seems that there is some flexibility 
in the prediction and that different predictions can be got by 
making different assumptions.
It does seem probable that Bahcall took an average over all 
Sears's models. The limits of uncertainty Bahcall set on the pre­
diction (20 - 60 SNU) do indeed cover the range of fluxes predicted 
by Sears. However, Bahcall's 'best' value, 40 SNU, corresponds 
neither to Sears ' s'best'model nor to a simple average of all the 
models. In view of this it seems most likely that Bahcall derived 
his 40 SNU by taking a weighted average.
I raised the discrepancy between the two predictions with 
41Professor Bahcall. Despite digging in his notes he was unable
42to say what the exact relationship between the two predictions was.
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He agreed that he had certainly read Sears's paper and pointed out 
that the domain of values he had given corresponded to the range of 
values predicted by Sears. This of course does not explain the 
difference in the 'best values'. However, he also drew my attention 
to a later letter which Sears had written him which indicated their 
different viewpoints over how to derive a 'best value'. This letter 
lends support to the notion that Bahcall's 'best value' came from 
some sort of averaging procedure. In the piece of correspondence 
referred to. Sears is objecting to Bahcall's predicted boron-eight
43flux (this is a later prediction) ; lie writes:
If you want the 'best' value of something, either (i) you 
ask an expert and he gives you the latest result, duly biased; 
or (ii) you decide to be impartial and survey the available 
numbers and brutally take an average. I personally preach 
the former procedure, arguing that the 'available numbers' 
are not stochastically related.
In other words. Sears claims it is spurious to take a statistical 
average over models which differ in the choice of input parameters. 
After all, the different choices made by the model expert may not 
represent a stochastic di stribution, On the other hand, the pre­
ferred model may also be distorted and represent the idiosyncratic 
choice of the expert. It would seem that both procedures are
44'reasonable' but they do entail differing neutrino-flux predictions.
Bahcall's 'best' value, as it is larger than the flux for Model 
J,must have been derived by considering models which produced 
larger fluxes than Sears'soptimum model. Bahcall's preference 
for a model giving a larger flux may have been related to his views 
on the best value for the He^-He^ cross-section. It will be recalled 
from the discussion earlier in this chapter that Bahcall felt that 
had been over-estimated in the 'standard' model (i.e. J), and 
hence he had got Sears to compute one model using a lower value for
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As was noted above, this model (E) gave a larger flux. There
is one piece of correspondence (between Bahcall and Davis) which
suggests that this particular model may have influenced Bahcall's
45thinking. Bahcall wrote:
I have glways argued that Dick's preferred model gives too 
low a B flux because he uses the standard Sq for He^-He^
[i.e. that WAF fFowler"] used to quote. When Pete [Parker]
and I re-examined the He^-He^ data we were convinced that the S 
measurements were unreliable and the for He^-He^ could 
really be much lower...You will see the evidence of my urging 
in Dick's model E.
3 3From this it would seem possible that Bahcall's views on the He -He 
cross-section led him to place less weight on model J (which Sears 
preferred) and more on Model E which happened to predict a larger 
flux. Hence his overall prediction was larger than that favoured 
by Sears.
Discussion of Sears's Prediction vis-à-vis Bahcall's Prediction
This account of the difference between Bahcall's preferred best
value for the neutrino flux and Sears's best value illustrates
the flexibility possible in neutrino-flux predictions. Both Bahcall
and Sears, for different reasons, arrived at different best values.
It would seem that, if he had so wished, Bahcall could 'reasonably'
have arrived at a lower prediction than he did.
Bahcall, himself, has pointed out the rather arbitrary nature
of the 'best' value. In a paper published in Physical Review which
was a sequel to his 1964 Physical Review Letters paper, he wrote:
The choice of 'best' values for the fluxes presented...is 
somewhat arbitrary since the predicted fluxes depend upon 
nuclear and solar parameters that are imperfectly known.
(Bahcall, 1964 b; B138).
Nevertheless, despite the arbitrary nature of the best value it
was this value which formed the basis for the funding of Davis's
experiment- Of course, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Davis's experiment
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was designed with a possible error in this theoretical value in mind. 
However, the whole project must have looked more compelling to the
funding agency the larger the signal-to-noise ratio that Davis could
^ 46 expect.
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, it was the dramatic increase in
the prediction in 1964 which was so crucial in convincing people
that the experiment should be funded. For instance, Fowler has
written in refer;ence to Bahcall's work on the analogue state],
Bahcall showed that the over-all detection cross-section was 
increased by a factor of 17. It was this more than any­
thing else which convinced the powers that be to give Davis 
the go-ahead for the construction of his neutrino observatory. 
(Fowler, 1969: 365).
The importance of a large theoretical prediction (as well as a feasible
experimental procedure with low backgrounds) has also been stressed
publicly by Goldhaber (whose support, as we saw in Chapter 3, was
crucial). Goldhaber said:
I used to resist this experiment when the predictions were 
ten times smaller and the background ten times larger than 
now so the effort did not seem worthwhile. But the more I 
resisted the more the theoretical value went up. (Goldhaber,
1967: 482).
Goldhaber also added the intriguing remark:
I have often suspected that the theory overshot a little 
(Ibid)
When I interviewed Goldhaber, I asked him to elaborate on this last 
remark. He told me:
I thought they had a bit over-sold it....
You see the first prediction was higher than the later one, 
and you can make the general remark independent of this 
particular case that usually when theorists would like to see 
their theories tested they are overenthusiastic and each factor 
is in favour of predicting a positive effect....
Similar views concerning the nature of theoretical predictions in
general and this one in particular were reiterated to me by several
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respondents. Certainly it can be said that Bahcall was highly
motivated to get support for Davis's experiment. As we saw in
the previous chapter, he and Fowler both played an active role
in seeking funds. As one scientist who had been at Caltech told me:
I would say the way I remember the history, it was John 
Bahcall in particular who made propaganda for doing the 
experiment before Ray Davis started collecting the money 
to actually do it...I thought it was more the theorists 
pushing the experiment..you know rather than the theorists 
calculating things after the experiment has started.
Also, as Bahcall himself told me:
A lot of times you do theory and someone else goes away and does 
the experiment. But in my case I invested such a large amount 
in the experiment and I was so enthusiastic about it that I
felt that as I continued to do work I wanted to sell the
experiment; that is to get funding for it so it would happen.
In view of Bahcall's and Fowler's direct involvement with the
funding process /Lt is evident that Bahcall was well aware of the con­
sequences that would follow from a significant increase in the 
theoretical prediction. The analogue-state discovery provided such 
a dramatic increase. However, as Bahcall finalised his calculations 
in order to predict the most likely signal (the 'best' value), we 
have seen that he averaged Sears's predictions and also interpreted 
the 8^2 data in a way which may have led to an enhanced prediction.
The interpretation of was shared by Parker who explicitly drew 
attention to the 'general hopes at the time for a large flux' (see 
above p. 140 ). As we shall see in Chapter 6, other interpretations 
of the cross-section data are possible. Although I would claim 
that enough detailed documentary evidence has been brought forward 
in this chapter to indicate a connection between funding considerations 
and the 'best' value of the theoretical prediction, 
care must be taken in the evaluation of the above argument.
Firstly,the argument is necessarily of the counter-factual type
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and hence must to a degree remain hypothetical. For instance, we 
have no way of telling that a smaller predicted flux would not also 
have led to the funding of the experiment. A second qualification 
concerns the interpretation of the evidence and, in particular, 
the interview data. This is not straightforward since the interviews 
were conducted in 1978 when it was possible with hindsight to view 
Bahcall's 1964 prediction with suspicion. After all, by 1978, 
his best value had fallen from 40 SNU to 4.7 SNU (see Fig. 1.1).
In such circumstances respondents might have been eager to find a 
social 'bias' to account for the 1964 prediction being exaggerated.
Such a 'bias' would be his 'motivation' to get the experiment funded. 
These reservations will receive more attention in Chapter 10.
Finally it should be noted that it is not being suggested that 
Bahcall as an individual was in any way peculiar in his search for 
ways of predicting large fluxes. As the quote from Parker (above, p. 140) 
makes clear, there was a widespread feeling at the time that S^^ 
would be revised downwards. The sociological rather than psycho­
logical character of the explanation being offered will also become 
more apparent in Chapter 10.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR
1. The development of a detailed solar model over this period was 
facilitated by the introduction of more powerful (and hence 
faster) computers. In 1956 it was estimated that a few hours 
of CCTnputer time would be needed to run a stellar-evolution 
programme (see C.B. Heselgrove and F. Hoyle, 'A Mathematical 
Discussion of the Problem of Stellar Evolution with Reference 
to the Use of an Automatic Digital Computer', Monthly Notices 
of the Royal Astronomical Society, 116, 1956, 515-26). By 
1964 stellar-evolution programmes took only ten minutes to 
run on the latestibii machine (see Sears, 1964, for example). 
Today they take only a few seconds on a CRAY machine.
2. Since the theoretical calculations made in the solar-neutrino 
field were mostly carried out on computers (rather than 
envelopes) artefacts such as programmes and print-outs are 
more likely to be available for historical analysis. Making 
sense of such material, even if it were available (most old 
programmes are discarded), would, however, be a daunting task. 
Even if the historian was competent in computer science, had 
access to a machine, and was prepared to re-run the programmes, 
he/she would probably not get anywhere. In view of the 
complexity of such programmes and their idiosyncratic character, 
usually only the person who wrote them has any chance of making 
them work. For instance, in 1966 ,when it became imperative
to check over a programme run at Caltech in 1964, the only way 
it could be done was to try and persuade the person whose 
programme it was to come back to Caltech and re-run the 
programme. (This incident is discussed in a letter, R. Gears 
to John Bahcall and John Faulkner, May 18, 1965).
3. The locus classicus on the veracity of scientific papers is 
P. Medawar, 'Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?' The Listener,
12th September 1963, 377-8.
4. Davis's experiment is sensitive to neutrinos with energies 
greater than 0.814 MeV. The boron-eight neutrinos have a 
spread of energies with a maximum energy of 14.1 MeV and an 
average of 7.3 MeV.
5. R.F. Christy and I. Duck, 'y Rays from an Extranuclear Direct 
Capture Process^ Nuclear Physics, 24, 1961, 89-101.
6. These values are to be found in: letter, R. Davis to W. Fowler
January 15, 1958, and letter, R. Davis to A. Cameron, February 
4, 1958.
7. Letter, W. Fowler to R. Davis, January 20, 1958.
7 8 7 88. R.W. Kavanagh, 'Be (p,y)B and Be (d,p)Be Cross-Section Measure­
ments', Bulletin of the American Physical Society, 4, 1958, 444.
9. This value is quoted by R.W. Kavanagh, 'Proton Capture in Be ', 
Nuclear Physics, 15, 1960, 411-20, and is given by Fowler in 
correspondence (letter, W. Fowler to F. Reines, January 13, 1960)
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10. The lithium-four neutrinos would have maximum energy of 18.9 MeV 
and an averagj^energy of 9.4 MeV. Fowler estimated a flux
(J)̂ 4̂ = 4 X 10 neutrinos cm”^sec“l (letter, W. Fowler to 
F. Reines, op. cit., note 9).
411. These arguments rested in part on the relative stability of He 
(the 'rival' candidate for formation) and the known instability 
of Li^.
12. Letter, W. Fowler to F. Reines, op. cit., note 9.
413. S. Bashkin, R.W. Kavanagh and P.D. Parker, 'Search for Li ', 
Physical Review Letters, 3, 1959, 518-20.
14. R.L. Sears, 'An Evolutionary Sequence of Solar Models with 
Revised Nuclear Reaction Rates', Mémoires de la Société Royale 
Sciences de Liège,3, 1960, 479-489.
15. Earlier models had assumed that the pp-chain terminated mainly 
through the He^ + He^ reaction (see Fig. 2.2).
16. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, February 19, 1962.
17. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, op. cit., note 16.
18. J.N. Bahcall, 'Beta Decay in Stellar Interiors', Physical Review,
126, 1962, 1143-9.
19. J. N. Bahcall, 'Electron Capture and Nuclear Matrix Elements of 
Be?', Physical Review, 128, 1962, 1297-1301.
3 720. P.D. Parker and R.W. Kavanagh, 'He (a,y) Be Reaction', Physical 
Review, 131, 1963, 2578-82.
21. Letter, W. Fowler to R. Davis, October 17, 1962.
22. Ibid.
23. Letter, R. Davis to W. Fowler, November 16, 1962.
24. The beryllium-seven neutrinos are monoenergetic (0.816 MeV)
and are just above Davis's detector threshhold (0.814 MeV).
It should be noted that, although the beryllium-seven flux 
is much larger than the boron-eight flux, its contribution 
to Davis's experiment is not similarly greater because the 
capture cross-section for beryllium-seven neutrinos is much 
lower due to their small energy.
25. Letter, R. Davis to W. Fowler, November 16, 1962.
26. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, November 20, 1962.
27. Bahcall, it seems, used nuclear values for a key parameter rather 
than atonic values.
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28. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, November 29, 1962.
29. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, December 20, 1962.
30. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, January 3, 1963.
31. It appears that a theoretical result is 'crafted' in much
the same way as an experimental result. The theoretician 
has to use his expertise to decide which formalism to use, 
which approximations can be legitimately made, and which 
standard parameters to use. Such a complex activity is as 
open to 'error' as the production of a result via a complex 
experiment.
32. I would not want to suggest that these 'errors' are funda­
mentally any different from other allegations of theoretical 
or experimental incompetence. It is just that consensus over 
these routine parts of the calculation is so widespread that 
it would be almost unthinkable for a scientist to refuse to 
acknowledge such mistakes. In principle, Bahcall could have 
made an argument for using nuclear rather than atomic parameters 
perhaps it made no difference in this case-but in practice 
no-one wants to fight that sort of battle. Similarly we can 
imagine that an experimentalist might,in some circumstances, 
argue that his failure to switch on some part of his apparatus 
was not important to his result and was a perfectly legitimate 
procedure.
33. It is, however, amusing that Davis, the experimentalist, pointed 
out the beryllium-seven possibility which the theoreticians
had overlooked, and that he got one calculation 'right' which 
Bahcall got 'wrong'. I was also told of another amusing case 
concerning the proposed gallium detector (see Chapter 7).
Bahcall had made a mistake in calculating the amount of gallium 
needed and this was only discovered when an experimenter made 
the same calculation just to see if he could do that sort of 
thing. Bahcall, who at first refused to believe he had made 
a mistake, was, needless to say, rather embarrassed by this 
incident, especially as it meant that the cost of the detector 
doubled in price since twice as much gallium would be needed!
34. This error was not mentioned by any other respondent and there 
has never been any published retraction of the FIBS result.
A lower-aged model would tend to predict smaller fluxes than 
the fully-evolved model.
35. Similarly,many experimental results in science are never 
replicated. For a discussion of the role of experimental 
replication^see Collins (1975, 1976) and Travis (1981).
36. In addition to the beryllium-seven and boron-eight neutrino 
fluxes tabulated in Fig. 4.1, there is a very small signal 
expected from the reaction p + p ^ + e^ + v, and from the
CNO reactions n1^ -*■ C^^ + e"*" + v and -+ N^^ + e'*’ + v.
Since the total signal from these reactions is an order of 
magnitude less than from the beryllium-seven and boron-eight
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36. contd.
contributions they are usually ignored for the purposes of 
Davis's experiment. Sears (1964, 1966) and Pochoda and Reeves 
(1964) did, however, for completeness, calculate the exact 
effect of these smaller contributions.
37. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, August 23, 1963.
3 338. W.M. Good, W.E. Kunz and C.D. Moak, 'The He + He Reactions', 
Physical Review, 94, 1954, 87-91.
39. Pochoda and Reeves (1964) also added a note in proof to their 
paper where they took some initial calculations of the 
effect of the analogue state and combined it with their flux 
predictions. They estimated a total signal also of 'V/40 SNU.
40. Letter, W. Fowler to R. Dodson, July 31, 1964.
41. Letter, T. Pinch to J. Bahcall, September 19, 1979.
42. Letters, J. Bahcall to T. Pinch, January 16, 1980, May 15, 1980.
43. Letter, R. Sears to J. Bahcall, June 27, 1966.
44. Another possible explanation of the difference between Bahcall's 
'best' value and Sears's 'best' value has been pointed out to
me by Professor Bahcall (letter, J. Bahcall to T. Pinch, June 
5, 1980). I was referred to a passage in a later paper by 
Bahcall in which the 1964 calculation was discussed. This 
passage, published in 1971, reads:
It is also of interest to note that Bahcall (1964), 
prior to the completion of Sears's model calculations,
had estimated a E^^Cl (cjo) = 40 ± 20 SNU by using the
then newly derived neutrino absorption cross-sections 
and preliminary neutrino fluxes calculated by Sears.
(Bahcall and Ulrich, 1971: 598). (My emphasis).
The implication of this passage is that the neutrino fluxes 
published by Sears may have been different from earlier values 
which Sears communicated informally to Bahcall. In which case 
it was these earlier values which Bahcall used.
This explanation seems unsatisfactory to me as Bahcall's 
1964a paper was written after Sears had given his initial 
results to the Stellar Evolution Conference held in New York 
in November 1963 (referred to above and in Chapter 3). I have 
a preprint of Searsfe presentation there and his results then 
were the same as in the published versions (Sears, 1964, 1966).
It seems unlikely that Bahcall would not have used Sears's 
most up-to-date model predictions for his 1964a paper. In 
addition,Sears himself has drawn my attention to the statement 
he and Bahcall made concerning this episode in their joint 
review of the field published in 1972. They wrote:
Bahcall,..^adopted an average over several of Sears's 
f1964 J models that gave (f) 8 = 2.5 x 10 ....(Bahcall cind 
Sears, 1972: 33) .
Sears (interview material) pointed out to me that Bahcall had 
raised no objections to this description of events, a description
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44. contd..
which implies that it was the published values of Searsb models 
which were used.
45. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, May 11, 1965.
46. Of course, Bahcall's prediction had a formal error bar attached
to it (± 20 SNU). It could be said that it was the size of 
this error bar, rather than the 'best value' which was the key 
parameter in considering whether the experiment was worth 
funding. However, all the emphasis at the time was placed on 
knowing the 'best prediction' rather than the error bar.
The best prediction was the number that was mentioned in the 
correspondence at the time. No-one said 'Look Üie error bar 
on the theoretical prediction is ± 20 SNU, this means that 
the theorists don't really know what they are talking about'. 
Indeed the emphasis at the time (such as in Fowler's letter
to the AEC - op. cit. note 40) was on the fact that the flux
could be precisely predicted. Also Bcihcall had informed Davis 
in August 1963 (op. cit., note 37) that the uncertainties 
could not lower the flux by more than 40% (this estimate was, 
however, for the 1963 rather than 1964 prediction).
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOLAR-NEUTRINO ASTRONOMY 1964-1967
In this chapter the description of experimental developments is 
continued until the point in August 1967 when Davis was ready to 
make his first measurement. Although much of the detailed material 
presented deals with the Davis experiment, other, less-ambitious solar- 
neutrino detection projects, that were undertaken over this period, 
are also described. As in the previous two chapters the account is 
largely chronological eind descriptive.
In Chapters 3 and 4 the partnership between the Caltech group 
of nuclear astrophysicists headed by Fowler and the Brookhaven group 
centred around Davis was outlined. As we saw, it was in the interest 
of both groups to get a solar-neutrino detection experiment performed, 
and, in 1964, after a detailed prediction of the expected signal 
was made, the funding for such an experiment was procured. After 
1964, the project moved to the experimenta1-construction phase, and 
Fowler became less directly involved. He still kept a close eye on 
developments but he was happy to let the Caltech end of the partnership 
fall upon the shoulders of John Bahcall. One of the main developments 
over the period dealt with in this chapter is the increasingly close 
working relationship which developed between Bahcall and Davis. This 
relationship will be described in Chapter 6 where the theoretical 
developments over the period will be outlined. However, it should 
be borne in mind that none of the experimental developments described 
in the present chapter occurred in isolation from the Caltech 
group. Davis constantly reported on his progress in letters to Bahcall 
and, as we shall see in the next chapter, Bahcall even visited the 
site of the experiment to inspect the rig for himself.
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Negotiations with Mining Companies
Davis, in late 1964, having got the money to construct his 
apparatus, now set about organising the project in earnest. It will 
be recalled from Chapter 3 that he had settled upon the Sunshine 
Silver Mine, Idaho, as the most favourable location for his detector. 
Negotiations between Brookhaven and Sunshine were to be commenced 
in December 1964. Before a contract could be drawn up, the Brook­
haven administration (in the shape of a Procurement Review Board) 
delineated all the technical, contractual and legal problems which 
the neutrino experiment might raise. The Review Board met at 
Brookhaven on October 16, 1964. The complex nature of the venture 
upon which Brookhaven was embarking can be seen by the range of topics 
discussed at this meeting. The memorsuidum in which the meeting was 
reported included the following headings:^ Types of Contracts (three 
contracts were required - one with Sunshine for the excavation of 
the chamber; one with a tank fabricator for the construction and 
installation of the tank in the mine; and one with Sunshine for a 
long-term lease of the mine); Expenditure of Money (details of 
the budget breakdown for the forthcoming financial year); Tentative 
Schedule for the Tank Procurement (the likely stages of negotiation 
with the tank fabricators); Insurance (discussion of liability 
should there be a leak from the tank); Removal of Perchloroethylene 
(Sunshine were insisting that the perchloroethylene be removed at 
the termination of the experiment); and Mining Consultant (it was
suggested that BNL emplcy an independent mining consultant to assess
2Sunshine's work on the project).
A further meeting of the BNL Procurement Review Board to 
discuss progress on all these matters was held a month later.^ The
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details of the contracts with Sunshine had by this stage been settled
and copies sent to Sunshine's attorneys. A meeting of the two parties
was scheduled for early December. This was to be held at the mine
and it was hoped that this would be when the final contracts were
signed. It was also planned that the companies tendering bi Is for
the construction of the tank should attend so that they could see
the likely technical problems at first hand. All in all, the necessary
administrative and legal apparatus which accompanied the construction
of the scientific apparatus seemed to be in place. Davis himself
was very optimistic about developments; as he wrote to Philip
4Morrison at the time:
We are making progress on the large scale experiment...Next 
week we will make detailed plans with the Sunshine Mining Co.
(Idaho) for the excavation and sign a contract for this work.
They will provide a room 30 x 60 feet with a 30 foot arched 
ceiling to hold our tank...Hopefully they will have this room 
1-eady by May 1st, and then we will start fabricating the tank.
We estimate the tank will be finished December 1965, and the 
entire apparatus ready for the first run in March 1966.
This optimism was, however, to be short-lived. The meeting with Sunshine 
did not go well and it became clear that it would be impossible for 
Brookhaven and Sunshine to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. 
Contributing to the impasse were factors such as rising costs, 
insufficient electric power and BNL not being given clear title to 
the area selected for the experiment. However, the real sticking 
point was a contractual problem. Brookhaven, as a GoWrnment- 
sponsored laboratory,was required by law to write a general non­
discrimination clause into all its contracts. This was designed 
to prevent discrimination (on grounds such as race, colour or creed) 
against any potential emp^xDyees of the Government. As Davis (who 
was somewhat embarrassed by this issue) told me:
That means that...if you're black, and that was what they 
were worried about, and you wanted to come and work in the
159.
mine you had a perfect right to...Idaho apparently has had 
a reputation...for not being too kind to black people...So 
they were kinda scared by that. And so BNL and the Government, 
they said 'You can't leave that clause out, that's impossible'.
So the whole thing fell down really on that basis.
The wider backcloth of political and commercial realities within 
which solar-neutrino experimenters worked can be seen from this episode. 
Home stake Changes its Mind
Davis was very disappointed by this set-back because, having got 
the money budgeted for that financial year, if he did not spend it 
at once, he was in danger of losing it altogether. As there were 
only two other feasible sites for the experiment(the Homestake Gold 
Mine and the Anaconda .’Copper Mine) Davis had little choice but to 
once more review these possible locations. Because of the technical 
advantages presented by the Homestake site (as discussed in Chapter 
3) he decided to try there first. In view of the urgency of the 
situation, Munhofen (who, it will be recalled, was Dodson's admini­
strative assistant) made a special trip over Christmas 1964 to 
Homestake. The cong»any agreed to reconsider their estimate of 
the costs for excavating a suitable chamber and, on January 2, 1965, 
Davis heard the good news that they were now enthusiastic about the 
project.^ They estimated the costs to be $125,000 - in other 
words a >very reasonable amount. Furthermore, they had no objections 
to the non-discrimination clause. Davis expressed their attitude 
on this point as follows:
We [Homestake] are not worried about blacks, we don't care 
who comes and works in our mine. If blacks want to come, fine ̂ 
we'll give then a pick and shovel and they can go to workI^
The reasons for the change of heart by the mining conç>any are
not entirely clear. Davis had the impression that the decision to
support the project was not taken locally but at Homestake's head
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office in San Fransisco, and therefore might have been open to 
influence from more general commercial considerations. In particular 
he thought there; may have been two contributory factors. Firstly, 
the involvement of the company with a scientific project might be 
good for public relations. Mining companies in the US have, in 
general, a rather tarnished image and this might be improved by 
their involvement with public 'cultural-type' activities.^ The 
second reason Davis gave was that Homestake might have been parti­
cularly sympathetic toweirds any project connected with the AEC.
This was because Homestake also owned a uranium mine, and the main 
purchasers of uranium were, of course, the AECI 
The Construction of the Tcink
Whatever the reasons, Davis found that, from that moment onwards, 
Homestake went out of their way to be cooperative over the project.
On January 8 , a satisfactory contract was signed and construction
of the chamber began almost immediately. By May, 7,000 tons of rock 
had been blasted out to form a chantoer 30 feet wide, 60 feet long 
and 32 feet high. The floor was lined with concrete and, to ensure 
stability, the walls and ceiling were covered with chain-linkLfencing. 
(see photograph. Fig. 5.1). In addition, two smaller chambers 
to house the 'pumps and the control room were excavated.
By this stage the contract for the construction of the tank had 
also been settled. The successful contractors, the Chicago Bridge and 
Iron Company, started immediately to prefabricate the various 
sections of the tank. In view of the restricted access, all the 
sections would have to be taken down into the mine separately and 
welded underground in the chamber (see photograph. Fig. 5.2).
The underground-construction work started in August 1965 and was
Fig. 5.1 The Excavated Chamber at Homestake,
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Fig. 5.2 The Tank (partially constructed) 162
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expected to be completed by December in order that the first measure­
ments could be made in early 1966.
By October 1965 the construction of the tank was nearly completed 
and tests ".were begun to see if there were any leaks. As atmospheric 
argon could contaminate the tank it was vital that the tank should 
be air-tight. However, the plan to start the experiment in early 
1966 had to be shelved when there was a delay in the supply of the 
special pumps needed to purge the helium and argon from the tank.
These pumps were not expected to be ready until February 1966, 
so reluctantly Davis, in the winter of 1965, had to postpone any 
further work on the tank until March.
By the middle of June 1966 the pumps had been installed and 
the tank was ready to be filled. By this stage, the inside surface 
of the tank had been shot blasted and cleaned in order to remove 
any traces of rock dust, which might contain radioactive contamineints.
Also the tests for leaks had been completed. Before the tank was
finally sealed, AEC-official John Pomeroy (Van Dyken's assistant) 
visited the experiment to inspect progress. In his memorandum 
to Van Dyken in which he reported on the experiment, Pomeroy noted
one unusual difficulty which might affect the long-term prospects
8for the experiment. He wrote:
It should be noted that the workers at Homestake have just 
beccxne unionised for the first time in their history. The 
long-term effect of this on the e^eriments cannot be
anticipated at this time. I am told that the mine is not a
highly profitable operation, since the ore now being used 
runs $10 of gold/ton. Higher labour costs could possibly 
cause the mine operation to be shut dcwn before all the 
experiments are con$)leted.
Pomeroy included in his memorandum a copy of a story from the
9Washington Post in which the unionisation of the mine is reported.
In order to show something of the flavour of the Homestake operation
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at this time part of this story is reproduced in Fig. 5.3.
It seems that the worry was that the union involved had a reputation 
for militancy and they might push labour rates too high to make 
the mine profitable. Homestake could not raise the price of gold 
to cover the increased costs because they were required to sell 
all their gold to the Government at a fixed rate of $35 an ounce.
If the mine became unprofitable and closed down, the solar-neutrino 
experiment would almost certainly have to be terminated as well.
This particular worry was, however, to be short-lived, because 
in 1968 the US abandoned the gold standard and the price of gold 
rose rapidly. The gold mine became highly profitable and was 
still operational in 1978. Again though, the importance of wider 
political and economic factors for the future of Davis's project 
can be seen.
Pomeroy, in his report to Van Dyken, also reviewed the technical
progress of the experiment. He was happy with this, as he
^  ^  10 reported:
My over-all impression of the operations at this site is 
very favourable. Ray Davis and John Galvin (his technician 
from BNL) are doing a good job.
Technical Snags with the Processing Equipment
It took five weeks to fill the tank with perchloroethylene. This 
was a laborious task because the liquid could only be taken under­
ground in tank-car lots of 650 gallons. With the tank filled, the 
next stage in the project was the installation of the processing 
equipment which would enable a small sanple of argon to be separated 
from the helium and perchloroethylene vapours pumped out of the 
tank as it was purged. It was with this part of the apparatus 
that Davis ran into the first major technical snag of the project.
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Fig. 5.3 Story from Washington Post, June 23, 1966,
UNIONIZED GOLD MINE FACES PROBLEMS
By George Moses
LEAD, S.D. (AP) - Don Thai sen lives up Grizzly Gulch in a 
corner of the Black Hills near Deadwood, where Wild Bill Hickock 
was shot dead holding aces and eights in a poker game.
Theisen's business is gold mining. He works a mile or more 
underground in the largest gold mine in the western hemisphere . 
Nearly half the gold mined in the United States ccanes from Lead 
(it rhymes with "speed").
For nearly 90 years, Hcmestake Mining Co.,a San Francisco- 
based firm,has worked the ore-rich rock in Lead and for nearly 
60 years it has done so with non-union miners.
But two weeks ago, in an election which shook Lead to its 
rocky foundations, the AFL-CIO United Steelworkers of America 
won the right to bargain for Homestake workers. It was the 
seventh attempt to organize Homestake since 1947.
Theisen, 35, was a leader of the organizing drive, climaxed 
by an 841 to 512 union victory in the face of long-established 
Homestake policies that touch every miner and his family intimately.
Homestake owns and staffs a hospital for the 8300 people in 
Lead. Miners and their families pay neither hospital nor doctor 
bills.
The land a miner's house stands on is often owned by Homestake 
and he pays no rent
Free Library.
Homestake has built a community center called the Homestake 
Club, where anybody can swim or bowl without charge. Arid Homestake 
runs, without tax dollars, a free public library.
So what happened when the Steelworkers broke the barrier, and 
why, and what happens next?
The ccxnpany and the miners appear to agree on the biggest 
problem. Gold is getting i incredibly expensive to mine and the 
government, which by law buys all the gold Homestake produces, 
has been paying the same rate, $35 dollars an ounce, since 1934.
Since 1960, net income from gold has been shrinking. Then it 
cost slightly more than $27 to produce one ounce. The figure 





So what are the Steelworkers, one of the AFL-CIO's most 
militant unions, going to do about it?
Theisen, chairman of the union organizing committee, says 
the big answer will have to come from Washington.
"Copper, lead and zinc mining were all in bad situations, too" 
Thel.sen said the other day on the steps of his house, puffing 
pipe smoke into the pine-scented air. "But with the backing of 
labor unions, these metals all got subsidies." He doesn't 
say directly whether he thinks the United States might start 
paying more than $35 cin ounce.
Theisen is what is called a contract miner. So, he says, 
are most of his fellows. From a ton of rock they bring to the 
surface,Homestake produces a bit of gold scarcely larger than 
a collar button, about a third of an ounce.
$35 a day
Theisen says contract miners are guaranteed about $16.72 
daily, more if they produce ore beyond a given tonnage. Some
have earned up to $35 daily, he says.
His last paycheck, covering 15 days, came to $226.45 before 
deductions. For this, he worked a six-day, 48-hour week. Homestake
supervisory personnel also work a six-day week.
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Thus far he had met few problems in scaling-up his apparatus.
However, he found that, for use with the 100,000-galIon tank, the 
processing equipment was unsatisfactory. There were two major 
difficulties. One was that the condenser which removed perchloro­
ethylene vapour tended to get clogged up. The second difficulty 
was that the condenser was found to use excessive amounts of its 
coolant, liquid nitrogen.
The technical problems of the processing equipment occupied 
Davis's attention for most of the summer of 1966. By early 
September, he and a co-worker, Don Harmer, had finalised the details 
of a new processing system, and had put in a request to Dodson for 
extra funding to construct the new equipment. However, thismoney 
was not immediately forthcoming as the chemistry department operating 
budget had been cut for the financial year 1967. Indeed the original 
budgeting for the solar-neutrino experiment seemed itself to be 
short by an amount of 'V/ $100,000. Dodson could not give permission 
for the new processing system to be constructed until October and 
only then after he had persuaded BNL director,Goldhaber, of the 
urgency of the situation. He wrote to Goldhaber that:
The experiment is in genuinely serious financial trouble.
This, it seems, was enough to convince Goldhaber and the AEC to 
increase the support for the neutrino experiment.
The combined technical and financial problems had by this time 
put the e3q>eriment well behind schedule. In December 1966, the 
processing equipment had still to be installed and it was not now 
expected that measurements would be made until February 1967 at the 
earliest.
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1967 - The Experiment is Finally Ready
The new processing system was eventually installed in the mine
in January and February 1967. The final layout and photographs
of the completed tank are shown in Figs. 5.4 and 5.5. At the
end of February Davis sent a letter to John Pomeroy at the AEC
12reporting that the detector was finally coiqplete. He wrote:
We have everything together now, and the whole system works 
beautifully. Tomorrow John Galvin [his technician] and I 
plan to go out for a few weeks and put on the finishing 
touches, and start everything operating.
The first purges of the tank in which the large quantities of
atmospheric argon which had accumulated in the system were removed
were started soon after. Eventually, after several such purges,
a sample of argon was taken back to Brookhaven for analysis. This
sample was found to be too large to be placed in the small counters
designed for the experiment,but, as it was the very first sample
from the tank, it was suggested (by Dodson) that it should be
counted anyway. It was placed in a relatively large counter and,
to everyone's surprise, it was found to give an extremely high
count rate. This high level of activity was soon explained by the
presence of Kr^^ which had been dissolved in the perchloroethylene
and had contaminated the sample. Davis had to introduce, a small
modification to the processing equipment whereby this isotope
222and another atmospheric isotope (Rn ) could be removed.
Another measurement was commenced on May 5, 1967. A small 
amount of Ar^^ carrier gas was introduced and the tank was left 
exposed for 48 days. On June 22, the helium purge was started 
and the Ar^^ was found to be recovered with a 94% efficiency.
The argon sample was taken back to Brookhaven and placed in a 
small proportional counter.




Fig. 5.5. The Completed Tank.
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Whether the previous years of effort put in by Brookhaven 
and the Caltech group were worthwhile depended now on the tiny 
sample being counted in a heavily shielded part of the bas.ement 
of the Brookhaven chemistry department. Davis would soon know 
whether or not his neutrino-detection programme was finally 
to meet success, and the nuclear astrophysicists would know 
whether their prediction had been confirmed.
Neutrino Spectroscopy
Once solar-neutrino astronany became a more realistic 
undertaking in 1964, as signified by the funding of the Davis 
experiment, other possible detection processes were given detailed 
investigation. Bahcall (1964c) published an article entitled,
'Neutrino-Sp^troscopy of the Solar Interior', in which he 
proposed a variety of detection experiments with different neutrino- 
energy thresholds so that neutrinos from all the branches of the 
pp-chain could be investigated. In particular, he stressed 
the importance of measuring the low-energy neutrinos from the 
basic p + p reaction (see Fig. 2.2). Unlike the boron-eight 
neutrinos,the flux of these neutrinos was not dependent on 
the detailed solar model. The detection of a variety of 
neutrino fluxes would enable a very detailed picture of the solar 
interior to be constructed. Bahcall did not investigate the 
experimental feasibility of the various possibilities he suggested, 
but he did calculate the cross-sections for the various detection 
reactions.
Another notable article along similar lines was published 
by the Soviet physicist, v.A. Kuzmin (1965). This article was 
to prove of great importance for later developments in the field
172,
71 71 -because in it Kuzmin suggested that the Ga + v Ge + e
reaction could be used to detect the low-energy solar neutrinos
(pp neutrinos). This reaction forms the basis for the gallium
solar-neutrino detectors now under construction in the United
States and the Soviet Union (see Chapter 7).
Reines tsNeutrino-Detection Programme:
The period 1964 - 1967 saw not only theoretical work on new 
detection processes, but also the construction of a further 
three detectors. These other experiments were all of the direct^ 
counting type and all were, in one way or another, connected with 
that other pioneer of neutrino detection- Fred Reines.
Reines, having succeeded in detecting reactor neutrinos in 
1956, had also looked for other areas into which he could extend 
his technique. Rather than choose solar neutrinos, as Davis 
had done, he had put his efforts into the detection of cosmic- 
ray neutrinos. These are neutrinos produced by the interaction 
of cosmic-ray protons with the Earth's atmosphere. The neutrinos 
produced are of much higher energies (typically billions of 
electron volts) than solar neutrinos and are therefore suited to 
the direct-counting methods which Reines favoured. Another 
attractive aspect presented by this source of neutrinos was that 
they could be used for exploring problems in high-energy and 
particle physics. The cosmic-ray neutrinos had higher energies 
than could be produced in accelerators and reactors.
In the early 1960's, several groups proposed experiments 
to detect cosmic-ray neutrinos. Reines,in collaboration with a 
team from the University of Witwatersrand, S. Africa, was one 
of the first to meet s u c c e s s . Reines's experimental apparatus 
consisted of 36 scintillation detectors housed in a tunnel
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500 feet long and eight feet in diameter at a depth of approximately 
two miles. The two miles of rock shielded the experiment from the 
primary cosmic-ray muons. The experiment was located in the 
East Rand Proprietary Gold Mine (the deepest mine in the world).
The muon secondaries produced by the interaction of muon neutrinos 
with the rock could be observed by detecting their characteristic 
scintillations. The experiment was on a scale similar to
Davis's solar-neutrino detector and Reines too received his 
funding from the AEC ('>̂ $500,000).
Reines's approach to neutrino detection since 1958 had thus 
been similar to Davis's in that he too had used large underground 
detectors. His programme was different, however, in that he 
used direct-counting methods. Given his interests it is not sur­
prising that, when the importance of the comparatively energetic
Q
B neutrinos was established, he should attempt to mount a solar- 
neutrino experiment, but with a direct-counting rather than radio­
chemical approach.
As mentioned in the previous chapter ,in 1960 Reines was not
optimistic about solar-neutrino detection, and again, in 1962,
he had written that the solar-neutrino detection problem 'stops 
14me cold. ' Nevertheless, he was keeping in close touch with
the leading figures in the field such as Fowler, Bahcall, and, 
of course, Davis. He had reason to be particularly familiar with 
Davis's work, as Davis's Barberton Mine experiment was not far 
from Reines'sown institution, the. Case Institute of Technology, 
Cleveland, Ohio. Reines was thus well aware of the developments 




One of the experiments Reines was working on at that time
was an attempt to observe the elastic scattering of neutrinos
by electrons - v + e  ->v + e .  This V^tmction, which had beene e
predicted by Feynmann and Gellmcin, had yet to be observed. He 
realised in early 1964 that the apparatus he was using to search 
for this reaction could also be used to set an upper limit on 
the solar-neutrino flux. The experiment consisted of a 200- 
litre liquid-scintillator detector surrounded by a large Cerenkov 
anticoincidence detector (to eliminate spurious background 
counts). The 'kick' which the electron received from the neutrino 
should be observable by the accompanying scintillation. In 
order to reduce the background further, the equipment had been 
installed 2,000 feet under the Earth's surface in a nearby salt 
mine. In this location the experiment might be sensitive to
solar neutrinos. Reines, together with his student, W. R. Kropp,
8 9 - 2 -1published the result of their limit on the B flux (10 cm sec
or 1000 SNU ) in an article in Physical Review Letters in March
1964 (Reines and Kropp, 1964). In their paper. Reines and
Kropp described their experiment as 'complementing' Davis's
effort. They estimated that, with a similar detector of
10,000 gallons situated in a deep mine, they should be able to
0
detect the predicted B neutrino flux (^60 events/year).
The disadvantages of using this particular reaction to 
detect solar neutrinos were two-fold. Firstly, since elastic 
scattering of neutrinos by electrons had not itself been observed 
previously, a negative result with this process would, .have an 
ambiguous interpretation. The second disadvantage was that
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the cross-section for the reaction was comparatively small; thus 
not many events were likely to be observed and it would be diffi­
cult to separate the signal from the background. There was, 
however, an important advantage to be gained from this type of 
detector. This was that the recoil electrons would reflect 
the direction of the inccaning neutrinos and thus give a clue 
as to their source. Thus, unlike Davis's experiment. Reines's 
could, in principle, confirm that he was observing solar 
neutrinos.
Reines eventually.went on to build a larger version (4,000 
litres of scintillator) of this apparatus in collaboration with 
the South African group of cosmic-ray neutrino experimentalists.
This detector was housed in the same mine in S. Africa whidh 
had been used for the cosmic-ray neutrino experiments. The detector 
consisted of five sections and was viewed by 35 photomultiplier 
tubes located at each end (see Fig. 5.6). A large shield of 
paraffin and borax was placed around the detector in order to 
cut down the background from neutrons and other radiations 
naturally occurring in the surrounding walls. This size of 
detector was expected to register about 24 events/year from 
solar neutrinos. In November 1966, Reines gave an important 
review paper at a Royal Society meeting in London in which he 
described the progress of the various experimental attempts 
to detect solar neutrinos (Reines, 1967). (Davis had been 
invited to this meeting but had been unable to attend because 
BNL could not come up with the travel expenses!). In regard 
to his detector in S. Africa, Reines was able to report that:
The detector is now in place, filled and surrounded by
the borcLAC and paraffin shield. The elelctronics are being
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debugged and installed, cind we should, in the next few 
months, have some better idea of the background levels... 
(Reines, 1967: 169).
It can be seen that this experiment was expected to be 'on the
air' at approximately the same time as the Davis experiment.
The Lithium-Seven Detector
Reines was involved with another direct-counting approach
to solar-neutrino detection. This used the inverse beta-decay
reaction
7 7V + Li -)■ Be + e e
This detection reaction was proposed by Reines and Woods (a
colleague at Case) in Physical Review Letters in January 1965
(Reines and Wood, 1965). A detector based on this reaction was
constructed and consisted of large thin slabs of target surrounded
by liquid scintillator. Again the electrons produced should be
accompanied by characteristic scintillations. The planned
arrangement of the detector is shown in Fig. 5.7. With this
apparatus it was expected to see about 60 events/year against
a background of 20 events/year. The experiment was housed in the
same salt mine as had previously been used for the Reines-Kropp
elastic-scattering experiment. At the Royal Society meeting
Reines reported that:
...the essence of the e:q)erimental arrangement is 
now nearing completion (Reines, 1967:165).
This experiment, too, was thus expected to be ready at about the
same time as the Davis experiment.
The Jenkins Experiment
The third solar-neutrino detection experiment to be discussed
in this section also came from the Case Institute of Technology.
Although the initiator of the project, T.S. Jenkins/was a member
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of Reines'group and had worked in the past with Reines, both 
on neutrino detection at Savannah River, and on the cosmic-ray 
neutrino experiment, Reines was not directly involved with 
this experiment. His attitude towards it was described to me 
as 'luke-warm'but he did agree to support some preliminary 
work by Jenkins to study feasibility. The Jenkins experiment 
is perhaps the most interesting of the three because it was 
actually completed before the Davis experiment. There was thus
considerable interest in it at the time. Indeed there was an
air of competition between Jenkins and Davis. For instance,
H. Uberall, a theoretical physicist who had helped work on the 
theoretical calculations for the Jenkins experiment, wrote in 
early 1966:^^
I think Jenkins' experiment is an exciting story, and
I wonder whether he will overtake Davis.
Jenkins himself has written to me that:^^
You might say there was a rivalry but it was never 
openly expressed.
The basis of the experiment was again an inverse beta-decay
18reaction with direct counting. The reaction to be used was
V + D - > - p  + p + ee
The experimental technique consisted of searching for the Cerenkov 
light produced by the emitted electron in a large volume of 
heavy water (DgO). Thus the heavy water served as both the 
target and the detector. 2,000 litres (550 gallons) of D^O 
were used in the experiment and this was viewed by fifty-five 
photomultiplier tubes surrounded by an anticoincidence shield 
consisting of liquid scintillator (see Fig. 5.8). The liquid 
scintillator shield registered any spurious events induced in
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the inner tank by charged particles entering from the outside.
In order to reduce cosmic-ray backgrounds the apparatus was 
located 585 meters underground in a salt mine (the same one as 
used in the other Case experiments). It was expected that 
"̂ 96 solar-neutrino-induced events a year would take place in 
the tank.
The main advantage of the detector was that it was compara­
istively cheap. Apart from the D^O itself, most of the apparatus 
could be constructed from parts already available in the Case 
physics department. The heavy water would have cost about 
$100,000 but fortunately Jenkins was able to persuade the AEC to 
loan him a sufficient quantity for the duration of the experiment.
By February 1966, Jenkins had the experimental apparatus
completed and installed in the mine. He initially filled the
tank with H^O in order to see what the background was like. To
his surprise he found it was very high (of the order of one
count per minute! ).̂ *̂  At the time Reines was delivering his
report to the Royal Society in November this background had not
yet been eliminated. Jenkins carried out exhaustive tests to
find its source. He managed to shew that it came neither from
natural radioactivity in the rock nor from cosmic rays. Since
these were the principal background emitters in solar-neutrino
experiments the large signal was something of a puzzle. Eventually
the mystery was solved. It turned out that a colleague of Jenkins
had accidentally left a radioactive source in the vicinity of 
21the experiment! In the event, even with this background
eliminated, it was discovered that there was still a background 
from cosmic rays and natural radioactivity in the rock of about
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3000 events a year. As the expected signal was 96 events a 
year, it seemed that this experiment could not hope to detect 
solar neutrinos. By March 1967 it was clear that the Jenkins
22experiment had been unsuccessful. As Bahcall wrote to Jenkins:
I am unable to think of any likely new experimental 
possibility thàt can be achieved with your current 
epcperimental system. I wish that it were, othejrwisel
The deuterium experiment was continued throughout 1967 and Jenkins
did mem age to improve the sensitivity somewhat but never to the
point where he could set a better limit on the flux than Davis
was able to set with his Barberton experiment. By the time
Jenkins had managed to achieve the same sensitivity as the
Barberton experiment, Davis's new 100,000 gallon experiment was
23already in operation.
Discussion of Direct-Counting Experiments
In conclusion to this section, it should be noted that all 
the direct-counting solar-neutrino experiments described above
were designed to detect the boron-eight flux calculated by
7 -2 -1Bahcall in 1964 (#^8 =2.5x 10 neutrinos cm sec ). However,
even with this flux they would be near to the limits of their
sensitivity. The realisation, in early 1967 that the boron-eight
flux was only half this value (because of new measurements
of - see next chapter) meant that these experiments were
even less likely to succeed. In addition, none of the detectors
had undergone the many years of experimental development which
the chlorine experiment had undergone and hence experience of
the likely backgrounds to be encountered was limited. As we
have seen, it is the separation of the neutrino signal from the
background which is the bugbear of solar-neutrino astronomy. In
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such circumstances, it is not surprising that the above experi­
ments have made very little impact, and that it has been the 
comparatively lavishly funded Davis experiment which has dominated 
the field. However, all the above experiments were serious 
efforts at solar-neutrino detection. As Davis wrote to Bahcall^
in 1969,in urging him to include a description of these experi-
24ments in a review he was writing;
I hope you did decide to include the experimental 
detectors of Reines, and others, and Jenkins.
These detectors would perhaps now be giving results 
if it were not for the low flux of B® neutrinos.
The above experiments will be discussed again briefly in
Chapter 7 in the context of mapping out the response to Davis's 
25result.
Summary
As we have seen, over the period 1964 - 1967 four solar- 
neutrino detectors were constructed. Of these e:g>eriments,
Davis's was by far the most sensitive. However, if it turned 
out that there was a larger flux of neutrinos than the theoreticians 
expected,then the prospects for solar-neutrino astronomy as 
a whole looked very rosy indeed. All the detectors would
be capable of measuring something. The immediate future of 
solar-neutrino astronomy thus depended crucially on the results 
of the most sensitive experiment - that of Ray Davis.
182.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE
1. Brookhaven National Laboratory internal memorandum, B.W.
Quinn to Procurement Review Board, October 16, 1964.
2. This idea was later dropped as it was felt that Sunshine
might not agree to an independent consultant. Instead an 
official from the Bureau of Mines was appointed to 
supervise the work.
3. Brookhaven National Laboratory internal memoraindum, B.W.
Quinn to Procurement Review Board, November 24, 1964.
4. Letter, R. Davis to Philip Morrison, 3 December 1964,
Morrison had been at Caltech and had published an article 
on neutrino astronomy in Scientific American - he was thus 
keeping a close eye on developments (see P. Morrison,
'Neutrino Astronomy', Scientific American, 207, August 
1962, 90-98).
4a. The impact of the wider political reality in this case is 
not, however, a direct impact on the content of scientific 
knowledge (stage 3 of the empirical programme of relativism - 
see Chapter 1). The effect of the wider commercial/political 
reality was "at most an inconvenience which slowed down the 
production of knowledge. However, it should be remembered 
that even if they do not impact on the content of knowledge , 
the wider political realities are as much a part of the 
environment in which science is carried out as for any other 
activity.
5. Letter, Donald T. Delicate to B. Munhofen, January 2, 1965.
6. Of course Homestake's attitude does not necessarily imply 
any more liberal attitudes. After all, S. African mining 
compcinies used predominantly black labour forces and no-one 
would say that this is evidence of their enlightened 
concerns.
7. It is worth noting in this respect that Homestake devoted 
four issues of the company magazine Sharp Bits to coverage 
of the neutrino experiment. See, Sharp Bits, 16, No. 8, 
September 1965; 17, No. 5, June, 1966; 17, No. 11,
December 1966; and 20, No. 1, Spring 1969. Sharp Bits
is obtainable from the Homestake Mining Company, 650 California 
Street, San Fransisco, California.
8. United States Government Memorandum, J.H. Pomeroy to 
A.R. Van Dyken, June 23^ 1966.
9. 'Unionized Gold Mine Faces Problems' Washington Post,
Thursday June 23, 1966.
10. Op. cit., note 8.
11. Brookhaven National Laboratory internal memorandum, R.W.
Dodson to M. Goldhaber, October 7, 1966,
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12. Letter, R. Davis to J.H. Pomeroy, February 28, 1967.
13. For details of this and other cosmic-ray neutrino experiments 
see F. Reines and J.P.F. Sellschop, 'Neutrinos from the 
Atmosphere and Beyond', Scientific American,214, February, 
1966, 40-48.
14. Letter, F. Reines to W. Fowler, November 29, 1962.
15 . Letter, T. Jenkins to T. Pinch, April 30, 1980.
16. Letter, H. Uberall to J.Bahcall, Jcinuary 3, 1966.
17. Op. cit., note 15.
18. The theoretical cross-section for this reaction was 
calculated by F.J. Kelly and H. Uberall, 'Absorption of 
Solar Neutrinos in Deuterium', Physical Review Letters,
16, 1966, 145-7.
19. This point was stressed by Jenkins to me in his letter, 
op. cit., note 15.
20. Letter, T. Jenkins to J. Bahcall,June 20, 1966.
21. I heard of this story quite by chance. Whilst having lunch
at Princeton with Martin Schwarzschild, I was introduced 
to Jenkins,fe brother and it was he who told me this story. 
Jenkinsfe own comment on the incident was that the source 
hàd been stored near to his apparatus 'by a colleague who 
is notorious for his reluctance to ccxnmunicate', op. cit., 
note 15.
22. Letter, J. Bahcall to T. Jenkins, Marcjx 12,1967.
23. The full story of Jenkinsfe experiment has never been 
published. The account presented here is based upon, copies 
of the relevant correspondence which Professor Jenkins
has kindly supplied. Also an (unsuccessful) research 
proposal submitted to the NSF in 1973, in which a plan to 
build a larger deuterium detector is outlined, has 
provided much informative material.
24. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, June 18, 1969.
25. As it has turned out, direct-counting solar-neutrino detection 
has only become more of a feasible proposition recently with 
the development of the indium experiment (see Chapter 7 for 
details).
26. It should be remembered that the development of radio- 
astronomy was held up for years because theorists thought 
there would be no detectable sources.'
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CHAPTER SIX
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1964-7 
The theoreticians' final preparations for Davis's experiment 
form the subject matter of this chapter. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the bulk of the theoretical work over this period 
was carried out at Caltech by John Bahcall. Thus most of the 
material presented here concerns Bahcall's involvement. However, 
as we shall see below, other theoreticians (notably Ezer and 
Cameron) also did significant work on the neutrino-flux predictions 
over this period. The account will again largely be chronological 
and takes us from the 40 SNU prediction of March 1964 to the 
prediction on the eve of the experiment, of 19 SNU (see Fig. 1.1).
Neutrino-Absorption Cross Sections
As was emphasised in Chapters 3 and 4, the dramatic increase 
in the expected signal in Davis's experiment, which occurred in 
1964, was largely due to Bahcall's work on the analogue state.
When Bahcall hàd made his initial calculations in September 1963, 
there was very little experimental information available on the 
analogue state for the argon thirty-seven system. Indeed Bahcall 
had persistently been urging nuclear experimentalists to make 
measurements on the calcium thirty-seven system in order to 
provide indirect confirmation of his calculations. As more 
experimental evidence became available in 1964, Bahcall had to 
modify slightly his original estimate of the absorption cross- 
section. The first modification was noted by Bahcall (1964b) 
in a paper published in Physical Review in July 1964. This paper 
contained more details of the cross-section calculations than
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his previous shorter Physical Review Letters paper. Bahcall 
estimated that, with the most up-to-date information on the ab­
sorption cross-sections, the total signal Davis could expect 
was 36 ± 20 SNU. By the end of the year, with yet more detail 
on the argon thirty-seven system available, Bahcall again 
revised the prediction and obtained a value of 30 ± 20 SNU.^
In the light of these revisions, it seemed as if Bahcall's 
original estimate of the effect of the analogue state had been 
slightly over-optimistic.
^17
As was mentioned in Chapter 4, Pochoda and Reeves had
drawn attention to the possibility of a large uncertainty in S^^.
Since this reaction leads directly to the branch of the pp-chain
where boron-eight neutrinos are produced (see Fig. 2.2), any
changes in S^^ would also affect the rate of production of boron-
eight neutrinos. The uncertainty stemmed frcan the paucity of
low-energy data on the reaction. Kavanagh, in 1958, had only
been able to make measurements at two energies and hence a
variety of extrapolations to the zero-energy intercept were
possible. The question of this uncertainty gained renewed
urgency in late 1964 when a Caltech nuclear physicist, Tom
Tombrello, attempted , to make a theoretical estimate of, Ŝ .̂
7 7using data from the related reactions: Li + n Li + n
7 8 2and Li + n Li + Y* Tombrello' s estimate came^ito half
the previous experimental value of Kavanagh (as calculated by
Christy and Duck).^ If Tombrello's calculation was taken
seriously then it would in^ly a solar-neutrino detection rate
of only 15 ± 10 SNU.^
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Bahcall hoped that this uncertainty could be cleared up by a 
new measurement of hopefully to be made by Parker who was
now at Brookhaven. The urgency of the situation can be seen 
from Bahcall's letter to the Goldhabers of November 17, 1964
(this is the same letter in which Bahcall urged the Goldhabers
37 5to search for Ca ); he wrote:
Finally, I would like to express my strong hope that 
someone at Brookhaven will repeat the Be^(p,Y)B® experiment. 
This is rapidly becoming the most uncertain link in the 
long chain of reasoning leading to the predictions.for the 
solar neutrino experiments. It seems a shame that only 
two data points are available for this laboratory 
experiment which forms the basis of our study of the 
solar interior...Ray Davis has expressed his willingness 
to make a Be target and Pete Parker has indicated plans 
to try the experiment. I hope you will encourage them.
The importance of this particular measurement can also be seen from
a letter Davis sent to Bahcall a few weeks later. He wrote
I have been busy and have not had a chance to talk with 
Parker.Our whole story hangs on the (p,y) cross section 
on Be?!
The concern displayed over now reflects something of
a change in attitude. Before the experiment was funded, Bahcall
and Fowler had not been greatly worried by the uncertainty in
and Fowler, it will be recalled, had even claimed in his
letter to the AEC that 'little more can be done in the.study of
the nuclear reaction rates either theoretically or experimentally'.
However, it now seemed that more experimental work had to be done
on S-_ before the neutrino fluxes could be confidently predicted.1 /
Eventually Parker, with the help of Davis (who prepared the 
Be^ target) mde new measurements of at Brookhaven over the 
summer of 1965. The results were good for Davis's experiment 
as Parker found a value that was even larger than.Kavanagh's
g
(S^^ = 0.043 ± 0.004 keV-barns) , thus boosting the expected
9neutrino flux. As Davis wrote to Bahcall:
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Peter did a very clean job on the Be (p,y) cross section... 
Fortunately the cross section was high ...I am greatly relieved, 
since I was prepared for the cross section to be a factor 
of two below Kavanagh's value.
The impact of this new value on the neutrino-flux prediction will
be discussed below.
The Ezer-Cameron Solar Model
As we saw in Chapter 4, there were a variety of solar models
available for neutrino-flux predictions in 1964. These models
gave what was considered to be a reasonable agreement over the
predicted neutrino fluxes. In 1965 another model was produced.
This was computed by A. Cameron, who, as we have seen, had a
longstanding interest in the solar-neutrino project, and his
student Dilly Ezer. The Ezer-Cameron model caused quite a
stir when it first appeared because it seemed to predict lower
7 -2 -1 10fluxes (di 8 = 0.95 x 10 neutrinos cm sec , 7 = 0.69 x 10B Be
-2 -1neutrinos cm sec ) than both the Sears, and Pochoda and Reeves
models. The expected detection rate with the Ezer and Cameron
fluxes was found to be only 12 SNU .
The first news of this new model came from Davis, who had
met Cameron at a seminar. The worry caused by the lower prediction
can be seen in Davis's letter to Bahcall where he informed him
of the Ezer-Cameron r e s u l t s . D a v i s  was particularly concerned
at the apparent sensitivity of the neutrino fluxes to variations
12in the hydrogen content (X) of the Sun. He wrote:
An important difference in their (% Ezer's and Cameron'si 
calculations is that they take X = 0.739 and this is 
why their fli^es are so low...I did not fully appreciate how 
fast the 4)(B ) falls with increasing primordial H-content.
In fact if X = 0.77 the flux of B neutrinos would drop 
out of sight.
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When Bahcall received Davis's letter, he immediately wrote
to Sears to see if he had any comment on the discrepancy between
the m o d e l s . I n  reply. Sears pointed out that his model
was not strictly comparable with the Ezer-Cameron model since
he had varied the parameter, Z/X, rather than X alone (Z is the
heavy-metal content of the Sun)̂ *̂  Nevertheless, he did have
some sympathy with Davis's worries. He wrote:
Ray's fears are not groundless; the dependence of N^8 
[<f>g8l on abundances was emphasized in the pithy tract 
of my paper. Oh well, even a negative result would be 
valuable, eh?
The situation was clarified to some extent when a preprint
of the Ezer-Cameron paper became available. Bahcall, John
Faulkner (a colleague of Bahcall's at Caltech) and Sears looked
at the Ezer-Cameron model in some detail cind found that it
differed from Sears's model in several ways.^^ In particular,
Ezer and Cameron used a smaller value of S._ (0.2 keV-bams) than.1/
that favoured by Sears (0.3 keV-barns) . This smaller value
was, of course, quite permissible in view of the uncertainty
noted above in this cross-section. This choice of a different
value for Ŝ .̂  was thought to account for about half the difference
in the neutrino-flux predictions. The source of the rest of the
difference was not clear, but was held to result from a number .
of small differences in parameters (in particular, different
mixes of opacities), and in the way the computation was performed.
These differences pointed to a growing air of uncertainty over
the exact prediction of the neutrino fluxes. For instance, it
18led Bahcall to comment (to Davis):
I think it only serves to illustrate how sensitive 
is the quantity which you will measure [the B fluxj and 
how uncertain the astronomical information really is when
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you seek quantitative statements about even the most 
thoroughly studied of stars, the sun...I don't think 
we know more about the B® flux than that it can be  ̂
reasonably expected to lie in the range (4 to 1) x 10 vs 
cmT^sec"!.^.This is all the better for your experiment 
since it will give us valuable astronomical information 
and will saddle the models with a sensitive fact. (My 
emphasis).
This comment was contained in the same letter quoted in Chapter 4
(p.1 4 7 ) where Bahcall pointed out the uncertainty in
The uncertainties in and combined with the various
solar-model uncertainties now apparent, made the predictions as
a whole seem sanewhat less definite than they had appeared to
be in 1964. Then, it will be recalled, the argument was that
the fluxes were known well enough to justify an experimental
attempt to measure them. Now the argument seemed to be that the
experiment would clear up the doubts and uncertainties, and,
hence valuable astronomical information would be accrued. This
chcuige in emphasis in the pre^funding and post-funding climate
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
The difference between the Ezer-Cameron prediction and the
Sears prediction was reduced somewhat when it became clear that
Parker's measurements supported a larger value of With
19= 0.035 keV-bams, the total signal expected according 
to the Ezer-Cameron model was 21 SNU as opposed to a signal of 
27 SNU from Sear's model (J) (also with the new value for Ŝ .̂  
incorporated)
In addition to calculating the neutrino fluxes expected with 
a 'normal ' Sun, Ezer and Cameron considered a Sun which had 
evolved with a varying gravitational constant, G, as expected 
according to Brans-Dicke cosmology. They found that if G varied
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21as Brans and Dicke expected, then larger neutrino fluxes would
7 -2 -1 10result (4>g8 = 4.6 x 10 neutrinos cm sec ; ^^^7 = 1.4 x 10
neutrinos cm ^sec It thus seemed that, even if Davis was
not able to detect boron-eight neutrinos from a Sun evolved 
according to conventional cosmology, then at least he might be 
able to test the unconventional assumptions of Brans and Dicke. 
Bahcall*s Close Relationship with Davis
Throughout the period that Bahcall was attempting to resolve 
the various anomalies in the theoretical prediction, he kept 
in close touch with Davis. He let him know of the latest develop­
ments on the theoretical front, and Davis, in turn, sent him 
many letters reporting on his experimental progress.
The unique partnership which was developing between Bahcall, 
the theoretician, and Davis, the experimentalist, did, however, 
require delicate handling - especially as Beihcall was located 
on the West coast and Davis on the East coast. The sensitivity
needed can perhaps best be seen by their reaction to two
episodes where reporting of the collaboration gave the impression 
that only one of them was responsible for the experiment. Davis 
on one occasion expressed concern to Bahcall about a report in
23
Time magazine (this is the report referred to in Chapter 3):
The article, in Time magazine seemed quite good but I was 
disappointed that there was no mention of your paper and 
the Cal tech contribution. I, of course; like the idea 
of the expriment being a joint effort.
Later, it was Bahcall's turn to express concern when a report
24appeared in Scientific American which seemed to attribute the 
whole project to him - the author of the article being under the 
impression that Davis was just the technician who was supervising 
the building of the experiment! After Bahcall complained to the
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25Editor, Scientific American published an erratum. Perhaps
the somewhat delicate nature of the relationship between Bahcall
and Davis at this stage can be seen from Bahcall's recollection
of the Editor's comment when they first met:
He said it was unique in his experience at Scientific 
American that somebody complained about getting too much 
credit!
Although both sides in the collaboration had the same aim -
to mëike a measurement of the solar-neutrino flux - this particular
aim,as has been repeatedly stressed, formed part of two very
different research programmes. Davis's primary concern as a
neutrino experimentalist was the detection of neutrinos - he was
not so much interested in the test of nuclear-astrophysical
theory. For the nuclear astrophysicists on the other hand, it
was the test of their theories which made solar-neutrino astronomy
such an attractive proposition.
Apart from calculating the theoretical flux of neutrinos,
Bahcall also helped Davis by keeping him informed of wider
developments in theory. Of more immediate use, he would advise
Davis over particular theoretical issues raised by the experiment,
such as how often to take samples from the tank. Bahcall
described this working relationship to me as follows:
I used to go back continually to talk to him about 
theoretical things, advise him how often to take samples, 
current levels of theory. He's always been interested in 
the theory and he wanted to talk to me about that all the 
time, I worked quite a while. We made our first calculations 
on the expected background from the cosmic-ray neutrinos.
And so there was always questions coming up in the experiment 
and in the language, I was the*house theorist*. Whenever 
a wild article came out, then Ray would call me and I would 
have to go read it, and explain it to him.
The relationship between Bahcall and Davis was put on an insti­
tutional basis in April 1966. Davis sent a memorandum to Dodson
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in which he outlined the case for Bahcall being made a consultant
to B r o o k h a v e n . O n  April 25, Dodson wrote to Bahcall as
^  -.1 2 7follows:
Ray Davis would like to have your very helpful interactions 
with the solar neutrino experiment recognized with a BNL 
appointment which would further facilitate these 
interactions.
The contract between Bahcall and Brookhaven stated that Bahcall 
woudld be paid $75 a day for his time devoted to the experiment,
28plus reimbursement of travel expenses and a subsistence allowance.
Bahcall was thus truly the 'house theorist' - he was paid for
his services by the same house!
Davis was keen to have Bahcall visit the site of the
experiment. In his letters he would often tell Bahcall in advance
the dates of his projected visits to the mine in case Bahcall
wanted to meet him there. In Dodson!s letter to Bahcall inviting
29him to become a BNL consultant, this wish was again expressed.
This visit would not be of much practical significance since 
Bahcall was not an experimentalist, but it would be of scxne 
symbolic importance - it would further demonstrate the commitment 
of Bahcall and the Kellogg group to the experiment. Soon after 
being made a BNL consultant, Bahcall did indeed visit the site; 
as he told me:
I went to visit the site, I believe I'm the only theorist 
who has ever visited the site...I didn't have much useful 
to say but I wanted to be involved in that...
The bond which by this time existed between Davis and Bahcall
was recalled for me by Bahcall:
I was also the guy that encouraged him. You know there's 
a lot of hand-waving that goes on in something like this...
We were good friends. He's much older than I but we had 
both more or less staiked our careers on this. I had 
staked my career on ray ability to predict the response of
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the instrument, that the instrument would work and be 
sensitive in the way I said it, and he in spending his 
major, almost his entire, effort in building the equipment.
It can be seen that, by this stage, professional relationships 
haci become extended into personal ones as a result of the colla­
boration. Bahcall's reference to Davis and himself having both 
staked their careers on the project shows that more than just 
an experimental test of an abstract theory was involved. Both 
scientists had put a lot of personal effort into the project.
Each can be said to have invested his scientific credibility 
in the project - a notion to which we will return later, in 
Chapter 10, where the sociological implications of the above 
developments will be discussed.
Bahcall's 1966 Prediction
As Davis's experiment neared completion, Bahcall once more 
reviewed the theoretical prediction with a view towards publishing 
another paper in Physical Review Letters. There was by this time 
a considerable amount of new information available on the neutrino- 
absorption cross-sections. Aljthough this new information did not • 
lead to any major changes in the cross-sections for neutrino 
capture by chlorine thirty-seven, the range of the uncertainty 
from this source was slightly reduced. In addition, Parker's 
new value of had to be incorporated into the prediction. 
Finally, Bahcall had to take account of the recent developments 
on the solar-model front. As well as the Ezer-Cameron model, 
there was another new model computed by Weymann and Sears.
All the solar models tended to use different sets of nuclear- 
physics data. In order to compare accurately the predictions 
given by the different models, Bahcall had to rework the models
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using a standardised set of nuclear-physics data (these were the
data given in Parker, Bahcall and pbwler (1964), plus Parker's
new value of S^^). Bahcall put all this information together
in his paper and obtained a value of the boron-eight flux of
(j) 8 = (2.1^^ ) X 10^ neutrinos cm ^sec ^ (Bahcall, 1966:400).
Combined with the latest calculation of the neutrino-capture
cross-sections this gave an expected detection rate for the
Davis experiment of 30^^^ SNU. It seemed that the main uncertainty
in this prediction arose from errors in the solar composition.
It was to errors such as these that the Ezer and Cameron model
had drawn attention. As Bahcall wrote:
The primordial (or surface) composition assumed in 
computing the solar models represents the largest 
recognised uncertainty in the predicted capture rate: 
the errors given on the theoretical prediction are 
no more than guesses for the magnitude of this uncertainty 
(Bahcall, 1966:400).
This frank admission of the uncertainties just being 'guesses' 
is again rather different from the air of certainty which pre­
vailed before the experiment was funded.
It can be seen that the predicted 'best value' in 1966 (30 SNU) 
was lower than the 1964 'best value' (40 SNU). This reduction 
seems to have resulted in part from the new neutrino-absorption . 
cross-sections (discussed earlier) and from the lower fluxes 
predicted by the more up-to-date solar models. However, in 
compensation for some of this reduction, there was an increase 
caused by the larger value of S^^.
It was mentioned in Chapter 4 that, at the heart of Bahcall's 
derivation of the 1964 'best value', was an averaging procedure 
which seemed to favour a larger prediction. In 1966, Bahcall 
was again faced with a variety of model predictions - so how
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did he derive a 'best value' this time? It seems that initially
he took some sort of average, as he had done in 1964, and ob-
+3 7 -2 -1 31tained a value of (J> 8 = (2.9 ) x 10 neutrinos cm secB “I
This value was mentioned in correspondence between Bahcall and 
Sears shortly before the 1966 paper was submitted. It was also 
la.r̂ r than the value given in the final version of the 1966 
paper (see above). It seems that, in the period before the 
paper was submitted, Bahcall bowed to pressure from Sears who 
argued, as mentioned in Chapter 4, that Bahcall should not 
average the fluxes from several models but choose the flux from
the 'best' model. Commenting on Bahcall's value of (J>g8 = 2.9 xlO^
-2 -1 1? neutrinos cm sec Sears wrote:
I do not agree with it. Obviously the best value is 2.1, 
neglecting varying G and the now obsolete Sears J.
As the final version of Bahcall's paper did give a best value of
2.1 for the boron-eight flux it seems that he derived a lower
prediction by using the 'ask the expert' (in this case Sears)
33means of combining different predictions together.
Again the flexibility in the 'best value' can be seen. By
using a different averaging procedure from that which he had
favoured in 1964, Bahcall was able to derive a lower -'best value'.
CNO-cycle Versus pp-Chain
Bahcall (1966) also calculated the expected detection rate
in Davis's experiment if the CNO cycle was (improbably) the
dominant energy cycle in the Sun. He found the expected signal
to be 35 SNU. As this was the same order of magnitude as the
signal expected from the pp-chain (mainly boron-eight neutrinos),
it did not look as if Davis's experiment could distinguish
34between the two modes of energy generation. Bahcall suggested.
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however, that the results obtained by the other proposed solar- 
neutrino experiments of the direct-counting type (as discussed 
in Chapter 5) which were sensitive in different degrees to 
CNO and boron-eight neutrinos, could be used to decide which 
cycle predominated in the Sun.
f33
There was one more major development over this period which
affected the solar-neutrino flux prediction. This was the long
3 3awaited results of the Caltech measurements of the He -He
35cross-section. These results became available in December 1966.
Much to everyone's surprise, the results indicated, not a lower
value of S^2 as Parker and Bahcall had expected, but a value
approximately five times larger (5,000 keV-barns) than the
old 'standard' value (1,100 keV-barns).
The measurements were carried out by two groups: A.D.
Bacher and T.A. Tombrello^^ who, as we saw in Chapter 4, had
started measurements in 1964 and H.C. Winkler and M.R. Dwar^anath,
who were the first to make measurements at low enough energies
to enable reasonable extrapolations to the zero-energy.intercept
to be made. In addition, some results obtained by a Chinese-?
Russian group became available at around this time, and they
38also indicated a larger value of the cross-section. The 
emergence of these experimental attempts to measure this cross- 
section at this time were stimulated in part by the increased 
availability of He^ for use in the target. This rare material 
became more abundant as a by-product of the construction of 




Although the new value for seemed to be approximately
5,000 keV-barns, there was still considerable uncertainty over
39the extrapolation to this value from the low-energy measurements.
In order to resolve this uncertainty more experiments were
commenced at Caltech with a view to obtaining even better measure-
40ments at even lower energies.
The delay in the construction of Davis's apparatus (as 
mentioned in Chapter 5) enabled Bahcall to incorporate the new 
value of into the prediction before the experiment was ready. 
The new larger value had the effect of diminishing the importance 
of the branch of the pp-chain leading to boron-eight neutrinos 
(see Fig. 2.2), and hence the neutrino fluxes were reduced in 
magnitude. In a note submitted to The Astrophysical Journal 
in May 1967 Shaviv (a young solar-model specialist who assisted
Bahcall), Bahcall and Fowler estimated that the boron-eight
7 -2 -1 41flux was reduced to ((>̂8 = 1.6 x 10 neutrinos cm sec
Discussion of Interpretation of Data
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that Parker and Bahcall
had interpreted the low-energy data as indicative of a possible
new extrapolation which would result in an even lower value of 5^3*
The latest results, reported in 1966, went the opposite way to
such expectation. The new results and the old data are both
shown in Fig. 6.1. Now, viewed with hindsight, the old data took
on a new meaning. As one nuclear physicist who had been involved
with the cross-section measurements, told me:
One of the reasons that the original prediction has changed... 
one of the most important reasons is the fact that this is 
the extrapolation that was being used [Fig. 4.2,line a]
In hindsight it was a dumb thing to do. They should have 
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Fig. 6.1 The Cross-Section Factor, from four Measurements
The data in the lower left region are from the early work of Good,
Kunz and Moak. The triangles are from Neng-ming / the open
circles from Bacher and Tombrello, and the solid circles from 
Winkler and Dwarakanath. This figure is to be found in Kavanagh (1972).
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sense I'm a little bit surprised that the people didn't 
try to redo the experiment before, earlier on...People 
had been going along rifely quoting this extrapolation 
and not really acting as if they were concerned, not 
really going on to say 'look this really ought to be 
rmeasured; there's clearly something wrong'.
I asked another nuclear physicist, who had actually produced one
of the new measurements of whether he was surprised that his
result was five times larger than the previous 'standard' value.
He told me :
I don't believe it was considered as a surprise, part 
of the reason being that it was suspect. Actually it 
was less of a surprise just interpreting the Oak Ridge 
data...The cross-section factor comes down and then 
sharply goes up and that was sorta worrying us. Why is 
it going up so sharply, what is going to happen at even 
lower energies when you extrapolate the thing? And it 
was really reassuring to find something behaving nice 
. and smoothly. I do not believe that people could be 
surprised.
For these physicists the Oak Ridge S-factor plot indicates not
that a lower extrapolation is possible but that the data are
in themselves too suspect to draw any firm conclusions from them.
Some respondents commented to me that, as the Oak Ridge data .
was produced in the 'early days' of nuclear physics, it was
not surprising that it was in error. Other respondents pointed
to possible experimental errors in the Oak Ridge data such as 
42
'beam straggling'.
It is, of course, easy to discard old measurements when 
you have reason to believe the new measurements. One respondent 
was disarmingly frank about this process of selection. This 
respondent, who had been involved with the new measurements, 
told me why, for instance, he thought the data from the Chinese- 
Russian collaboration (see Fig. 6.1) were correct cind the Oak 
Ridge data incorrect:
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I don't think we would have believed them fthe Chinese- 
Russian data^ except they fell right in with the stuff 
that we were just getting...They weren't specifically 
after the low-energy cross-section...There was nothing 
wrong with the data...but after you have a cross- 
section you believe, it is very easy to sort through 
all the garbage and decide which of the ones made were 
correct. Before the fact you have several things 
that differ by an order of magnitude, you don't really 
know which is right. And so it became very clear, for 
example, that the TOak Ridge"] experiment was wrong 
and the {[^Chinese-Russian’J experiment was correct.
In actual fact, if you looked at the way the 
experiments were done it would not have been clear that 
either were particularly correct.
If nothing else, these statements show the interpretative 
flexibility of the cross-section data. The interpretation is 
constructed according to a variety of assumptions. In this case 
we have seen that data which behave 'nice and smoothly' and 
data which 'fit in with other results' are preferable to the 
Ocik Ridge data which have neither of these properties. It 
is this interpretative flexibility which earlier enabled 
Bahcall and colleagues to read the data in one particular way. 
Solar-Composition Uncertainty
Accompanying the note in the Astrophysical Journal, in 
which the prediction with the new value of was set out, was
43another paper by Bahcall (co-authored with Cooper and Demarque).
In this paper the uncertainty in the prediction which resulted 
from the poorly known primordial solar composition was estimated. 
As mentioned above, Bahcall had already drawn attention to this 
uncertainty in his 1966 prediction. In order to obtain a more 
precise estimate of this error, Bahcall had calculated the 
neutrino fluxes predicted by solar models constructed by Demarque 
and Percy which had a range of values of Z (the primordial heavy- 
metal content of the Sun). The conclusion was that there was an
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uncertainty in the neutrino flux of approximately a factor of two 
due to solar-composition uncertainties.
The Prediction on the Eve of Davis's Experiment
As Davis prepared to make his first measurements in the late 
Spring of 1967, the theoreticians checked over their predictions
once more. Ezer and Cameron made renewed model calculations using
7 -2the new value of S^^ and obtained (̂ >̂8 = 1.18 x 10 neutrinos cm
-1 44sec . Bahcall and Shaviv also worked throughout this period
to try to produce as precise a prediction of the neutrino flux 
as possible before Davis made his first measurement. As Davis 
informed me:
John Bahcall and Willy Fowler were following every move 
as we were building it, so I saw quite a lot of them.
John Bahcall took it as his personal task to do the best 
you can with the theory and have a forecasted rate when 
the experiment was done. So he kept a track of everything 
and he wanted to find out the number, and just before I 
tell him the number, he will say 'It's got to be that'.
That was what he envisioned.
Bahcall was thus very anxious to know exactly when Davis
would start making measurements in order that he could prepare .
his final prediction in time. For instance, on January 4, 1967,
45he wrote to Davis as follows:
Dear Ray:
Could you give me a call or drop me a card regarding 
the possibility that you will actually be taking data 
early in March. I will be on my way back to Pasadena 
from Israel at that time and, as we discussed earlier, 
could stop off at Brookhaven if the time seems really 
ripe.
It can be seen that Bahcall wanted to be there at the moment 
towards which his activity over the previous four years had 
been directed.
A lot depended on the measurement Davis was about to 
make. Bahcall, it seems, felt increasingly apprehensive as that
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date drew nearer; as he told me:
I can remember being enormously nervous before the results 
came out...Between '64 and '65 there was a burst of 
activity, which a number of us at Caltech participated 
in...And after that nobody else was involved theoretically, 
and that was my thing. I had calculated the background,
I had defined the predictions. I was the only guy working 
on that. I was then a young research fellow whose emotions 
and scientific advancement depended in a large part on 
my correctness in what I was asserting.
As the moment approached, Bahcall did more and more calcul­
ations in order to make his prediction as exact as possible. With 
the aid of Shaviv, he constructed a range of solar models using 
the most up-to-date input data. This included not only the new 
value of 8^2 but also a new estimate of the Be^-electron capture 
rate which had just been revised with the consideration of bound-
kêelectron capture (Iben, Kolata, and Schwartz, 1967). Iben,
who had initiated this calculation, found that the beryllium- 
seven capture rate was reduced by about 20% with the consideration
of this effect. Bahcall and Shaviv predicted (̂ 8̂ = (I.4 ±  0.8)
7 - 2 - 1  . 47X 10 neutrinos cm sec and a total signal of 19 ±  11 SNU.
This corresponded to a neutrino event rate in Davis's tank of
2 - 7  events/day. Their paper was submitted to the Astrophysical
Journal on August lO,just as Davis's first measurement was being
completed.
Although Bahcall's prediction on the eve of Davis's experiment 
was lower than that of 1964 and Bahcall now placed more stress on 
the uncertainty in the prediction due to the possible error in the 
solar composition, it would be wrong to give the impression that 
Bahcall was no longer confident that his prediction would be 
verified. His confidence was, for instance, demonstrated by 
two symbolic bets he had with other scientists at this time that 
Davis would detect a signal within the error range of the prediction. 48
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Also, at a conference held in February-March 1967 Bahcall re­
iterated the unambiguous nature of the prediction. As he stated:
A measurement of the solar neutrino flux provides an 
opportunity to test quantitatively unambiguous predictions 
of the theory of solar models for a supposedly well-understood 
star, the sun. (Bahcall, 1967:248).
Although Bahcall fully expected his prediction to be confirmed
he did speculate over the possibility that Davis would refute
the prediction and detect nothing at all. Indeed Bahcall (at this
same conference) claimed that one of the arguments that Davis had
put to Goldhaber in 1963 in order to try to persuade him to support
the experiment was that the most scientifically interesting result
would be a null result. However, Bahcall did not really expect
this to occur as his concluding comment at the conference reveals:
In preparing this talk I came across some remarks made by 
Eddington in the same address in which he proposed hydrogen 
fusion as the ultimate energy source for the sun which 
express more accurately the true sentiments of both Davis 
and myself as we await the first results of his experiment. 
Eddington said: "I suppose that the applied mathematician 
whose theory.has just passed still one more stringent test 
by observation ought not to feel satisfaction, but rather 
disappointement - 'Foiled again. This time I had hoped 
to find a discordance which would throw light on the points 
where my model could be improved'. Perhaps this is a 
counsel of perfection; I own that I have never felt very 
keenly a disappointment of this kind". (Bahcall, 1967:249).
Bahcall had not put all the hard work into his prediction in the
expectation that it would be refuted. To reiterate an earlier ,
quote from Bahcall:
I had staked my career on my ability.to predict the response 
of the instrument... and he [^Davis] in spending his major, 
almost his entire effort in building the equipment.
The drama that was unfolding as Davis prepared to make his first
measurement is clear. A lot of time, effort and human resources
had, by this stage, been invested in the project. The partnership
between the theoretician and the experimenter was entering its most
204.
crucial phase. In a sense, it was Davis's and Bahcall's scientific 
careers which were at stake, as much as the flux of solar 
neutrinos.
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EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENTS 1967-1978 
In this chapter, the description of experimental developments 
is continued from the point in 1967, when the first results of 
Davis's experiment became available, until the point in 1978 when 
his experiment met with widespread acclaim. As well as looking 
at Davis's activities over this period, the reception accorded 
his result amongst the wider ccmmunity is mapped out. Also the 
development of 'second generation' solar-neutrino experiments is 
briefly discussed.
Given the scope of this chapter it is convenient to divide 
the material into two parts. In Part I, the focus is on the 
central experimental developnents over the period and the general 
reception accorded Davis's results. In Part II, the one serious 
attenpt to challenge Davis's result is looked at in some detail.
Again, in this chapter, descriptive material is well to the 
fore. The account of activities is based upon correspondence 
files, interview material, and scientific publications. Another 
important resource is the recent account of the history of the 
solar-neutrino problem written by Bahcall and Davis (1980).
The material presented (particularly in Part II) has also been 
chosen, however, so as to illustrate an important sociological 
theme. This relates to one of the central contentions of this 
work - that scientific knowledge (and in this case the outcome 
of the Davis experiment) can be looked at as a product of the 
social world rather than the natural world.
It was argued in Chapter 1, that in order to show the social 
basis of scientific knowledge the sociologist is faced with two
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tasks. The first task is to deconstruct scientific facts in such 
a way as to show that they are not necessary outcomes of the 
natural world. Along with this task of deconstruction, is the 
need to show the social processes of construction whereby a 
socially contingent fact becomes widely accepted as a certified 
scientific fact. In other words,the sociologist must also show 
the social processes of construction such that a consensus is 
reached that a valid fact of the natural world has been established.
In this chapter these tasks are accomplished by looking at 
the reception accorded Davis's results amongst the wider community. 
Attention is focussed initially on the issue of replication. Davis's 
result is further deconstructed by following the attempts of one 
scientist to claim that Davis's result was merely an artefact of 
his detection procedure. The attempt is made to show that 
scientific arguments alone cannot settle the issue of whether 
Davis's result is fact or artefact. Furthermore, by monitoring 
the acceptance of Davis's result amongst the wider community 
and the eventual defeat of the efforts to challenge the. 
result, it is to be hoped that some of the processes of knowledge 
construction can be revealed. The processes which are illustrated 
by the material presented in this chapter will be discussed again, 
in more detail, in Chapter 10.
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PART I; DAVIS'S ACTIVITIES AND THE RECEPTION OF HIS RESULT, 1967-1978
The First Result
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the first sample recovered from
the Davis eageriment that was suitable for analysis was taken to
Brookhaven in June 1967 after the tank had been exposed for 48
days. The radioactivity produced by the sample was measured in
a small Geiger counter, surrounded by anticoincidence cosmic-
ray counters in a heavily-shielded eureaw of the chemistry
department basement. The sample was counted over the period
June 26 - August 7, 1967. The 1/10 cc of argon thirty-six
carrier gas,^ which had been placed in the tank prior to exposure,
was found to be recovered with a 94% efficiency (the amount of
carrier gas recovered was determined by mass-spectrcxneter
measurements). Thus^if any argon thirty-seven formed, it too
was expected to be recovered with a high efficiency.
There was by this stage considerable excitement in the
scientific world as the long-expected result was awaited. Fowler,
who was at Cambridge at the time, wrote to Davis on August 10,
2that;
There are the usual batch of rumoursconcerning the preliminary 
results of your observations and I have been besieged with 
questions on all sides...If you are...divulging your 
preliminary results to others I would very much like to 
be in the know.
At leeist one person, apaurt from Davis, knew already how the 
counting was progressing. This was John Bahcall, who, as we saw 
in Chapter 6, was keenly following Davis's progress and who had 
had several telephone conversations with him over this period.^ 
Bahcall knew of the result almost as soon as Davis himself did.
The first written communication of the initial result seems
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4to have been in a letter which Davis sent to Fowler on August 11.
This letter contained the counting data for the first run. The
pulse-height spectrum for the sample (the histogram of counts in
a range of energy bins) showed no evidence for an excess of
argon thirty-seven in the expected energy range. In other words,
it seemed as if there was no signal above the background. The
background rate was estimated by observing the counter for a
period before the sample was introduced (in later runs the
background was measured by observing the counter for a period
37after all the sample should have decayed). The Ar -production
rate in the tank could be calculated from the signal observed
in the counter after allowance had been made for the exposure
period, the counting period, the recovery efficiency and the
counter efficiency.
As in this first run there was no evidence for argon thirty^
seven decay above the background rate, the result could only
be expressed as an upper limit. This allowed for the possibility 
37that the Ar counts were produced entirely by background effects.
Davis estimated a result of Z(pa less or equal to 6 SNU (equiva-
7 -2 -1lent to a boron-eight flux of <{>̂8 ̂  0.5 x 10 neutrinos cm sec ) .
It will be recalled from Chapter 6, that the theoretical
prediction which Bahcall and Shaviv had made on the eve of the
experiment gave a total rate of E<pa = (19 ± 11) SNU and a boron-
7 -2 -1eight flux of <l>̂6 = 1.4 (1 ± 0.6) x 10 neutrinos cm sec
Davis's first result thus seemed to be well below the 'best
value' for the theoretical prediction and on the border lines
of the lower limit of this prediction. Davis commented to
Fowler that this result seemed 'quite low'.^
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The result was,at this stage, highly provisional, as Davis
emphasized to Fowler:^
Please regard these results as very preliminary. There 
are several points that must be checked before we are 
certain this is a bona fide observation.
That Davis should be initially cautious is hardly surprising
given the importance of the experiment. Davis's worries were
also amplified by the particular context in which the experiment
was being performed. The location of the apparatus, a mile
under the Earth's surface in the backwoods of South Dakota, did
not facilitate inspection of his procedures by interested parties.
Also, he was the only experimental scientist working on the
project. His collaborators, Don Harmer and Ken Hoffman,, who
had helped design and build the apparatus, were both engineers,
and Bahcall was, of course, a theoretician (there was also a
technician, John Galvin, who had worked with Davis throughout
the entire project).
One of the first things Davis did, after reporting his
initial result to Fowler, was to get two of his immediate
colleagues at Brookhaven (both of whom were nuclear chemists)
to visit the mine with him and check over his experimental 
7procedure. After this careful scrutiny by his colleagues
Davis felt confident that there was nothing obviously wrong.
At this point he decided to make his preliminary result public.
He presented his result to a meeting of the American
0
Chemical Society in Chicago on September 14, 1967. Davis 
chose this forum because there was a drive on at Brookhaven 
at the time to get people to join the American Chemical Society 
and participate in its activities. Davis got very little reaction
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to his paper which concentrated on details of the design and
operation of the experiment; as he told me:
I just gave a regular contributed paper, and I gave it to 
an audience of about six or eight chemists sat in this 
little room...and I mean they didn't care less [^laughterJ.
It seems that one of the most important results in nuclear
astrophysics could hardly have been presented in less exciting
circumstances.
7 -2 -1The result Davis reported (#^8 < 0.9 x 10 neutrinos cm sec )
was slightly larger than the upper limit given in the previous 
letter to Fowler. It seems Davis's initial analysis had been 
scsnewhat pessimistic. In the intervening period his upper 
limit had risen slightly.
Davis's decision to present his result initially to his 
immediate professional colleagues in chemistry was understandable 
since his experimental technique was first and foremost a piece 
of chemistry. The lack of reaction of his colleagues gives some 
idea as to just how standard a piece of chemistry it was considered 
to be. His work was similar (although on a larger scale)to that 
carried out by other radiochemists in the identification of 
elements from the decays of just a few atoms. Davis, as an 
acknowledged expert in this technique for argon thirty-seven 
(an expertise gained over his previous fifteen years in the field), 
was unlikely to meet much criticism from his colleagues in chemistry. 
In that his result was of little consequence for chemistry per se, 
there was little motivation for chemists to give his results 
the close scrutiny which, as we shall see below, some astro­
physicists felt was necessary.
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The Second Result
Although his first result did not show any evidence for
argon thirty-seven activity and hence the presence of solar
neutrinos, Davis, it seems, remained optimistic. He wrote to
the Homestake Mining Company on September 23 that:
We will improve our sensitivity in future experiments, 
so we are still hopeful.
The exposure for the first run had been 48 days. By exposing
the tank for llO days, Davis hoped the sensitivity would be
increased somewhat because there would be more opportunity for
argon thirty-seven to form. On October 9 a new sample was taken
from the tank for analysis.
This second measurement, which would hopefully clarify
the situation, was eagerly awaited not least because the scientific
media, having heard of the first measurement, were anxious to
publicise the result. During October Davis had requests for
information from the British magazine. New Scientist,- and the
house journal of the Americcin Physical Society, Physics Today.
The results of the second measurement were communicated by
Davis to Bahcall on October 31, 1967.^^ The argon thirty-six
recovery efficiency was again found to be satisfactory (95%).
After an exposure of 113 days and counting for 13 days, Davis
estimated the total signal was < 4 SNU and that (J)g8 < 0.3 x 10^
—2 —1neutrinos cm sec . This corresponded to a capture rate of 
< 0.8 neutrinos/day. Again, the pulse-height spectrum for the 
sample looked little different from the spœtrum for background 
alone, thus indicating that no excess argon thirty-seven was being 
formed.
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Davis described the result as 'very low'. It seemed that the
expected neutrino flux was not there. The negative result
12caused Davis to comment in his letter:
It's too bad we do not have a positive result for Bethe 
this year.
By coincidence Hans Bethe had that year been awarded the Nobel
prize for his earlier work on the nuclear reactions in stars.
It was indeed ironic that the first direct test of his theories
of nuclear synthesis in stars, should be made in the same year
and, furthermore, indicate that something was amiss.
Although Davis appeared not to be detecting solar neutrinos,
there was some small hope that in the future he might be able to
increase the sensitivity of his experiment. This could bg
achieved by the use of smaller counters, which would reduce
background effects at the counting stage, and by the accumulation
of more data and hence better statistics. However, .he was near
to the absolute sensitivity of the apparatus which was governed
by the backgrounds in the tank. He estimated there to be a
37background of 0.2 Ar atoms/day formed by cosmic rays^ 0.6 
37Ar atoms/day formed by fast neutrons,and 0.02 atoms/day
formed by internal alpha contamination (these figures should be
37compared with his detection rate of < 0 . 8  Ar events/day).
The fast-neutron effect could eventually be eliminated by 
flooding the tank chamber with water - Davis planned to do this 
at a later date. He also planned to obtain a more accurate 
estimate of the cosmic-ray background by exposing tank cars 
of perchloroethylene at various depths in the mine.
One other test Davis hoped to perform was to irradiate the 
tcink with a neutron source. This would produce argon thirty-seven
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35 35 37 37by the reactions. Cl + n - > S  + p. Cl +p->-Ar +n. This
test would serve as a calibration of the apparatus, because the
number of cirgon thirty-seven atoms produced, although not known
absolutely, could be shown to scale-up proportionately with
similar tests carried out with smaller tanks.
Davis was very concerned to make every test possible to
check on the operation of his experiment. This can be seen in
his request to Bahcall that:^^
If there are any other tests you or your colleagues can 
think of that we could perform, please let me know.
The need to convince the Caltech group, in particular, of
the correctness of his result was uppermost in Davis's mind at
the time. As he told me:
I was very concerned about Willy Fowler and Caltech and 
I always welcomed someone from their lab coming to visit
the experiment . You see he has a lot invested in this...
So it meant quite a lot to him and I wanted to be thoroughly 
satisfied that we were doing things right. I've had lots 
of discussions with Willy from the beginning and they, 
continued to this day.
In a sense the Caltech group formed the most important audience 
for Davis's result. As we have seen, it was their interest and 
involvement which wa6 largely responsible for Davis getting the 
funding for his apparatus. It was this group that Davis was 
most concerned should be convinced of the correctness of his 
e:q>eriment - especially as his experiment seemed to disagree with. 
their theory.
As we shall see later, one of the things that has most 
impressed the nuclear astrophysicists about Davis's experiment 
has been the fact that he has been prepared to listen to all 
their suggestions and, where possible, make checks on his 
procedures. Thus,Davis's deliberate policy of openness which
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started with his offer to Bahcall does seem to have paid dividends
in the long run.
By early December 1967, Davis hkd further refined the
analysis of his second run. After an additional period of counting
-35 -1he reached the conclusion that E<f>(j < 0.3 x lO sec (3 SNU)
"6 **2 ”1 and that 4)̂ 8 < 2 x 10 neutrinos cm sec . The neutron-source
test had by this stage also been completed successfully - the
correct number of argon thirty-seven atoms having been recovered.
14Davis, in his letter to Bahcall reporting these results, wrote:
I am quite convinced the experiment is giving a correct 
result, and that I shall publish these results fairly 
soon.
Thus, in December 1967, as far as Davis was concerned, he 
was convinced of the validity of his result and was now ready 
to formally publish it , (his earlier presentation to the American 
Chemical Society was not the same as a scientific publication).
He did this by means of a paper in the May 20, 1968, issue of 
Physical Review Letters (Davis, Harmer and Hoffman, 1968).
His reported result, an upper limit of 3 SNU, meant that he had 
thus far failed to detect any solar neutrinos. From the 
experimental viewpoint it seemed that his attempt to extend 
his neutrino-detection programme into astronomy had met with 
little success. Here too, as with his earlier work at reactors, 
he had found nothing to detect.
The Response of Other Solar-Neutrino Experimenters to Davis's 
Result
It seems that other solar-neutrino experimenters were soon 
convinced of the validity of the Davis result. By early December 
1967, they had enough faith in the correctness of his experiment 
to be prepared to give up their own experiments. As Davis
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commented to Bahcall, in his letter of December 8:^^
I have discussed the present results with Fred Reines 
and Tom Jenkins [ the other experimenters - see Chapter 5 ]
They seemed inclined to discontinue their experiments 
particularly if they have difficulty pushing their 
backgrounds down.
It will be recalled from Chapter 5, that around this period 
there were three other experiments built to detect solar neutrinos. 
Two of these were carried out by Reines and co-workers - the 
other one being performed by Jenkins. Reines's experiment to 
detect solar neutrinos by elastic scattering of electrons 
actually came into operation in a mine in S. Africa at about 
the same time as the Davis experiment came on the air. The 
Reines experiment was, however, dogged by a much larger back­
ground (thought to be caused by gamma radiation) than had been 
ej^ected. In order to get down to the sensitivity Davis had 
already achieved, a new lead shield would have to be added to 
the apparatus. Reines's attitude to this prospect was recalled 
for me by Davis, who remembered this conversation with Reines 
particularly well as it had been carried out in unusual circum­
stances. Davis spoke on the telephone to Reines's secretary 
(in California) who then sent Davis's comments on to Reines 
(who was in S. Africa) by telex. Davis told me:
So they were wondering what to do about that, should 
they abandon the experiment or should they do a lot 
more work to build a shield...and I think that another 
thing that was involved was that the mining company let 
them have a certain tunnel for a certain period of time 
and then the mining company wanted to use that tunnel.
So they were going to provide them with another tunnel...
And the question is, is it worth moving the apparatus?...
So he would type out a little question... That was the 
way of our conversation of what our results were...and 
he finally did abandon the experiment.
With Davis already reporting a negative result at a sensitivity
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below that which he could easily achieve, Reines felt it was 
not worthwhile continuing the experiment.
Reines's other detector - built in association with Wood, 
and based on the interaction of neutrinos with lithium seven - 
was never put into operation, although the apparatus was completed. 
The experiment had been designed to look for a much larger flux 
than seemed likely in autumn 1967. (It should be recalled that 
when these detectors were designed Bahcall was predicting a 
flux of 40 SNU - Davis's latest upper limit was 3 SNU cind 
the theoretical limit had also fallen to 6 SNU by this time - 
see next chapter).
The amount of confidence Reines attached to Davis's work 
can be seen from the fact that he was prepared to abandon his 
observational programme at this point and not even put into 
operation a detector that was already b u i l t . G i v e n  the un­
expected nature of Davis's result, it might seem surprising 
that Reines did not pursue his programme further in order to at 
least provide some sort of check on Davis's result. However,
Reines had every reason to trust Davis. It must be remembered 
that Reines and Davis, as the two pioneers of neutrino detection, 
were well acquainted with each others' work. They were also 
good friends. Reines has always had a high opinion of Davis's 
experimental abilities and he described the Davis experiment 
to me as having been performed with 'exquisite care, thought­
fulness cind humility'. Furthermore,Davis's earlier neutrino- 
detection results at Savannah River, although negative ones, 
were consistent with the Reines-Cowan positive result. Finally, 
it would be wrong to assume that experimentalists necessarily 
feel compelled to question a result which conflicts with
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theoretical expectations. For Reines,the lack of fit
with the theory gave no special reason for doubting the merits
of the Davis experiment.
Jenkins discontinued his experiment for much the same 
17reasons. As mentioned in Chapter 5, he was already encountering
a large background and again, like Reines's experiments, his
had been designed to detect a much larger flux. Davis's low
result was the final blow which made him give up.
It seems that Davis's fellow neutrino experimentalists had
no real doubts about his competence. Indeed, as one of the
pioneers of what was generally considered to be a difficult
and demanding (some would say hopeless) enterprise, Davis was
much admired. Naturally other experimentalists were disappointed
that he had not detected any solar neutrinos because this meant
that the field as a whole would not take off as had other new
18areas of astronomy. The attitude of the other neutrino experi­
mentalists is reflected in remarks made by Arnold Wolfendale
(a cosmic-ray neutrino specialist). When he learnt of Davis's
19result he wrote to Davis:
I was most surprised to hear that you had not had any 
neutrino counts and that the neutrino flux is much less 
than had been predicted. How very disappointing...
I admire your courage in continuing the search 
despite the background problems...
For the neutrino experimentalists Davis's experimental abilities
were never in doubt and the main consequence of his result for
them meant that it had made a difficult enterprise even more
difficult.
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The Response of Theorists to Davis's Result
As mentioned above, Davis, although convinced of the validity
of the result himself, was apprehensive as to how the theorists,
and in particular the Caltech group.would greet his work. After
all, they were hardly expecting Davis to find a negative result
since the whole thrust of their work had been to argue, that
stolar neutrinos could be detected. In general, their attitude
has been to accept the result - but not until they had given
Davis's work very careful scrutiny.
The attitude of Bahcall to the first results was described
to me by Davis:
When we got a low result of course he [Bahcall] knew about 
it right away because we talked on the phone. And I 
remember going to Caltech and giving a seminar on the 
result. I remember going to John Bahcall's house, W^lly 
came over and we were all talking about these things...
And we discussed it and he used to argue about why was 
I sure, and what are the arguments and how did I khow 
that. Sort of what John Bahcall used to refer to as the 
nuts and bolts of the whole thing.
And,on another occasion,Davis informed me:
I remember when I first got this result, John Bahcall 
was very upset that we didn't see what we should. I 
remember being there at Caltech for a couple of days, 
discussing 'How do you know that you did that? How do 
you know you got the argon out? How do you know what 
the yield is?' and so on.
I asked Bahcall if he could recall his immediate reaction
to Davis's results. He told me that he could not remember but
he felt that it would not have been unreasonable for him to have
shown some initial scepticism:
I can remember being certain that the experiment was 
right a few years later, expressing myself publicly that 
way...I think it would not have been unnatural to have 
wondered about that at the time...If the experiment had 
proved to be much less sensitive for reasons that you
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couldn't do the chemistry or couldn't get the atoms 
out or whatever, then I would have made a bad professional 
choice and I would have been very much further out of 
the stream than I was. So it would have been reasonable 
for me to worry about that, certainly before all the 
subsequent checks were made.
From piecing together other accounts, it seems that Bahcall
did have the 'good sense' to be worried. As Davis mentioned
above, Bahcall went over his work with a fine tooth comb.
Bahcall himself, in the context of relating another story
concerning his relationship with Davis, described in passing
the sort of examination he gave Davis's results:
He [[Davis] came to Caltech to talk to me...and he wanted
to discuss a variety of things, including his latest 
experimental results, and he spent a day and a half with 
me...And I talked to him so forcefully and at such length 
about analysing his data statistically in detail, he 
wasn't so much interested in that, he got a headache.
And my wife told me, I had better lay off him!
That BahccLLl still had worries in early 1968 can be seen
from the correspondence between him and Davis as Davis prepared
his Physical Review Letters paper. The publication format was
to be the same as that which they had used in 1964, when they
first proposed the experiment - that is an experimental paper
by Davis published 'back to back' with a theoretical paper by
Bahcall and his associates. As in 1964, preprints of the two
papers were exchanged between Brookhaven and Caltech. In a
21letter which accompanied his preprint, Davis wrote:
I tried to answer your worry about the chemical trapping 
of Ar^^.
This refers to the possibility that argon thirty-seven was formed 
in the tank but was not properly extracted because it binded 
with something in the tank. Most chemists thought that this was 
very unlikely as the chemistry of argon was considered to be
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very simple; however, a number of theoretical physicists,
including Bahcall, have been worried about this possibility,
as we shall see below. Davis attempted to allay Bahcall's
fears on this score by discussing the trapping possibility
(and rejecting it) in his paper.
After sending his paper to Bahcall, Davis visited Caltech
the following weekend to discuss it. Bahcall then sent a letter
to Davis on the Monday, in which he expressed further worries
22about the e3q>eriment. The letter commenced;
I have redone the calculations we looked at together last 
.Saturday. I am more convinced now, than then, that the 
simplest explanation of your results is that the background 
counter was hotter than the counter which contained the 
sample.
There were several pages of accompanying calculations where
Bahcall attempted to establish this point. The worry here was
that the background rate in the counter for the most recent run
was really lower than Davis measured it to be, and hence that
37the signal in the counter from Ar was in reality, larger 
because too many background counts were being subtracted. The 
basis for this argument was a difference between the background 
rate recorded when no sample was present in the counter and 
the rate recorded when the sanple was present, but after a 
sufficiently long enough period for it to have all decayed - thus 
in theory, leaving just background counts. There was some
debate as to which of these two background rates was the better
^ 1 23one to take.
This worry was, it seems, eventually answered by Davis to 
Bahcall's satisfaction as Davis made more experimental runs and
24managed to produce counters with self-consistent background rates.
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However, it seems that for a while Bahcall (and Fowler) both had
hopes that Davis's negative result would turn into a small
positive signal because of his over-estimation of the background
25contribution in the counter.
Part of Bahcall's concern over this point was also reflected 
in his questioning of Davis's presentation of his result as an 
upper-limit. It seemed to Bahcall to be important to assess
the probability of the experimental value exceeding the upper
limit. This issue had been raised by Richard Feynman in con­
versation with Bahcall. As Bahcall wrote Davis
I have been talking to Feynman about your experiment...
He questioned.. .your method of estimating upper 
limit. He pointed out that it would have been very 
different to have seen the difference betwegg what^ 
you actually saw and a of say 0.5 x lo sec 
It is clear...that you could tell the difference 
between what you saw and 2.4 x 10*35 sec ...
A similar point was raised by Bahcall in a later letter concerning
Davis's proposed paper for Physical Review Letters. Bahcall
4- 27wrote:
...you should say explicitly what the probability is 
that the actual rate is above any limit you set. (His 
emphasis).
This point warranted particular attention in Bahcall's mind at
the time because, as we shall see in the next chapter, he was
hopeful that the theoretical 'prediction' was actually lower
than had been thought to be when the experiment had been under-
teiken. It was not clear to Bahcall that the results did contradict
the theory. Clearly if the upper limit of the experimental
result was seen as a statistical limit with a finite probability
of being transgressed, then a contradiction with a theoretical
-35 -1prediction (say 0.5 x 10 sec ) just above this upper limit
28would appecir less compelling.
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It can be seen from the above interchanges that Bahcall, 
anyway, was not convinced of the validity of Davis's results 
quite as quickly as Davis himself and the other experimenters 
had been. In this regard it is important to note that the 
publication format of separate papers that Bahcall and Davis 
adopted permitted Bahcall to map out the theoretical impli­
cations of the experiment without actually having to commit 
himself to the validity of the experimental results. By the 
time Bahcall and Davis published jointly-authored papers on 
the result (the first was in 1976^^Bahcall was confident that 
the experiment was working correctly.
Other theorists seemed willing to express more confidence 
in Davis's work in 1968, especially after they had had a chance 
to read his Physical Review Letters paper. The seriousness with 
which Davis's work was being taken can be seen from the following 
two comments of theorists. The first is made by solar-model
specialist,R. Sears. After receiving a preprint of Davis's
^ 30paper. Sears wrote:
Thank you very much for your preprint...I am most grateful 
to get the official word on your data, after hearing only 
gossip from Fowler, Hoyle, Dicke, Cameron, and Physics 
Today!
The results of your elegant and careful work are 
certainly exciting...
I certainly hope you will continue your beautiful 
experiment....
The second comment comes in a telegram sent to Davis by the
highly influential Princeton theoretical group centred around
Robert Dicke and John Wheeler. The telegram, sent by Robert
Dicke, Donald Morton, James S. Mark, Remo Ruffini, and John
Wheeler, reads:
To (sic) bad theoreticians encouraged you to undertake 
such a difficult experiment but now you have done it and
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shown we were all wrong we all consider it one of the most 
challenging problems in present day physics...Congratulations 
on what you have done and best wishes for the future.
It seems as if Davis had, by this stage, impressed several important
32theorists with his work.
Summer 1968 - Davis Decides What to do Next
With the publication of his first results, Davis settled
down to the more mundane tasks of trying to improve the sensitivity
of his apparatus by making more and better measurements, and
of trying to get a more accurate estimate of the cosmic-ray
background. Davis was hoping to enlist Wolfendale's assistance
in analysing the measurements he was making of the cosmic-ray
33background at different depths. In a letter to Wolfendale , 
sent in early May, Davis reported that he had completed measure­
ments at a depth of 800 feet; he estimated, however, that it 
would be two years before enough measurements had been made to 
calculate the background accurately. It seemed that any future 
progress on the experiment would be slow and painstaking.
At the end of July 1968 a further san$)le was taken from the 
tank and counting ccmmenced. It soon became clear that the 
result was similar to the earlier ones and confirmed the 
previous upper limit of 3 SNU.
Davis spent the summer of 1968 visiting Reines at Irvine.
At the end of the summer he presented his latest results at an 
international conference on solar-neutrino astronomy held
34in Moscow and organised by the Soviet physicist, George Zatsepin. 
Reines and Wolfendale also attended this meeting. Bcihcall was 
invited but was unable to attend as he had just become a father.
The Moscow meeting, as well as providing a forum in which 
to discuss the Davis result, was evidence of the continuing Soviet
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interest in solar-neutrino astronomy. Of course, the original 
idea for the chlorine experiment came from a Soviet physicist - 
Bruno Pontecorvo. As well as contributing to theoretical 
developments, the Soviets were following experimental develop­
ments closiy.^^ Many young Soviet physicists quizzed Davis 
in some detail at this meeting concerning his experimental 
procedures. Eventually the Soviets were to start work on 
building their own chlorine detector. If this experiment is 
ever completed (it had not been by 1978) it will represent the
A 37only attempt thus far to rejpt the Davis experiment.
Soon after returning to Brookhaven, Davis sent Fowler a
copy of the paper he had read at Moscow. He informed him that
he did not think he would be able to improve on his results unless
he could reduce his counter background to zero. Davis also
sent Fowler a copy of the Dicke telegram (mentioned above) which
he had just received. It will be recalled that Dicke's message
38opened with the cryptic remark:
To bad theoreticians encouraged you to undertake such 
a difficult experiment...
Davis obviously thought that the telegram warranted some comment
as Fowler was the head of the group that had encouraged him
to perform the experiment. He summarised his feelings as follows:
It is very clear that we have learned a lot from this 
experiment, and I am very happy that we forged ahead 
in 1964. I feel that we can get more out of the 
experiment in the future, though it may be slow going.
Davis certainly would not admit that the experiment was a failure.
After all it had worked as planned - it was just that the flux
he had hoped to detect did not seem to be there. There is no
doubt, however, that Davis felt some disappointment. As Bahcall,
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who probably knew Davis as well as anyone over this period, told 
me:
Davis's reaction was even sharper than mine...because he
had spent many years measuring nothing at a reactor.
And the thing we were most worried about...in funding 
it, was that it was just a pipe dream of astronomers 
and they'd measure nothing anyway.
In view of the overall goal of his research programme - to
detect neutrinos - Davis now had to consider what to do next. As
40he wrote to Reines at the time:
I have reached a plateau with the chlorine experiment and
must consider seme new approaches to solar neutrinos, 
or perhaps start out in a new direction. There is much 
more that has to be done to finish the Homestake 
experiment, but this is on the ways, and I can see the 
end ahead.
It appears that Davis used the opportunity of the summer spent
at Irvine and the Moscow meeting to reflect on the prospects
for the future. It seemed that a new approach would be required.
After much discussion with Reines, Davis concluded that the
most promising new detector would be one based on the reaction 
7 7Li + V -► Be + e . This was the same reaction Reines and
Wood had earlier planned to use in their detector. However,
Davis planned (possibly as a joint project with Reines) a Icirge
radiochemical version with the lithium in the form of lithium-
chloride solution. The Be^ could be separated frcm the solution
and its radioactive decay monitored in much the same way as 
37the Ar was observed in the chlorine experiment. The great 
advantage of this detector was that it was likely to be sensitive 
to lower energy fluxes of neutrinos, such as the pep neutrinos, 
the flux of which had been shown to be independent of detailed 
solar models (Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv, 1968; see next 
chapter for details).
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It can be seen that, by the end of 1968, with three 
experimental runs reported, as far as Davis was concerned his 
experiment was substantially complete. He was convinced of 
the correctness of his result, as were his fellow experimentalists. 
Even the theoreticians seemed to be taking his result seriously. 
Although modifications and further work could be carried out 
to tighten up on and improve the result (e.g.^ flooding the tank 
chamber, making more runs, measuring the cosmic-ray background, 
and building new counters and electronics), the main 'news' was 
in. The detection of solar neutrinos - the long term goal of 
Davis's research - seemed unlikely to be fulfilled with the 
chlorine experiment.
1968-1972, Davis Sets an Even Lower Limit on the Solar-Neutrino 
Flux
Although Davis started serious work on planning a lithium
detector, the main developments of/interest in this period were
still associated with the chlorine experiment. In particular,
Davis achieved a dramatic increase in sensitivity with the
37introduction of a new technique for measuring the Ar decay 
counts.
The new technique was a means of measuring the pulse-rise 
time of decay counts. The pulse in the Geiger counter produced 
by argon thirty-seven has a faster rise time than background 
events (this is because of the very short range of the argon 
thirty-seven Auger electrons). If the pulse-rise time could be 
measured, the signal from argon thirty-seven events could be 
distinguished from the background more easily. This technique 
was in use in x-ray astronomy where it enabled x~ray events to be
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detected in the presence of large fluxes of cosmic rays. The idea 
of using this system for the chlorine detector had first been 
suggested to Davis in 1968 by a Caltech l*ray astronomer, Gordon 
Garmire. Davis was given the idea by Garmire as they releuced 
at the Caltech pool after a seminar presentation by Davis. It 
took the BNL electronic engineers two years to develop am 
amplifier fast enough for Davis's needs, and the pulse-rise 
facility was not finally introduced until late 1970.
The increased sensitivity brought about by the introduction
of this new counting technique gave Davis his first indication
of a positive signal. In reports of his results in 1970 and
1971 (Davis, 1970, 1971), he tentatively concluded he was seeing
a signal of 1.5 ± 1 SNU. Because of the uncertainty in the
background Davis was reluctant to conclude that this signal was
produced by solar neutrinos. In late 1931 he obtained a series
of very low counts (one actually being zero) and this led him
to reaffirm an upper limit - the new upper limit (Davis, 1972)
was given as 1 SNU. With this very low signal Davis finally felt
it was worthwhile to flood the tank chamber with water in order
to shield the detector frcm fast-neutrdn.. background effects.
He did not expect the water shield to have much effect since
measurements of this background by other means indicated a
41negligible contribution. The first runs with the water shield
in place were reported in early 1972.
Throughout this period Davis continued his measurements of 
the cosmic-ray background. It was not possible to maüce measurements 
at very deep locations (because of the size of tank needed) so 
the cosmic-ray effect at depths equivalent to the location of his
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detector was extrapolated from a series of measurements made at 
lesser depths. By 1972 this analysis had been completed by
37Wolfendale and the background in the tank calculated (0.24 Ar 
atoms/day - Wolfendale, Young and Davis, 1972). This value was 
close to that which Davis himself had estimated earlier .
It was clear by this stage, with the experimental improve­
ments and with the completion of the background measurements, 
that not only was Davis reporting a signal well below that 
expected from theory, but also there might not be any neutrinos 
at all - a result which would pose a very severe challenge to 
the theorists (see next chapter for details).
The concern over what was now widely referred to as 'the 
solar-neutrino problem' was reflected at a small informal meeting 
held at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, in early 
1972. Bahcall had just taken up a post at Princeton and it 
was he who organised this meeting between Davis and leading 
Princeton theorists,including Martin Schwar&schild and John Wheeler.
The subject discussed can be seen from a subsequent letter of
42Davis's to Bahcall where he wrote:
The question we discussed at length...of whether or not 
our program is sufficiently vigorous to solve the problem 
in a reasonable time, say four years, is of primary concern.
Amongst other possibilities Davis outlined a four-year plan to
build a lithium radiochemical detector.
It can be seen that with the new lower limit on the solar-
neutrino flux, fresh impetus was given to the possibility of
launchLng new experimental approaches. However, new approaches
were not to prove feasible until nearly a decade later (see
below for details). Meanwhile the chlorine experiment once more
came under careful scrutiny.
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1972 The Irvine Conference on Solar Neutrinos
It was no coincidence that a special conference on solar
neutrinos was held at this time. The goals of the conference,
which was organised primarily by Reines were'to clarify the
present status [of solar neutrinos ], to formulate a long range
43program and to elicit agency support'. And to this end,
amongst the fifty scientists who attended the meeting held at 
the Western White House, San Clements and the University of 
California, Irvine, were representatives from the National Science 
Foundation and the Atomic Energy Commission. The conference 
was an informal 'chat shop' and the remarks made were tape- 
recorded and the edited transcripts appeared as the Irvine 
Conference Proceedings (Reines and Trimble>,1972).
Although the organisers had hoped that new experimental 
approaches would be uppermost, with so much new data available 
from the chlorine experiment (results obtained with pulse-rise 
time and water shield), much of the discussion centred on 
Davis's results. It became clear that scxne of the nuclear 
astrophysicists present at the meeting felt there were further 
tests Davis might perform to show his experiment was working as 
he claimed. In particular, it was suggested (by Fowler) that he 
put a fixed number of argon thirty-seven atoms into his tank 
(preferably the same number as was expected to be formed from 
neutrino interactions) ; leave them for a short while, and then 
recover them. If he recovered the same number as he initially 
put in this would be a good test of his recovery procedure.
It was also felt that he should test the possibility that
37Ar ions were somehow chemically trapped in the tank and hence 
not extracted in the helium purge. This was the same possibility
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that Bahcall had raised in 1968. Davis pointed out that this
could be tested with a further experiment using a tank of per-
chloroethylene labelled with Cl^^. The Cl^^ would decay into Ar^^
and the number of Ar^^ atoms expected to be formed could be
estimated. If he extracted the correct number of Ar^^ atoms
this would rule out the trapping hypothesis, as Ar^^ was
37expected to behave in a similar way to Ar
Not everyone at the Irvine conference was agreed that Davis
should spend further time on such tests. For instance, Goldhaber
stated that he thought there was no need for,yet more tests of 
44the chemistry. However, Davis himself,in line with his policy 
of taking all suggestions seriously, no matter how unlikely
45they seemed, stated that he was prepared to make such tests.
Despite the probing of Davis's experimental procedures, it
was clear that the atmosphere of the conference was not hostile
towards Davis (most of the participants were on first-name terms)
and, indeed, there was much praise for his efforts in embarking
upon the experiment at all. The suggested tests were put forward
more in the guise of exploring every avenue rather than pointing
46to serious holes in the experiment which Davis had overlooked.
This renewed questioning of Davis's procedures, by the
nuclear astrophysicists.in particular, can be seen to stem from
the grave consequences which Davis's latest results spelt for
the theory. The air of crisis in nuclear astrophysics.meant
that, whilst up until this point most theorists were satisfied
with the validity of Davis's results (with the exception of
Bahcall's initial scepticism), they now had more reason to be
critical. Even Bahcall now called for an independent check
47on Davis's result be made.
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The radiochemistry was not the only area to be scrutinised 
at the Irvine meeting. Suggestions were made as to loopholes 
in both the nuclear physics and astrophysics (see next chapter 
for details). As there were further checks to be made in both 
the theory and experiment, and no other experimental approach 
yet seemed feasible (the separation of counts from background 
was still a problem in the planned-lithium experiment), the 
atmosphere at the end of the meeting was very much one of 'wait
and see'. Cameron summed up the feeling of the conference as
4T 48follows:
As to the long range future, I think we should exhaust 
a lot of these avenues of research before we commit 
ourselves to major and expensive new facilities.
And, as Trimble and Reines stated in their review of the 
49conference ;
The critical problem, is to determine whether the 
discrepancy is due to faulty astronomy, faulty physics, 
or faulty chemistry.
Davis was rather disappointed with the outccxne of the Irvine 
meeting since he had hoped more time would be spent on the 
discussion of new experimental approaches rather than chewing 
over his data.^^ As far as he was concerned, his experiment 
was working correctly and had been since 1967. However, he 
realised the importance of satisfying his colleagues in astro­
physics, however, far-fetched scxne of t-heir suggestions seemed, 
and thus he agreed to make the further checks requested.
Further Testing of the Radiochemistry
By June 1972, Davis had successfully carried out the test 
37of his Ar recovery prcxzedure. He had introduced '\/500 atoms of 
37Ar into his tank and after a short period had recovered them
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with the expected efficiency. Also, two colleagues of Davis
at Brookhaven carried out some experiments to test for the
formation of stable argon molecule ions which might lead to argon
being trapped in the tank. They were not able to observe any
ions with their mass-spectrometer observations (Leventhal and
Friedman, 1972).
In addition to these tests, Davis ran another neutron-
source calibration test to check his earlier results. Again,
the result was consistent with his experiment working properly
37and being capable of recovering a small number of Ar atoms.
Davis also explored the possibility of making a more
direct calibration of his experiment using a known source of
neutrinos. One suggestion, made by Alvarez, was to use neutrinos
produced by the decay of Zn^^. A sufficiently strong source
could be made by irradiating zinc in a nuclear reactor for a
year.^^he source could then be placed in or near the tank.
Davis was unenthusiastic about this proposal' as it would
be very expensive (he estimated a cost of $400,000 just to make
the source), and hazardous (the source would be very powerful
and would have to be transported over land and manoeUvered
52in confined spaces underground). In addition, the irradiation of 
the tank might prevent Davis selling the perchloroethylene back 
to the dry-cleaning company. He hoped in the long-term to 
do this in order to recover some of the cost of the experiment.
Another approach to calibration considered in some detail 
by Davis was to use neutrinos produced at the Los Alamos accel­
erator, LAMPF (Los Alamos Meson Physics F a c i l i t y ) . T h i s  
neutrino source would not only test the radiochemistry but also
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the theoretically calculated neutrino-capture cross-section for 
37Cl . This idea had, however, eventually to be dropped when
it was discovered that the background in the experimental area
at LAMPF was too large to warrant such a test.
Davis eventually carried out the Cl^^ test for chemical
trapping of argon ions. As we shalli see in Part II, some of the
motivation for this test came from further questioning of his
experiment by nuclear astrophysicists. This test turned out
to be harder to carry out than originally planned because of
difficulties encountered in the preparation of the specially
labelled perchloroethylene. The test was finally completed in
1978 and again the results were consistent with the argon-recovery
54procedure working as e^gected.
It seenfed with the success of these various tests, that 
Davis had answered all the objections which had been raised at 
the Irvine meeting. Over the period 1972-78, as Davis success­
fully carried out the tests, confidence grew amongst the astro­
physicists that the solution to the solar-neutrino problem was 
not to be found in Davis's chemistry.
New Results
In addition to making tests of his procedures, Davis con­
tinued to take data from his main experiment (see Fig. 7.1, where 
his results from 1970-78 are given). There was some excitement 
over a run made July 7 - November 5, 1972 (run no. 27) which was
much higher than any previous result. There was much debate 
55at the time as to whether or not Davis should include this 
run in the overall analysis of his data. With run 27 included, 























































limit of 1 SNU. A statistical analysis of run 27 (Pallister
and Wolfendale, 1974) indicated that it was anomalously high.
The large signal detected in this one run could be explained in
many ways. For instance, there might have been an increase in the
background for that run or else a fluctuation in the solar-
neutrino flux itself. Other astronomical events, such as a
large solar flare (known to have occurred during run 27) or
a collapsing star, might also have been connected with the result.
Another possibility, which, as we shall see in Part II, was pursued
by one scientist, was that there was something untoward happening
with the argon chemistry in this run.
The possibility that run 27 was caused by a collapsing star
gained heightened interest in 1974 when an antineutrino detector,
run by Kenneth Lande and his groiç) from the University of
Pennsylvania, and housed in the same mine as the Davis detector,
indicated the presence of a very large signal (Lande e^ al., 1974).
When this signal was detected on Jemuary 4>,1974, Davis, after
consultation with Bahcall, immediately decided to sweep his
tank in case he too had a large signal. Although antineutrinos
would not trigger his detector,most theories of collapsing stars
indicated that neutrinos and antineutrinos should be emitted
in approximately equal numbers. Davis found only a small amount 
37of Ar for this particular run (Evans, Davis and Bahcall, 1974).
In view of this, considerable ambiguity has remained over both 
the interpretation of the Lande event and Davis's earlier run
27.5*
Throughout the period 1972-78, Davis continually made im­
provements to his experiment. The design of his counters was 
modified so that they could be calibrated more accurately. The
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composition and total pressure of the filling gas were changed 
in order to optimise energy resolution and pulse-rise-time 
discrimination. A new anticoincidence counter and shield 
arrangement were i n t r o d u c e d . B y  the variation of cleaining 
techniques and choice of materials, counters with even lower 
backgrounds were i n t r o d u c e d . F i n a l l y ,  in 1977,the counting 
system was installed in the mine alongside the experiment. Thus
the need to fly the sample from Homestake to Brookhaven was
_  ^ 59 avoided.
In order to collect more 'standardised* data, Davis initiated 
a series of ten runs (nos. 39-49) where the tank was exposed 
for 35 days cind then swept. Up until then the tank had been 
left for various periods of exposure according to contingencies 
such as availability of counters and access to the tank.
As Davis continued to collect more and more data he found 
that he had several runs in which the signal was larger than 
average ( e.g. runs 36, 37, 47 and 49^? The effect of these 
larger values was to make run 27 appear less anomalous and 
more as a statistical fluctuation. The larger results also 
tended to rad.se Davis's upper limit slightly. In 1976 he reported 
an upper limit of 1.5 SNU (Davis emd Evans, 1976).
As more and better data became available, more sophisticated 
statistical techniques were used in the analysis. Davis, it will 
be recalled, had initially used the method of counting the 
sample for a period when he expected signal plus background and 
counting for a period when he expected background alone. The 
signal was obtained by subtracting the background counts from 
those obtained with the sample present. Fowler and other nuclear 
astrophysicists, however, constantly urged Davis to attempt a
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more sophisticated analysis of his data. Davis did not think
that the data warranted it but eventually he bowed to such
pressure and persuaded a colleague, Bruce Cleveland, to analyse
his data. Cleveland used a maximum-likelihood method which
utilized the time occurrence of all the decay events. From
37this the most likely time distribution of Ar events could be 
determined. He found that this technique gave a slightly larger 
signal than Davis had obtained previously (this is because 
negative counts are not permitted in the maximum-likelihood 
method). Also, by this stage, enough data had been gathered 
for many decay counts to be averaged together. Such an analysis 
of all the events in the expected envelope of pulse-rise' time 
and energy gave a firm indication of the presence of argon 
thirty-seven.
With these more sophisticated analyses and improvements in
the sensitivity of the experiment, Davis, in 1978, was able to
give his result in the form of a number with an error, rather
than as an upper limit. His result was reported to be 1.6 ±0.4
SNU.^^ He did not claim that this result was definitely caused
by solar neutrinos since there was still a possibility that
background events in the tank were responsible and the source
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might not necessarily be solar. However, it seemed less
likely now, than in 1972, that there were no solar neutrinos at 
all to detect.
1978. The Completion of the Davis Experiment - The Planning of 
New Experiments
By 1978, it was widely believed that Davis's experiment had 
achieved all that could be expected of it. It was felt to be 
unlikely that any major increase in sensitivity could be obtained.
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Indeed, as far back as 1975, Davis had expressed the view that
he would have stopped taking data but for the continuing theore- 
64tical interest. The only point in continuing to take data
seemed to be to measure the fluctuations in the signal. The
small positive signal which Davis reported in 1978 was felt to be
a remarkable achievement, especially considering that the detector
had been designed for a signal an order of magnitude greater.
The high regard with which the Davis experiment was held
in 1978 was reflected at an informal conference on the status
and future of solar-neutrino research held in early January 1978
at Brookhaven (Friendlander, 1978a,b). The earlier criticisms
of the experiment made at the Irvine conference were not repeated
here and there were many laudatory comments concerning Davis's
work (see Part II). The status . the experiment had reached
by 1978 can be seen from the report of the conference in Physics
Today. There it was claimed
Unlike the first data that hinted at the unexpectedly low 
value, the current results have gained general acceptance 
because the ceureful refinements and checks in the inter­
vening years have dispelled most doubts.
With the completion of the chlorine experiment there was much
discussion at the conference of new experimental approaches
(indeed, the conference had been organised with this purpose
in mind). Most of the new experiments were designed to measure
the lower energy neutrinos fluxes^ either from the basic pp
reaction or the pep reaction. These fluxes were thought to be
less dependent on the details of the solar model and hence their
detection could be expected to be given a less ambiguous theoretical
interpretation than the measurement of the boron-eight flux.
The two new approaches to solar-neutrino detection which seemed
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the most feasible were the 'gallium experiment' and the'indium
e x p e r i m e n t . T h e  gallium experiment, with which Bahcall
and Davis are both involved (Bahcall et al., 1978), was proposed
as a collaborative venture between the Brookhaven National
Laboratory, the Institute for Advauiced Study, the University
of Pennsylvania, the Max Planck Institute for Nucleeir Physics
(Heidelberg) and the Weizman Institute (Behovot, Israel). The
71 71planned detector is based on the reaction Ga + v ->■ Ge + e . 
This reaction had first been suggested for the detection of 
solar neutrinos by the Soviet physicist,Kuzmin (1965), At the 
time it was first proposed an experiment did not look feasible 
as gallium was a very rare metal and many tons would be needed. 
However, with the increasing use of gallium in the electronics 
industry (it is used in LEDs), it has become available in larger 
quantities and at a cheaper cost. Nevertheless to build a 
sufficiently large detector to measure the flux of pp-neutrinos 
will require an immense amount {'̂ 10 tons or the total world 
consumption for one year).
The planned detection technique is very similar to that 
used in the chlorine experiment. The gallium will be in a solution 
of gallium chloride contained in a vast underground tank. The 
radioactive germanium can be extracted from this tank and 
counted.
The proposed indium experiment is a direct counting experi­
ment and was first suggested by Roger Raghaven and a group at
Bell Labs (Raghaven, 1976). It is based on the reaction 
115 115In + V -> Sn + e . The detector is expected to be sensitive
to pp neutrinos, pep neutrinos and Be^ neutrinos. As it is a 
direct=counting experiment (making use of new counters developed
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in particle physics), it should be able to distinguish between 
the different fluxes of neutrinos (because of their different 
energies) and hence provide a measurement of the neutrino-energy 
spectrum. Again, the planned experiment is very large; it will 
consist of 3*5 tons of Indium and 100,000 photomultipliers.
These second-generation solar-neutrino detectors are 
large scale projects and are expected to cost anything up to 
25 million dollars each (the cost of a small accelerator). The 
battle to get these projects funded has already started and pilot 
experiments are under way. It seems that sometime over the 
next decade a measurement of the low-energy fluxes of solar 
neutrinos will be made.
In addition to the two experiments mentioned above and 
several other experimental proposals put forward at the Brookhaven 
conference, there is a vast Soviet effort in this area. A chlorine 
detector and a gallium detector are being constructed under a 
mountain in the Cauco-sus. Again huge sums of money are involved.
Thus, as Davis nears the end of his research programme with 
the chlorine experiment (and also nears the end of his career) 
solar-neutrino astronomy seems to be on the dawn of becoming a 
'big science' with large international groups and investments 
of many millions of dollars. As solar-neutrino astronomy enters 
the 1980's its prospects look very rosy indeed.
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PART II. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE DAVIS RESULT 
The Politics of Replication
In Part I, the slow acceptance of Davis's result was outlined.
We saw that, although Davis was himself convinced of the validity 
of his experimental claims within a month of completing his 
first measurement, and other experimentalists were convinced 
almost equally as quickly, the nuclear astrophysicists were more 
sceptical and it was not until 1978 that Davis's result won 
widespread acceptance. This acceptance was - achieved despite 
the experiment never having been repeated. As we saw, the major 
new experimental effort (apart possibly from the Soviet work) 
was aimed towards measuring different components of the
solar-neutrino energy ^ectrum than those which Davis attempted 
to measure. However, DAvis was able to increase the 
veracity of his experimental claims by carrying out exhaustive
tests of his cwn procedures. These tests in some senses,
served as a substitute for^replication because Davis was 
able to take other peoples' doubts and test them on his own 
apparatus. It seems that by the use of 'exhaustive experimental 
method' Davis was able to establish his result as a fact 
of the natural world.
It was argued in Chapter 1, that the task of the sociologist 
of science is to deconstruct the facticity of seemingly immutable 
scientific results in order to show their social basis. Something 
of this process of deconstruction can be achieved in the case 
of Davis's result if the issue of replication is considered more 
closely.
As a starting point, let us imagine that replications of
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Davis's experiment were attempted and failed to confirm his 
result. In such circumstances, it is highly likely that Davis's 
result would appear to be much less solid. This counter-factual 
question is not as far-fetch&d as it might seem, especially if we consider 
what happened in another case. The most obvious case for 
comparison with Davis (and one to which many respondents them­
selves drew attention) is the Weiber case (Collins, 1975, - 
see also, discussion of the Weber case in Chapter 1). Weber, 
in 1969, after years of apparently hopeless pioneer work, claimed 
finally to have detected gravitational r a d i a t i o n . T h i s  claimed 
result, like Davis's was obtained with an experiment of great 
technical difficulty, and also seemed, again like Davis's result, 
to be theoretically unexpected.. If reports of Weber's progress 
are studied, it can be seen that, before the results of repli­
cations of his experiment appeared, the original claim had
achieved a degree of acceptance. For instance, in a report in
69New Scientist in 1970, it was noted:
Earlier this week, Weber...published new data to support 
his claim that gravitational radiation is being observed.
His arguments are very convincing and will no doubt 
convert many of the sceptics.
This solidity, however, quickly vanished once other groups started
to report negative r e s u l t s . T o d a y ,  most scientists would say
Weber's results were artefacts rather than facts (Collins, 1981b).
It is quite possible that Davis's result could meet a similar
fate if other scientists failed to confirm it. Such a possibility
was raised by one respondent who, in comparing Weber and Davis,
told me:
I think that kind of acrimony [associated with the Weber 
episode ] is not present in this field because there is not 
another experiment. To be absolutely honest, if there was
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possibly another experiment that gave a different result, 
you could possibly see that kind of debate raging in 
this field also. When we have two alternatives, one 
doesn't respect what you did before in your life, but 
when there is only one result all these social feelings 
are strong arguments whether each individual person wants 
to accept a result or not. And, we are in that state I 
think. And that's where Ray's personality, his openness, 
as well as his past accomplishments, are a strong 
indication that there can't be anything wrong.
The 'social feelings', referred to by this respondent, which have, 
in a large measure, led most scientists to trust Davis, will be 
discussed later. From the above comment, however, it does 
seem possible that the failure to confirm Davis's results could, 
in principle, lead to changes in the current feelings that his 
results are correct.
Of course, replication is not any more of an agent of 
natural-world facticity than a single experiment, as Collins 
(1975, 1981b)has shown for the Weber case and for replication 
in general (Collins, 1976; Travis, 1981). Experimental repli­
cation seems to be a thoroughly social constituted process.
However, it is interesting to ask why such a social process, 
which is usually taken to be the corner-stone of scientific 
method, has not been a central concern in the solar-neutrino 
field.
Most respondents, when asked about the need for a replication
of Davis's experiment agreed that replication was a good thing
in principle and also pointed out that care was called for in
the interpretation of a result which had not been replicated.
However,they were still prepared to believe Davis's result.
A typical expression of this position is Bahcall's comment that:^^^
37I know of no reason to doubt the Cl results, and Davis 
has reported absolutely convincing tests that establish 
the validity of the 3^C1 detection method as well as one 
can for any single experiment, but scientists are more
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confident when results are confirmed by independent 
experiments. It would be very useful, for similar 
reasons, for some other group to try to repeat the Cl 
experiment.
However, given that there were limited resources for such experi­
ments, most respondents felt that it was more important to carry 
out a new experiment altogether rather than repeat Davis's 
experiment. Typical comments were:
If one could do everything that scientifically should be 
done there is absolutely no question that it shouldc be 
repeated , but I think, then, the value would only be if 
it could be done by a quite independent group. I would 
not give it anything like the same importance as going 
after the pp neutrinos directly. I trust Ray Davis's 
experiment sufficiently that I would give an experiment, 
really quite fundamentally different, a higher weight.
Well it would be nice to have a second detector, but it's 
such a big experiment that I think maybe it's just not 
likely, not reasonable, to have to repeat it...What we 
really want to see now is a different experiment. I 
don't think anybody wants to repeat the chlorine experiment.
I think it would be nice to see the gallium experiment done.
Some respondents felt that the gallium experiment would
itself, in some senses, serve as a replication of the Davis
experiment; as one told me:
One should repeat-dt but not repeat precisely the same 
experiment. Try to do a better experiment, one where you 
get slightly better statistics so as to advance the 
field...Just suppose, for instance, that the Russians 
were able to do the gallium...That would be an additional 
point on the curve emd one could make some sort of 
intercomparisons, although we recognise that it's at a 
different spectrum and so on. So it would perhaps be more 
interesting if one had the choice to do the gallium first.
It was even suggested that the involvement of several different
groups in the plans to carry out the Brookhaven gallium experiment
would give the project the status of an 'independent' replication.
Another indication of the interpretative flexibility associated
with the term 'replication' came from one respondent who felt that
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Davis's tests of his own experimental procedures in some ways
constituted replication. I had asked this particular respondent
whether Davis's experiment had ever been repeated; he replied:
How do you mean; repeated by other people or just 
repeated with different apparatus? If you mean repeated 
with different apparatus it's not true to say. You know 
the improvements he made in shielding, you know a 
different way of having water around it and so on. That's 
almost like a new technical set-up.
One respondent felt there was little point in repeating
Davis's experiment anyway because even if a different result
was obtained, people would prefer to believe Davis:
Say a second experiment was done, and it was different 
from Davis's, it would take a lot of convincing to be 
convinced that that experiment was right and Davis was 
wrong. That means you would need a third experiment 
and so on. So I really think for the progress of science, 
since they are relatively major efforts, that it would be 
better to put the effort in an experiment that gave you 
some kind of differing informati>on.
In addition to these kinds of reason, I was told that the 
cost and time-consuming nature of such experiments made repli­
cation improbable. Also it seems that there was little scientific 
credit to be obtained from checking upon someone else's work 
rather than attempting to make a new discovery. By way of 
contrast, respondents pointed out that others had attempted to 
replicate Weber's experiment because he had found a huge signal. 
There was more incentive to repeat a positive result because 
new discoveries could be made, such as subtleties in the experi­
mental properties of the new radiation. It seems likely that if 
Davis had found a significant flux of neutrinos, then the Jenkins 
amd Reines experiments (discussed in Chapter 5 and Part I of 
this chapter) would not have been discontinued.
This cautious attitude again reflects the confidence in the 
veracity of Davis's result. If he had been mistaken, then a
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replication might easily have led to such a new discovery1
The unwillingness of other groups to repeat Davis's experiment^ 
again puts paid to the myth that scientific truth is established 
by independent replication. The politics of replication are far 
more subtle than that. Experimentalists do not enter the arena 
simply to conform with the statements of philosophers - although 
scientists still, it seems, occasionally pay lip service to the 
rhetoric of replication. Replication is a social process and, 
whether or not to embark upon a replication, is a decision which 
depends on other factors than a simple willingness to assert 
scientific truth. For instance, experimenters entered the gravity- 
wave field to carry out 'quickies' and disprove W e b e r , a n d ,  in 
the solar-neutrino field experimenters have avoided repeating 
an experiment where they see little to be gained from such an 
enterprise.
As was emphasised above, the lack of replication has not 
proved to be a barrier to the acceptance of Davis's claims. In 
the rest of this chapter it will be shown that Davis's own tests 
of his procedures, which in some senses were a substitute for 
replication, are also thoroughly socially constituted. Happily 
the argument can now move from the counter factual to the factual. 
This is because an attempt was actually made to show that Davis's 
own tests did not guarantee the truth of his result. By following 
these arguments, it will be shown that 'exhaustive testing of 
experimental procedures'can be no more of a touchstone of 
scientific truth than replication.
Davis's Experiment Comes Under Challenge
As mentioned in Part I, there were two prominent occasions 
when nuclear astrophysicists became concerned over the experimental
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validity of the Davis result. The first such time was in late 
1967, when Davis reported his initial observations. These 
came under critical examination from Bahcall, in particular.
The second occasion was the Irvine conference in 1972, by which 
time Davis was reporting a result which seemed to indicate 
that no nuclear fusion reactions were occurring in the Sun at 
all. On both occasions the criticisms were madô : directly to 
Davis in a largely informal setting. Davis was able to satisfy 
his critics by agreeing to make further checks of his procedures 
and none of the doubts about the experiment were ever published. 
Davis's personal relationship with the theoreticians and, in 
particular, the partnership he had entered into with the influen­
tial Caltech group as far back as 1958, held him in good stead 
and such criticisms were not made ad hominem. Rather, they 
were put forward as loopholes in the (impersonal) chemistry 
which normally would not merit attention, but, given the extra­
ordinariness of the result it was felt Davis should check them 
out. Any personal remarks about Davis were always positive and 
expressed admiration for his experimental achievements in tackling 
such a difficult project in the first place.
The informal means of dealing with criticism of the 
experiment only broke down on one occasion. This was when 
Kenneth Jacobs, an astrophysicist at the University of Virginia, 
felt compelled to put his reservations concerning the experiment 
into print. He did this by way of a letter to Nature, published 
in 1975 (Jacobs, 1975).
Jacobs's criticisms centred on the familiar problem of 
'chemical trapping' of the argon in the tank. Davis had hoped 
that the experiments performed by his colleagues Leventhal and
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Friedman after the Irvine conference which purported to show that
argon ions did not form molecules in combination with the perchloro-
72ethylene would put an end to the matter. In the long-run he
planned to perform the Cl^^ experiment which he felt would be 
the definitive test of chemical trapping, but, as mentioned in 
Part I, this was proving to be more difficult to carry out than 
first planned. When Jacobs started to worry about the chemistry 
of the solar-neutrino problem in 1974 the Cl^^ experiment had 
not yet been performed.
Jacobs was not the only person concerned by the possibility 
of chemical trapping at this time. Robert Rood, another astro­
physicist at Virginia; shared his concerns, and Rood was actually 
a co-author of the original version of the Jacobs paper. Another 
astrophysicist to consider the problem was Don Clayton, of Rice Univer­
sity, Texas. He too wrote to Davis in early 1975 expressing
73worries about the possibility of chemical trapping.
Jacobs'.fe interest in the solar-neutrino problem seems to 
have been stimulated by Rood. Rood is a solar-model specialist 
who had worked at Caltech with Fowler. He has had a long-standing 
interest in the solar-neutrino problem since studying for his 
PhD under the supervision of Icko Iben at MIT (as we saw in 
Chapter 4, Iben had been part of the original Caltech team to 
work on the theory). Before moving to Virginia, Rood had 
published several theoretical papers on the solar-neutrino 
problem (Rood, 1972; Rood and Ulrich, 1974). He had also 
attended the Irvine conference. Rood was thus an established 
member of the network of ex-Caltech physicists who worked on 
the problem. As such, he often received copies of Davis's 
letters to Fowler which contained copies of the experimental
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'raw data^ (e.g.̂  pulse-rise plots for individual runs).
Rood's own reasons for looking at the chemistry of the 
problem stemmed from his failure to find a satisfactory astrophysical 
solution to the dilemma. He felt the chemistry of the experiment 
was one of the least investigated areas and, as he had been a 
radiochemist as an undergraduate, he was enthusiastic about 
finding a radiochemical solution to the problem.
Jacobs had also been at Caltech before moving to Virginia.
His thesis had been in the area of relativity theory and cosmology 
(supervised by Kip Thorne). As had Rood, he had been an under­
graduate chemist and organic chemistry was his hobby. Rood and 
he were close friends at Virginia and they!tooth used to discuss 
Davis's raw data. It was from these discussions that their . 
joint paper arose.
The main new idea of Rood and Jacobs was the possibility that 
perchloroethylene might, under certain conditions, form polymers. , 
For instance, it was known that CgH^ polymerized to form poly­
ethylene and C^F^^which is a close analogue of CgCl^ (perchloro­
ethylene), polymerizes easily to form Teflon. They felt that
37gamma radiation might induce polymerisation and that Ar ions 
could be encapsulated into tiny polymer globs which would not be 
extracted from the tank by sweeping with helium gas. Rood and 
Jacobs suggested some tests for this possibility and concluded
that the best test would be the Cl^^ test which Davis planned
 ̂ 74 to carry out.
Rood's and Jacobsfe paper was sent to Davis by Rood for 
comment.(Rood knew Davis from the Irvine meeting). Davis's 
unenthusiastic response can be gauged from the following extracts
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of his letter written to Rood in reply;
...I think it is very unlikely that these mechanisms are 
operating in our'detector and reducing its sensitivity. 
However, I appreciate your feelings about the apparent 
conflict between the theory and experiment ...We have 
placed most of our efforts into developing the detector
test the PeP flux and increasing the sensitivity of the 
Cl experiments. Apparently several astrophysicists 
feel we should spend more effort in checking further our Cl 
experiment. These additional checks are difficult, expensive 
and time consuming, but^are doing them. My personal 
feeling is that no new chemistry or physics will come of 
these tests whereas something new could come from a 
second solar neutrino experiment.
Having pointed out that he regarded such tests largely as a waste
of time, Davis went on to assure Rood that he would nevertheless
carry out the Cl^^ test which would further check for trapping.
Rood also sent the paper to Fowler for comment. Fowler
passed it on to a Caltech chemist, Norman Davidson, who « xzommented
that what was being suggested was 'pretty unlikely
In his letter to Rood, Davis also suggested that he come to
Brookhaven and discuss the experiment in detail with him. In
fact Rood was not able to take up this offer until 1977, but
in March 1975, Davis visited Virginia (Jacobs was, at the time,
on sabbatical in England) and Rood talked with him extensively
about his experiment. After this discussion Rood decided to
drop out of the joint paper with Jacobs. As he told me:
I communicated with Davis.' That was the first time I 
had really talked to him at length. I sorta lost 
enthusiasm...Because it turns out that a lot of the ideas 
that I felt were fairly clever, he had considered and he 
had actually done some preliminary-type experiments to 
show the thing worked right...
We sent copies to Fowler, and Fowler had passed it on to 
chemist friends and having had Davis explain very carefully 
to me all the things that had been done I lost enthusiasm... 
It seemed to me no point in casting doubt on the experiment.... 
What I'm saying is it's very unlikely that you would 
produce any action that you felt was very beneficial anyway.
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Thus the type of informal procedures which Davis had used in
the past to disarm his critics in nuclear astrophysics once more
seemed to have worked. Rood could see that publication of his
reservations çculd 'cast doubt' upon the experiment, and he
was thus prepared to wait and see what the tests would show.
Rood continued his informal interaction with Davis and the
eventual success of the Cl^^ experiment meant that ultimately he
became very enthused about Davis's experiment. He remarked:
Since that time I've gottJin actually to see Davis a number 
of times...and I've been to Brookhaven to look at the 
experiment....At the moment I have no doubts at all that 
the experiment is good and I have the utmost admiration 
for Davis as an experimenter.
Undeterred by Rood's loss of faith, Jacobs pressed ahead with 
the trapping hypothesis alone. As well as the idea that perchloro­
ethylene might form polymers, Jacobs explored the possibility
37of some sort of weak binding between Ar ions and perchloro-
37ethylene which might prevent the Ar being extracted from the
tank. He felt that there might be seme theoretical justification
for this; as he told me:
I went another step further, which was to look at rare-gas 
chemistry and try to extrapolate downwards to argon 
theoretically. We know that krypton and xenon bind with 
things like chlorine and oxygen...At that time.it wasn't 
completely known how the binding occurred in terms of, 
molecular orbitals...I never had the time or money to 
do the computer studies on it, or didn't know enough 
chemistry about how to really get it to ^o. But I did 
figure out that if you could bind the thing by more than 
approximately 1/10 of an eV you could account for the 
effects seen and also the fluctuations in the counts.
Jacobs had the idea that, with binding at this level, the,
thermal agitation in the liquid would account for the breaking
of bonds and that this could lead to fluctuations in the signal,
such as the higher run 27. Jacobs felt that this high run could
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not be accounted for in terms of a cosmic source of neutrinos 
(such as a collapsing star) as run 32 which was coincident with 
the antineutrino events detected by Lande's group (See Part I, 
p. 2 38) had been low.
As well as attempting an embryonic theory of argon binding, 
Jacobs also did some experiments with a group of Dutch molecular- 
beam specialists to try and see if they could get argon to bind 
to chlorine. These experiments were inconclusive as the X^ray 
source being used blew up!
Jacobs, in the winter of 1974 when he was in Cambridge,
redrafted the original paper he had written with Rood. His plan
was to submit this paper to Nature and he first sent a copy to
Davis. In response to the paper,Davis reiterated the points he
77had made in his earlier letter to Rood. He also remarked that
he felt it was unreasonable to use runs 27, 32 and the Lande event 
which were all subject to a variety of interpretations, to argue 
that the argon formed a chemical compound in his tank. Davis also 
felt that Jacobs should give more weight to the work of Leventhal 
and Friedman. Finally, Davis once more asked Jacobs to come out 
to the mine and see the experiment and go over all the details 
with him personally.
It is interesting to speculate as to why Jacobs pressed on 
with the trapping explanation and did not back down as Rood had 
done. One reason for this may have been to do with Jacobs' s own 
position on the fringes of the solar-neutrino physics community. 
Rood was part of the Caltech network which had worked on the 
problem. Although Jacobs had been at Caltech,his interests lay 
more in the direction of relativity theory and cosmology and 
he had never worked directly on the problem. Jacobs spent the
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year in which he developed his chemical-trapping hypothesis on
sabbatical in Cambridge and Holland. He was thus even further
out of the North American network which might have constrained
his action. Also Jacobs, unlike Rood, never talked directly to
Davis about his experiment. Jacobs felt Davis, as a person,
was Ictrgely irrelevant, as he told me:
...It has nothing to do with Davis. I have never even 
met him so I hope it's not taken negatively by people... 
Several people have said to me they believe Ray Davis 
is a good experimentalist, the best in the world to do 
this, and they trust him. They don't ccme right out and 
say I shouldn't disbelieve him. They are just very 
positive about it, no-one says anything the other way...
If it comes down to a question of a democratic vote 
versus science - I realise now that a lot of science 
is democratic vote or consensus"-but deep in my gut I'm 
not willing to believe the majority, if I really believe 
that something is going on in the experiment.
In the published version of his paper, which appeared in
Nature in August 1975, Jacobs examined all the chemical tests
carried out by Davis and others (including Leventhal and Friedman)
which were meant to exclude trapping. He pointed out that
two of the tests - the Ar^^-rocovory efficiency test and the
37recovery of a fixed number of Ar atoms from the tank- both
excluded trapping of neutral argon but not argon ions (in
neither experiment were argon ions produced in the same manner
as by neutrino interaction). Jacobs also argued that the neutron-
source calibration test did not rule out trapping, as the amount 
37of Ar extracted in such a test could not be determined
37absolutely since the Ar production rate from neutrons could
not be calculated. It could only be estimated by comparing it
with the recovery rate of the carrier Ar^^. Since Jacobs had
argued that the Ar^^-recovery test did not rule out the possi- 
37bility of Ar ions being trapped, neither too did the neutron
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test, which dependent on the same Ar^^-carrier data. Another
argument against trapping which Jacobs considered was one which
rested upon the cosmic-ray background estimates made at the
Homestake mine. It had been found that the data,taken at
six different heights with small tanks of perchloroethylene,fitted
the appropriate theoretical curve for the penetration of cosmic-
ray radiation with depth (Wolfendale, Young and Davis, 1972).
37Since all these experiments required the extraction of Ar
from tanks it might be argued that this fit with theory showed
the chanistry of the experiment to be unproblematical. However,
Jacobs pointed out that this was, again, not a definitive test,
since the absolute cosmic-ray background could not be calculated
and hence all the experiments might have a constant error caused 
37by trapping of Ar . Finally, Jacobs briefly discussed the work
of Leventhal and Friedman. Again, he found this not to be a
strict limit on the trapping hypothesis since all their data on
37the lack of formation of Ar molecules were relevant to the 
78gas phase. Jacobs wrote;
To extrapolate these gas^phase findings to a liquid CgCl^ 
environment (&lo6 times denser), however, is totally 
unwarranted. (Jacobs, 1975: 560).
Jacobs's conclusion was:
From this investigation of experimental constraints I 
conclude that the chemical hypothesis remains a viable^^ _ 
solution to the solar neutrino problem only if the Ar 
is 'chemically trapped' in Davis's system before neutralising 
to free 37&r atoms. (Ibid: 560)
The version of Jacobs's article which finally appeared in 
Nature was much shorter than the original paper. Jacobs had 
difficulty in getting it through the referees, not only because 
it was too long, but also because of what the referees thought
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was a provocative introduction. As Jacobs told me:
It made allusions to other experiments of a marginal nature, 
where the phenomena being sought was very elusive and 
where there was only one experiment involved. And they 
didn't like that sort of an introduction...Well I was 
thinking of things like the solar-oblateness experiment 
and what was called the old A^Ag problem in particle 
physics...Theorists spent a long time trying to explain 
that whole phenomena and they discovered that with more 
data it went away, that sort of thing. And they didn't 
like the insinuation that if you have, what I call a 
marginal detection experiment, and only one experiment, 
nothing else, that it can be dangerous...
Indeed, Jacobs has informed me that part of his motivation
for questioning the experiment itself stemmed from these other
well-known 'mistakes' where there was only one experiment. That
scientists refer to other infamous cases of error as part of : a
general debunking ploy against an experiment is a well-known
79phenomenon from other cases. However, in this case Jacobs
was attempting to debunk what was becoming regarded by most 
scientists as an exemplary example of a well-done experiment.
It is no surprise that his allusions to other 'bad' e:q>eriments 
were thought to be inappropriate.
Jacobs soon received a .reply to his paper. This was published in 
Nature by a group of Indian physicists: Banerjee, Chitre,
80Divakaran and Santhanam (1976). They pointed out
additional experimental evidence which indicated that the poly­
merisation of perchloroethylene in a way which would trap argon 
was extremely unlikely. They also stressed that it was unlikely 
that the result of the neutron-source test and the cosmic-ray 
data were in error by the order of magnitude which, they maintained, 
was necessary to make trapping a plausible way to explain Davis's 
results. In the same issue of Nature, Jacobs, in turn, replied 
(Jacobs, 1976). He pointed out that polymerisation of perchloro-
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ethylene was just one of the hypotheses he had suggested and that
37some sort of weak binding of Ar was more likely to be the 
trapping mechanism. Thus, the additional evidence against poly­
merisation, was not fatal to his case. He also rejected Banerjee 
et al.'s order-of-magnitude argument, pointing out that Davis's 
most recent data were much nearer the theoretical lower limit 
and hence that a small amount of trapping only would be necessary 
to explain the discrepancy. Thus the neutron-source test data 
and the cosmic-ray data need not be out by as much as an order 
of magnitude. His conclusion was:
Finally, I conclude again that my chemical solution to
the solar neutrino problem remains a viable alternative. 
(Jacobs, 1976: 557).
It can be seen that, despite the attack on his trapping hypothesis
by Banerjee et al., Jacobs was still able to argue for the
feasibility of his position. It seems as if the tests of Davis's
procédure which were so convincing to other scientists were not
compelling for the determined critic.
It would be wrong to give the impression that the debate
between Jacobs and his critics has been vitriolic. The best
81scientific manners have been displayed on both sides. Neither
has the debate been particularly vociferous. The response to
Ja(èobs in Nature and a later article by thé same authors expanding
upon and reiterating their arguments (Banerjee et al., 1977),
was almost the full extent of the attention which Jacobs's
comments received. The only other place where Jacobs's arguments
are discussed is in a review article published in Science by
Bahcall and Davis (Bahcall and Davis, 1976). There,the implausi-
82bility of any chemical—trapping mechanism is reiterated.
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It seems that although Jacobs, unlike other astrophysicists,
made his criticisms public he was to all intents and purposes
ignored or suffered the fate of, what has elsewhere been referred
to as, implicit r e j e c t i o n . J a c o b s  himself felt that it was a
major victory even to get Bahcall emd Davis to refer to his
work. As he told me:
As far as I know the only other published reference to 
this at all was an article by Bahcall and Davis in 
Science, where they got so they couldn't avoid the 
fact that I published that thing finally. I'd been 
talking with them and they finally agreed to write 
something in this review up to that date. Basically 
to say that they didn't agree, but that's OK. At 
least they acknowledged its existence.
The lack of response to Jacobs is a sign of the consensus
view that Davis's experiment was correct. Any lingering doubts
were finally dispelled in 1978, when Davis eventually carried
out the long-promised Cl^^ test and found that he recovered the
correct number of Ar^^ atoms. For most scientists this was the
final nail in the coffin of chemical trapping, especially as this
was the same test which Jacobs himself had suggested as being
capable of settling the issue. Given the similarity between
the dynamics of the beta-decay of Cl^^ into Ar^^ and 
37of the Cl inverse beta-decay, it seemed unlikely that there could 
be chemical trapping of Ar^^ and not Ar^^.
It is important to note, however, that this test does not 
necessarily rule out chemical trapping, any more than the previous 
tests had done. Ar^^ different from Ar^^ and if anyone 
was sufficiently motivated and ingenious enough they could 
perhaps claim that the difference was significant enough to 
invalidate the test as a means of ruling out trapping. This, of 
course, would mean going against contemporary cultural wisdom.
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but the fact that Jacobs had in the past been prepared to do
this, points to the possibility that an even-more-determined-
critic might be able to get around the Cl^^ test too.^^
What of Jacobs himself? Given his reservations concerning
the experiment could we not expect him to be that' even-more-
determined-critic'? It is unlikely that, having suggested the
Cl^^ test himself, Jacobs could, with any plausibility, now
refuse to accept it as a good test. It is much more.likely
that, if he still had doubts, he would claim that the test was
improperly performed. Unfortunately the question can only be
asked in the abstract because Jacobs, in 1976, ceased to
be a practising physicist when he failed to get tenure at the
University of Virginia (an episode which does not seem to be
connected directly with his work on solar neutrinos}. When
I talked to Jacobs in 1978, he had been a financial analyst .
at Bell Labs for over a year and hence was no longer in a position
to pursue his interest in solar neutrinos. In fact he had been
so upset by his failure to get tenure that he had burnt all
his notes and correspondence on this problem along with his
other papers I Jacobs had, however, heard of the. Cl^^ test via
Rood. He certainly was not prepared to accept it at face
value without at least seeing the results. As he told me:
He got supposedly a statistical result that said nothing 
bound. I think that's a pretty good test, unfortunately 
I haven't seen it in priht anywhere.
In that as of 1978 the results of the Cl^^ test had not been
published Jacobs again can be seen to display greater scepticism
than his colleagues who were mostly prepared to accept the Cl^^
test based on Davis's word and despite it not having been
published.
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It seems that Jacobs's efforts came too little and too late 
to have any real chance of damaging the credibility of the Davis 
experiment. He was always faced with an uphill struggle as 
by 1975 most scientists were already convinced of the validity 
of the experiment. Jacobs's efforts could largely be ignored, 
especially as he was in a marginal position vis-à-vis the solar- 
neutrino physics community. He was also taking on an experiment 
in which there was a lot at stake. As has been emphasised before, 
the Davis experiment was widely regarded as one of the most 
important experiments in nuclear astrophysics carried out over 
the last decade.
Jacobs felt some of what he was up against, himself; as he 
told me:
The simplest thing would be to say evej^ody is keeping 
quiet, you know.They believe Davis and that's the 
establishment, so this[his idea of trappingJ is 
unacceptable.
The implications of the reaction to Jacobs' ideas for the social
construction of science will be discussed further in Chapter 10.
The degree of doubt and scepticism which Jacobs amd Rood
(for a short time) felt about the Davis experiment is difficult
to gauge with hindsight. However, the following extracts
from my conversation with Jacobs in 1978, as he relived the period
when he worked on the problem, are informative:
Jacobs: The average counting rate with time, it seemèd
to have funny trends in it. If I recall back 
before a certain number of runs, they weren't 
convinced they had anything at all and their 
little Auger counters began to get better. They 
began to see things and then, all of a sudden, 
you have got run 27 or thereabouts amd things 
begin to go up to the sky and then they begin 
to oscillate around. So the results seei».' to be 
a function of time of technique as opposed to real 
answers:----  [My emphasis] .
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Oh yes, there was a problem still about the 
water shield. If I remember that now. I never 
really consider anything worth looking at till 
after the water shield went on. It's just too 
much of a chance for bad background.
Pinch: But Davis says the water shield doesn't make
much difference.
Jacobs: But its still a dangerous thing to leave off...
From the rumours I've heard they were having trouble 
with their little tiny Auger counters. It's such 
a tiny thing, and they are very delicate and very 
difficult to make reproducible....In the early days, 
from what I heard, and I can't even say where I 
heard it, but it was a very distinct impression, 
you couldn't really trust anything that was coming 
out. It was only later that they began to feel 
confident that they had decent counters. Like I 
say, this is a very marginal experiment, right on 
the very edge.
Pinch: But most people are confident that his data are
good.
Jacobs: I think i f  s more a question of trusting him and
his ability, which is a good thing, people should 
trust, but if there is a difficulty in the solar- 
neutrino problem you should look to see where it 
is.
From these extracts a much less solid view of the Davis 
experiment starts to emerge. Rumours about trouble with the 
equipment and allegations that incorrect procedures have been 
followed cast a general air of suspicion over the whole thing.
If the above view was widespread amongst the solar-neutrino 
physicists rather than just being held by one, not very 
influential,astrophysicist then it would not be hard to imagine 
a climate of opinion being built up in which the chemical- 
trapping hypothesis would be welconed as a vindication of more 
generally held suspicions. In such circumstances Davis's results, 
rather than being fact, could become artefact.
Any experiment, if probed exhaustively enough, can be made 
to look shaky and doubts can be cast upon the competence of the
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experimenter. The routine errors and uncertainties involved in 
getting any difficult and complicated experiment to work can 
take on special significance for the critic. What is seen by 
the experimenter as part and parcel of the 'trial and error' 
nature of research becomes, for the critic, an important indication 
of 'lack of care' or 'sloppiness' Such criticisms can easily 
escalate and engender an air of paranoia and mutual suspicion, 
as has been seen in other c a s e s . I n  the face of such criticisms, 
the experimenter may become more cautious about divulging details 
of his procedures. This, in turn, can reinforce the critics' 
doubts and be tciken as evidence that there really is something 
to hide. If such criticisms become widespread then the experiment 
can quickly lose credibility.
This loss of credibility has not happened in the case of
the Davis experiment. Although, as we have seen, Davis faced a
determined critic in the shape of Jacobs, Jacobs was not able to
make much headway. Davis was able to respond to Jacobs's
criticisms in much the same way that he had dealt with previous
objections. His policy of being completely open with his data
and offering to consider any suggestions had worked in the ,
past and it was unlikely that at this late stage that he would,
himself, become embroiled in a mutual-reinforcement cycle of
88criticism and paranoia. Indeed, Davis's openness and his
willingness to consider, all criticisms is mentioned by most
respondents as one of the main reasons why they believe his
experiment is good. They often contrast Davis's attitude with
that of Weber. Many respondents felt that Weber's gravity-wave
89experiment (and Dicke's solai-oblateness: experiment) had lost
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credibility because they had become so secretive about their data. 
The Weber case ̂ in particular, appears to be a classic example 
of criticism leading to paranoia which, in turn, reinforced the 
criticisms.
Typical comments concerning Davis's openness were:
And he [ Davis] always responded to people, and if his 
first response didn't satisfy people he would frequently 
go out and do an esqperiment to show that he was right, 
and he was always incredibly open to telling you what he 
did...Whereas, from what I can see, Weber and Dicke 
enshrouded their experimental technique in a cloaüc of 
mystery of some kind. They would not help, as far as I 
know, the critics with the details that the critics needed 
to pursue their criticisms. It was always 'Well we'll 
tell you this later'.
I think the attitude was, as I stressed earlier, Davis 
always disarmed his critics by doing what they suggested - 
Weber didn't. Weber was very defensive, very sure he 
was right, and for a long time resisted any attempt 
by people to look at the data.
One can contrast this to other exciting discoveries where 
in some cases the experimenter sorta gets his back up if 
people seem to be asking 'Did he do this right or that right?/ 
Ray has always been so grateful for any criticisms that 
people make or any suggestions for something he might try 
to test.
Discussion of the Acceptance of Davis's Result
As was mentioned in Part I, there is little doubt that by 
1978 Ray Davis and his experiment were held in very high regard. 
Although one or two scientists still expressed lingering worries 
to me that somewhere in the vast tank the few atoms of,argon thirty- 
seven were somehow being lost (see Pinch, 198L%, in Appendix II) , 
the consensus was generally in favour of Davis. Perhaps some of
the status in which Davis's work is held can be seen by remarks
made by two eminent members of the North American physics community. 
The first comment comes from Fowler, who, as we have seen, has
had a long-term interest in the area and who, it has been widely
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rumoured, could have expected to receive a Nobel prize if Davis
9ohad found the predicted signal. Fowler, in a recent article 
on solar neutrinos, referred to Davis as 'one of the greatest 
experimentalists in the world'. The other comment ccanes from 
Martin Schwarzschild, the Princeton theorist who has played a 
large part in the development of stellar-evolution theory. 
Schwarzschild summarised the feelings of the Brookhaven conference
towards Davis, and, from his remarks, it can be seen why Davis
91is so widely admired:
There is one, exactly one, more feature of this conference 
that I feel I should summarise. It's that feature that 
we usually refer to as "Ray Davis". It's a feature of 
quite singular character. It differs from most of us in 
three respects. One is straight ability in this wide 
field...Singularity number two is his stubbornness. He 
has been for two decades under a barrage of criticisms...
Ray Davis has not let himself be driven into a corner.
He has smiled when silly criticism has come, let it roll 
off his shoulders and when serious criticism has come, . 
he has quietly gone and invented a test and at the next 
session everything was in order on that point....There is 
a final characteristic and that is the unusual caution 
with which Ray Davis presents his results. It is a 
marvelbus caution for those who understand what he is 
talking about because it doesn't prevent the insider from 
feeling the excitement that lies behind his very, very 
quiet and cautious work. But it does have the consequence 
that Ray Davis is not what he should be, namely a public 
hero in science.
Ray it is difficult to quite put in words our admiration 
for you, for you both as a scientist and as a person. The 
only words that I know to say and they are much too weak 
are, "From all our hearts, congratulations for the milestone 
you have achieved."
Schwarzschild's comment that Davis has impressed with his
caution, was echoed to me by many of the nuclear astrophysicists
92I spoke with in 1978. They admire the way that he refuses to
indulge in theoretical speculation concerning his result and limits
93his presentation to matters of experimental detail. Again 
the publication format adopted by Davis cind Bahcall which 
permitted separate experimental and theoretical papers can be
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seen to have facilitated this.
From the above ccxnment of Schwarzschild's, in particular, it 
is very clear that Davis's personal success^and his scientific 
success are closely intertwined.
In any attempt to explain Davis's success in eventually con­
vincing the theoreticians of his claims, it is important to bear
in mind the personal relationship he had built up with the Caltech
group over the years. As we have seen in earlier chapters, Davis 
had entered into this partnership with the theoreticians as far 
back as 1958. Both sides of the partnership had kept in close 
touch over the intervening years and the Caltech group had 
played a key role in funding Davis's experiment. Bahcall had 
eventually become so closely involved with the project that he 
became the 'house theorist’. Given the close links between the 
two groups before 1968, it was exceedingly unlikely that the groups 
should fall out with the disclosure of Davis's result. Davis's 
good informal relationship with the nuclear astrophysicists helped 
him in winning acceptance for his result. He could give them 
details of his e:q>eriment at first hand and they, in turn, could 
put their criticisms directly to him without having to publish 
them formally - a publication which would have done the experiment 
little good. By the time a criticism appeared in print (Jacobtfs 
paper), the battle had largely been won by Davis.
Davis's partnership with the theoreticians meant that he 
was obliged to test all sorts of implausible hypotheses. Although 
such tests were largely a waste of time in terms of his experi­
mental goals (he was convinced the experiment was working back 
in 1967)^ they did serve an important ritual function in satisfying 
the theoreticians and thereby boosting the credibility of his
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experiment. The importance of ritualised scientific rationality 
in the social construction of science is familiar from other cases 
(Wynne, 1976; Collins, 1981b).
X The role of the partnership with the theoreticians has been
acknowledged by Davis; as he told me:
This all started out as a kinda joint thing...and if you 
start that way you tend to leave these little boundaries 
in between. So I stayed away from forcing any strong 
opinions about solar models and they've never made much 
comment about the experiment...
The importance of the partnership between theorists and experi­
menters in the social construction of science is one of the most 
important findings of this thesis and is further discussed in 
Chapter 10.
Whether Davis's low profile and concili .atory stance has 
meant that he has got less rewards than he should have, as 
Schwarzschild suggests above, is a difficult question to answer. 
Certainly, compared with the leading theoretician (Bahcall)
Davis has not done as well. Bahcall holds one of the most important 
chairs in astrophysics and is also a fellow of the National 
Academy of Science. Davis on the other hand had (in 1978 anyway) 
not been elected to the National Academy and still works in a 
National Laboratory. Such comparisons are, however, almost 
impossible to make since Bahcall has done much work in other fields. 
Davis's lack of institutional recognition may stem from him 
falling between the twin stools of chemistry and physics and 
also, such rewards are not usually made for negative discoveries.
It is possible, however, that, when there is scientific consensus 
over the explanation of his result, Davis may receive more acclaim 
(the parallel case might be the Michelson-Morley experiment). In 
any case, Davis's own modest nature has meant that he has not sought
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insitutional rewards. The main reward for Davis is knowing that 
he has done a competent job and is widely respected for this.
In summary then, in 1978, ten years after he started to 
collect data, Davis's result was widely taken to be a fact :of 
the natural world. Although his experiment has never been 
repeated it was felt that, by his exhaustive tests of his procedures, 
he had done more than enough to show the validity of his result. 
However, as has been argued here, his knowledge claim can be 
deconstructed and the social processes involved in its construction 
revealed. Davis's achievements can be said to have been located 
in the social world.
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1. In later runs Davis alternated between using argon thirty- 
six and argon thirty-eight as the carrier gas.
2. Letter, W. Fowler to R. Davis, August 10, 1967.





7. These two chemists were G. Friedlander and M. Perelman.
8. A report of this meeting is to be found in, C & E N 
(Chemical and Engineering News), September 25, 1967, 13-14.
9. Apart from his work on solar neutrinos, Davis carried put 
work on the analysis of meteorites and lunar rocks and dust. 
This work was based on radiochemical techniques too. His - 
uncontroversial work in this field must have provided 
further evidence to his colleagues of his experimental 
competence.
10. Letter, R. Davis to D. Delicate, September 22, 1967.
11. Letter; R. Davis to J. Bahcall, October 31, 1967.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, December 8, 1967.
15. Ibid.
16. This was a sizeable piece of apparatus, as Reines told me:
It's quite large and ambitious piece of equipment
though. It still exists but it's mouldering and
decaying. We never used it. It's about the length 
of this room and a good fraction of the width.
17. For instance, in a letter written in December 1967, Jenkins 
remarked: g
At present the outlook for detecting B neutrinos 
from the sun...is very dim. The reason for this is 
the latest result of Davis...The prelimimary 
result of his initial run, which he quoted to me on 
the telephone the other day, is that the flux is 
2 X loG/cm^/sec. Our equipment here has been 
improved steadily...However, since the apparatus 
was designed to detect a flux of the order of that 
predicted theoretically this latest information 
is such as to make the pursuit of the experiment
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17. contd. rather pointless. We are presently debating the 
future of the apparatus and I strongly suspect 
that we will terminate operating it within the 
next month or so.
Letter, T. Jenkins to D. Allen, December 26, 1967.
18. For example, 
two decades.
X-Ray Astronomy has grown rapidly in the last
19. Letter, A. Wolfendale to R. Davis, December 14, 1967.
20. Most of this criticism has been put forward in the context
of seminars. As Bahcall has told me:
The experiment has been challenged repeatedly 
over the eleven years since. At every seminar 
people raise some questions all of which have been 
subsequently answered. Ray is very goo^^^abouJL that. 
I've raised some myself which he's don^, and lots 
of other people have.
21. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, February 16, 1968.
22. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, February 26, 1968.
23. Bahcall argued that the background determination (made by 
Davis in the first two runs) should be treated as a different 
experiment since it was carried out before the sample was 
introduced. The introduction of the sample perhaps upset 
things in some unknown way. He argued that it would be more 
self-consistent to measure the background with as least 
disturbance as possible - that is after a sufficiently
long time for all the Ar^7 to have decayed (thus leaving 
background counts only).
24. In his letter to Bahcall of November 6, 1968, reporting 
the results of a new run, Davis wrote:
The flux limit is the same as given earlier, but 
is free of the objection you raised....In this 
case the initial background, the final residual 
background and the sample count were essentially 
the same.
25. For instance, Fowler (1969: 368) wrote:
It may well be that the "standard" background observed 
by Davis does not apply to the radioactive and 
carrier argon which is subject to considerable 
pre- and prior-exposure purification and processing.
It is my impression that the upper limit...may well 
represent a real effect.
And Cameron wrote to Bahcall that:
Personally, I hope you are right and that the 
negative result obtained by Davis will turn into 
a positive one...
Letter, A. Cameron to J. Bahcall, July 31, 1968.
26. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, January 26, 1968.
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27. Letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis, op. cit., note 22.
28. This statistical issue became important again in 1978 when 
the upper bound of the experimental result and the lower 
bound of the theory were fairly close together - see 
Pinch (1980a)in Appendix II.
29. Bahcall and Davis (1976).
30. Letter, R. Sears to R. Davis, May 9, 1968.
31. Telegram, R. Dicke, D. Morton, J. Mark, R. Ruffini, and
J. Wheeler to R. Davis, October 22, 1968.
32. Another reference to the Davis experiment at the time is 
that of Gribov and Pontecorvo in their article in which 
they put forward th-e suggestion of neutrino oscillation 
to explain the low result (see next chapter for details) .
They refer to the 'beautiful experiment of Davis et al.'
(Gribov and Pontecorvo, 1969: 493). Of course, a beautiful 
experiment can always be wrong! .
33. Letter, R. Davis to A. Wolfendale, May 3, 1968.
34. R. Davis Jr. 'A Search for Neutrinos From the Sun', B.N.L.
12981, 1968.
35. See, for example, G.E. Kocharov, 'The Proton-Proton Cycle 
and Solar Neutrinos', Soviet Physics Doklady, 9, 1964,
468-70; G.E. Kocharov, 'Nuclear Reactions in Stars and 
Solar Neutrinos', Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences of
the USSR, 29, 1965, 1563-9; V.A. Kuzmin, 'Neutrino Radiation 
and Thermometry of the Interior of the Sun' , Bulletin of the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 29, 1965, 1573-5; V. A. 
Kuz^min, 'Neutrino Generation in the Solar Interior',
Soviet Astronomy, 9, 1966, 953-6; and V.A. Dergachov and 
G.E. Kocharov, 'On the Investigation of the Internal 
Structure of the Sun by Means of Neutrino Radiation Studies', 
Canadian Journal of Physics, 46, 1968, S491-S493.
36. This account of the Moscow meeting is based upon that given 
in Bahcall and Davis (1980).
37. For an account of the Soviet work in 1978, see B. Belitsky, 
'Soviet Neutrino Astronomy', Spaceflight, 311-312. I am 
grateful to David Edge for drawing my attention to this 
reference.
38. Dicke et al., op. cit., note 31.
39. Letter, R. Davis to W. Fowler, November 9, 1968.
40. Letter, R. Davis to F. Reines, November 14, 1968.
41. These measurements were made using detectors based upon the
reaction Ca + n Ar^^ + He^.
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42. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, February 3, 1972.
43. Reines and Trimble, 1972: 'Conference Description'.
44. For Goldhaber's comments see Reines and Trimble Cl972:C25).
45. This offer was reiterated by Davis in his letter to Reines 
of March 30, 1972, where he thanks Reines for organising 
the conference.
46. Perhaps the attitude towards Davis at the Irvine conference 
is best summed up in the report of the AEC representative, 
R. Kandel. Kandel wrote:
The meeting was convened, primarily, to sit in 
judgement of the BNL-Davis experiment...The 
astrophysicists and nuclear physicists present 
half-heartedly suggested that something might be 
wrong with the chemistry... another year or two 
of work remains on this experiment. Most people 
who have looked into it don't seriously doubt the 
results but nobody understands them.
Letter, R. Kandel to R. Van Dyken, March 10, 1972.
47. For Bahcall's comment see Reines and Trimble (1972: C24) .
48. For Cameron's comment see Reines and Trimble (1972: D7) .
49. V. Trimble and F. Reines, 'The Solar Neutrino Problem - 
A Progress (?) Report', Reviews of Modern Physics, 45 
1973, p. 1.
50. Letter, R. Davis to F. Reines, March 30, 1972.
51. The energy of the neutrinos produced by the decay of
was not sufficient to excite the analogue state of Cl 
but it would test the ground-state cross-section as well
as the Ar^^ chemistry. For more details see, L.W. Alvarez, 
'A Signal Generator for Ray Davis' Neutrino Detector', 
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Physics Notes Memo 767,
March 23, 1973.
52. Although it is not planned to use this calibration for 
the chlorine experiment, it is proposed to calibrate 
the gallium experiment using Zn (for details of the 
gallium experiment see later this chapter).
53. See, R. Davis, B.C. Fowler, S.L. Meyer, J.C. Evans, 'Study 
of the Neutrino Capture Cross Section in ^^Cl with 
decay Neutrinos', Research Proposal to the Los Alamos 
Meson Physics Faculty, June 1973.
54. The results of this test are reported in Davis (1978).
55. See, for example, Evans, Davis and Bahcall (1974) and 
Pallisto and Wolfendale (1974).
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55. I asked all the scientists I interviewed in 1978 about 
both events. Most scientists felt that run 27, with 
hindsight was probably a statistical fluctuation. The 
interpretation of the Lande event is a matter of 
speculation as no similar event has since been recorded.
57. Davis reported the introduction of a new shield (a layer
of mercury 8 inches thick) on August 8, 1975. He said he 
hoped this would reduce the counter background by a factor 
of three. Letter, R. Davis to H. Hecht, August 8, 1975.
58. Davis reported to Fowler in late 1975 that all these changes
had led to the first counter he had constructed with an
essentially zero background (used for run 37). Letter,
R. Davis to W. Fowler, December 9, 1975.
59. No appreciable reduction in background was achieved by 
placing the counter in the mine.
60. A few respondents have remarked that the trend in the 
data seems to be that of a sine wave (see Fig. 7.1), or
a pattern which might be linked to the solar cycle. See, 
for instance, K. Sakurai, 'Quasi-biennial Variation of the 
Solar Neutrino Flux and Solar Activity', Nature, 278, 1979, 
146-8; and A. Subramanian, 'Neutrino Flux Correlation 
with Solar Activity', Current Science, 48, 1979, 705-7.
61. All these developments are reported in Davis (1978).
62. This result was reported in Davis (1978). The value has,
on further analysis, subsequently been revised to 2.2 ±0 .4 SNU 
(Letter, R. Davis to T. Pinch, July 30, 1979) . A Bayesian 
cinalysis of Davis's data is reported as giving a result 
of 2.2 ± 0.3 SNU, see Davis (1978).
63. There is still some uncertainty over the exact contribution 
of the cosmiccrray background. Provisional background 
measurements by E. Firenan of the Smithsonian Astrophysical 
Laboratory are reported to indicate a background twice that 
estimated by Davis. See Davis (1978).
64. Letter, R. Davis to D. Dpdansky, January 15, 1975.
65. 'Solar-neutrino hunters still seek explanation'. Physics 
Today, December 1978, 19.
66. Many other proposals were discussed at the conference and 
there was an air of competition between the various proposals. 
For full details see Friedlander (1978.a,b),I have much 
fascinating data on the funding battle for these experiments. 
However, as there is, thus far, only one pilot study funded 
(for the gallium experiment at a cost of 1.5 million 
dollars) it would be politically insensitive to present
such data until the experiments are funded.
67. See Belitsky, op. cit. note 37. Some of the correspondence 
I have seen suggests there has been a serious effort to get
a joint US-USSR project off the ground.- However, thus far the 
only real collaboration seems to have been short scientific 
exchange visits.
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68. See J. Weber, 'Evidence for the Discovery of Gravitational 
Radiation', Physical Review Letters, 22, 1969, 1320-4.
69. 'Monitor', New Scientist, 12 February 1970, p. 294.
70. See Collins (1981b).
70a. J.N. Bahcall "Some Remarks on Solar Neutrinos", Talk
presented at the Leningrad Conference on Particle 
Acceleration and Nuclear Reactions in Space, August 
19-21, 1974.
71. See Collins (1981b).
72. See, for instance, letter, R. Davis to W. Fowler, June 
23, 1972.
73. Davis answered Clayton's letter in a similar way to that
which he answered Rood's (see below). Letter, R. Davis 
to D. Clayton, March 13, 1975. Clayton told me in 1978 
that he did not now think the problem lay in the chemistry.
74. K.C. Jacobs and R.T. Rood, 'A Speculation on the Deficiency
of Solar Neutrinos', unpublished paper, 1974.
75. Letter, R. Davis to R. Rood, June 25, 1974.
76. Letter, W. Fowler to R. Rood, June 25, 1974.
77. Letter, R. Davis to K. Jacobs, December 17, 1974.
78. The type of arguments Jacobs mounted here can in principle 
be made against all calibration experiments. The basis of 
the argument is the difference between the calibration 
experiment and the main experiment. Jacobs's arguments 
all pointed to the significance of this difference. For 
the experimeter, however, these differences are not 
important. In order to get the calibration experiment 
accepted as valid the experimenter draws.on a repertoire 
of cultural resources which point to the non-significance 
of the differences. The critic can only get around the 
calibration by challenging these cultural resources. 
Calibration of itself is clearly not a proof of the 
validity of the experiment since the determined critic, 
such as Jacobs, can mount such a challenge and circumvent 
the calibration (this point is elaborated in Chapter 10). 
However, the cultural resources drawn upon for the 
calibration experiment are usually more central and solid 
than the new finding which the main experiment is purported 
to demonstrate. By forcing the critic to challenge these 
more solid areas of knowledge the critics' task is made 
much harder. As the edge of criticism is shifted towards 
ever more solid parts of knowledge, the critic will appear
276.
78 contd.
more and more deviant. Rather than appear to be this radical 
the critic will often bow to the weight of contemporary 
cultural wisdom and be forced to accept the calibration 
as a legitimate test. In this way calibration can be 
said to have a social function. See, Collins (1980).
79. Harry Collins informs me that this ploy was used in the Weber 
case.
80. There is no reference to this reply in any of the correspondence 
to which I was given access. One of the Indian scientists,
Chitre, had been at Caltech. Whether they were encouraged
by Fowler (say) to reply to Jacobs is an open question.
81. Jacobs,as mentioned above, had nothing personally against 
Davis and made no recourse to ad hominem arguments.
82. This is not quite the full extent of the literature on trapping.
Now, with the Cl^^ experiment completed, Jacobs's arguments
can be safely mentioned as an example of a meritorious wrong
ideal For instance, Bahcall and Davis in their recent 
history of solar neutrinos take this approach; they write:
There have been some worries expressed by physicists and astro­
nomers that there could be something wrong with the 
radiochemical procedures...Some specific suggestions 
were advanced by Kenneth Jacobs....Although these 
suggestions were not based upon sound chemistry, we 
felt that an experiment should be performed to test 
these unlikely possibilities. To this end an 
experiment was performed with ^^Cl-labelled per- 
chloroethylene.. .This experiment emd the other argon 
efficiency tests made with the 100,000 gallon tank 
shew that ^^Ar is recovered with high efficiency.
(Bahcall and Davis, 1980: 44-45).
83. See Collins and Pinch (1979) and chapter 10.
84. In other words a 'hypothetical Jacobs' could, in principle, 
challenge this calibration test. See Harvey (1981) and 
Collins (1981b) where similar hypothetical arguments are 
used to show the non-determinate nature of experimental 
outcomes.
85. Both Jacobs and Rood have assured me that Jacobs's work on 
solar neutrinos had nothing directly to do with his failure 
to get tenure. This was not the 'establishment' way of 
getting back at him for stepping out of line. However, 
there is cin indirect connection. Jacobs did not have many 
'solid' publications in his mainstream area. He tended 
towards dilettanteism. His work on solar neutrinos (being 
chemistry) may not have counted for much professionally.
As Jacobs commented, with some bitterness:
I think it may also be more profitable to write
papers dealing with the possibilities of what might going
on the other way Qi.e. theoretical possibilities].
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than to worry about the experiment. Worrying 
about the experiment is not a profitable venture 
at all. There are few papers and essentially no 
profit in the sense of scientific profit. I'm 
sure you don't get tenure for trying to find 
something wrong with someone else's experiment, 
unless you find something wrong.
It is interesting to note that Jacobs's last paper, before 
losing his post, was the solar-neutrino paper.
86. This view is argued extensively in Pinch (1981a) in Appendix 
II, and Collins and Pinch (1982).
87. Again, the Weber case is the prime example - see Collins (1976, 
1981b). But there are many others. For example, see the 
reception of- the SRI remote-viewing experiments of Targ
and Puthoff discussed in Collins and Pinch (1979).
88. Davis's confidence in this policy can be seen from his comment 
to me that he actively encourages people such as Jacobs
to publish their ideas.
89. R.H. Dicke and M. Goldenberg, 'Solar Oblateness and General 
Relativity' Physical Review Letters, 18, 1967, 313-6.
90. W. Fowler, 'The Case of the Missing Solar Neutrinos', 
Engineering and Science, May-June 1978, p. 4.
91. M. Schwarzschild, 'Conference Summary' (Friedlander,
1978b: 278-80).
92. It would be tedious to give further examples.
93. Some theorists ccanplain that Davis is a little too modest.
They think it would be easier to get funding for new 
experiments if he made more claims for the importance
of his experiment. However, this would not necessarily 
be a good thing from their point of view because if Davis 
made exaggerated claims he might damage his credibility 
which, in the long-term, would not help with funding.
(cf. the exaggerated claims of cancer researchers to be 
able to find a cure).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE THEORETICAL PREDICTION OF THE SOLAR-NEUTRINO FLUX 1967-1978
The developments in the theory since 1967 (when the first 
experimental measure of the solar-neutrino flux was reported by 
Davis), form the subject matter of this chapter. The material, 
which is drawn from correspondence files, articles, and interviews, 
is again presented in two parts. Part I focusses on the year 
immediately following the announcement of Davis's result. In 
terms of Fig. 1.1, this takes us from the prediction of 19 SNU, 
of 1967, to the 7.5 SNU of 1978. This period, as we shall see, 
was characterised by different assessments as to what the theore­
tical consequences of Davis's result were. These differences 
culminated in a bitter controversy between two of the leading 
theoreticians as to whether or not there was a conflict between 
theory and experiment. Part II covers the period between 1968 
and 1978. The main development up until 1976 was a growing 
consensus that the theory and experiment were in conflict coupled 
with an air of crisis in the theory. However, in 1976, the gap 
between the theoretical prediction and experimental result started 
to lessen and, by 1978, arguments were once more being broached 
as to whether or not there was a conflict.
As in previous chapters, this one has a chronological and 
descriptive bias. However, topics important for the overall 
argument of the thesis also get detailed treatment in what follows.
In particular, in Part I, it is argued that once Davis's experimental 
result became known, the theoreticians, and especially Bahcall, 
set about attempting to accommodate the result within standard 
theory. By drawing attention to new input data cind laying stress on
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the uncertainties in other input data, Bahcall was able to argue 
that the result were not in conflict with the theory. The 
revisions in the theoretical prediction which followed the 
appearance of Davis's result add weight to the argument of earlier 
chapters that the standard theoretical prediction is to be seen 
as a social construct which can, in certain circumstances, be 
permeated by wider social factors. In this case, it is suggested 
that Bahcall's previous commitment to the validity of the theory 
and the need to maintain his credibility as a theorist led him 
to seek ways of avoiding a conflict between theory and experiment. 
As a result of the interpretative flexibility in the theoretical 
prediction, it was possible, in the aftermath of Davis's first 
result, to argue that the result was consistent with the theory 
(as Bahcall maintained) or that there was a conflict (as another 
theorist - Iben - maintained). These two opposed positions, 
although both supported by seemingly legitimate scientific 
arguments, indicate that 'conflict' and 'consistency' are both 
terms which are subject to a degree of interpretative flexibility. 
It would appear that conflict and consistency between theory and 
experiment are themselves socially constructed relationships.
In Part II,the interpretative flexibility of 'conflict' emd 
'consistency' is revealed further when it is shown that Bahcall 
eventually changed his mind about the consistency of the theory 
and experiment emd became one of the leading exponents of the 
'conflict' thesis. It is suggested that such a view was 
rhetorically expedient in terms of arguing for new solar-neutrino 
experiments. However, in 1976, with the lessening of the gap 
between theory and experiment, arguments once more started to
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appear as to whether or not there was a conflict. This renewed 
debate again illustrates the interpretative flexibility possible 
in the comparison of theory and experiment.
PART I. THE EVENTS OF 1967-1968
The First Reaction to the Davis Result
It will be recalled that, just before Davis's initial result
was known, Bahcall and Shaviv had finalised their theoretical
prediction in the light of new measurements of the cross-section 
3 3for the He + He reaction (S^^). The dramatic change (by a factor
of five) in the value of had drawn attention to the possibility
that other parameters, upon which the prediction was based, might
be in error and part of the theoretical investigation which
Bahcall and Shaviv undertook was to look at a range of possible
uncertainties. Their conclusion was that the overall detection
0
rate, was 19 ± 11 SNU, and they predicted a B flux of
I 7 - 2 - 14>g8 = 1.4 ± 0.8 X 10 neutrinos cm sec . Although the paper
in which these results were given, was not published until nearly
a year later (Bahcall and Shaviv, 1968)', these predictions were
widely quoted at the time the first experimental result became
known.^
The first discussion of the implication of Davis's result
for the theory came at a Japanese nuclear phsyics conference held
in September 1967. Maurice Goldhaber, the director of the Brookhaven
National Laboratory, had been following Davis's work closely and
mentioned the first result in his opening address to the
conference. Goldhaber showèd a slide where the then experimental
upper limit of Z(pa < 12 SNU was compared with the Bahcall and
2Shaviv prediction of E<t»0 = 19 ± 11 SN'U. Goldhaber remarked i
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...you might say Davis is getting at most an effect of 
the kind expected by Bahcall, but it might still be 
considerablv smaller when the background counts are 
subtracted.
This last comment refers to the background effect in the tank which
had not yet been subtracted from the 'signal'. Although even this
upper limit seemed to be lower than Bahcall's best value for the
prediction, Goldhaber, as yet, saw no clear contradiction. As he
went on to comment:
I do not believe that he fDavisJ will succeed in 
contradicting Bahcall because of the large errors 
which incidentally, in my opinion, are optimistic 
errors because of all the cross-section errors which 
go in. (Ibid : 21).
It seems that Goldhaber felt that there still might be large
errors in the prediction, particularly cross-section errors,
and that these errors had probably been underestimated (optimistic
errors) as had proved to be the case for Thus it seemed
likely to him that the prediction could be lowered to bring it
in line with Davis's upper limit.
Goldhaber also noted that Davis's experiment did seem to
have ruled out the CNO-cycle as the predominant mode of energy
production in the Sun. It will be recalled that if the Sun
worked on the CNO-cycle then Davis was expected to detect 35 SNU
(Bahcall, 1966). Davis's upper limit of 12 SNU led Goldhaber to
remark:
So you might say Davis has probably shown it is not all 
the CNO cycle (Ibid.: 21).
Although this confirmation of a small part of the theorists'
claims received some acclaim,^ it can also be seen to be not that
significant a result since there was almost universal agreement
before Davis's experiment that the Sun was too cold for the CNO-
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cycle to predominate anyway.
It seems that Davis's first result, which was at this stage
still only provisional, although lower than expected, was not held
to be ccanpletely out of the bounds of theoretical possibility.
Goldhaber's emphasis on the lack of conflict and what he felt to
be the remaining nuclear-physics uncertainties, was the first
indication of the approach to be taken by the Caltech group in
accommodating Davis's result. They too were to emphasise the
lack of conflict.
Davis's Own Reaction
Before going on to discuss the reaction of Bahcall and other
theorists, let us first see what Davis himself took to be the
theoretical consequences of his result. Like Goldhaber, Davis
was reluctant to draw any very firm conclusions from the first
measurement, simply reporting to Fowler that the result seemed 
4'quite low'. However, by the time he had made.his second 
measurement and obtained an even lower limit, he became more 
confident over the interpretation. His view was quite straight­
forward . A certain strength of signal had been predicted which 
he had failed to find.For instance, in a letter to the American 
Physical Society (written in November 1967 when his upper limit 
was 4 SNU) Davis commented:^
We now have preliminary results, but unfortunately they 
are negative. The experiment was designed to observe the 
flux calculated by theorists from detailed models of the 
sun. Our present limits to the solar-neutrino flux appear 
to be a factor of five below the calculated flux.
On December 1st (by which time his limit had fallen to 3 SNU and
he had completed the neutron-source calibration test - see Chapter
7), he wrote to Arnold Wolfendale that:^
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The experiment is a factor of seven below the calculations... 
John Bahcall and Al Cameron are aware of these results and 
I trust there will be some changes in the theory.
From this it is clear that Davis saw his result as being in dis­
agreement with the theory and, as a consequence, he expected some 
changes to be made in the theory.
Davis's emphasis on the prédiction he had gone out to test is 
understandable since the whole project was designed around the 
expectation that he would see a certain strength of signal. For 
Davis, as an experimentalist, the theory was most important in 
the context of arguing for and designing experiments. As we saw 
in chapters 3 and 5, Davis, throughout the history of his research 
programme, had turned to theory where,and when it could be used 
to support his experimental ambitions. Although he needed the 
theory (and the theoreticians) to argue for the merits of his 
experiment (and to get funding for it) , this did not mean that 
he expected the theory to be exactly correct. Indeed he had had
the foresight to design his apparatus so as to be sensitive to
7a smaller signal than that predicted in 1964. Given this
attitude to the theory, Davis was not that surprised when h e .
failed to confirm the prediction. As he told me:
I didn't feel strongly that I should see exactly what 
they calculated.. .So the fact that it didn't come out 
as expected didn't strike me as being so anomalous as 
it did someone like John Bahcall who was very certain 
that it would come out the way that he calculated it to.
Davis's own opinion was that the theory was far too simple to
take into account the full complexities of the Sun. As he remarked:
I feel the Sun is very complicated, and that there are 
many things that aren't taken properly into account - and 
in essence a lot of this is a gross extrapolation on 
elementary physics.
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Davis's sceptical attitude towards the theory was well 
served by the publication format of separate papers published 
'back to back' which he and Bahcall had used in 1964 and again now 
in 1968 with the appearance of the first major experimental 
report arid theoretical discussion .In their paper,(Davis, Harmer 
and Hoffman, 1968) Davis and his group stated their failure to find the 
predicted signal and referred to the accompanying paper by Bahcall 
and his associates (Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv, 1968) for 
the theoretical interpretation. The publication format enabled 
Davis to be cautious about the theory in the same way, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, it enabled Bahcall to be cautious about 
the experiment.
Bahcall's Reaction
As Davis hinted above, Bahcall's reaction was rather different. 
After all he had spent the previous five yegirs on the calculations 
and he fully expected his prediction to be confirmed. Bahcall's 
plan had been to produce the best prediction shortly before 
Davis made the first measurement and, to this end, he and Shaviv 
had reviewed all the uncertainties just before Davis obtained his 
first result. As we saw in Chapter 6, Bahcall anxiously awaited 
the first result not least because he felt that this was a personal 
test of his scientific capabilities. Thus, for Bahcall, once it 
became clear that the result and his prediction were in conflict, 
this was no mere scientific anomaly - it was a personal disaster .
The extent to which this affected his life can be seen from the 
following anecdote (related to me by Bahcall) which describes 
a seminar which took place in 1970, by which time it was clear 
to Bahcall that the experiment and his prediction were in sharp 
conflict:
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Ray Davis...came to Caltech and gave an informal seminar, 
and Richard Feynman was there...And he is known for being 
a really tough guy at a seminar...Ray started off with 
what I told him, and what it was he had measured, and 
why he believed what he measured was right. And it was 
clear that there was just absolute conflict and afterwards 
I was enormously depressed...I think that was really the 
low point of my feeling about science...! remember after 
that seminar,Feynman...when he saw I was really pretty 
much destroyed by this...took me for a walk around Caltech... 
and then he took me out to dinner...He was really very 
nice and told me, 'Don't worry, you've done nothing wrong, 
nobody has found anything wrong in your calculations...
It's not your fault if there's a discrepancy, it's all 
the more important'.
For me that was the lowest point I ever reached 
scientifically and even though he spent a lot of time 
with me, it took me quite a while to get over that...
Well it was a big blow to my ego that it came out wrong.
I think now that I was mistaken for the reasons that he 
said...The result is more important because it is in 
conflict. But at the time I was expecting something very 
different.
Bahcall's initial dismay at the conflict between theory and
experiment shews the amount of faith he had put in his prediction
being correct. Davis, when he first discussed his result personally
with Bahcall and Fowler (in early 1968), was also a witness to
this. As he told me:
I remember going to Caltech and giving a seminar, on the 
result [ this is probably an earlier seminar than the one 
referred to by Bahcall aboveJ ...John Bahcall was very 
defensive about the theory. He didn't see that there 
could be anything wrong with it.
Bahcall's competence as a theorist was threatened by the 
Davis result. Although, in the long run, as Feynman had tried 
to point out to him, the result could be more important because 
it conflicted with the theory, Bahcall, at the time the result 
first came out, was expecting his prediction to be confirmed.
His disappointment was probably enhanced by the active 
part he had played in getting the experiment funded. It was not 
just his career or credibility as a theorist which was at stake.
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but also a $600,000 investment. There was a danger that he might 
beccxne seen to be responsible for a very large white elephant - 
a one-hundred-thousand-gallon tank of cleaning fluid a mile 
under the Earth, which was not detecting anything! , As Bahcall 
told me:
And the thing we were most worried about this experiment, 
in funding it, was that it was just a pipe dream of 
astronomers and they'd measure nothing anyway. ( This 
quote, is also to be found in Chapter 7, p. 228).
In view of what Bahcall had staked in the project, it is
not surprising that when he first got an indication, that Davis's
result was out of line with his prediction, he fought long and hard
to try and avoid the consequences. For some time Bahcall refused
to believe there was any serious contradiction between theory
and experiment and, as we shall see in Part II, it was not until
1970 that he was finally prepared to admit to there being a serious
discrepancy.
Part of Bahcall's initial pesponse to the result was, as we 
saw in Chapter 7, to double check everything Davis had done.
In addition, he hoped for a while that Davis's report of a 
negative result might turn out to be a positive result because 
of problems in the estimation of Davis's counter background.
Thus he did have reservations about the experimental side of the 
apparent conflict. However, his main line of attack was to re­
examine the theory, and in particular the input parameters, in 
order to try and find a way of accommodating the result.
Bahcall had time on his side in this endeavour. Because of 
his close relationship*with Davis, he knew of the results 
immediately - he also knew of Davis's publication plans. As 
the first major paper giving the results did not appear until
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May 1968, Bahcall had approximately six months in which to
try to lessen the impact. If Davis had published his results
immediately, the clash between theory and experiment, of a factor
of seven, would have seemed much more dramatic. As we shall
see, by the time the results were actually published, the
theoretical prediction had dropped to within the margins of the
e:q>erimental limit and thus the conflict with theory was much
less clear cut. Furthermore, because the first experimental report
appeared alongside the new prediction, the impression could be
obtained that this prediction was derived at about the same time
as the result became known. In other words,it would not be so
obvious that the theoreticians had had to revise their predictions
in the light of the experimental result . For instance, Fowler,
gave such an impression in one of the first major reviews of
the result; he wrote:
Thus at about the same time in 1968 that Davis completed 
the analysis of his preliminary experiments, Bahcall 
and collaborators found [the theoretical prediction 
given in May 1968 J ...(My emphasis, Fowler, 1969: 367).
Of course, in actual fact Davis, as we saw in the previous
0
chapter, was certain of his result by December 1967 when the
prediction was higher, and Bahcall had had indications of the
9low result as early as August 1967.
It seems as if Davis had, at one stage, planned to publish
his results earlier that winter in Physics Letters, a quick
publication journal, rather than submit to the slower Physical
Review Letters. However, Bahcall had advised him against this,
10writing:
I hope that you will yourself submit your results promptly 
to Phys. Rev. Letters (I would like a chance to see the
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paper first if possible in rough draft form) as I think 
you don't do the experiment any real good by having it 
appear first in Physics Letters. I'm sure you feel the 
same way about it. (My emphasis).
Whether, by this comment, Bahcall was pointing out the lower
prestige of Physics Letters vis-à-vis Physical Review Letters
or was hoping for more time before the result appeared, is an
open question. However, it is clear that the Caltech group
themselves had no such reservations about publishing in Physics
Letters. For whilst they advised Davis not to publish his result
there, they had, at about the same time, submitted their own
theoretical results to Physics Letters! F u r t h e r m o r e ,  their
paper gave the appearance of being written in ignorance of
Davis's result. The experiment was referred to as being
12fcurrently' carried out and the unwary reader could easily gain 
the impression that the theoretical results reported had been 
obtained independently from any knowledge of what the experimental 
result was. As we have seen already, the Caltech group had, 
however, been aware of Davis's result since the previous August.
The Caltech paper was written by John Bahcall, his wife 
Neta (also a Caltech nuclear physicist), Fowler and Shaviv.
The paper was received by Physics Letters on January 23 and 
published on Feburary 19 (Bahcall, Bahcall, Fowler and Shaviv,
1968) . The main claim of the paper was that there was:.sufficient
uncertainty in key nuclear-physics cross-sections to mean that the 
solar-neutrino flux could not be predicted very accurately at all.
To demonstrate this, the results of two extreme solar-model 
predictions were given. One prediction had various nuclear parameters 
pushed to the extreme of their ranges so as to produce the smallest
possible result (7 SNU). The other prediction gave the largest
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possible result (49 SNU) and had the parameters set at the other 
extreme of their error range.
The reason given for looking at the nuclear-physics uncertain­
ties in particular was the correction which had been needed in 
S^2 (although this had occurred over a year earlier). It was now
argued that other cross-sections and in particular, S^^, S^^ and 
S^^ (the cross-section for the p + p reaction) could all be in 
error. I will briefly look at each of these cross-sections in 
turn.
Sg^ had been measured in 1963 by Parker and Kavanagh and 
a value of S^^ =0.47 ± 0.05 ke\MDarns had been obtained. This 
value had been used in Bahcall's previous predictions. Now it 
was claimed that other extrapolations of the S-factor data for 
this reaction could be obtained such that could be as high as
0.6 keV-bams or as low as 0.3 keV-bams.
it will be recalled from Chapter 6, had been a matter 
for concern in 1965 because up until that point there had only 
been two low-energy measurements by Kavanagh. > Parker (with the 
aid of Davis) had, however, remeasured the cross-section and 
obtained a value of = 0.043 ± 0.004 keV-barns. At the time 
there was great relief because Davis and Bahcall had feared 
that this result might be considerably lower. Parker's new 
value had been used by Bahcall in his prediction made in 1966 
(Bahcall, 1966) and that made on the eve of Davis's experiment 
(Bahcall and Shaviv, 1968) . Now, however, was quoted as
ranging from 0.02 keV-barns to 0.05 keV-barns. The first value 
came from Kavanagh's old measurements and the second was the 
upper limit on Parker's more recent measurement.
S c a n n o t  be directly measured in the laboratory since 
the reaction proceeds too slowly. It can only be estimated
290.
theoretically. Bahcall's latest calculations of indicated
-25 -25it could range from 3.70 x 10 MeV-barns to 3.03 x 10 MeV-barns.
The uncertainty in this cross -section had, however, been pointed
out by Bahcall and Shaviv in their paper written on the eve of
Davis's first experiment. The significance of this particular
cross-section will be discussed below.
With attention now focussed on the uncertainties in the cross-
sections, Bahcall e^ al.were able to conclude their article by
referring to the ' large uncertainty in the prediction for the
neutrino experiments' (Bahcall, Bahcall, Fowler and Shaviv, 1968:
361) and to call for new experimental measurements of S^^ and S^^
to be made. This meant, of course, that it would be much harder
to say whether or not Davis's result was in conflict with the
theory.
It is interesting to note that Bahcall ^  ' s estimate
of the spread in the uncertainties in the flux prediction which
arose from nuclear-physics errors was now larger than that given
earlier, before the experiment was funded. It will be recalled
that Bahcall had written to Davis then claiming that he could not
find uncertainties in all the parameters (both astrophysical
and nuclear) and the solar model that lowered the predictions
by more than 40% (Chapter 4, p. -̂35). Also, in Fowler's (1964)
letter of support to the AEC the impression was given that the
nuclear-physics data were better known than now appeared to be
the case. It will be recalled that Fowler had written then:^^
The position has been reached where little more can be 
done in the study of the nuclear reaction rates either 
theoretically or experimentally.. .With our present 
knowledge the neutrino flux at the earth can.be 
precisely predicted.
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The increased spread in the range of the prediction, which
came from the nuclear-physics data, seems:to have come as a
surprise to Davis. He had been led to understand that the errors
in the nuclear physics were fairly small by this stage. As he
14had written to Parker earlier (in December 1967):
As you know there are errors in the calculations that 
have been carefully assessed by John [Bahcall] and the 
result is outside of the expected errors. The errors 
in the cross sections should be small now...it is hard 
to believe that the error in the flux calculations is 
in the nuclear physics. (My emphasis).
In response to now receiving a preprint of the Bahcall e^ al.
paper, Davis felt compelled to question some of the findings. In
particular, he disagreed with the large error range which Bahcall
placed on and Concerning he wrote (to Bahcall)
It does not seem reasonable to use the old Kavanagh 
measurement as an extreme. Peter [.Parker J used a 
technique that gives a far cleaner result than 
Kavanagh's, cind I would think his result would be 
accepted with the quoted error for S.17
On S_. he noted; 34
The range of values of S of 0.3 to 0.6 keV-barn seems a 
little wide.
He went on to remark rather pointedly:
If you stick to the quoted errors from the experiments,
I would estimate t^e range of values of the (})(B®) would 
be 1.3 to 2.2 x 10 cm"^sec”^ [ this compares with a range 
of 0.38 to 3.31 X lo7 cm~2sec"^ given in Bahcall et al.
(1968) ]. This range is more in agreement with the spread 
you have quoted before arising from the errors in the nuclear 
cross sections.(My emphasis) .
Davis's comments indicate the change in emphasis which had 
now occurred. It seemed that the nuclear-physics data would bear 
a range of interpretations. Just as in 1964 Bahcall had interpreted 
the data on the He^ + He^ reaction as indicative of a lower value 
of and hence a larger flux, he now interpreted the data on
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7 3 4the Be + p and He + He reactions as indicative of a larger range
in the values of and than had previously been quoted.
The reason for this change in emphasis was partly the impact of 
the revision that had been needed in However ,the change
in had occurred nearly a year earlier and the uncertainty in 
and had not been emphasised in Bahcall's and Shaviv's 
(1968) paper where all the uncertainties were reviewed in prep­
aration for Davis's first measurement. In view of this, I would 
argue that a more important reason for the change in emphasis 
now was Bahcall's knowledge of Davis's first result. The new 
emphasis on the uncertainties in the cross-sections would mean 
that the conflict between prediction and experiment would be 
less sharp. Thus Bahcall's embarrassment would be lessened 
and, furthermore the blame for the change in the prediction 
could be seen to lie in the uncontrollable input data rather than 
the theoretical calculation itself. And, of course, the 
publication of the cross-section uncertainties before Davis's 
result was itself published gave the appearance that the 
discovery of the uncertainties arose independently from the 
knowledge of the first experimental result.
As it turned out, by May 1968 Bahcall's argument that the 
experimental result fell within the range of his prediction 
became even more compelling when further input data, upon which 
the prediction was based, were re-examined. New values for two 
parameters came to the fore which, when incorporated into the 
theoretical prediction, had the effect of lessening the gap between 
theory and experiment.
The existence of new data for one of these parameters, the
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solar heavy-element abundance, Z, seems to have been pointed out
first by Davis. The new measurements, made by D.L. Lambert (1967)
had been chanced upon by Davis when scanning through Nature. He
had written to Bahcall in December 1967, asking him:
How does the abundance of Lambert affect the calculation?
From my crude approximations; from your graphs it could 
make Z<|>a = 1.0 x 10 sec [lO SNU ], a drop by a 
factor of 2.4...
Davis did not know who Lambert was - neither did Bahcall. It turned 
out that Lambert was spending time at Caltech, but Bahcall*s 
interest in his work was only aroused after Davis's letter, a 
subsequent telephone call, and a chance meeting; as Davis 
informed me:
I called John Bahcall about this, 'I see this paper in 
Nature by this person Lambert says the abundance of 
carbon, nitrogen and oxygen is entirely different 
from what you used, isn't it?' John Bahcall said 
'I don't know I haven't seen the paper.' So I told him 
where it was...So after John talked to me, either 
the saune day or the day afterwards, they went out to 
lunch auid a lot of people came along, so he was 
introduced to Launbert... And so they were talking and 
John Bahcall says 'What aure you working on, what's your 
field?'. And Lambert said 'Well I've been doing 
the spectrum of the Sun...carbon, nitrogen auid oxygen.'
And John Bahcall says 'What's your name again?' And he 
says 'Lambert'. 'Oh:', he says, 'you're Lambert'.
From then on Launbert convinced John Bahcadl that he had 
it correct....
Although Lambert's results had been published in July 1967, it was 
only now that their significance for the neutrino-flux predictions 
was realised. Lambert's measurements gave a lower value for 
the heavy-element content of the Sun (Z - 0.013). If this value 
of Z was used in the solar model, the predicted flux was lowered 
and the discrepancy with Davis's result was lessened. Bahcall's 
decision to use Launbert's value for the flux predictions was not 
entirely inconsistent with his previous work, as he auid Shaviv 
had already pointed out the large uncertainty in the solar
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composition. In view of this uncertainty, it was not unexpected
that a lower value of Z had been obtained. However, the choice of
the first new measure of the solar composition to come along
was not acceptable to at least one solar-model specialist, as
we shall see:below.
The other new piece of input data to be incorporated into
the prediction is relevant to the theoretically-determined cross-
section mentioned above^ ^ii* key parameter used in the theory
17from which is calculated is the half-life of the neutron.
In December 1967, a new measurement of the neutrdn half-life
was reported. This result appeared in time for Bahcall, Bahcall,
Fowler and Shaviv to add a note in proof to their paper. They
pointed out that if the new value of the neutrdn half-life was
-25used then the extreme value of given = 3.70 x 10
MeV-bams) for the model with the low neutrino-f lux prediction
was approximately correct. In a further paper, in which the
detailed calculation of was outlined,Bahcall and May (1968)
showed that, with the new measurement of the neutron half-life,
-25was even larger (S^^ .= 3.78 ± 0.15 x 10 MeV-barns) . This
led to correspondingly lower neutrino flux (#^8 = 0.9 x 10^
-2 -1neutrinos cm sec ). The new result for the neutron half-life
was thought to be preferable to the earlier value because 'it
has a smaller quoted probable error and is more recent' (Bahcall
18and May, 1968: L18).
The combination of using the new solar-composition measure­
ment and the new neutron half-life measurement had the overall 
effect of drastically lowering the neutrino flux. Bahcall's 
provisional calculations indicated the flux could be as low as 
4.5 SNU (and this was before the uncertainties in S^^ and S^^
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were taken into account). Bahcall estimated that with the use of 
this new input data there was as yet no contradiction between 
Davis's result and his theoretical prediction. Bahcall immediately 
contacted Davis with the new results. He was anxious to stem 
speculation at the time that there was a contradiction. As we 
saw above, Davis himself felt this to be the case and, furthermore, 
the scientific media had heard Davis give a presentation at
Yeshiva University where he claimed his result was in conflict
19 20 21'with theory. Both Physics Today and New Scientist ran
cirtides which suggested that Davis's result contradicted the
theorists' prediction. Bahcall wrote to Davis concerning the
22Physics Today journalist:
She wrote something to the effect that the results 
indicated something may be wrong with the theory of 
nuclear-energy generation...! suggest not, at least 
the results of the just mentioned calculations [those 
which gave a result of 4.5 SNUJ suggest it may only be 
a combination of smaller uncertainties.
Bahcall'-s and his associates' new calculations were published
alongside Davis's paper in the May issue of Physical Review Letters
(Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv, 1968). Bahcall et al. claimed that,
with the latest input data, and allowing for the uncertainties
in the cross-section data, and particularly S^^, there was no
obvious conflict between theory and experiment. They wrote:
...the present results of Davis ... are not in obvious 
conflict with the theory of stellar structure. (Bahcall, 
Bahcall and Shaviv, 1968: 1209).
The result of their latest prediction was that E<J)a = (0.75 ± 0.3) 
-35 -1X 10 sec S^^/0.043 keV b. In other words, the expected 
detection rate was 7.5 ± 3 SNU, if Parker's value for S^^ of 
0.043 keV-barns was correct. The reason the result was expressed 
in this unusual way (directly in terms of the uncertainty of S^^)
296
was because of the increased misgivings that this cross-section
was in error. As Bahcall d  al.wrote;
If we use...the value of 0.043 keV barns obtained for 
by Parker, the most probable predicted counting rate 
E 7.5 SNUl is about a factor of 2 larger than the probable 
upper limit set by Davis Pet al.]. However, the provisional 
results of Vaughn at al.[Vaughn et al# 1967 \ suggest that 
Parker's value may require revising downward.(ibid., i 1209) .
The new prediction was almost down to Davis's upper limit and
Bahcall hoped that an error in might account for the remaining
discrepancy. A possible error in had been given a renewed
emphasis at this time because of some provisional measurements
made by a group at Lockheed, Palo Alto (Vaughn, Chalmers, Kohler
and Chase, 1967). Their results indicated that Parker's previous
value may have been too large.
As well as reporting their latest model calculations, Bahcall
et al. also specified am absolute lower limit on the theoretical
prediction. They claimed that if Davis failed to confirm this
limit it would mean there was something fundamentally wrong with
the theory. This lower limit, 0.3 SNU, was the expected signal
from the low-energy pep neutrinos (see Fig. 2.2), the flux of
which was expected to be independent of the detailed solar model
and hence the uncertainties over the solar composition and the
value of In addition, Bahcall ett al.reiterated the point made
earlier by Goldhaber, that Davis's result showed that less than
9% of the Sun's energy was derived from the CNO-cycle.
Bahcall's view, that there was no conflict between theory
and experiment, was, as indicated above, different from that of
Davis. This difference was a matter of emphasis. For Davis the
important theoretical prediction was the onemade before his
result was known. It was this flux of neutrinos which the apparatus
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had been designed to detect and which he had searched for and
failed to detect. Bahcall, on the other hand, chose to focus
attention on his most recent theoretical calculation. This
difference in emphasis is nicely illustrated by letters which
Davis and Bahcall wrote independently, and at about the same time,
to Hans Bethe. Bahcall and Davis were to present papers in
Washington at a meeting of the American Physical Society, and
Bethe also planned to be in Washington to give a repeat of his
Nobel lecture. It was expected that he might make some comment
23about the solar-neutrino results. Davis informed Bethe:
Unfortunately we have not observed the estimated flux of 
boron-8 neutrinos predicted by current solar model calculations...
As you probably know. Dr. John Bahcall has a theoretical 
interpretation of these results in terms of his solar models...
Bahcall, expressed a somewhat different viewpoint in his letter
24(written a day earlier) :
As you will readily see, there is no obvious conflict 
between theory and observation (despite numerous and popular 
statements to the contrary) when the uncertainties in both 
are taken into account.
The outcome of the test of stellar-evolution theory as conveyed 
in the Physical Review Letters papers was thus rather unclear. Davis 
had failed to find the flux originally predicted, but, meanwhile, the 
theorists had changed their predictions. Furthermore it looked as 
if Davis's apparatus would not be sensitive enough to measure the new . 
absolute theoretical limit of 0.3 SNU.The situation was summed up in 
a review article written by E. Salpeter, a theoretical nuclear astro­
physicist who had close connections with the Caltech group of theorists, 
but who had not actually worked on this problem:
The present state of affairs is most frustrating for all 
concerned. The original theoretical estimate of about 12 
counts per day would have been easily and accurately
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measurable and the theoretical revisions could as easily 
have been up as down. They were down, however, and we have 
seen that a further factor of two down in the theoretical 
estimate is quite possible. Thus, at the present time we 
neither have a positive identification of solar neutrinos 
nor the morbid satisfaction of predicting a scandal in 
stellar-evolution theory! (Salpeter, 1968:101).
The critical test of stellar-evolution theory which Bahcall had
promised in 1964 seemed to have vanished along with the neutrino
flux.
In summary then, it can be said that the publication lag in .
Davis's results gave time for Bahcall to re-examine his prediction.
By the time Davis-s result was published, the conflict had been
minimised by the production of a new lower prediction (made with
the choice of new input data) and by attention being drawn to
parameter uncertainties, and, in particular, uncertainties in
the vàlue of S^^. It has been argued that it may have been
important to Bahcall at this stage for the conflict with the
prediction to be minimised since he had stalked his reputation,
and the AEG had staked $600,000,on the prediction being correct.
Other Reactions to Davis's Result
Bahcall was, of course, only one of a number of scientists
to have made predictions of Davis's expected signal. Fowler,
25Sears, Reeves , Cameron and Iben had all also been involved 
to a greater or lesser extent, as we saw in Chapters 4 and 6.
It turns out that Fowler, Sears and Cameron, although not always 
in complete agreement, were in general sympathy with the approach 
Bahcall had taken. Iben,on the other hand, had a very different 
interpretation of events - he felt that Davis's results were in 
clear conflict with the theory and further he was prepared to 
challenge Bahcall on this point. We will look at the attitude 
of each of these scientists in turn.
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Fowler
Fowler's reaction was particularly important given his 
institutional role at Caltech and his previous involvement with 
the experiment. It is no surprise that he was in almost complete 
agreement with the theoretician he had hired to work on the 
problem - John Bahcall. As a co-author with Bahcall of the 
Physics Letters paper in which the uncertainties in the cross- 
sections were discussed, he shared Bahcall's pronouncement that 
the uncertainties in the nuclear-physics cross-sections made it 
difficult to give a definitive theoretical prediction anyway.
By the time Bahcall et a^. had published their Physical Review 
Letters paper in which the prediction had been lowered by the 
inclusion of new input data/ Fowler,in his first major review 
of the consequences of Davis's result, was able to write about 
the 'precarious agreement'between theory and experiment.
Also, as mentioned above, Fowler gave the impression that this 
latest prediction had been arrived at at about the same time as 
Davis's result became known. He further bolstered the impression 
of agreement by pointing to the exclusion of the CNO-cycle
27which he felt to be a 'significant and satisfying result'.
The general impression conveyed by Fowler was that,although 
Davis's result was not quite what had been expected, nevertheless 
there was no need for serious concern.
Sears
Since computing the solar models upon which Bahcall had 
based his 1964 prediction. Sears had not had much involvement 
with solar neutrinos. He had computed some more solar models 
in 1965 with Weymann (Weymann and Sears, 1965) , but his active 
participation had waned after he left Caltech for the University
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of Michigan. Davis had, however, sent Sears preprints of the 
Physical Review Letters papers and Sears had written back comm­
enting on the theory. He certainly felt that Davis's results
28had not confirmed the original prediction. As he wrote;
I suppose we would have sat back with ill concealed smirks 
if your experiment had agreed with our predictions... In any 
case your experiment has certainly got us with our backs 
,to the wall.
However, Sears seemed to be in agreement with what Bahcall had 
subsequently done. As he went on to comment;
gI have been following the effects on the predicted B flux 
of the revisions that have come along, and my crude estimates 
agree well with the detailed work of John Bahcall. One g 
revision that may lower the solar opacity and thus the B 
flux, which I don't think he knows about, is a collective 
interaction amongst electrons...But the effect is probably 
negligible.
Although Sears does not say whether or not he agreed with 
Bahcall's conclusion that there was no obvious conflict between 
theory and experiment, it is evident that he too was thinking 
of ways of reducing the theoretical prediction in order to minimise 
any discrepancy. In this regard, his position seems to have been 
similar to Bahcall's.
Cameron
Despite BahcallÎ.S and Fowler's claims that the stcindard
theory was not yet in trouble, other theorists found some cause
for alarm. For instance, Cameron and his student Ezer, on learning
of Davis's results, produced the first proposed modification to
the standard model. They suggested that there might be circulation
currents in the solar interior which meant that hydrogen from the
29outer layers was continually mixed with the core. This would 
increase the energy production, expand the core and lower the 
central temperature. The net effect would be a reduction of the
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highly temperature sensitive B^-neutrino flux. They estimated
that this mixing process could produce a B^ flux as low as 2.5 x 10^ 
-2 -1neutrinos cm sec , which was in the region of Davis's upper 
limit. Also, further small adjustments in the input data, such 
as the solar composition and nuclear parameters, could produce a 
value for the predicted flux that was below Davis's upper limit.
Thus, this model could be made consistent with the experimental 
result.
Although he had proposed this model, Cameron himself hoped
that such a radical way out would not be needed. This view was
strengthened after the appearance of the Bahcall et a1.paper
in May 1968. As he wrote to Bahcall at the time:^^
Personally I hope you are right and that the negative 
results obtained by Davis will turn into a positive 
one consistent with the new values of the nuclear reaction 
rates and abundances which you have discussed. The 
interior circulation may be the remaining 'ace in the hole' 
which might have to be invoked if the neutrino flux turns 
out to be lower than can be accounted for from your recent 
modifications to the various solar quantities.
Thus, Cameron was hopeful that a contradiction could be avoided,
but felt that in the circumstances an investigation of other ways
around the problem was warranted.
Iben and the Controversy over Whether or Not there was a Discrepancy 
One theorist disagreed enough with Bahcall's interpretation, 
that the theory was not yet in trouble, to take issue publicly 
with him. This theorist was Icko Iben who, it will be recalled, 
had been a member of the original Caltech team which had made the 
first attempt to produce an accurate prediction of the boron- 
eight neutrino flux. Iben had subsequently left Caltech for 
MIT. As a stellar-model specialist who had also worked on the 
nuclear-physics part of the neutrino-flux prediction (the calculation
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of the Be^ screening effect mentioned in Chapter 6), Iben was
particularly well qualified to evaluate the theoretical implications
of Davis's result.
In a paper submitted to Physical Review Letters, in July 1968,
Iben reported the results of an extensive investigation of the
relationship between the neutrino flux and a variety of input
parameters. He found results which he felt were, at some points,
at variance with those found by Bahcall et al. The most
important difference was that Iben, unlike Bahcall, felt that the
standard solar-input composition parameters were not consistent
with the Davis result. Although he thought a contradiction could
still be avoided if the cross-section data were pushed to the
limits of their error range, such a possibility seemed rather
unlikely. His main disagreement with Bahcall centred over the
value of the primordial helium abundance of the Sun Y, that was needed
in a solar model consistent with Davis's result. This value
should agree with observational determinations of Y (such as
made from other stars). Bahcall et al.had concluded that Y -
0.22 ± 0.03, a value just consistent with observation. Iben's
conclusion was, however, different; as he wrote:
With the standard choice of solar input parameters, the 
Davis, Harmer, and Hoffman li#it implies an upper bound 
on the sun's initial helium abundance that is small 
compared with the helium abundance estimated for other 
galactic objects. The upper limit on Y...required for 
consistency with the Davis, Harmer and Hoffman limit 
is Y - 0.16 - 0.17. On the other hand, almost every 
attempt to estimate Y for galactic objects other than 
the sun has led to values in the range 0.2 - 0.4...
(Iben, 1968:1208)
In order to understand the difference between Bahcall and 
Iben on this point it is necessary to delve a little into the 
procedure of solar-model construction. To produce a solar model
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the primordial chemical composition of the Sun is required. The chemical 
composition is given in terms of the fractional abundances, X (the 
hydrogen abundance), Y (the helium abundance) and Z (the heavy-element 
abundance). As X + Y + Z = 1, only two free parameters are needed.
For computational convenience the two parameters which are usually 
used are Z/X, and Y. Once the initial composition has been set the 
solar model can be evolved over the age of the Sun (.4.7 billion years). 
The correct solar model must, after this period, be able to produce 
the observed luminosity. If it fails to do so it is conventional 
to vary slightly one of the composition parameters until a match with 
the luminosity is achieved. The approach followed by Sears (1964), 
Bahcall and Shaviv (1968), and Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv (1968) was 
to adopt an initial value of Z/X,given by current spectroscopic 
observations of the solar photosphere, and to vary Y until a match 
with the luminosity was achieved. In this approach it was assumed 
that the value of Z/X obtained in the photosphere was the Scune as 
the primordial value, and that this value was better known than Y 
(which could not be obtained frcxn the photosphere) . Of course, the 
value of Y chosen to fit the model must be consistent with observations 
of Y made from galactic objects,and values of Y derived from cosmology. 
Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv claimed that,with Lambert's value of 
Z/X = 0.019^ they needed a value of Y=0.22 to produce the present lumin­
osity. This value of Y was just consistent with observations.
Iben, on the other hand, followed a different approach. He felt that
z/X was not that well known as emphasised by the recent revision in the
value made by Lambert.He preferred to use Y as his composition parameter 
31and vary Z. He found that, for a reasonable value of Z,consistency with 
Davis's upper limit for the neutrino flux could only be obtained with 
Y=0.16-0.17,which was much lower than observation permitted. In his paper, 
Iben pointed out that the only reason Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv
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had managed to obtain a higher value of Y was because they had
chosen Lambert's value of Z/X. He felt that this spectroscopic
measurement might not be the correct choice of Z. As he wrote:
A Z estimated from spectroscopic data is therefore not 
necessarily the appropriate choice for the opacity 
parameter Z.
The value of Y = 0.22 quoted by Bahcall, Bahcall 
and Shaviv is the result of a specific choice of Z...
Y - 0.22 is not consistent with the Davis, Harmer and 
Hoffman limit. An insistence on consistency with this 
limit, rather than on insistence on a particular choice 
for Z, leads instead to an upper limit of Y = 0.16 - 0.17. 
(Iben, 1968: 1209, his emphasis). °
The implication of Iben's argument was that Bahcall et al.
were shirking from the inevitable conclusion of their
calculations which was that a model consistent with reasonable
values for the solar composition and with observations of the
neutrino flux could not be obtained. Thus, Iben felt that there
was a contradiction between the standard model and Davis's result.
This contradiction was most clear if the helium abundance, rather
than what he considered to be the more uncertain heavy element
to hydrogen ratio, was taken as the composition parameter.
Some of Iben's motivation for writing his paper can be seen
from the following comment which he made to me:
Well anyway, along came the first experiment and a rather 
dramatic discrecpancy.. .And immediately people started 
counting, finding effects that would bring it down...
Bahcall wrote something saying there was no discrepancy, 
everything is still OK. . .So here we are with the experiment 
out and the theoretiqian on the team arguing that nothing 
was wrong. So I tooled up and constructed a whole bunch 
of solar models. I wrote a Physical Review Letter...and 
that got bombed by John who said it had all been done.
Iben's paper had initially been sent to Bahcall for refereeing
cind Bahcall had recommended against publication in Physical
Review Letters. Iben had been very annoyed by this. He had
immediately rung Bahcall on his home number to complain and thus
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woke Bahcall in the early hours of the morning-in his annoyance 
it seems Iben had forgotten the time difference between the 
East and West coasts! Iben's strong feelings on the matter can 
be seen from the letter he wrote to the Editor of Physical Review
Letters requesting that his paper be sent to another referee.
32He wrote:
I can only conclude from the tone of his report
that the referee considers the subject of solar neutrinos 
to be his exclusive preserve and feels that I am poaching 
on his territory.
Much of the theoretical work that was instrumental 
in persuading governmental agencies to finance the Davis 
et al.experiment has been presented to the scientific 
community in a deceitful manner, with high claims made 
for a Z(f)a that is an order of magnitude larger than the 
upper limit resulting from the experiment.
The article published by Bahcall ̂  is a continuation
of this deceit. All the previous bold predictions are 
forgotten and it is proclaimed that the Davis e^ limit 
is consistent with theoretical models. In order to achieve 
this proclaimed consistency, one of the parameters in the 
model calculations (the choice of Z) is changed from what 
had formerly been considered most likely. The work of the 
one spectroscopist ]" Lambert ] , whose estimate of Z happens 
to be appropriately low, is cited to make the work appear 
respectable and unforced.
A careful look [ reference to his own manuscript] 
shows that the B S (fBahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv, 1968] 
results are not consistent (as advertised) with the Davis 
et al. limit. I submit that this is quite unscientific 
reporting. I feel that the Physical Review Letters is, in 
good conscience, obligated to give equal time to an 
astrophysicist who can correct the misconception.
Accompanying this letter were detailed comments (many acrimonious
ones) on the referee^s report.
Iben's comments to the Editor state forcefully his view
that Bahcall had chosen input data which led to a lower prediction.
Iben felt the real consequences of Davis's results for the theory
could be seen from his own paper which used the helium abundance
rather than a value of Z/X based on the work of LaAibert. It is
clear also from his letter that Iben felt that Bahcall was
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reneging on the theoretical prediction made before the experiment
was undertaken.
Unfortunately Bahcall's original comments on Iben's paper
are not available. However, some of what Bahcall's riposte might
have been can be seen from his comment on the matter made to me
in 1978. In referring to the difference between his approach and
Iben's, he told me:
It's a difference in philosophy but there is nothing 
scientifically different...The traditional thing, or at 
least the thing I have always done, and people working 
with me have therefore done, is to take the ratio of heavy 
elements to hydrogen from observations of the surface of 
the Sun, supplemented by guesses as to what the neon abundance 
is from other staurs. Icko has assumed instead that he knew 
the helium abundance. We calculate the helium abundance...
I think it is more plausible to teJce for the Sun the heavy 
element to hydrogen ratio, because we observe that pretty 
much in the surface of the Sun.. .The helium abundance is 
the cosmological one, I don't like cosmology so I didn't 
do it that way...
From this comment it would appear that Bahcall's preference
for the Z/X parameter was quite reasonable. As far as he was
concerned, this was the standard approach (auid it is true that
Sears had used this parameter for his models) and furthermore
he regarded the Y parameter, which was notJdirectly observable in
the Sun, to be even less reliable since its value was derived, in
part, from cosmological arguments.
In order to try and resolve Bahcall's and Iben's disagreement^
Iben's paper was sent to another (anonymous) referee for adjudication.
This referee recommended the paper be published and commented.
I believe that the author, after setting aside the polemics, 
is entirely correct in the scientific conclusion of his 
paper emd his reply to the first referee...
The author is also correct in stating that some of the 
results are in contradiction to the conclusions offered by 
Bahcall et al. in their paper...Since this whole matter is 
of great current interest in physics and in astrophysics,
I believe that a rapid publication of a note emphasizing 
these differences could be justified...
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Iben's paper was finally published in Physical Review Letters
in October 1968. However, his battle with Bahcall was not yet
over. As a sequel to the letter, he prepared a longer paper giving
his detailed results. This he submitted to the main journal in
the field - The Astrophysical Journal. However, Bcihcall was again
the referee and again he turned the paper down. By this time Iben
had become so disenchanted, that he took up the offer of a MIT
colleagut^ who was editor of Annals of Physics, to submit his paper
there instead. The paper was duly accepted for publication in
that journal (Iben, 1969). However, as that journal was not read
by astrophysicists Iben felt that, in effect, his work had been
i^Aored, He felt sane bitterness about this, as he told me:
Here is a field in which one person has essentially wiped 
out the opposition. In the minds of the whole community of 
astronomers, the only guy who has ever done anything worth 
while is John Bahcall. And I don't deny that he should 
receive full credit for the whole thing. On the other hand, 
that's crappy science, to wipe out the opposition, in 
effect, just out of pique.
Iben's feelings at the time are also reflected in a letter which
34he sent to Davis; he wrote:
I really don't know why I'm having this much trouble with 
getting my stuff on solar neutrinos published, but I've 
become pretty disgusted with the whole affair.
Although Iben and a student did calculate some further solar
models (Abraham and Iben, 1971), his active participation in the
field ceased from this point. Since within a year, Bahcall was,
himself, to admit to there being a contradiction the differences
between his view and Iben's, in hindsight, appear to be rather less
vital than they were in 1968.^^ However, the vociferousness of
the controversy for its short duration indicates that an issue of
some substance was at stake.
This particular episode is of considerable interest because
it is one of the few cases of acrimonious controversy in the
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solar-neutrino field. Its implications will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter 10. The main conclusion to be drawn here is that 
it shows thxtBahcall's interpretation of Davis's result was not 
the only one which could be legitimately held at the time. Iben's 
position seems to have been equally viable, as indicated by the 
endorsement given it by the anonymous referee.
Thus, in the year following the announcement of Davis's 
result, the theorists wereoin some disarray. Bahcall, the theorist 
most closely associated with the project, maintained that there 
was no conflict between theory and experiment. Others, however, 
thought that the situation was more serious t h ^  Bahcall was 
willing to concede and at least one theorist, Iben, was prepared 
to argue that there was a contradiction between theory and experiment. 
It seems that whether or not there was a contradiction between 
theory and experiment depended on which theorist's view was believed. 
And, as we have seen, there were reasonable scientific arguments 
in support of each side.
Contradiction and consistency in this case seem to have been
36
(to use current sociological parlance) matters for negotiation. 
Scientific argument alone could not seem to settle the issue.
The outccxne of the experimental test of the theoretical prediction 
can be said to have been socially constructed. Bahcall, with his 
strong commitment to the 'prediction' being correct, was able to 
claim the experimental result was not in conflict, whilst Iben, 
who was less personally involved with the theoretical prediction, 
was able to claim that a contradiction existed.
309,
PART II. THE EVENTS OF 1.968-1978
Bahcall Acknowledges the Existence of a Discrepancy
Throughout 1968, Bahcall still maintained that there was no
fundamental contradiction between theory and experiment. As before,
he continued to base this view largely on the expectation that
would have to be revised downwards.
In October 1968 , was indeed revised downwards, but only
very slightly. Parker, under the stimulus of the new measurements
of by Vaughn e^ al. (1967) had looked again at his 1966 data.
He now found (Parker, 1968) that the best value for was
0.035 keV-barns, as opposed to the old value of 0.043 keV-barns.
This small downward revision was caused, partly by changes in
the standard value of an experimental parameter which had been
37used to normalise the low-energy extrapolation , and partly by
a reanalysis of the effect of a low-lying resonance on the extra- 
38polation. Parker now took a slightly different extrapolation
and obtained the new lower value.
The resulting effect on the solar-neutrino flux prediction
was reported in a paper, submitted to The Astrophysical Journal
in October 1968, by Bahcall, his wife Neta, and a solar-model
39specialist Roger Ulrich (Bahcall, Bahcall and Ulrich, 1969).
They estimated that, with all the most likely values for the inp ut 
parameters, Davis should expect a rate of 6 SNU. The reduction 
of 1.5 SNU since the May 1968 prediction was not produced by the 
new value of Ŝ ,̂  alone. A new value for the rate of electron 
capture by Be^ was also used. As was mentioned before (in Chapter 
6) Iben had recalculated this rate taking into account bound- 
electron capture (Iben, Kalata, Schwartz, 1967). Bahcall and 
a colleague at Caltech, Charles Moeller, (Bahcall and Moeller, 1969),
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had now refined Iben's calculdtion and it was their new value for 
this reaction rate which was used in the latest solar-model cal­
culations. As the new value was very slightly larger than the old
g
one,it led to a correspondingly small reduction in the B -neutrino 
flux."^°
The conclusion which Bahcall, Bahcall and Ulrich reached 
in comparing their latest model prediction with Davis's results, 
was similar to that, drawn earlier by Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv. 
They stated:
There is as yet no obvious conflict between the theory of 
stellar structure and the experimental results of Davis 
et al.(1968) (Bahcall, Bahcall and Ulrich, 1969:567)
Again, this conclusion seemed to be based on the uncertainty in
As they wrote:
...the cross-section factor S^^...should be subject to 
further careful experimental and theoretical analysis.
We note that the quoted experimental values for this 
cross-section factor have varied by a factor of 2...in 
recent years. It is probably the most difficult cross- 
section measurement...and it is certainly the most 
important for solar-neutrino experiments. (Bahcall, Bahcall 
and Ulrich, 1969: 566-7).
Bahcall et al. went on to list further uncertainties in the 
low-energy extrapolation of this cross-section and pointed out 
that if Tombrello's 1965 theoretical calculation of was used 
(this gave = 0.012 keV-barns - see Chapter 6) then the
theoretical prediction could be as low as 3 SNU, which would not 
be in disagreement with Davis's upper limit.
Although Bachall's main hope for removing the remaining 
discrepancy lay with the cross-section, he continued to explore 
other uncertainties in the solar model. For instance, Bahcall, 
Bahcall and Ulrich (1969) attempted to see how arbitrary modif­
ications to the equation of state (the Sun was assumed to be
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described by an ideal-gas law equation of state - see Chapter 9
for more details) and the opacity would affect the neutrino flux.
They could not find any definite plausible effect that lowered
the neutrino fluxes by the requisite amount.
The extent to which Bahcall, in the summer of 1969, hoped
that the remaining discrepancy between theory and experiment would
be explained by an error in can be seen from an article of
his publ ished in August 1969, in Physical Review Letters (Bahcall,
1969b). The purpose of this article was largely to review detection
rates for a variety of new experimental targets that had been
proposed. Bahcall's calculations of these detection rates were
all based on the lower value of (S^^ =0.012 keV-barns)
estimated by Tombrello from his work on Li^. As Bedicall wrote:
In order to obtain consistency with the experimental results 
of Davis, Harmer and Hoffman we have adopted the value of 
determined from experiments invôlving ^Li (which is a 
factor of 3 smaller than the 'standard' value of S^?). We use 
this indirectly determined because it enables us to 
make somewhat more plausible estimates for the rates of 
future solar neutrino experiments not because of any 
criticism of the 'standard' measurement. (Bahcall, 1969b:252)
Despite the disclaimer concerning criticism of the 'standard'
measurement, some criticism of it must have been implied by the
fact that it was this parameter which had been changed. It
seemed that Bahcall had such confi daice in the standard value of
being in error that he was starting to make computations
based upon a lower value.
Although Bahcall could maintain his view that there was no
fundamental discrepancy well into the summer of 1969, events
which occurred in the autumn of 1969 forced him to change his mind.
Firstly, theoretical work on the solar opacity indicated that the
previous value was in error and that the new opacity would produce
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a larger neutrino flux. Secondly, and more importantly, Kavanagh 
reported on his new measurements of and found a result which 
supported Parker's value.
The new work on the opacity was carried out by a student of Iben's 
42at MIT, W.D. Watson. His thesis had been on radiative transfer
processes in stars and, as such processes governed the central 
temperature, his work was of great importance for solar-neutrino flux 
calculations. Watson looked at the Effects on the neutrino flux of 
several refinements which he had made to the opacity calculations.
In particular, he drew attention to three effects.
Firstly (Watson, 1969a), he found that the inclusion of auto­
ionisation lines increased the opacity. Autoionisations are parti­
cular lines observed in optical spectra that have a peculiar shape 
caused by the mixing of discrete and continuous states of cin 2)̂ Vo.'a. 
such that the x(ro,Af\ . spontaneously ionises. Their effect on the 
solar opacity had previously been ignored. The increase in the opacity 
which stems from autoionisation lines enhances the boron-eight neutrino 
flux. Watson (1969b) also pointed out that the controversy occurring 
at the time over the correct value of the iron abundance in the Sun
43would have an appreciable effect on the boron-eight flux prediction.
It seemed likely that the previously used value for the iron abundance 
would have to be revised upwards by a factor of ten. In which case, 
this would again lead to an increase in the expected neutrino flux. 
Watson (1969c) also investigated another atomic-physics effect. This 
was the so-called plasma effect, and concerns the influence of 
collections of electrons on the opacity. This tends to decrease 
the opacity and thus to some extent off-sets the increases in the 
flux produced by the other two effects.
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The detailed influence of Watson's findings on the solar-
neutrino flux predictions was considered by Bahcall and Ulrich
(1970). Using all the latest input parameters,they found a flux
of 7.8 SNU, but this could easily be higher if the iron aibundance
needed to be revised further, as seemed likely. It was also in this
paper that the first announcement of Kavanagh's measurements of
was made. The upwards trend in the theoretical prediction
produced by the work on the opacity and the closing off of the
loophole led Bahcall and Ulrich to write:
A comparison...with the experimental results of Davis et al. 
shows that a sizeable discrepancy exists between theory and 
experiment. This discrepancy has been strengthened greatly 
by the results of the beautiful experiment of Kavanagh e^ al. 
(Bahcall and Ulrich, 1970: L58).
Thus, two years after the results of the experiment were first
known, Bahcall was ,at last, prepared to accept that a 'sizeable
discrepeincy' existed.
1970-1976 The Years of Crisis
The discrepancy between theory and experiment reported by
EbhcalL.jand Ulrich (1970) became more dramatic in 1971. It emerged
that there had been a coding error in Ulrich's conputer programme
which seemed to have been caused by the move from Caltech to
UCLA (whère Ulrich had just taken up a post). This meant that
the previousj prediction had been about 30% too low. Bahcall and
44Ulrich (1971) now predicted a signal of 9 ± 5 SNU. In addition,
in 1971 Davis reported results which were ccnsistent with a signal
of 1.5 SNU. The combined effect of the larger prediction and smaller
result led Bahcall and Ulrich to write:
This observation Eof Davis J is in conflict with the theories 
of stellar evolution and nuclear fusion in stars as applied 
to the Sun. (Bahcall and Ulrich, 1971: 593).
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The emphasis which Bahcall now placed on the contradiction
between theory and experiment can be seen from a talk given
to the American Astronomical Society in 1970. This talk, entitled,
'Some Unsolved Problems in Astrophysics', was the HelenB. Warner
Prize lecture for 1970. This prize was awarded for outstanding
work done by an astronomer under 35 while resident in the U.S.
It was the first time the prize had been awarded to a theoretical
physicist and Bahcall's work on solar neutrinos no doubt contri-
45buted to the award. Bahcall, in his talk, referred to the
'discrepancy between theory and observation which cannot be 
explained by known uncertainties in either'. (Bahcall, 1971:283). 
Bahcall stated that he felt that the theory of stellar interiors 
was 'probeüDly wrong' and he cautioned his fellow astronomers 
against the use of this theory. Bahcall's argument was, that since 
the Sun was the best star on which to test the theory (as there 
was more accurate information about the Sun than any other star), 
the failure of the theory in this case pointed to the problems 
of applying the theory to stars where the uncertainties were all 
the greater.
Bahcall's new emphasis on the discrepancy seemed, however, 
to take some time to percolate through into the scientific media.
For instance, reports in the scientific press in 1971 of Davis's
latest results (1.5 ± 1  SNU) played down any discrepancy. In a
46report in Science it was claimed:
Although their fDavis et al%s] recent rate is a trifle low com­
pared with that expected from the best models of the Sun, 
it should cause no serious theoretical problems.
47In New Scientist it was reported:
They fDavis et al. ] calculate a corrected solar neutrino 
capture rate per chlorine-37 atom of (1.5 ± 1.0) x 10“^^ 
per second. This is the first positive signal to emerge
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above the background. It can be compared with the current 
theoretical calculation of 10~^^ per second. Although slightly 
low, the experimental result probably will not cause any 
serious problem.
These reports seem to have based their conclusions on the fact that 
Davis (1971), with the introduction of the pulse-rise discrimination 
facility reported for the firfet time a positive signal and an error. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 7, this positive signal was short­
lived and Davis (1972), with several very low runs, once more expressed 
his results as an upper limit.
The view that there was a discrepancy between theory and experi­
ment was, however, becoming prevalent in the technical literature 
on the problem. For instance, Abrahams and Iben (1971) presented 
solar-neutrino flux predictions which gave similar, results to those 
obtained by Bahcall and Ulrich, and they referred to:
...what is now generally recognised as a rather clear 
discrepancy between theory and dbservation (Abraham and 
Iben, 1971: 157).
In 1971 Bahcall and Sears were asked to review the subject of
solar neutrinos for the Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics.
They commenced their review with the statement:
The most important fact about the subject we are reviewing 
is that there is a large discrepancy (at the present 
writing) between calculation and observation. (Bahcall and 
Sears, 1972: 25).
The conflict between theory and experiment worsened in 1972 as Davis 
started to report even lower results. Bahcall's assessment of the
48situation in early 1972 was, as he reported to the Irvine Conference:
It seems to me that the situation is so grossly discrepant 
with the theory that we are clearly faced with the question 
of something basically being wrong either in the physics 
or the astrophysics.
He expressed a similar opinion in an article written at about this
time:
The most recent experimental results...have established what
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appears to be a scientific crisis...(Bahcall, 1973: 381)
He went on to write:
The present crisis can be appreciated by comparing Davis's 
limit El SNU I with the expected counting rates... It is 
clear that something very serious is wrong with the theoryi- 
(Bahcall, 1973: 383).
49The term 'crisis' appeared in correspondence at the time
and there was even talk of a revolution occurring in stellar-
evolution t h e o r y . I t  thus appears that, by 1972, it was widely
believed that there was a serious problem with Davis's solar-
neutrino results which might lead to important theoretical revisions.
Now that Bahcall was convinced that there was a contradition
between theory and experiment, he began to reiterate the arguments
he had made in 1965 concerning the crucial nature of the experiment.
For instance, he wrote:
The Brookhaven Solar-Neutrino experiment of Davis and his 
colleagues is therefore a crucial one for the theories of 
stellar evolution and of nuclear energy generation instars.
One might even hope that the solar neutrino problem will 
play somewhat the same role in the theory of stellar evolution 
as the hydrogen atom did in quantum mechanics. (Bahcall,
1973: 381, his emphasis).
The extent of the transformation in Bahcall's viewpoint, 
from his earlier attempt to play down the discrepancy by stressing 
the leeway in the prediction to his new view of a serious contra­
diction, can be seen from à comment which Bahcall made to Davis in 
June 1973. In a letter, Bahcall criticised a recent conference 
presentation by Davis. Bahcall wrote
The rémark you made at the beginning is midleading: 'though 
with variations in the standard models...the flux can be 
reduced below 1 SNU.' No model with a consistent physics 
gives 1 SNÛ. As you know, one has to introduce special 
assumptions about the physics that are revolutionary from 
the standpoint of physics and stellar evolution. I think 
you would be doing a disservice to your experiment, which 
tests astrophysics where the predictions are most inflexible, 
if you give the opposite impression. I am sure Schwarzschild 
feels the same way. (My emphasis).
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Bahcall's mild rebuke to Davis here, for failing to stress the
contradiction between theory and experiment, is ironic when we
recall that Davis earlier (in January 1968) had chastised Bahcall
for his attempts to argue there was no such contradiction!
The view that there was a serious discrepancy was by now
reflected in the scientific media as well. For instance, in Science 
52it was reported:
The implications of Davis's result, if sustained by further 
experiment, is that either existing solar models or some 
fundamental nuclear theory as applied to the Sun are seriously 
in error.
With the standard theory so obviously in conflict with the
experiment, numerous suggestions appeared as to where, the problem
might be. Apart from the questioning of the radiochemistry at the
Irvine conference,as discussed in the preceding chapter, renewed
attention was focussed on the nuclear-physics and astrophysical
components of the calculation. For instance, the suggestion Was
made at the Irvine conference that there might be a low-energy
3 3resonance in the He + He reaction. This might distort the low- 
energy extrapolation and hence affect the value of On the
astrophysical front, it was suggested at Irvine that the Sun might 
be 'mixed-up'. That is sudden^convection currents in the Sun 
might periodically mix material from the outer layers in with the 
core. This would lead to an expansion of the core and lower the 
central temperature enough to deplete the boron-eight flux. This 
suggestion is similar to the earlier one by Ezer and Cameron (1968) 
only they had proposed mixing over the whole life of the Sun, 
rather than the sudden mixing now being discussed.
Another important class of explanations lay in the direction 
of neutrino physics. It was possible that there was some property 
of neutrinos which took on importance in their long journey from
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the Sun to the Earth. One idea , which had some currency, was 
that of neutrino oscillation. For instance, it was known that there 
were two types of neutrino - electron neutrinos and muon neutrinos.
If electron neutrinos could change state and spend dome time as 
muon electrons and vice versa this could explain the low result.
Half of the electron neutrinos produced by the Sun which were 
expected to be detected in Davis's experiment, would have changed 
into muon neutrinos by the time they reached the Earth and hence 
would escape detection. The various explanations which have emerged 
over the years to explain Davis's result are discussed further in 
Chapter 9.
The different disciplinary components of solar-neutrino astronomy,
as exemplified by the different domains called upon to explain the
outcome of Davis's experiment, were widely thought to be a barrier
to the solution of the problem. It was felt that scientists
working in one specialty tended to disregard the problem, believing
it to be the responsibility of some other specialty. As Cameron .
commented, in his summing up of the Irvine conference.
Thus a possible solution of the puzzle may lie in nuclear 
physics, in astro-physics or in neutrino physics. There is 
a tendency for scientists working in any. one of these fields 
to feel that the chance that his field is the culprit is 
so remote that one of the other fields must be involved.
It is always easy to blame the other fellow , particularly 
if you do not know much about his specialty. As long 
as this general attitude holds, work on the solar-neutrino 
problem is bound to go forward somewhat sluggishly.
The view that astronomers blame physicists and vice versa was
54also shared by Bahcall. As he wrote to.a colleague at the time:
Almost universally, astronomers believe that the difficulty 
must lie in the physics and physicists think the difficulty 
must be in the astrophysics.
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It can be seen that the suspicions of the theoreticians 
concerning the correctness of the experiment and the suspicions 
of the experimenter concerning the correctness of the theory had 
by now spread amongst ..different groups of theorists, with each 
group tending to blame others for the problem. The interdisciplinary 
tensions which the solar-neutrino problem had aroused are discussed, 
in their own right, in the paper presented in Appendix II (Pinch, 
1981a).
In 1973 two further corrections were made to the standard 
theory which both had the effect of lowering the «predicted fluxes . 
somewhat. Gari and Huffman (1972) recalculated the p-p rate 
(S^^) taking into account meson-exchange effects which had been 
ignored in the previous calculations. They found a lower value 
of and this reduced the predicted detection rate by 1.65 SNU. 
Also, it was discovered that the effect of one of the corrections 
to the opacity made earlier by Watson (the autoionisation effect) 
had been overestimated. New opacity calculations by the Los .
Alamos group revealed a reduction of about 2 SNU & ' The
incorporation of these new calculations into the solar-neutrino 
flux computation was reported in a paper written by Bahcall and 
Ulrich in association with the Los Alamos opacity group (Bahcall, 
Heubner, Magee, Merts, and Ulrich, 1973).They estimated an overall 
detection rate of 5.6 SNU. A prediction which they still claimed 
to be 'in strong disagreement with the experimental results'.
(Bahcall et al., 1973:2).
Over the period 1973-6, the main theoretical effort was 
directed towards the attempt to explain the discrepancy. During 
this time, the explanatory candidates to emerge from the Irvine
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conference were investigated and, by and large, rejected. In
addition, a whole range of non-standard solar models had by now
been proposed. None of these gained widespread acceptance (see
Chapter 9). Also, by now, most people were willing to accept that
Davis's experiment was, itself, not the cause of the problem
(see previous chapter).
Thus, by 1976, the solar-neutrino problem seemed more
imponderable than ever. Bahcall and Davis summarised the situation
with a joint publication in Science. T h e y  wrote in the introduction
to their paper:
For the past fifteen years we have tried, in collaboration 
with many colleagues in astronomy, chemistry and physics, 
to understand emd test the theory of how the sun produces 
its radiant energy...All of us have been surprised by the 
results; there is a large unexplained disagreement between 
observation and supposedly well established theory. This 
discrepancy has led to a crisis in the theory of stellar 
evolution; many authors are openly questioning some of the 
basic principles and approximations in this supposedly 
dry (and solved) subject. (Bahcall and Davis, 1976: 264).
Again , in this article the, by now,familar theme
that the experiment was of a crucial nature was reiterated. Also,
the phenomenon of physicists blaming astronomers and vice versa
was stressed. In order to settle the issue of whether the solar-
neutrino problem was a result of faulty astronomy or faulty physics,
Bahcall and Davis called for a new experiment to be carried out
(either the gallium or lithium experiment). Because such experiments
were sensitive to the lower-energy neutrinos (pep and pp neutrinos)
the fluxes of which were independent of detailed astrophysical
models, they should be able to distinguish between whether the
problem was in the physics or astrophysics. For instance, if the
lower-energy neutrinos were found in the correct quantities, then
this would indicate that the detailed solar model was incorrect and
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that the problem was in the astrophysics rather than the physics.
On the other hand, a failure to detect the lower-energy neutrinos 
would indicate that something fundamentally was wrong in the physics 
(perhaps neutrino oscillation).^^
The emphasis which Bahcall now placed on the confcradication 
can be seen to be a useful rhetorical ploy in terms of arguing 
for new experiments. Bahcall's (and Davis's) argument was, that 
because the chlorine experiment was in conflict with the theory 
new experiments were required to solve the problem. Any 
embarrassment caused by the previous failure of the theory was in 
the past. Bahcall had not lost his credibility as a theorist.
He now appeared to have taken Feynman's advice and emphasised the 
discrepancy as an indication of the importance of the Davis result.
Thus, by 1976, Bahcall seemed to be once more furthering 
his theoretical ambitions, by starting, to push for new e3q>erimental 
approaches .xperiments which would give him, as a theorist, further 
opportunities to make; predictions and produce the associated 
theoretical work. In essence, Bahcall's arguments for new exper­
iments now were similar to those which he had put forward in 1964, 
Whilst, in 1964, it seemed that&sizeable prediction was needed 
in order to show the feasibility of the experiment, now the existence 
of a sizeable discrepancy would help in the battle for the funding 
of ' second-generation experiments.
1976-1978 The Argument over Whether or Not There is a Discrepancy 
Reappears
Although Davis quoted an upper limit of 1.5 SNU in 1976, his 
latest data which were shown in the Science article (see Fig. 8.1) 
seemed to indicate an upward trend. This led some, people to wonder
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whether he was, at last, detecting something. For instance, in the
commentary^in New Scientist.on the Science article, it was stated:
...for most of the last decade he saw nothing...But in the 
last year his neutrino count has risen; the last three 
counts each lasting 100 days, have returned numbers within 
striking distance of the neutrino brightness that has 
always been expected...So has the solar neutrino problem 
gone away?
The author of the article concluded thattthe answer was probably 
'no' and quoted Davis as saying that the last few higher counts 
were to be intepreted as statistical fluctuations. However, it 
seems that the first hint that the problem might be lessening 
was appearing. Others seemed to be thinking along similar lines. 
For instance, Steven Weinberg, in a letter sent to Bahcall in 
February 1976, noted the upward : trend in the data and asked:^^ 
Anyway isn't Davis now seeing almost enough SNU's?
59And the British astrophysicist, Douglas Gough, wrote in 1976:
Interestingly, Davis's most recent measurements are more 
than a factor of three above his previous mean and only 
marginally below the theoretical values. This has led 
scxne people to believe that the theory is more or less 
correct and the problem is disappearing, others still 
believe the solar models are seriously in error.
Over the period 1976 - 1978 the discrepancy appeared to
narrow further. Bahcall (1977) reported some revised calculations 
37of the Cl -capture cross-sections using more up-to-date data 
and techniques. He found that the cross-sections were about 15% 
lower than he had previously estimated and this reduced the 
prediction to 4.7 SNU. Also (as was mentioned in Chapter 7),
Davis with the use of more sophisticated statistical techniques, 
reported a positive signal of 1.6 ±0.4 SNU (Davis, 1978) later 
to be revised to 2.2 ± 0.4 SNU.
With the theoretical prediction and experimental result
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drawing closer together, arguments once more arose as to whether
or not there was a discrepancy and how serious it was. Bahcall,
for instance, firmly adhered to the view that there was a serious
discrepancy. When discussing the theoretical interpretation of
60Davis s;xesult at the Brookhaven conference, he remarked.
...what we conclude is that we are in trouble; the standard 
theory is wrong ; it's wrong becauslB.it predicts too large 
a boron-8 flux.
However, other scientists thought otherwise. For instance, one
respondent, whom.1 interviewed in 1978, told me:
The accumulating data...is no longer entirely out of 
line with the theoretical predictions.
Thus, a decade after the first comparisons between theory 
arid experiment were made, we seem to have come full circle with 
arguments once more appearing as to the significance of the dis- ' 
crepancy* These new arguments would seem to be linked with.the 
attempts to get new solar-neutrino experiments underway (and to 
get funding for them). As was mentioned above, the argument made 
by Bahcall in favour of such experiments depended on the crisis 
over the interpretation of the Davis experiment. If the crisis 
disappeared, then much of the rationale for carrying out new 
experiments might also disappear. Clearly, with the huge 
investment which these new experiments require, a lot hangs on 
the present theoretical interpretation of the Davis experiment.
The current (as of 1978) arguments over the existence or 
not of a discrepancy and, in particular, certain statistical 
arguments used to assess the degree of discrepancy, are discussed 
in their own right in a paper presented in the Appendix (Pinch, 
1980a) . The material presented there adds weight to the 
argument of this chapter that 'contradiction' and 'consistency'
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are to be seen as being socially constructed.
Interestingly enough, since 1978, the theoretical prediction 
has again been revised. In their latest publication (Bahcall, Lubow e^ al. 
1980) Bahcall and his associates have indicated that further modi­
fications to the opacity calculations and to some of the nuclear- 
physics data have raised the predicted detection rate to 7.5 ± 1.5 SNU. 
This latest widening of the discrepancy, can be seen to have made 
the arguments for new experiments (and their funding) even more 
compelling. These latest developments are discussed briefly in 
the paper in the Appendix.But it is clear that negotiations are 
still in progress!-
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT
1. For instance, in a letter to Fowler (August 11, 1967), in 
which his initial measurement is reported, Davis wrote;
'This limit is quite low, but according to the latest 
opus from Bahcall and Shaviv the B® flux is 1.4 (1 ± 0.6)
X 10^ cm“2sec~^.' Also, in the first public discussion 
of the result Goldhaber (see below) cited Bahcall and 
Shaviv (1967) as giving predictions of <))g8 = 1.4 (1 ± 0.6)
X 10^ cm“^sec~^ and Z<l>o = 1.9 (1 ± 0.6) x lO'^S sec"^.
The original Bahcall and Shaviv paper was not received by 
The Astrophysical Journal until August 10, 1967. Since 
Bahcall had been in touch with Davis by telephone throughout 
August and probably had the first indications of a low 
result at the beginning of August, it could even be argued 
that the Bahcall and Shaviv 1967 prediction was made in 
the knowledge of Davis's low result. However, although 
logistically possible, this seems to be unlikely as the 
Bahcall and Shaviv paper was probably in its final form 
some time before it was submitted for publication (allowing 
for typing delays etc.).
The paper was not finally published until July 1968 having 
had a minor revision in January 1968 which led to the 
fractionally smaller prediction of (j)g8 = 1.3 (1 ± 0.6)
X 10^cm“2sec” .̂ (It is not clear what the cause of this 
revision was).
Bahcall was anxious for an earlier publication date. For 
instance he wrote to Chandrasekhar (the Editor of The 
Astrophysical Journal) on November 8, 1967 and urged him 
to publish the paper earlier. He wrote:
As you may have heard on the grapevine, the experiment 
which motivated these calculations is now essentially 
completed and comparisons with our theoretical cal­
culations have already been used in summarizing the 
implications of the experimental results [mentions.. 
Goldhaber's talk in Japan]...Under the circumstances 
I would very much appreciate it if you could check 
to see if an earlier publication date for our paper 
is possible.
It seems an earlier publication date was not possible and 
thus Bahcall was faced with the prospect that his prediction 
made in August 1967 would not appear in the scientific 
literature until a year after the experimental result was 
known. By the time the Bahcall and Shaviv paper appeared, 
the theoretical prediction had been drastically revised 
(see below).
2. M. Goldhaber, 'Introductory Talk, II: Nuclear Physics - Where 
do we Stand?', p. 21. Undated paper, given sometime in 
September 1967 at an international nuclear physics conference 
in Japan. Copies of this paper are available from M. Goldhaber, 
Brookhaven National Laboratory.
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3. For instance, it is stressed in Davis, Harmer and Hoffman 
(1968), Bahcall, Bahcall and Shaviv (1968) and Fowler (1969).
Also, in a letter drawing the attention of the: AEC to the 
Davis result, it was claimed:
The full significance of their measurements is being 
evaluated but they can state definitely that less than 
9% of the sun's energy is produced by the carbon 
nitrogen cycle.
Letter, C. Goodman to J. Conway, and E. Bauser, AEC, May 31,1968.
It is interesting to note that the failure of the experiment 
to detect the CNO neutrinos is often put forward as a straight 
forward success of the experiment. However, it does seem to 
beg the question to claim any successes for an experiment 
which has failed to find the expected pp-chain neutrinos.
After all if the explanation of this failure lies in some 
exotic property of neutrinos or something being fundamentally 
wrong in the fusion reactions, then the failure to detect 
neutrinos may not have any great significance.for whether 
the CNO-cycle is in operation or not. However, as we shall 
see, Bahcall and Fowler at this time were still not convinced 
that the experiment was iniconflict with any aspect of their 
prediction.
4. Letter, R. Davis to W. Fowler, August 11, 1967.
5. Letter, R. Davis to H. Barschall, The American Physical
Society, November 6, 1967.
6. Letter, R. Davis to A. Wolfendale, December 1, 1967.
7. Davis had claimed in 1964 (see Chapter 3) that he would be
able to look a factor of ten below what the theorists pre­
dicted at the time (40 SNU). In fact, this turned out to be 
rather an optimistic claim because in 1967 he was only able 
to set an upper limit of 3 SNU. He did not achieve increased 
sensitivity until the introduction of the pulse-rise 
facility in 1970.
8. Bahcall had written to Chandrasekhar in November 'the 
experiment...is now essentially completed', op. cit., note 1.
9. As Davis reported to Fowler in his letter of August 1, 'I 
have, of course had many telephone conversations with John', 
op. cit., note 1.
10. Handwritten letter, J. Bahcall to R. Davis. Unfortunately 
this letter is undated but from other information in the 
letter it is possible to impute that it was written sometime 
in December or January.
11. This paper was definitely not written earlier because Davis, 
who received all of Bahcall's papers as soon as they were 
written, did not receive a copy until January 1968. For 
instance, Davis's letter to Bahcall of January 29, 1968, commences, 
'I have looked over your latest reprint...'
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12. Of course, as Davis had not yet officially published his 
result the Caltech group may not have wanted to pre-empt 
him. But Davis's preliminary result was already in the 
literature (C & EN, September 25, 1957, 13 - 14); and often 
theorists quoteJprivate ccanmunications of experimental 
results. It seems unlikely that any deliberate deception 
was implied here as many people must have known already 
that Davis's results were available and such a deceit would
have been obvious to them. It was more a question of
'understatement' than deception.
13. Letter, W. Fowler to R. Dodson, July 31, 1964.
14. Letter, R. Davis to P. Parker, December 7, 1967.
15. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, January 29, 1968.
16. Letter, R. Davis to J. Bahcall, December 8, 1967.
17. This is used in the V.A. theory of weak interactions.
18. Although Bahcall's preference for the new measurement has 
not to my knowledge been questioned, the neutron half-life 
seems to be fcir from being settled. For instance,
V.L. Telegdi has recently referred to the 'controversy 
concerning the different values of the neutron life time.'
(see V.L. Telegdi, 'Summary', in Till Van Egidy (ed.).
Fundamental Physics with Reactor Neutrons and Neutrinos,
Bristol; Institute of Physics, 1978, 169-174). This 
controversy seems to have stemmed from new measurements 
made in 1978. For a discussion of these measurements
and the most recent results see, J. Byrne, J. Morse,
I.F. Smith, F. Shaikh, K. Green, and G.L. Greene, 'A New 
Measurement of the Neutron Lifetime'. Physics Letters, 92B,
1980, 274-278. This latest measurement, which leads to a 
slighUy increased neutrino flux, is the value used in 
Bahcall's latest prediction (Bahcall et al., 1980).
19. This seminar was held sometime in November and is referred 
to in: 'Neutrino Flux from Sun is Lower than Expected',
Physics Today, March 1968, 73.
20. Ibid.
21. E. Edelson, 'The Puzzle of the Missing Neutrinos', New Scientist, 
February 29, 1968, 472.
22. Op. cit., note 10.
23. Letter, R. Davis to H. Bethe, April 5, 1968.
24. Letter, J. Bahcall to H. Bethe, April 4, 1968. Bethe wrote
back to Bahcall on April 9, 1968, and commented: 'It is
a great comfort that there isfto irreconcilable contradiction 
between theory and experiment as yet'.
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25. Reeves seems to have played no further active part since 
there are no comments of his to be found in the correspondence 
files to which I was given access and he did not publish 
again on solar neutrinos.
26. Fowler (1969: 359). Fowler's attitude seems, however, to have 
been slightly contradictory because in a section of his 
review entitled 'Afterthoughts' he wrote that 'The observational 
results thus seem definitely lower than the lowest predicted 
ones' (p. 369). However, it seems that Fowler, like Bahcall, 
was not greatly concerned about any discrepancy because he 
shared Bahcall's misgivings about the uncertainty in
27. Ibid, p. 369.
28. Letter, R. Sears to R. Davis, May 9, 1968. We should perhaps 
be wary in interpreting Sears explicit agreement with 
Bahcall here since he sent a copy of his letter to Bahcall 
as well.
29. The suggested mixing mechanism was 'solar spin-down'. This 
is the slowing down of the rotation of the Sun caused by the 
loss of angular momentum from the exterior layers via the 
solar wind. The turbulence set up between the differential 
rotation of the solar interior and exterior would initiate' 
the mixing.
30. Letter, A. Cameron to J. Bahcall, July 31, 1968.
31. Iben used Z rather than Z/X.
32. Letter, I. Iben to G. Trigg, August 19, 1968.
33. Anonomous referee's report, undated.
34. Letter, I. Iben to R. Davis, September 20, 1968.
35. The conflict between Iben and Bahcall seems to have been 
a puzzle to other people at the time. For instance, in 
1970, Bahcall and Sears were commissioned by the Annual 
Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics to write a review 
of the solar-neutrino field. In a letter to Sears the 
Editor noted:
I have recently been reading the papers by John 
Bahcall and Icko Iben on the solar neutrino problem, 
and I am puzzled by the discrepancies between them.
I hope these will be resolved in your review.
Letter, D. Layzer to R.L. Sears, November 18, 1970.
However, in the review (Bahcall and Sears, 1972 : 32 and 34-35)
the different approaches of Sears and Bahcall, and Iben 
are described with no attempt to evaluate the differences.
When I talked to Bahcall in 1978 he very much played down 
the controversy and talked about it as a matter of different 
philosophies.
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36. For similar ideas on contradictions being socially constructed 
see Travis (1980^) and Collins and Pinch (1982).
7 837. This is the cross-section for the reaction Li + d ^ Li + v .
38. The importance of such resonances was emphasised by the
data of Vaughn et al. (1967).
39. Ulrich had worked on solar models at Berkeley and had 
carried out some computations of neutrino fluxes (Torres- 
Peimbert, Simpson and Ulrich, 1969). Ulrich had been in 
contact with Bahcall since 1966 (Letter, R. Ulrich to J.
Bahcall, October 3, 1966)and had offered to run computations 
for him. After Shaviv left Caltech in 1967, Bahcall managed 
to get a temporary post for Ulrich at Caltech in order that 
they might collaborate. This was the first paper stemming 
from their collaboration.
7 740. The Be p and Be + e reactions compete. An increase in one
reaction rate means a decrease in the significance of the other
branch (see Fig. 2.2).
41. Bahcall's view that there was no fundamental contradiction 
because of the uncertainty in Ŝ .̂  was reiterated in a semi- 
popular article in Scientific American (Bahcall, 1969a).
It should be noted that around about this time the 
uncertainty mentioned by Bahcall et̂  al.(1968) over the value 
of S34 was resolved by new low-energy measurements made at 
Kellogg (Nagatani et al., 1969). A value slightly larger 
than the 'standard' value was found. The effect of this on 
the predicted neutrino flux (a slight increase 'u 10%) 
was counterbalanced by a modification due to theoretical 
work on non-equilibrium nuclear reactions (a slight 
decrease 'u lo%). These effects are described in Bahcall- 
(1969b).
42. Whilst at MIT, Watson shared an office with Rood (whom we 
encountered in Chapter 7).
43. This controversy concerned the interpretation of the iron 
spectrum in the Sun. Measurements made on the solar corona 
gave abundances a factor of ten larger than measurements 
made on the photosphere. Previously the corona measurements 
were regarded as unreliable, as they were considered to be 
difficult to interpret. However, new laboratory measurements 
of the transition probabilities of iron atoms at high 
temperatures indicated that the standard value was a factor 
of ten too small. (The transition probabilities are used for 
relating the intensity of tt̂ e solar iron spectra to the 
abundance). Thus the photosphere measurements turned out to 
be the unreliable ones!
44. This error is acknowledged in Bahcall and Ulrich (1971).
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CHAPTER NINE
OTHER THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE SOLAR-NEUTRINO PROBLEM
Thus far in this thesis, the theoretical predictions discussed 
have all come from the so-called 'standard' solar model. However, 
as mentioned in Chapter 8, a number of modifications to the physics 
and astrophysics which go into the standard model have been proposed. 
Such suggestions have also often included modifications to the 
standard physics of how neutrinos propagate through space and how 
they interact with the experimental target. In this chapter these 
radical theoretical ideas are considered. Firstly, the main ideas 
are briefly reviewed. Then, one particular radical theoretical 
approach is considered in some detail. It is argued that this 
approach (and, by extension, all the other non-standard theoretical 
approaches) is as scientifically plausible as the standard approach. 
Thereby, it is claimed that the standard
approach can be deconstructed. The rejection of deviant theories, 
it is argued, is to be understood as a social process.
The Main Classes of Solution
The different explanations of Davis's result which have been 
put forward tend to fall within the domains of either nuclear 
physics, astrophysics or neutrino physics. The explanations come 
across during the course of the present research are listed under 
these headings in Table 9.1. (The literature cited in Table 9.1 
refers, not only to the source of the original explanation, 
but also to further elaborations, discussions and attempted 
refutations).^ Occasionally other areas have been drawn upon.
For instance, Ruderfer (1975), has suggested that solar neutrinos 
are detected by living matter and hence are of relevance to 
parapsychology i
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TABLE 9.1. EXPLANATIONS OF THE SOLAR-NEUTRINO DISCREPANCY
(References are given after the notes to Chapter 9). 
NUCLEAR PHYSICS
3 3Low energy resonance in He +He
S in error 11




of particle velocities in error
Anomalous production of N
Ŝ .y in error 
S^^ in error
13
Fowler (1972); Fetisov and Kopysov
(1972); Barker (1972); Halbert et
(1973); Fagg et al.(197 3);
Parker et al.(1973); Dwarakanath
(1974); Fetisov and Kopysov
(1975).
Slobodrian et al.(1975); Newman 
and Fowler (1976a) ; Davies et al. 
(1977); Andreev et al. (1977).
Libby and Thomas (1969);
Salpeter (1970).
Mitalas (1973).
Clayton (197 4); Clayton, Newman 
and Talbot (1975a); Krook and 
Wu (1976).
Starbunov (1974)quoted in 
Kuchowicz (1976).





Heavy element abundance at 
surface differs from interior
Chemical Inhomogeneity
Bahcall, Bahcall and Ulrich (1969); 
Iben (1969a); Abraham and Iben 
(1971); Stothers and Ezer (1973); 
Carson et al. (1974) .
Torres-Peimbert, e^ al. (1969);
Iben (1969a); Bahcall and Ulrich
(1971).
Kuchowicz (1973); Joss (1974); 
Auman and McCrea (1976); Newman 
and Talbot (1976). ; Talbot and 
Newman (1977); Christensen- 
Dalsgaard et al. (1979).
Kuchowicz (1973); Prentice (1973, 
1976); Faulkner et al. (1975); 
Wheeler and Cameron (1975).
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ASTROPHYSICS contd.
Equation of State in error
Sun switches off
Tenç>erature Variation with time
Mixing over whole of solar life­
time
Sudden Mixing
Turbulent diffusion of He'
Magnetic Field in Sun
Rotation of Sun
Non-Orthodox Energy Transport 
Mechanisms
Black Hole in Sun
Unrealistic Solar Model 
Brans-Dicke Varying-G Cosmology 
Dirac Varying-G Cosmology
Bahcall, Bahcall and Ulrich (1969); 
Rouse (1969).
Sheldon (1969) ; Aurela (1970),
Shchepkin (1973).
Ezer and Cameron (1968); Shaviv 
and Beaudet (1968); Bahcall,
Bahcall and Ulrich (1968); Iben 
(1969b); Shaviv and Salpeter 
(1968,1971).
Fowler (1972); Dilke and Gough
(1972); Rood (1972); Ezer and 
Cameron (1972); Defouw (1973) ; 
Bochsler and Geiss (1973);
Ulrich and Rood (1973);
SchwarzschiId and Harm (1973); 
Rosenbluth and Bahcall (1973);
Ulrich (1975); Gabriel et al.
(1976).
Schatzjnan (1969) ; Bahcall and 
Ulrich (1971); Shaviv and 
Salpeter (1971).
Iben (1968, 1969a); Bahcall and 
Ulrich (1971); Abraham and Iben
(1971) ; Chitre et (1973) ;
Bartenweifer (1973); Parker
(1974) ; Snell et (1976) .
Demarque et al. (1973a,b , 1974); 
Bartenweifer (1973); Roxburgh 
(1974, 1975); Monaghcin (1974);
Rood and Ulrich (1974); Snell 
et al. (1976).
Littleton (1972); Hill et al.(1975); 
Newman and Fowler (1976b);
Beaudet et al. (1977).
Stothers and Ezer (1973);
Clayton, Newman and Talbot (1975b).
Rouse (1969, 1975).
Shaviv and Bahcall (1969).




Dilaton Theory of Non-Newtonian 
Gravity
Anisotropic Cosmology leading to 
high production of He®
Sun formed from Super Nova
Sun has half its mass added 
later
Fujimoto and Sugunato (1972).
Kocharov and Starbunov (1970); 
Abraham and Iben (1970); Mitalas
(1972).





Magnetic Moment of Neutrino
Different sorts of neutrino exist
Neutrinos lose energy in Sun
Neutrinos lose energy in space
Variation of Weak Interaction 
Constant
New Particle - Reggieum - A 
massive uncharged boson
Reverse Causality
New Version of Weak Interaction 
Theory
Gribov and Pontecorvo (1969); 
Bahcall and Frautschi (1969); De 
Graaf (1971); Parkinson and 
Vasholz (1973); Mann and 
Primakoff (1977); Bilensky and 
Pontecorvo (1976).
Bahcall et al. (1972); Hamza and 
Beck (1972); Moles and Vigier 
(1974); Davis and Ray (1975).
Cisneros (1971); Landovitz and 
Schreiber (1973); Radomski (1975); 
Kim (1976).
Pakvasa and Tennakone (1972, 1973); 
Perkins (1972).
Mikaelyan (1972); Clark and 
Pedigo (1973); Ruderfer (1974); 
Bamothy (1974); Leiter and 
Glass (1977).
Tennakone (1973); Aurela (1970). 
Finzi (1974); Shaviv (1974).
Bahcall and P^îgge (1972) as 
discussed in Trimble and Reines 
(1973).
Csonka (1970).
Ray Chaudhuri (1971a, 1971b); 
Bandyopadhyay (1972); Stothers 
and Ezer (1973).
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Given the complexity of the problem and the large number of 
input parameters involved, it is no surprise that so many solutions 
have been offered. There are too many solutions to discuss in detail 
here? however, some of the broad characteristics of the solutions 
can be identified.
The largest class of solution falls within the domain of
astrophysics and involves attempts to modify the solar model.
Because the boron-eight neutrino flux is highly temperature 
14dependent ((|)̂ 8°:T ) , any slight perturbation to the standard solar
model that will produce a small drop in the central temperature 
of the Sun, will also solve the solar-neutrino problem. The other 
major class of solutions falls within neutrino physics and involves 
the suggestion of scane property of neutrinos which prevents them 
reaching Davis's experiment in the expected number. The reason 
there are so many solutions of this type seems to stem from the 
letherial nature of the neutrino (it is thought to be massless 
and chargeless) and the consequent paucity of experimental data 
which might restrict such speculations.
Many of the solutions are simply suggestions that the current 
value of some input parameter is incorrect. For example, in the 
nuclear-physics domain, the explanations which postulate errors 
in and are of this type. If either of these cross-sections 
has been overestimated, then the predicted neutrino flux will be 
too large. Similarly, in the domain of astrophysics, if the opacity 
is actually lower than presently assumed, then this will lower
8the temperature gradient, the central temperature, and hence the B 
flux. Often explicit physical mechanisms have been postulated to 
account for errors in input parameters. For instance, in the nuclear
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3 3physics, the existence of a low-energy resonance in the He +He 
reaction would mean that the value of had been underestimated, 
and hence that the branch of the pp-chain through boron eight 
was less important. Similarly, the error in the opacity could 
have been caused by the accretion of matter on to the solar surface 
which would mean that the surface abundance (from which the opacity 
is estimated) was different from the interior abundance.
Another general type of explanation involves the postulation 
of physical processes which are not normally expected to occur 
under these conditions, or which are expected to play only a minor 
role. For instance, in the domain of nuclear physics, it has been 
suggested that boron eight is photodisintegrated in the Sun by the 
large fluxes of photons and gamma rays present. Suggestions have also 
been made that the Sun has a rapidly rotating core; large magnetic 
fields; an inhomogeneous composition; a mixed-up core; energy 
transport by acoustical waveg; and a central black hole - all 
of which, alone or in combination, could explain the lack of 
neutrinos. Similarly, in the area of neutrino physics, if neutrinos 
oscillate, decay, or have magnetic moments, then Davis could 
expect a reduced signal. Novel physical mechanisms have also 
been postulated, such as neutrino interactions with photons or 
other particles in the SUn. Even the universality of standard 
physical constants and approximations has been questioned. For 
instance, it has been suggested that the Maxwell-Boltzmann 
distribution of particle velocities, upon which the calculation 
of the nuclear reaction rates is dependent, does not apply in the 
interior of the Sun. Variations in the universal gravitation 
constant, G, and the universal weak-interaction constant, g, have 
also been suggested. Finally, some authors have postulated novel
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cosmological assumptions which have the effect of solving the 
solar-neutrino problem. For instance, Fred Hoyle has suggested 
from a cosmological basis, that half the solar mass with a diffe­
rent chemical composition has been added to the Sun at a later 
stage in its evolution.
This brief account of the different types of explanation does 
not do justice to the full complexities of the physics. Much 
more informative discussions of the physics involved in such 
explanations can be found in Kuchowicz (1976) and Rood (1978).
Despite the large number of suggestions which have emerged 
none has gained widespread acceptance as the solution to the 
solar-neutrino problem (assuming that there is such a problem). 
For instance, Bahcall, has recently written:
...there is no general agreement as to what aspect of the 
theory is most likely to be incorrect (Bahcall, 1979:227).
And Rood, in summarising his review of non-standard solar models
2at the Brookhaven conference, said:
So to summarize the status : Many things have been tried
and for various reasons none of them are very satisfying.
In such circumstances it seems that most scientists are content
to continue to use the standard model and standard assumptions
despite Davis's solar-neutrino results.
Although none of the proposed solutions has been widely
accepted there is agreement that some have been rejected. For
3 3instance, the He +He resonance solution has been tested in 
experiments and the consensus is now that it is no longer a 
vicible solution (but see Fetisov and Kopysov (1975) who still 
maintain that the e3q>erimental evidences is less than definitive) . 
The status of many of the astrophysical and neutrino-physics 
suggestions is, however, far less clear cut since such ideas can
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rarely be tested by experiment. More jListruse arguments, such 
as the degree of ad hocness of the idea, tend to be used to rule 
out such explanations.^
The Social Deconstruction of the Standard Theory
We must be careful in concluding that any suggestion has been 
rejected because it is found to be scientifically wanting. If 
we are to view scientific knowledge as being socially constructed, 
the falseness of certain solutions to the solar-neutrino problem 
is to be found in the social rather than the natural world. In 
other wordSyWe cannot say, as many solar-neutrino scienhists do, 
that certain of the solutions to the problem are manifestly 
scientifically false. To claim that an idea is false Ls to make 
a knowledge claim every bit as strong as to say that a certain 
idea is true. In the same way that in Chapter 7 we deconstructed 
the solidity of Davis's experimental claims we must also try to 
deconstruct the claim that certain theoretical ideas are patently 
false. That is to say, the sociologist must try and show the 
validity of such rejected ideas and point to the social processes 
whereby they have become discredited.
Ideally this should be done for every idea put forward to 
explain the solar-neutrino problem that has been rejected. To 
do this for every case, however, is clearly impossible in.the 
context of this thesis. Instead, what will be attempted is a 
much more limited task. It will be considered how just one of 
these explanations has been rejected. Such an analysis will 
serve to deconstruct the claims of the standard theory for, if 
it can be shown that one alternative theory is equally scienti­
fically plausible ., then the scientific standing , of the 'standard'
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theory can be seen to rest in the social rather than the natural 
world.
In the selection of a suitable illustrative case for such an 
analysis, a problem immediately arises. In previously researched 
cases of 'rejected knowledge' (e.g.,Pinch,1977; Collins, 1975; 
Collins and Pinch, 1979), the proponents of deviant ideas usually
4have been found to press home these ideas. That is, when 
challenged, they produce arguments and evidence as to why their 
approach is correct and the orthodox approach incorrect. This 
makes it relatively easy to see the scientific rationale for 
such ideas. Also, if they push hard enough the proponents 
frequently engender a controversy which makes the social processes 
involved more transparent. However, in the case of radical 
solutions to the solar-neutrino problem very few proponents are 
willing to press their ideas '.very far at all.
Many of the solutions to the solar-neutrino problem have 
been put forward in almost apologetic tones. It is as if the 
proponents do not themselves really believe such ideas. The 
ideas are often discussed in the context of 'seeing what is 
possible', and very few proponents are willing to defend their 
ideas to the hilt. As Rood commented, in his review of non­
standard models at the Brookhaven conference:^
I don't think I believe any of them, and many of the other 
people who perpetrated these models don't have any great 
fondness for them either.
This became apparent when I talked to some of the originators
of such ideas. For instance, one scientist told me:
You're presented with this result that you cam't explain 
easily. So the first reaction is, and it's a perfectly 
normal one, is exploring all possible suggestions as to how 
you can get out of it, kinda disregarding how ludicrous
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they are. I mean, in another context most of us wouldn't 
have touched these things. So I say they are kinda trash 
in the sense of normal astronomy, where you try to be 
conservative. And the idea was to try some outlandish 
things and to see just how far you can push the various 
aspects of the problem...
Pinch: Are you saying the models you propose as solutions
to this, you don't really believe them?
Yes that is true. I do not really believe in them. It is 
a matter of if I push this hypothesis to the limit, how far 
can I go?
Another respondent said:
None of us would have published these things or would have 
thought about these suggestions if there hadn't been a 
crisis in the theory of stellar evolution...If there is 
a serious problem it means that serious people, normally 
reasonably conservative in their scientific work, allow 
themselves to publish things that otherwise they would have 
probably not discussed at a cocktail party...I would describe 
the suggestion that Q and I published as 'crackpot'.
Although the ideas of what might be described as 'unen-
thusiastic proponents', could, in principle, be subject to
sociological analysis,^ it is easier to deal with radical ideas
towards which there is a degree of commitment. This is because,
in effect, the committed proponent does the sociologist's work
by showing how it is that the orthodox approach falls down and
why the radical ideas are so attractive.
The attitude of the above scientists who, although being
prepared to discuss radical ideas, were not prepared to believe
them, is understandable when we consider that most of the
scientists putting forward such ideas regularly use the standard
theory and indeed have built their scientific careers 'puzzle
solving' within the confines of the standard theory. Clearly
they will be ambivalent to ideas which serve to undermine their
'bread and butter' scientific work. Most are simply content to
obtain the publication to be gained from discussing such ideas
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without really pushing for them. One of the main phenomena
documented in %able 9.lis the vast outcropping of theoretical
publications which has been produced in response to Davis's
result. As one theoretician (Sears) perceptively remarked early
on in response to Davis's result:^
The results...are certainly exciting in the sense that the - 
negative result will produce some very positive activity in 
many people. As the old saw has it, 'No v's is good news', 
for theoreticians looking for challenges.
The phenomenon of scientists not been willing to push for their
ideas has been discussed by Bourdieu (1975), and Collins and Pinch
(1982). Since most scientists are already immersed in, and
dependent for their rewards upon, a particular knowledge culture,
they will be reluctant to mount challenges to the predominant
culture. In such a situation, scientists will often dabble in
radical ideas giving the appearance of a lack of 'authen,tic'
canmitment to the radical ideas (see Collins and Pinch, 1982,
and Chapter 10). Thus it can be expected that if there are any
ccanmitted revolutionaries, who are prepared to believe in and
push their radical ideas, these are more likely to be found on
0
the margins of orthodoxy.
This seems to be true for the solar-neutrino field. I only
encountered two respondents who were prepared to stand by their
suggested solutions to the solar-neutrino problem and both were
clearly marginal figures. One scientist was a retired cosmic-ray
experimentalist who operated from his own scientific institution
9(of biomagnetism) located at a private address. The other 
scientist worked for a commercial company (on reseairch not directly 
connected with the solar-neutrino field).It is the work of this 
second scientist - Carl Rouse - which will be considered here.
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RDuse's impact (or rather the lack of it) is particularly interesting 
since he was a contemporary of the leading theoreticians and had 
discussions with the Caltech theorists as far back as 1964. There 
are also other interesting aspects to his case. He is the only black 
scientist to be interviewed,. His case has also attracted the 
attention of at least one other sociologist^^ and has even been of 
interest to US Congressmen.^^
Rouse's Claims in 1964
Rouse's interest in stellar-evolution theory began in the
early I960's. He had obtained his doctorate at Caltech in 1956
12 13in cosmic rays and, after a short spell as an engineer, he took
a job as a physicist at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory where
he worked on hydrodynamical computer programmes for use in weapons
calculations. As part of this work. Rouse developed a very accurate
equation of state describing the behaviour of real gases in highly
ionised plasmas. An astronomer colleague at Livermore persuaded
him to use his equation of state to study pulsating stars. Rouse
constructed a stellar model and found that he could not get self-
consistent answers for this problem. He thus thought he would
check his programme by computing models for the best understood
star - the Sun. He expected this to be a simple matter. As he
informed me:
I thought I was wasting my time. I said everyone understands 
the Sun...In fact my programme did not even take time to 
print things out in a logical order, all we did was dump 
memory and looked in memory. That's how little time we 
thought was going to be involved.
He found, however, that he could not produce a model that agreed
with the temperature-density profiles of other standard models,
such as produced by Sears and Iben at Càltech. Rouse commented:
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I'll never forget. It was the September of 1963. I came 
back to my office at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory after 
one of my trials and I said to myself 'I don't think we 
understand the Sun'...And I've been working on it ever 
since.
Rouse reached this conclusion at approximately the same time
that Sears was producing the range of solar-neutrino flux*predictions
from the standard solar model which Bahcall used in arguing for
the feasibility of Davis's experiment (see Chapter 4). Indeed,
14Rouse was in correspondence with Sears at this time. Rouse
informed Sears that he was unable to construct a satisfactory 
model even when he attempted to use parameters given him by Sears.
He concluded that in order to produce a self-consistent model 
of the Sun he needed a lower central density, a higher central 
temperature and a greater abundance of helium in the core, than 
given by the standard m o d e l . T h i s  meant that, according to 
Rouse, the Sun was hot enough to produce its energy on the CNO- 
cycle. His model was described by Sears, in his letter to Rouse, 
as 'of course totally incompatible with solar models over the past 
several years'.
Whilst Rouse was concluding that the Sun was poorly under­
stood, Sears commenced his (1964) article in The Astrophysical 
Journal by writing:
Theoretical models of the internal structure of the Sun are 
no longer at the frontier of the theory of stellar structure 
and evolution. Since the recognition of the proton-proton 
chain as the major energy source, the general features of 
solar structure have become quite well established...
(Sears, 1964:477).
At the time this was being written Rouse was attempting to 
get his own results published in the same journal. As he had 
had a series of papers on the equation of state published in 
The Astrophysical Journal, he expected no problem in publishing
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an article on his solar model there too. Rouse's paper was, however,
rejected. He was given a very brief referee's comment which
read as follows:
Great advances have been made in the last few years in 
computational technique, as well as results, for stellar 
structure calculations in general and for solar models in 
particular...Unfortunately the philosophy and execution 
of the stellar model calculations in the present paper 
are highly unorthodox, somewhat arbitrary (e.g., the type of 
abundance variation assumed), and on several points less 
accurate than the standard modern methods (e.g., the use of 
mixing length theory for the outer convection zone). I 
would suggest Dr. Rouse get together with some of the 
exponents of the more orthodox modern methods (e.g..
Prof. Henyé at U.C. Berkeley or Dr s. Sears cind Iben at 
Kellogg Rad. Lab., Cal. Inst. Tech.) to combine his 
accurate equation of state with the best techniques for 
model calculations.
I strongly recommend against publication of this paper.
Rouse took great exception to this rebuttal as he felt that
he was being turned down because he did not follow the standard
approach. He,of course, knew what this approach was since he
had been in correspondence with Sears]"^ As we shall see below, as
far as Rouse was concerned there was no point in using the
standard approach since considered the standard approach
to be both arbitrary and incorrect.
He resubmitted his paper to Physical Review, but it was
again turned down. This time the Editor thought its subject
matter was more suitable for The Astrophysical Journal (from
19where, of course, it had already been rejected).
Although Rouse has managed to find other outlets for his 
work since (such as European journals),his failure in 1964 
and subsequently to get into the mainstream literature has lessened 
his impact. It would have been very dramatic (particularly with 
hindsight) if Sears and Rouse with their very different conclusions, 
had both had their articles published in the same issue of The 
Astrophysical Journal.
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Rouse has not only found it difficult to get his claims
published, but also he has found it virtually impossible to get 
21NSF funding (on which he is peculiarly dependent as he is not
at a University). Ironically, one of the criticisms of his
funding applications has been his failure to publish in the
22mainstream literature.
In order to understand the difference between Rouse's 
approach to solar-model calculations and the standard approach, 
it will be necessary to go into the construction of solar models 
at greater depths than has thus far been needed (descriptions of 
building a solar model can be found also in Chapters 4 and 8).
The Standard Approach to Solar Models and Rouse's Approach
The solar model is based upon observational parameters of 
the Sun which are coppled with theories of the Sun's physical 
structure, energy mechanisms and evolution. Certain of the 
observational parameters are known with a high degree of accuracy. 
These include the solar mass (which can be determined from the 
motion of the.planets), and the solar luminosity and radius 
(both obtained from direct observation of the solar photosphere). 
The age of the Sun is also well known (it is assumed to be the 
same age as the Earth). In addition, the heavy element to 
hydrogen ratio of the Sun, Z/X, can be determined from spectral 
observations of the photosphere. However, as we have seen in 
Chapter 8, there is some uncertainty as to the exact value of 
this ratio and it has, on occasions, been revised. The helium 
fraction of the Sun, Y, cannot be determined from direct spectral 
observations of the photosphere (despite helium having first 
been discovered in the Sun (Helios)). However, the abundance can
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be estimated from a variety of other source^ such as galactic 
objects and cosmology. But this abundance is not known accurately 
either. As we have seen (in Chapter 8), there is some disagreement 
as to whether Y is better known than Z/X. It is usually assumed 
that whichever composition parameter is chosen for the solar model 
that the present abundance is the same as the primordial abundance.
The fundamental physical processes of the Sun (hydrostatic
equilibrium between gravitational force and pressure, energy
production by hydrogen burning eind energy transport by radiation
and convection) can be described by a set of partial-differential
equations. It is the solutions of these equations with the
relevant input data which constitute the solar model. A computer
programme is necessary to solve the equations. Ideally,if an
23initial composition and distribution is assumed, and a model 
representing a star with the Sun's mass is evolved for 4.7 billion 
years (the solar age) then the model ought to be able to produce 
the observed luminosity and the radius of the present Sun. However, 
the outer convective layer of the solar envelope is considered to 
be poorly understood and the standard practice is to assume that 
such a model cannot be expected to produce the correct radius.
The correct radius is obtained only after one of either two 
adjustment procedures are followed. Either it is assumed that the 
Sun has an ideal-gas massless envelope surrounding it and the 
depth of this envelope is arbitrarily adjusted until a fit with 
the radius is achieved. Alternatively, the convective layer is 
described by a phenomenological theory, known as 'mixing-length 
theory'. This theory contains an adjustable parameter (the so- 
called 'mixing-length ratio', a) which can be arbitrarily adjusted 
to produce a match with the radius. Since the convective layer is
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thought to play a small part in energy-generation processes, it is 
considered to be acceptable practice in the standard approach to make 
an adjustment to get the correct radius.
The crucial test for the standard solar model is considered to 
be the match with the luminosity of the present Sun as the luminosity 
is more of a direct measure of the energy-generation processes. As we 
saw in Chapter 8, even the match with the luminosity cannot be achieved 
in a straightforward manner. The procedure followed is to choose 
ab initio a value of either Z/X (Sears and Bahcall) or Y (Iben), 
and to choose an arbitrary value for the other composition parameter.
A model is then computed and the luminosity produced after 4.7 billion 
years is inspected. Successive values of the arbitrary ccxnpositioh 
parameter are chosen and a succession of models computed until a 
fit with the luminosity is achieved. Provided the final value of 
the parameter that is varied lies within the acceptable observational 
range, it is assumed that the solar model has been found. It is 
this model which gives the neutrino-flux predictions by a sub-routine 
of the main programme.
It can be seen that the standard approach is not fully rigorous 
in the sense that a unique model can be derived from a given set 
of inputs. However, the composition parameters needed to make 
the model consistent with the present luminosity seem to lie in the 
range permitted by observation.
The approach Rouse adopted was to try and eliminate the free 
parameters needed to produce a self-consistent model, and, in 
particular, the parameter associated with the radius. His aim 
was to try cind produce both the observed luminosity and the 
radius. By using his own equation of state, which he claimed 
represented the Sun more accurately than the ideal-gas equation
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of state used in the standard approach, he considered that he
should be able to produce a model which, when evolved, gave the
observed radius. In other words, he refused to adopt what he
considered to be the 'fiddle* of arbitrarily adjusting parameters
to achieve a match with the radius. However, when he based his
model on composition parameters used by Sears and others he found
that he could not match both luminosity and radius. He found the
only way to achieve such a match was with a model which gave a
central temperature, density, and helium abundance different from
those commonly assumed.
To those following the conventional approach. Rouse's procedure
was considered to be hopeless because it was felt that there was
no adequate theory of convection. It was no surprise that he failed
to match radius and luminosity because this was assumed to be
impossible without assuming an adjustable massless envelope or
mixing-length theory. As one referee commented, on a later
24research proposal of Rouse's:
My conclusion is that Rouse's statement (in effect) 'that 
attempts to reproduce models found in the literature failed' 
is no surprise because if he did what he said he did there 
was no possibility of reproducing them.
Rouse, on the other hand, considered that the correct approach 
was to try and make more sophisticated physical assumptions, such 
as a real equation of state, and try and match the radius as 
well as the luminosity. As far as he was concerned, until a 
model could be found which did not require free-parameter adjust­
ments, the Sun had to be considered to be poorly understood.
As Rouse told me:
In the standard approach they wind up short of the radius 
and then they say this difference is made up of a perfect 
gas massless envelope. And what they do is essentially go
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back and fudge...Now the popular thing is so-called mixings 
length theory, where the temperature gradient is a function 
of some constant they call the mixing length. And that's 
fudged, that's a free parameter...So, Irsaid, I just don't 
believe these calculations should be done with so many free 
parameters...As a physicist coming into it I was^ppalled 
at a lot of this.
It can be seen that both sides of this argument have a certain 
plausibility. The standard procedures enabled model builders to 
produce what seemed to be workable models and hence investigate 
all the myriad problems of stellar-evolution theory. As far as 
they were concerned, there was little point in worrying about 
their failure to do something which they considered to be im­
possible anyway. On the other hand, we can easily imagine scenarios 
in which Rouse's attempt to bring more rigour and more sophisticated 
physical assumptions into solar-model calculations was seen as 
laudable. It seems very difficult to find anything mistaken 
about his approach, rather it is just that it is un-conventional.
The difficulty which the followers of the orthodox procedure 
have had in finding faults or errors in Rouse's work can be seen 
from the referees' conments which he has tended to receive. These, 
such as the one fran The Astrophysical Journal, all tend to point 
to the 'unorthodox', 'arbitrary', 'naive', or 'outdated' nature 
of his approach rather than to substantive errors.
Given Rouse's disenchantment with the standard solar model, 
the failure of Davis to detect solar neutrinos was an event of 
great significance to him. The Davis experiment had been billed 
as the definitive test of the standard model cind Rouse naturally 
took its failure as a vindication of his own approach.Rouse 
had learnt of the solar-neutrino experiment from Sears in 1963 
and he had sent profiles of his own model to Reines (whom he knew
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from his own undergraduate studies at Case) in the hope that he 
might be interested in searching for neutrino fluxes consistent 
with the model. When Davis's result became known. Rouse (1969a) 
published a short letter in Nature where he reiterated his 
arguments that the standard solar models did not correspond to 
the real Sun. According to Rouse, any agreement between Bahcall's 
prediction and Davis's result would have been by chance anyway.
After the publication of Davis's initial results. Rouse keenly
followed the progress of his work. He took issue with the reports
in Science and New Scientist (discussed in Chapter 8, Part II)
which suggested that there was no major discrepancy between theory 
25
and experiment. When Bahcall and Fowler publicly acknowledged, 
in 1972, that the Sun was not understood (see Chapter 8, Part II), 
Rouse felt this was no more than he had been saying for the 
previous ten years.
The impact of the solar-neutrino result on Rouse's work has, 
however, been somewhat diluted by his previous claims that the 
Sun operated on the CNO-cycle. If the CNO-cycle did predominate, 
then Davis was expected to detect an even larger flux than the 
conventional model p r e d i c t e d . T h u s ,  Rouse's own 1963 model 
was no better than the standard model at predicting the outcome 
of Davis's experiment. However, there is no doubt that Rouse's 
general message of 1963,that the Sun was not well understood, 
was borne out by Davis's result.
The failure of the standard model did not, however, help 
Rouse's approach to gain acceptance. It is one thing to point 
to something being wrong; it is quite another to convince others 
that your approach is any more likely to be successful. Rouse
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continued to fare badly, especially with his funding proposals 
27to the NSF. His proposals were turned down for similar reasons
to those mentioned already. Although Rouse was invited to both
the Irvine and the Brookhaven conferences, his presentations
did not draw much critical comment. There has never been any
public confrontation in the literature over his views and it
28seems that his work has met with 'implicit rejection'. As
Rouse told me himself:
I said to myself [in 1963J 'I don't think we understand 
the Sun'. And I've been working on it ever since. The 
establishment knows this but no one wants to admit it in 
public.
I asked several of the solar-model specialists I talked with
in 1978 about his work. It was clear that as far as they were
concerned his approach was too unorthodox to take seriously.
Typical comments were:
I haven't looked at his work for 7 or 8 years, so .1 am not 
sure of that...His argument was just wrong from a stellar- 
structure point of view.
Yes, Rouse is a kinda funny guy...He has a way of computing 
models that I don't think anyone else agrees with. It's 
just very strange you can't take him seriously at all.
He has been saying things like that for a long time and it's 
also true that people have not been taking very much notice 
of him. I think part of the reason for that is the content 
of some of his ideas have been a bit quacky.I mean he's 
a good scientist, but some of his ideas have pushed into the 
borders of quackery....It was more'his way of describing it 
and the timing seemed to go against the flow of contemporary 
science. I haven't looked at his stuff recently, it's old 
1960's stuff...It might be worth spending some time relooking 
at all of his papers and seeing how they look now. If I was 
more interested in the history of ideas I would do that.
I do not know his work well. I know he had, long before 
all this, differed from the majority of people in the field—  
I cannot judge the difference at all except that I have not 
seen anyone else agreeing with Rouse. I have not followed 
his more recent work in any detail. It's one of these 
very worrisome cases of possibly being unfair to somebody 
who, in a sense, is a lone wolf and deviates persistently 
from the establishment, although he has a good scientific 
background.
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When more technical objections were put to me concerning Rouse's
work, they tended to reiterate the standard view that it is hopeless
to try and produce a model which will give the solar radius. For
instance, I was told;
I've never been able to understand his approach because to 
get the radius you*have to get the convective zone and the 
convective zone has a variable value and you have a mixing- 
length parameter. And, for some reason, he has not 
recognised the existence of the mixing-length parameter 
which gives the flexibility to get the radius no matter what.
Another respondent recollected that:
Rouse would,put all this crazy stuff out, thinking you can 
use the Sun's surface as a boundary condition. Which you 
can't because there are uncertainties in convection theory 
that don't allow you to do that.
However, a more sympathetic view came from one fluid hydrodynamicist
with whom I spoke. He seemed to share scxne of Rouse's misgivings
concerning the way standard solar models were constructed, and hence
appeared less worried than most about the negative solar-neutrino
result:
You get less depressed about the failure of a theory that's 
not conpletely deductive...There are parameters and certain 
aspects of the theory when applied to stars like the Sun 
that are just empirically determined....The convective 
process...well I won't call it a theory...we have a kind of 
made up formula...a recipe...There are two arbitrary 
constants, but the Sun is sensitive to one of them and 
then you go and adjust the whole stellar-structure calculation 
by varying this constant[ mixing-length ratio^ till you 
predicted, in inverted commas, the radius of the Sun...Well 
that's a bit silly^it's not deductive.
A British scientist also had some sympathy and felt Rouse's earlier
contribution had not met with the credit it deserved:
If you look back at seme of the things he has done, it's very 
interesting actually...Some of the so-called corrections 
he has made to so-called early models, in terms of physics, 
are almost ahead of his time...It's only in the last few 
years that people like Ulrich and Bahcall bothered to do 
that sort of thing. And I think he should get some credit 
for this which he doesn't get.
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It should be said that most respondents (perhaps, being 
conscious of the racial issue) were at pains to stress to me that 
they thought Rouse was a 'nice guy'. There was also general agreement 
as to the quality of Rouse's scientific pedigree (PhD from Caltech) 
and his early work on the equation of state. However , despite 
these positive attributes, his work on solar models has almost 
universally been ignored.
Rouse's work seems to have been rejected, not so much because 
it gave different results to the orthodox models, but rather because 
it challenged the whole basis on which stellar-evolution computations 
were carried out. Because he made such radically different assump­
tions concerning the constraints on a viable solar model, most 
scientists could either not understand his approach or else rejected 
it out of hand. Furthermore, his approach tended to re-open problems 
that were considered to have been solved years before. By 1964, 
solar-model construction was a backwater of stellar-model con­
struction and most theorists were working on the latter stages of 
stellar evolution • (Recall the reluctance of Iben cind Sears to even 
work on solar models - See Chapter 4). Rouse, by calling for more 
rigorous solutions, was, in essence, challenging the whole industry 
of stellar-model construction. Since Rouse's call for more rigor 
was considered hopeless einyway, most model specialists were happy 
to get on with an activity which did seem viable, rather than chase 
'pie in the sky'.
Rouse's own marginal position (working for much of the time 
in industry without funding for this type of research), and his 
earlier failure to get into the mainstream literature meant that, 
by the time the solar-neutrino problem drew increased prominence to
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alternative theoretical approaches, he could make little headway.
Despite his failure to win acceptability, there do not seem 
to be any compelling reasons as to why Rouse's approach should be 
any less scientifically plausible than the orthodox approach.
Indeed, in terms of the standard rhetoric of scientific argument.
Rouse seems to have much going for him. He has been able to argue 
(Rouse, 1975) that his approach is more mathematically rigorous 
(because he needs fewer free parameters) and that it is more in 
tune with observations (since attempts to match the observable 
radius of the Sun). And, as indicated above, no-one has been able 
to point to factual errors in his work. Furthermore, what was 
billed as the crucial test of the standard approach - the solar- 
neutrino experiment - showed that, if anything, the standard approach 
was incorrect. Rouse had argued this before the results of the 
solar-neutrino experiment were known.
Summary
The argument of the above section has been that Rouse's 
proposed solution to the solar-neutrino problem - that the standard 
solar model is unrealistic - is an equally viable theoretical approach 
in terms of standard scientific arguments, such as the match with 
experimental data and logical consistency. Indeed, in some 
respects his approach was more scientifically rigorous than the 
orthodox approach. By showing the plausibility of Rouse's model, 
we have deconstructed the . standard model.
This points to the social construction of the standard model itself. 
The rejection of Rouse's approach (and by extension all other non­
standard approaches , to which, in principle, the same argument 
could be applied), is to be found in the social world rather than
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the natural world. The continuing success of the standard model 
in the face of its many rivals will be discussed again in 
Chapter 10.
Although the argument has been made in detail for Rouse's
approach only, to be consistent it must be applied equally across
the board. That is, the rejection of all the deviant theoretical
approaches must be considered to be a social process. If the
social-construction-of-scientific-knowledge thesis is to be pushed
to its limits, then it must be maintained that, not only are the
standard solar model and all the concomitant standard assumptions
concerning neutrino physics and nuclear physics social constructs,
but so also are all the theories and explanations referred to in
Table 9.1. Furthermore, we are not able to say that any of these
Plausible
theories are scientifically more ̂  than any other. Some of the 
consequences of this view for our picture of scientific knowledge 
will be pursued in Chapter 10.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER NINE
1. Since these solutions are taken from a broad sweep of time, 
and since the magnitude of the discrepancy between theory and 
experiment has varied over time, it is difficult to judge 
quantitatively how successful these proposals have been.
For instance, an idea which might have lowered the neutrino
flux by a sufficient amount in 1978, might not be drastic
enough for the 1980 discrepancy. Also, it should be
noted that, since there is nothing to stop different solutions
being combined together, virtually ciny magnitude of neutrino
flux desired can be predicted by taking the appropriate combination.
2. R.T. Rood, 'Review of Non-Standard Models', in Friedlander 
(1978a; 194).
3. The degree of ad hocness seems to be a singularly unconvincing 
way of ruling out such solutions. I found that there was
no agreement amongst respondents as to what counted as ad 
hocness in this context. Also, explcinations which one 
respondent would consider to be ad hoc would not be called 
ad hoc by other respondents.
4. But see Harvey's study of the local hidden-variables controversy 
(Harvey, 1980, 1981). It seems that one experimenter, having 
found a result at variance with orthodoxy, was not prepared
to even publish his result, never mind press for it.
5. Rood, op. cit., 1978, note 2, L77-8.
6. This can be carried out by using 'hypothetical' arguments
which a determined proponent might put forward. This formula 
was used by Harvey (1981), Collins (1981b) and in
Chapter 7 where Jacobs's hypothetical response to the Cl 
test of argon trapping was discussed.
7. Letter, R. Sears to R. Davis, May 9, 1968.
8. It is inevitably difficult to define marginality. In Chapter
10, it will be argued that the cohesiveness of the solar- 
neutrino field was in part due to its dominance by the Caltech 
nuclear astrophysicists. The scientists being considered 
here were both marginal in the sense that they were not part 
of the Caltech hegemony. Neither were they in any other way
in a strong institutional position - such as having a post 
at an elite N. American establishment.
9. This scientist had his own theory of how neutrino radiations
affected living matter. He told me, during the course of the 
interview, how he had smuggled a radioactive source out of a 
laboratory to keep in his house. He believed this source 
would help prolong his life! The recovery of the plausibility 
of this scientist's beliefs was considered to be beyond the 
scope of the research (this respondent did, however, seem to 
be unusually sprightly for someone of his age!)
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10. Michael J. Moravcsik, of the Institute of Theoretical Science, 
University of Oregon, who was a physicist colleague of Rouse's 
and who is now a science-policy analyst, has written to me 
concerning Rouse's work. In commenting on a paper of the 
author's (Pinch, 1981a,in Appendix II), he suggested that 'this 
part of the story [Rouse's work] is a truly "sociological" 
element in the controversy, and should eventually be investi­
gated in detail' (June 11, 1981). My decision to look at 
Rouse's work was taken in 1978 when I interviewed Rouse
and obtained conplete copies of his solar-neutrino corres­
pondence files. Moravcsik, in his letter, went on to write: 
...Carl being black and hence in some ways not the 
urban, smooth, cosmopolitan type of theorist, his 
model has been given very little attention, though 
nobody was ever able to point out anything in it that 
could be agreed on as being wrong.
As we will see in the text, I agree with Moravc ik that Rouse 
has received little attention and that nobody has been able 
to find an 'error' in his work. However, rather than attempting 
to explain his rejection in terms of his background and his
behaviour as a theorist, I argue in the text and in Chapter
10 that it is the fundamentally unorthodox procedures which 
he followed, procedures which did not promise solutions to 
the problems of stellar-evolution theory which other theorists 
could work on, which accounts for his lack of impact.
11. In 1973, Rouse wrote to three US senators in order to try
and elicit their support in the face of the continual rejection 
of his research proposals by the NSF.
12. Rouse chose an experimental project for his PhD because it
was a safer bet than a theoretical PhD that he could complete
it in time. However, he had a large mathematical component 
in his training and most of his subsequent scientific work 
has been on theoretical problems.
13. Rouse has told me that at the time he graduated it was almost
impossible for Blacks to get academic jobs at good universities.
He was offered several teaching posts in Southern (Black)
State Universities.
14. This correspondence arose via Fowler whom Rouse had contacted 
in 1963 (Rouse knew Fowler from his days at Caltech).
15. I have not been able to see a copy of Rouse's original paper
but a paper entitled 'A New Solar Model', presented to the
American Association of Physics Teachers, New York, January 
27-30, 1965 (UCRL-12120), summarises the conclusions of the 
earlier paper. Rouse wrote in this paper (p. 1):
No one really knows what the inside of the sun 
is like...
16. Letter, R. Sears to C. Rouse, February 28, 1964.
17. Anonymous referee's report, July 6, 1964.
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18. Rouse, ironically, was also in contact with Henyé at Berkeley.
19. Letter, S. Pasternack to C.Rouse, January 13, 1965.
20. Rouse haà had a number of articles on his views of stellar-
evolution theory published in the European Journal, Astronomy 
and Astrophysics, and in a series of books which he edited 
(see Rouse, 1966, 1969b,1975).
21. Rouse had five proposals to the NSF turned down between 1968 
and 1978. Rouse did, however, work on a NSF-funded project
in 1964. This research was an attempt to calculate the helium 
abundance in the photosphere, and was carried out 
at the Hulbert Centre for Space Research, Washington. This 
work, although part of his research programme of attempting 
to eliminate free parameters (such as the helium abundance)
frcm solar models - see below for details - could also be
considered a useful avenue to pursue from the point of view
of orthodox models since it might lead to a more accurate
determination of the notoriously unreliable helium abundance.
22. Rouse received this particular criticism from an NSF reviewer 
on June 6, 1972.
23. In actual fact, usually a series of half-a-dozen models are 
constructed to cover the full period of evolution.
24. NSF Review, sent to C. Rouse, June 6, 1972.
25. As might be expected. Rouse maintained that there was a 
conflict between theory and experiment. See, C.A. Rouse,
Letter to the Editor, New Scientist, August 19, 1971, 437.
Rouse's letter, criticising the reporting in Science, was 
refused publication by the Editor.
26. Two respondents told me that they rejected Rouse's work because 
his model was even more inconsistent with the Davis result 
than the standard model. However, as the standard model had 
also failed and they still believed in the standard model it 
seems questionable to reject Rouse's approach on such grounds.
Rouse probably did not help the chances of his approach being 
accepted by, at the time, enthusiastically embracing Bandyopadhyay's 
(1972) unorthodox theory of weak interactions. This theory 
predicted lower absorption-neutrino cross-sections than the 
standard theory and hence gave Rouse some grounds for hope that
the Sun might still work on the CNO-cycle. In advocating 
this radical theory. Rouse appeared to be advocating unorthodoxy 
to the power two!
27. After losing his NSF funding in 1968 (this was due to budget 
cut backs in NSF), Rouse tried again without success to obtain 
an academic post. Since 1968 he has worked as a staff scientist 
and consultant for Gulf General Atomic, San Diego.
28. This term comes from Collins and Pinch (1979). It is elaborated 
upon in Chapter 10.
360.
References for Table 9.1
Abraham, Z. and Iben, I. (1970)
'The Abundances of ^He and He in the initial Sun Implied 
by the Kocharov and Starbunov Assumption',
The Astrophysical Journal, 162, L125-L127.
Abraham, Z. and Iben, I. (1971).
'More Solar Models and Neutrino Fluxes', The Astrophysical 
Journal, 170, 157-63.
Andreev, Yu M., Bugaev, E.V. and Kopysov, Yu S. (1977).
'Solar Neutrinos and the Role of Exchange Currents in the 
pp Reaction', JETP Letters, 25, 557-60.
Auman, J.R. and McCrea, W.H. (1976).
'Solar Neutrinos and Galactic Contamination of the Sun',
Nature, 262, 560 -1.
Aurela, A.M. (1970).
'Search of Electrodynamic Radiative Corrections for Time 
Variations', Nature, 228, 985-6.
Bahcall, J.N., Bahcall, N.A. and Ulrich, R.K. (1968).
'Mixing in the Sun and Neutrino Fluxes', Astrophysical Letters, 
2, 91-5.
Bahcall, J.N., Cabibbo, N. and Yahil, A. (1972).
'Are Neutrinos Stable Particles?'
Physical Review Letters, 28, 316-18.
Bahcall, J.N. and Frautschi, S.C. (1969).
'Lepton Non-Conservation and Solar Neutrinos', Physics Letters, 
29B, 623-25.
Bahcall, J.N., Bahcall, N.A. and Ulrich, R.K. (1969).
'Sensitivity of the Solar-Neutrino Fluxes', The Astrophysical 
Journal, 156, 559-68.
Bahcall, J.N. and Ulrich, R.K. (1971).
'Solar Neutrinos III. Composition and Magnetic Field Effects 
and Related Inferences', The Astrophysical Journal, 170, 
593-603.
Bandyopadhyay, P. (1972).
'Solar Neutrinos and the Cl Neutrino Absorption Experiment', 
Journal of Physics, A, 5, L19-L23.
Barker, F.C. (1972). ^
'Solar Neutrinos and a Proposed Level in Be', Physics 
Letters, 42B, 313-14.
Barker, F.C., Spear, R.H. and Switkowski, Z.E. (1980).
'The ^Be (p,y) B Cross Section and the Solar Neutrino Problem', 




'Solar Neutrino Puzzle', Nature, 252, 666-67.
Bartenwerfer, D.(1973).
'Differential Rotation, Magnetic Fields and the Solar 
Neutrino Flux', Astronomy and Astrophysics, 25, 455-6.
Beaudet, G., Fontaine, G., Sirois, A. and Tassoul, M. (1977).
'The Solar Neutrino Problem: Limitations of Energy Transport
by Mechanical Means', Astronomy and Astrophysics, 54, 213-18.
Bilenky, S.M. and Pontecorvo, B. (1976).
'Again on Neutrino Oscillations', Nuovo Cimento Letters,
17, 569-74.
Bochsler, P. and Geiss, J. (1973).
'Solar Abundances of Light Nuclei and Mixing of the Sun', 
Solar Physics, 32, 3-11.
Carson, T.R., Ezer, D. and Stothers, R. (1974).
'Solar Neutrinos and the Influence of Radiative Opacities 
on Solar Models', The Astrophysical Journal, 194, 743-4.
Chin, Chao-Wen, and Stothers, R. (197 5).
'Solar Test of Dirac's Large Numbers Hypothesis', Nature,
254, 206-7.
Chin, Chao-wen and Stothers, R. (1976).
'Limit on the Secular Change of the Gravitational Constant 
Based on Studies of Solar Evolution', Physical Review Letters, 
36, 833-35.
Chitre, S.M., Ezer, D. and Stothers, R. (1973).
'Solar Neutrinos and a Central Magnetic Field in the Sun', 
Astrophysical Letters, 14, 37-40.
Christensen-Dalsgaard, J., Gough, D.O. and Morgan, J.G. (1979).
'Dirty Solar Models', Astronomy and Astrophysics, 73, 121-2.
Cisneros, A. (19.71) .
'Effect of Neutrino Magnetic Moment on Solar Neutrino 
Observations', Astrophysics and Space Science, 10, 87-92.
Clark, R.B. and Pedigo, R.D.C. (1973).
'Forward-Peaked ̂ -e Scattering and the Solar-Neutrino 
Problem', Physical Review, D, 8, 2261-63.
Clayton, D.D. (1974).
'Maxwellian Relative Energies and Solar Neutrinos',
Nature, 249, 131.
Clayton, D.D., Dwek, E., Newman, M.J. and Talbot, R.J. (1975a).
'Solar Models of Low Neutrino-Counting Rate; The Depleted 
Maxwellian Tail', The Astrophysical Journal, 199, 494-99.
362.
Clayton, D.D., Newman, M.J. and Talbot, R.J. (1975b).
'Solar Models of Low Neutrino-Counting Rate: The Central 
Black Hole', The Astrophysical Journal, 201, 489-93.
Csonka, P.L. (1970).
'Implication of Full Causality for Neutrino and Other 
Particle Production Rates', Physical Review,D, 2, 1923-25.
Davies, W.G., Ball, G.C., Ferguson, A.J., Forster, J.J. and Horn, D. 
(1977). 3 3
'Search for High Energy Deuterons in the He + He Reaction 
and the Solar Neutrino Problem', Physical Review Letters,
38, 1119-22.
Davis, T.M. and Ray, J.R. (1975).
'Massive Neutrinos', Physics Letters, 5lA, 199-200.
De Graaf, T. (1971).
'The Astrophysical Importance of Heavy Leptons', Nuovo 
Cimento Letters, 2, 979-84.
Defouw, R.J. (1973). 3
'Secular Stability with Departures from He Equilibrium in 
the Proton-Proton Chain? The Astrophysical Journal, 182,
983-8.
Demarque, P., Mengel, J.G. and Sweigart, A.V. (1973a).
'Rotating Solar Models with Low Neutrino Flux', The Astrophysical 
Journal, 183, 997-1004.
Démarque, P., Mengel, J.G. and Sweigart, A.V. (1973b).
'Solar Rotation and the Neutrino Flux', Nature, 246, 33-35.
Demarque, P. Mengel, J. and Sweigart, A.V. (1974).
'Oblateness of Solar Models with Rotating Cores', Nature,
252, 368.
Dilke, F.W.. and Gough, D.O. (1972) .
'The Solar Spoon', Nature, 240, 262, 293-94.
Dwarakanath, M.R. (1974).
'^He ( He,2p)4He and the Termination of the Proton-Proton 
Chain', Physical Review, C, 9, 805-8.
Ezer, D. and Cameron, A.G.W. (1968).
'Solar Spin-Down and Neutrino Fluxes', Astrophysical Letters,
1, 177-79.
Ezer, D. and Cameron, A.G.W. (1972).
'Effects of Sudden Mixing in the Solar Core on Solar Neutrinos 
and Ice Ages', Nature, 240, 180-2.
Fagg, L.W., Bendel, W.L., Enaslin, N. and Jones, E.C.Jr. (1973).
'Search for Solar-Neutrino Related Ml Transitions in ^Li Using 
180° Electron Scattering', Physics Letters, 44B, 163-64.
Faulkner, D.J., Da Costa, G.S. and Prentice, A.J.R. (1975).
'Hydrogen-Helium Inhomogeneities and the Solar Neutrino 
Problem', Monthly Notice$of the Royal Astronomical Society,
170, 589-97.
363.
Fetisov, V.N. and Kopysov, Yu S. (1972).
'Are the Solar-Neutrino Experiments Suggestive of the Existence 
of a Resonance in the ^He + ^He System?', Physics Letters,
40U, 602-4.
Fetisov, V.N. and Kopysov, Yu.S. (1975).
'Solar Neutrinos and Experiments to Search for the Hypothetical 
Level in Be', Nuclear Physics, A, 239, 511-29.
Finzi, A. (1974).
'Solar Neutrinos and the Behavior of the Fermi Coupling 
Constant', The Astrophysical Journal, 189, 157-60.
Fowler, W.A. (1972).
'What Cooks with Solar Neutrinos?', Nature, 238, 24-26.
Fujimoto, Masa-Katsu, and Sugimoto, D. (1972).
'Solar Neutrino and Dilaton Theory of Non-Newtonian Gravity', 
Progress of Theoretical Physics, 48, 705-7.
Gabriel, M., Noels, A., Scuflaire, R. and Boury, Y. (1976).
'On the Evolution of a IM star with a Periodically Mixed 
Core', Astronomy and Astrophysics, 47, 137-41.
Gribov, V. and Pontecorvo, B. (1969).
'Neutrino Astronomy aind Lepton Charge' , Physics Letters,
28B, 493-6.
Halbert, M.L., Hensley, D.C. and Bingham, H.G. (1973).
'^Li (%e,t) Reaction and the Solar Neutrino Puzzle',
Physical Review, 8, 1226-9.
Hamza, V.M. and Beck, A.E. (1972).
'Terrestrial Heat Flow, the Neutrino Problem, and a Possible 
Energy Source in the Core', Nature, 240, 343-44.
Hill, H.A., Stebbins, R.T. and Brown, T.M. (1975).
'Recent Progress in Solar Oblateness Studies', Bulletin of the 
American Astronomical Society, 7, 478.
Hoyle, F. (1975).
'A Solar Model with Low Neutrino Emission', The Astrophysical 
Journal, 197, L127-L131.
Iben, I. (1968).
'Solar Neutrinos and the Solar Helium Abundance', Physical 
Review Letters, 21, 1208-12.
Iben, I. (1969a).
'The Cl37 Solar Neutrino Experiment and the Solar Helium 
Abundance', Annals of Physics, 54, 164-203.
Iben, I. (1969b).




'Are Stellar Surface Heavy-Eleraent Abundances Systematically 
Enhanced?', The Astrophysical Journal, 191, 771-74.
Kim, J.E. (1976).
'Neutrino Magnetic Moment', Physical Review, D, 14, 3000-2.
Kocharov, G.E. and Starbunov, Yu. N. (1970).
'Concerning Thermonuclear Reactions in the Interior of the 
Sun and Solar Neutrinos', J.E.J.P. Letters, 11, 81-83.
Krook, M. and Wu, Tai Tsun (1976).
'Formation of Maxwellian Tails', Physical Review Letters,
36, 1107-9.
Kuchowicz, B. (1973).
'The Solar Neutrino Puzzle and the Question of Solar Abundances', 
Astrophysical Letters, 15, 107-8.
Kuchowicz, B. (1976) .
'Neutrinos From the Sun', Reports of Progress in Physics, 39, 
291-343.
Landovitz, L.F. and Schreiber, W.F. (1973).
'Motion of Neutrinos in Charged Matter', Physical Review 
Letters, 31, 789-92.
Leiter, D. and Glass, E.N.(1977).
'Fermion Nonminimal Coupling and the "Solar Neutrino Problem"', 
Physical Review D, 16, 3380-83.
Libby, L.M. and Thomas, F.J. (1969).
'Solar Energy Without Neutrinos: Fusion Catalysis by Quarks', 
Nature, 222, 1238-40.
Littleton, J.E., Van Horn, H.M. and Heifer, H. L. (1972).
'Processes of Energy Transport by Longitudinal Waves and 
the Problem of Solar Neutrinos', The Astrophysical Journal,
173, 677-79.
Maeder, A. (1977).
'Four Basic Solar and Stellar Tests of Cosmologies with 
Variable Past G and Macroscopic Masses', Astronomy and 
Astrophysics, 56, 359-67.
Mann, A.K. and Primakoff, H. (1977).
'Neutrino Oscillations and the Number of Neutrino Types', 
Physical Review, D, 15, 655-65.
Manuel, O.K. and Sabu, D.D. (1977).
'Strange Xenon, Extinct Superheavy Elements, and the Solar 
Neutrino Puzzle', Science, 190, 208-9.
Mikaelyan, L.A. (1972).
'What is the Penetrating Ability of the Neutrino?', J.E.T.P. 
Letters, 16, 221-22.
365
Mitalas, R. (1972). ^
'Reduction of the Solar Neutrino Flux by Primordial He 





P ration of B in the Interior of the Sun',
Moles, M. and Vigier, J.P. (1974).
'Possible Interpretation of Solar Neutrino and Mont Blanc 
Muon Experiments in Terms of Neutrino-Boson Collision',
Nuovo Cimento Letters, 9, 673-75.
Monaghan, J.J. (1974).
'Solar Neutrinos and Rotation - A Caution', Monthly Notices 
of the Royal Astronomical Society, 169, 13P-14P.
Newman, M.J. and Fowler, W.A. (1976a).
'Maximum Rate for the Proton-Proton Reaction Compatible 
with Conventional Solar Models', Physical Review Letters,
36, 895-97.
Newman, M.J. and Fowler, W.A. (1976b).
'Solar Models of Low Neutrino Counting Rate: Energy Transport 
by Processes other than Radiative Transfer', The Astrophysical 
Journal, 207, 601-4.
Newman, M.J. and Talbot, R.J. (1976).
'Solar Neutrinos and Solar Accretion of Interstellar Matter', 
Nature, 262, 559-60.
Pakvasa, S. and Tennakone, K. (1972).
'Neutrinos of Nonzero Rest Mass', Physical Review Letters,
28, 1415-18.
Pakvasa, S. and Tennakone, K. (1973).
'Neutrino Spectrum and the Solar-Neutrino Experiment', Nuovo 
Cimento Letters, 6, 675-76.
Parker, E.N. (1974).
'The Instability of Strong Magnetic Fields in Stellar 
Interiors', Astrophysics and Space Science, 31, 261-66.
Parker, P.D., Pisano, D.J., Cobem, M.G. and Marks, G.H. (1973).
'Solar Neutrino ■ Problem: No Low Energy ^He + 3ne Resonance', 
Nature, 241, 106-8.
Parkinson, M.T. and Vasholz, D.P. (1973).
'On the Possibility of Massless Particle Instability',
Physics Letters, 45B, 376-78.
Perkins, W.A. (1972).
'Effect of a Neutrino-Photon Interaction on the Solar-Neutrino 
Flux', Nuovo Cimento, 5, 672-74.
366.
Prentice, A.J.R. (1973).
'Early Inhomogeneities of Composition and the Solar Neutrino 
Problem, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, 
163, 331-35.
Prentice, A.J.R. (1976).
'Supersonic Turbulent Convection, Inhomogeneities of 
Chemical Composition, and the Solar Neutrino Problem', 
Astronomy and Astrophysics, 50, 59-70.
Radomski, M. (1975).
'Neutrino Magnetic Moment, Plasmon Cerenkov Radiation, and 
the Solar Neutrino Problem', Physical Review, D, 12, 2208-11.
Ray Chaudhuri, P. (1971a).
'The Sun, cl2/cl3 Abundance Ratio and Neutrino Emission', 
Astronomy and Space Science, 13, 231-33.
Ray Chaudhuri, P. (1971b).
'Elastic Scattering of Electrons by Solar Neutrinos and 
Weak Interaction Theories', Journal of Physics, A, 4, 
L109-L111.
Rolfs, C. (1979).
'Some Problems in Experimental Nuclear Astrophysics',
Paper presented at the International Workshop VII, at 
Hirschegg, W. Germany, January, 1979.
Rood, R.T. (1972).
'A Mixed-up Sun and Solar Neutrinos', Nature, 240, 178-80.
Rood, R.T. and Ulrich, R.K. (1974).
'Solcir Models with Rotating Cores', Nature, 252, 366-8.
Rosenbluth, M.N. and Bahcall, J.N. (197 3).
'Non-spherical Thermal Instabilities', The Astrophysical 
Journal, 184, 9-16.
Rouse, C.A. (1969).
'Interior Structure of the Sun', Nature, 224, 1009-10.
Rouse, C.A. (1975).
'A Solar Neutrino Loophole: Standard Solar Models',
Astronomy and Astrophysics, 44, 237-40.
Roxburgh, I.W. (1974).
'Internal Rotation of the Sun and the Solar Neutrino Flux', 
Nature, 248, 209-11.
Roxburgh, I.W. (1975).
'Solar Neutrinos and Solar Rotation', Monthly Notices of the 
Royal Astronomical Society, 170, 35P-36P.
Ruderfer, M. (1974).
'Neutrino Energy Loss and the Solar-Neutrino Experiment', 
Nuovo Cimento Letters, lO, 393-98.
367,
Salpeter, E.E. (1970).
'Difficulties with Fusion Catalysis by Quarks', Nature, 225, 
165-66.
Schatzraan, E. (1969).
'Turbulent Transport, Solar Lithium and Solar Neutrinos', 
Astrophysical Letters, 3, 139-40.
Schwarzschild, M. and Harm, R. (1973).
'Stability of the Sun Against Spherical Thermal Perturbations', 
The Astrophysical Journal, 184, 5-8.
Shaviv, G. (1974).
'Reduction of Solar Neutrino Flux by Variable Fermi Coupling 
Constant and High He^ Abundance', Astronomy and Astrophysics, 
35, 385-88.
Shaviv, G. and Bahcall, J.N. (1969).
'The Effect of the Brans-Dicke Cosmology on Solar Evolution 
and Neutrino Fluxes', The Astrophysical Journal, 155, 135-43.
Shaviv, G. and Beaudet, G. (1968).
'Solar Spin-Down and Neutrino Fluxes', Astrophysical Letters,
2, 17-19.
Shaviv, G. and Salpeter, E.E. (1968).
'Solar Rotation and Neutrino Flux', Physical Review Letters,
21, 1602-5.
Shaviv, G. and Sal peter, E.E. (1971) .
'Solar-Neutrino Flux and Stellar Evolution with Mixing',
The Astrophysical Journal, 165, 171-9.
Shchepkin, M.G. (1973).
'Concerning Solar Neutrinos', JETP Letters, 17, 162-5.
Sheldon, W.R. (1969).
'Possible Relation of a Null Solar Neutrino Flux to the 11 Year 
Solar Cycle', Nature, 221, 650-51.
Slobodrian, R.J., Pigeon, R. and Irshad, M. (1975^. ^
'Production of High-Energy Deuterons in the He + He 
Reaction and the Solar Neutrino Problem', Physical Review 
Letters, 35, 19-22.
Snell, R.C., Wheeler, J.C. and Wilson, J.R. (1976).
'A Solar Model with a Rotating Magnetized Core', Astrophysical 
Letters, 17, 157-61.
Stothers, R. and Ezer, D. (1973).
'Solar Neutrinos and the Influences of Opacity, Thermal 
Instability, Additional Neutrino Sources, and a Central 
Black Hole on Solar Models', Astrophysical Letters, 13, 45-48.
368.
Talbot, R.J. and Newman, M.J. (1977).
'Encounters Between Stars and Deme Interstellar Clouds', 
The Astrophysical Journal, Supplement Series, 34, 295-308.
Tennakone, K. (1973).
'Can Solar Neutrinos have Anomalous Gravitational Red- 
Shifts?', Nuovo Cimento Letters, 7, 358-60.
Torres-Peimbert, S., Simpson, E. and Ulrich, R.K. (1969).
'Studies in Stellcir Evolution VII. Solar Models', The 
Astrophysical Journal, 155, 957-64.
Trimble, V. and Reines, F. (1973).
'The Solar Neutrino Problem - A Progress (?) Report', 
Reviews of Modern Physics, 45, 1-5.
Ulrich, R.K. (1975).
'Solar Neutrinos and Variations in the Solar Luminosity', 
Science, 190, 619-24.
Ulrich, R.K. and Rood, R.T. (1973).
'Mixing in Stellar Models', Nature, 241, 1973, 111-2.
Wheeler, J.C. and Cameron, A.G.W. (1975).
'The Effect of Primordial Hydrogen/Helium Fractionation on 




CONCLUSIONS; THE SOCIAL DECONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIMENTAL 
AND THEORETICAL SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
In this chapter the findings of greatest import to the thesis 
as a whole are summarised. These findings are further developed 
in terms of both the social deconstruction and construction of 
scientific knowledge. The consequences of the 'deconstructivist' 
viewpoint for the relativistic sociology of science is discussed.
An attempt is made to show the fruitfulness of interest models
cind credibility models for understanding the social construction of
science.
Summary of Findings
In view of the breadth of material presented and the range of 
sociological topics covered, it is helpful to start by summarising 
the main points raised in each chapter. These points will be 
presented in the context of the overall goals of the social decon­
struction and construction of scientific knowledge.
In Chapter One, it was argued that research carried out within 
the relativist programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge 
needed to meet two goals. The first goal is the social deconstruction 
of scientific knowledge. That is, it has to be shown how a seemingly 
hard-and-fast fact (or theory) of the natural world can be decon­
structed such that the interpretative flexibility which resides at 
the heart of all human knowledge (i.e., socially produced knowledge) 
can be recovered. The second goal which the research must meet -
and it is upon this goal which much of the present work centres - 
is to show processes whereby scientific knowledge is socially 
constructed. In other words, we must try and show how interpretative 
flexibility vanishes from scientific knowledge such that scientists
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reach a consensus about facts (and theories) of the natural world.
It was argued that the development of solar-neutrino astronomy 
provided a suitable location for research orientated towards these 
two goals. Also, this research location provided an opportunity 
to investigate problems raised by other studies of the construction 
of scientific knowledge and of the roles played by theory and experi­
ment.
The two branches of science frcan which solar-neutrino astronomy 
emerged - neutrino-detection physics and nuclear astrophysics - were 
described in Chapter Two. Davis's long-term experimental aims - to 
detect neutrinos - and the nuclear astrophysicists' long-term 
theoretical aims - to test the theory that stars have nuclear 
energy sources - were spelt out. It is the meshing together of . 
these separate experimental and theoretical aims which sets the 
scene for subsequent developments. It was described how these 
two aims came together in 1958 when the first realistic opportunity 
arose to test nuclear-astrophysical theory by means of a solar- 
neutrino detection experiment.
In Chapter Three , events associated with the experimental 
project between 1958 cind 1964 were described. This chapter is 
an important chapter in terms of the social construction of scienti­
fic knowledge because the emergence of social processes and relation­
ships vital for the future of the project are outlined. The eventual 
social construction of the facticty of Davis's result can only be 
understood in terms of social processes dating back to this epoch 
in the history of solar-neutrino astronomy. In particular, attention 
was focussed on the crucial need to get funding for the experimental 
project. The commitment of the Caltech nuclear astrophysicists 
to the project was outlined and the processes whereby funding was
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successfully obtained, in 1964, were documented. Attention was 
drawn to the importance of publicising scientific activity as 
part of the process of getting funding. Davis's relationship 
with the theoreticians was described as an 'instrumental relationship' 
That is, Davis used the theory to further his own experimental 
ambitions.
Chapter Four, which focussed on theoretical developments between 
1958 and 1964, is important with respect to both the social con­
struction of the facticity of Davis's result and the social decon­
struction of the theoretical prediction. The instrumental attitude 
of the Caltech nuclear astrophysicists, whereby they used the 
experiment as an opportunity to further their theoretical aims, was 
outlined. As has been stressed already, it was the involvement 
and support of the theoreticians over this period which was to 
prove to be so vital in understanding Davis's later successes in 
getting his claims accepted. It was shown that, as a consequence 
of their interests, the theorists were concerned to get the 
experiment funded - and that, in turn , required them to predict 
a large signal. The prediction of this expected signal was de­
constructed by showing the interpretative flexibility in certain 
constitutive elements of the prediction. In particular, the flexi­
bility in the determination of the value of the parameter, and
the flexibility in the averaging of solar-model predictions were 
shown. The need to predict a sufficiently large signal in order 
that the experiment might be funded was, it was argued, a key factor 
in the social construction of Bahcall's prediction of 1964.
Chapter Five is, in the main, a descriptive chapter. The period 
covered took us from the funding of the experiment in 1964 until the 
successful completion of the apparatus in July 1976. The financial
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and technical problems which Davis met were described. The con­
struction over this period of three other, less-ambitious, solar- 
neutrino detectors was also outlined.
In Chapter Six, the activities of the theorists, and in 
particular Bahcall, were described as preparations were made for 
Davis's first result. It was shown that by this stage Bahcall 
had entered into a close partnership with Davis. He was for a while 
Davis's 'house theorist'. This relationship between Bahcall and 
Davis was to prove to be important for the reception of Davis's 
result. Thus, processes vital to the social construction of knowledge 
are described in this chapter. The deconstruction of the theoretical 
prediction was also furthered in this chapter by the demonstration 
of the interpretative flexibility over the certainty adduced to the 
prediction. Bahcall's increased emphasis on the uncertainty in the 
prediction, as opposed to the pre-funding emphasis on its certainty, 
can be understood as part of the processes of social construction 
of the theoretical prediction.
Chapter Seven is in two parts. In Part I, the social construction 
of Davis's result as a fact of the natural world was outlined. It 
was shown that Davis cind the other neutrino experimentalists were 
convinced of the veracity of Davis's claims almost immediately, 
but that the theorists were not finally convinced until 1978. It 
was argued that the pre-existing relationship between Davis and 
the theoreticians helped him to maintain the public credibility 
of his e:q>eriment. By an elaborate programme of experimental 
tests, Davis was eventually able to convince the theorists of the 
correctness of his results. In Part II, an attempt was made to 
deconstruct sane of the facticity of Davis's result. Attention 
was drawn to the role of replication (and, in particular, the lack
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of replications) in the acceptance of Davis's result. The arguments 
of Jacobs that the result is an artefact of the chemistry of the 
detector were described and it was shown that these arguments 
could be viewed as having some force. The rejection of Jacobs's 
arguments drew attention again to some of the processes of social 
construction (in this case, destruction) of knowledge.
Chapter Eight is also in two parts. The first part dealt 
with the immediate theoretical aftermath of Davis's result. Bahcall's 
reaction was outlined and it was shown that he attempted to accommodate 
the result within the range of the 'prediction' by modifying the 
error range and the 'best value' of the prediction. Again, the 
social deconstruction of the prediction was illustrated by a 
comparison of Bahcall's prediction in 1967 with his earlier predictions. 
It was argued that, to maintain his credibility as a theorist,
Bahcall constructed a prediction that did not conflict with the 
experiment. However, other theorists, and in particular Iben, 
questioned the degree of conflict between theory and experiment.
The interpretative flexibility in the notions of 'contradiction' 
and 'consistency' was illustrated by considering the scientific 
merits of both Bahcall's and Iben's views. Iben's failure to make 
much impact again illustrated important social processes of know­
ledge construction (destruction in this case, again). The social 
deconstruction and construction of the notions of consistency 
and conflict were further illustrated in Part II. It was argued 
that Bahcall's switch to the 'conflict thesis' by 1970 was rhetori­
cally expedient in terms of his overall scientific goals - to get 
second-generation experiments funded. The reappearance of the 
consistency/conflict debate in 1978 added weight to the attempt to 
deconstruct these terms (the current debate has been pursued in
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Pinch, 1980a, in Appendix II).
Finally, in Chapter Nine, the deconstruction of the standard 
theory (rather than the standard prediction) was attempted by 
describing the wider theoretical response to Davis's result. It 
was argued that the interpretative flexibility of the standard 
theory could be revealed by showing the scientific plausibility 
of non-standard theoretical approaches. This argument was made, 
in particular, for Rouse's non-standard theory. The rejection of 
Rouse's approach again illustrated aspects of the social construction 
(destruction) of theoretical knowledge .
Having outlined which pieces of the previous chapters are 
relevant to the social deconstruction and social construction themes,
I will now develop further these two basic themes.
The Social Deconstruction of Experimental Knowledge
At the heart of any piece of relativistic sociology of science, 
is the need to show that the production of experimental knowledge 
can be understood as a process in which the natural world plays 
a small or non-existent part. In this case, the piece of experimental 
knowledge on which attention has been focussed has been Davis's 
solar-neutrino results. The detailed argument has been made in 
Part II of Chapter 7.
The standard technique for the deconstruction of an experimental 
claim is, as outlined in Chapter 1, to locate a scientist or group 
of scientists who dispute the result that is to be deconstructed 
and then to show the plausibility of their arguments. In the event 
of failing to find such scientists, or them failing to want to press 
home their arguments, the researcher must exercise his/her own 
ingenuity and invent hypothetical arguments which serve the same 
effect.
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The deconstruction of Davis's result has not been easy to 
achieve with standard methods since he is the only experimentalist 
involved and no attempt has been made to repeat his experiment.
This lack of replication^however, can be used, in its own right, 
as a means to deconstruct the result. By a comparison with the Weber 
case, it was argued that the lack of replication in the Davis case 
pointed to the possible defeasibility of his result. That is, the 
Davis result could, in principle, have been rejected in a similar 
manner to that in which Weber's has been rejected, if replications 
had been attempted. The justifications scientists gave for their 
belief in Davis's result, despite the lack of replication, re­
vealed some of the politics of the process of replication. There 
was felt to be little benefit in attempting to repeat Davis's 
experiment. However, seme scientists, rather than acknowledging 
the lack of replication, argued that the experiment was to be or 
had already been repeated. For instance, second-generation detectors 
(such as the gallium experiment) were regarded as potential repli­
cations, and for one respondent, Davis's own tests of his procedures 
were even regarded as a replication. It seemed that what counted 
as replication was itself a matter for negotiation. This finding 
is in broad agreement with the work of Collins (1975, 1976) and 
Travis (1981).
Another front, on which the attempt to deconstruct Davis's 
result was pursued, was the more traditional means of deconstruction. 
That is, a scientist was located who, for a period anyway, con­
tested Davis's experimental claims. Although this scientist,
Jacobs, had presented the main force of his argument a few years 
earlier (1974-5), it proved possible to recapture some of his doubts
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with the use of interview material and historical documents 
(correspondence files and scientific papers). The present-day 
facticity of Davis's results was further deconstructed by 
considering how a 'hypothetical-Jacobs' could have responded to 
the Cl^^ test - the test which was found to be so convincing to 
most scientists.
The criticisms Jacobs mounted are slightly different to those
encountered in most cases where an experimental result is disputed,
in that they centre on secondary experiments performed by the main
experimenter. In some senses these secondary experiments can be
regarded as 'calibration experiments'. That is, they follow the
same basic experimental procedures as are used in the primary
experiment but use different sources to produce the effect. In this
37case the effect is the production of Ar , and, in one such
37experiment, a neutron source was used, and, in another, Ar s were 
physically placed in the tank. The conclusiveness of such experi­
ments lies in the claim that they mimic the main experiment in all 
essential details. The way Jacobs circumvented this claim was to 
make the counter claim that in some essential detail these experi­
ments were new and different. Hence their results did not serve 
necessarily to bolster those of the primary experiment. Jacobs 
argued that such experiments were not the same because he did not 
accept all the assumptions made in the secondary experiment. For 
instance, he did not accept the assumption that argon atoms behaved 
for all intents and purposes in the same way as argon ions. For 
Davis and for others who accepted the conclusions drawn from 
secondary experiments involving argon atoms, it was ceteris paribus 
that argon atoms behaved in the same way as argon ions. For
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Jacobs such a claim was questionable, especially as he had his 
own theory, which pointed to such an assumption being in doubt.
In essence, then, the argument over these secondary experiments 
is similar to the arguments over replication documented in Chapter 
1. It is just the Duhem-Quine thesis in another guise.
The above means of social deconstruction is relevant to Collins's 
(1980) argument concerning calibration. It shows that scientists 
need not necessarily be constrained by calibration experiments 
(it appears that Weber did accept certain calibrations of his 
apparatus). In principle, such experiments can be challenged in 
the same way that any experiment can be challenged. Of course, 
there comes a point, as Collins argues, at which a scientist can 
no longer plausibly refuse to accept a calibration experiment 
as reproducing the experimental technique of the primary experiment.
It is possible that Jacobs had reached such a point with the Cl^^ 
experiment. However, there is always the option that, having 
accepted such an experiment as a calibration experiment, the 
scientist can claim it was inccxnpetently performed. It thus seems 
that the general argument concerning the deconstruction of experimental 
knowledge can be extended to calibration experiments as well.
There can be little doubt, as argued in Chapter 1, that the 
task of social deconstruction would have been easier to carry out 
if contemporaneous material had been gathered. For instance, inter­
views with Bahcall in the autumn of 1957, when his scepticism of 
the experiment was at a height, and with Rood and Jacobs in 1974 
would probably have made the social deconstruction task easier.
However, the claim made here is that more traditional historical 
methods have sufficed in this case.
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Of course, Davis's experimental result is not the only one 
encountered in this work. For instance, the earlier results at 
nuclear reactors, the results of other neutrino experimentalists 
and cosmic-ray experimentalists, and the whole range of experimental 
parameters upon which the theoretical prediction of neutrino fluxes 
are based (e.g., the nuclear-physics cross-section measurements) 
are all important experimental results which bear on the development 
of solar-neutrino astronomy. The deconstruction of every one of 
these pieces of experimental evidence is possible in principle, but 
is clearly beyond the resources of the present study. Each piece 
of evidence would require as assiduous an investigation as the 
deconstruction of Davis's results has required. Upon closer in­
vestigation, perhaps scientists who contested some of the above 
experimental claims could be found. Even without going into any 
detail, in the course of the present research I often came across 
intriguing references to experimental disputes. For instance, 
the 'wrong' experiments (mentioned in Chapter 2) in favour of 
neutrino-antineutrino similarity and in favour of the four-component 
neutrino theory are, I would suggest, just the tip of an ice berg.
In general, once the analyst is alerted to the possibilities 
of the deconstruction of knowledge it is easier to see hints that 
the basis of experimental knowledge is much less robust and straight^ 
forward than is often portrayed in realist accounts. Even if the 
analyst does not get the whiff of an experimental controversy, he 
can always make the hypothetical argument - 'If someone wanted or 
cared sufficiently to contest any experimental result, then, in 
principle, they could'. This argument is not as weak as it first 
appears when we bear in mind that realists must habitually make a
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similar hypothetical argument. Noione can possibly look at every 
experimental result in detail and often scientists (and presumably 
other realists) take such results on trust. The realist reasons 
that if every case was probed in detail then no doubt the real world 
would be found to be behind every result. But this is only a hypo­
thetical argument. Of course, it would be unreasonable to ask a 
realist to show the influence of the real world in every case. 
Similarly, it is unreasonable to ask the relativist to deconstruct 
every experimental result that is encountered.
The Social Deconstruction of the Theoretical Prediction
This aspect of the research is quite novel since (to my knowledge, 
anyway), the deconstruction of a theoretical prediction (as opposed 
to the theory itself) has never before been attempted. The type of 
argument mounted has also been slightly different to that encountered 
before in the deconstruction of experimental knowledge. Because 
we are dealing here not with just one prediction, but a number 
presented over a period of time (see Fig. 1.1), it is possible to 
use the different predictions to deconstruct themselves. That is, 
a prediction produced at one time, which differs from the same pre­
diction for a different time, can be used as a means to question 
the veracity of both predictions. The assumption is that both 
predictions cannot be correct and thus they can be treated as com­
peting claims. The counterposing of such competing claims is, of 
course, the essence of attempts to deconstruct experimental knowledge. 
This approach is used throughout the sections on the theoretical 
prediction (Chapters 4, 6 and 8). For instance, Bahcall's and 
Shaviv's prediction on the eve of Davis's experiment was compared 
with Bahcall et al.'s lower prediction made after Davis's results
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became available. The implication is that, as the two predictions 
differed, in some senses this points to the interpretative flexi­
bility possible in the generation of such predictions.
The underlying assumption of the above argument is that both 
predictions are based on the same knowledge. Of course, such an 
assumption is, in the main, unrealistic, particularly for such a 
horrendously complicated calculation as a solar-neutrino flux pre­
diction. As we have seen, such a calculation is dependent idself 
on a whole variety of other experimental and theoretical inputs.
It is quite possible that these experimental inputs and sub­
theories themselves change over time. If this is the case then 
perhaps it is less remarkable that the overall prediction should 
change with time. Such a chcinge might simply reflect better and 
better experimental and theoretical knowledge.
It is arguable that something similar to this has happened 
in the solar-neutrino case - but the connection between the overall 
theoretical prediction, sub-theory and experimental inputs is not 
as straightforward as portrayed above. There is no standard way 
in which revisions and updates in sub-theory and experimental 
inputs are assessed. For instance, the experimental values them­
selves may be in dispute, in which case, it is not easy to say which 
value should be used. For example, was Bahcall correct to take 
Lambert's new value of Z, a value which Iben thought was too new 
and controversial to use in solar-model calculations (see Chapter 
8)? It seems that in general there is a built in inertia in the 
production of the predictions such that 'standard' values tend to 
be used(unless there is a good reason for a change (after all, a 
major change often requires a modification to the computer programme
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used for such calculations). Certainly, it appears there is no 
systematic way in which new experimental inputs and sub-theories 
are incorporated into the predictions. The accidental way in 
which Bahcall's attention was drawn to Lambert's new value of Z 
will be recalled (see Chapter 8). In view of this, there seems 
to be considerable room for choice and selection by the theorist 
as to which input values and sub-theories are to be used. This 
element of choice makes it very difficult to say for the pre­
dictions documented in the thesis, how much the changes in the 
prediction were 'forced' upon the theorists by experimental and 
theoretical events beyond their immediate control, and how much 
the changes were a product of particular choices of input parameters.
In view of this difficulty, no strong claim can be made for 
the deconstruction of the theoretical prediction by the comparison 
of differing predictions made at different times. Such evidence 
is a best suggestive ,and at times it is very suggestive, especially 
when the prediction changes over a very short time span (as in 1967-8)
The above reservations do not apply to a second method:! of 
deconstruction which has been followed in this work. This second, 
more conventional, method is to use disagreements between different 
theorists over the correct value of the prediction at any one time. 
For instance, the disagreement between Bahcall and Sears over 
whether the best prediction, in 1964, was Sears's model J or 
Bahcall's weighted average (see Chapter 4), is a good example of 
such a disagreement. Another example is Bahcall's and Parker's 
non-standard interpretation of the S^^ data which led them to 
favourJismaller value than normal for this parameter (again, see 
Chapter 4). As in the experimental deconstruction case, the argument
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proceeds by recovering the scientific rationality for each contending 
viewpoint. This method of social deconstruction of the theoretical 
prediction is more clear cut and is free of the problems raised by 
taking predictions at different periods of time.
The same comments, in regard to the limited number of pre­
dictions considered, as were made for the case of experimental 
deconstruction, apply here. The aspects of the theoretical pre­
dictions dealt with have only been those upon which it has been 
possible to marshal evidence. The comment made at the start of 
Chapter 4 on the paucity of evidence associated with the production 
of theoretical work is especially pertinent. The details of the deri­
vations of all the solar-neutrino predictions just are not known 
and hence it is difficult to attempt their deconstruction. It is quite 
possible that the sort of analysis attempted for some aspects of the 
theoretical prediction (such as the disagreement over averaging 
procedures and the choice of could be extended to other parts.^
Even if documentary evidence could not be found the analyst could 
always make a hypothetical argument. However, it must be said that 
to produce hypothetical theoretical arguments (and, by necessity, 
these must be quantitative arguments) of a convincing nature requires 
a far greater degree of conpetence in modem physical theory than 
the present author would presume to possess. That is why no such 
hypothetical arguments in the domain of theoretical predictions 
have been made in this work.
The Social Deconstruction of 'Consistency* and 'Contradiction*
In a way, much of the argument of the above section applies 
here as well, because it has been disputes over the details of the 
theoretical prediction, rather than the experimental result, which
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have often been at the core of the debate over whether or not the 
theory is consistent with or in< contradiction to the experiment. 
This was certainly the key issue in the disagreement between Bahcall 
and Iben (Chapter 8, Part I). Their dispute provided a good 
opportunity to deconstruct the notions of consistency and contra­
diction because their arguments were mounted at the same time, and 
hence avoid the problems of conparing pronouncements of consistency 
and contradiction made over a period of time. Consistency and 
contradiction were deconstructed by showing that Bahcall's • 
argument for consistency and Iben's argument for contradiction 
both possessed a degree of scientific plausibility. The current 
(as of 1978) controversy over whether or not there is a serious 
discrepancy between theory and experiment (Chapter 8, Part II;
Pinch, 1980a in Appendix II) is also highly relevant to the de­
construction task because the arguments again occur within the 
same time frame. This last controversy over consistency and 
conflict has a further advantage. Because the arguments have 
occurred contemporaneously with the fieldwork they provide a
rich source of data with which to demonstrate interpretative 
2flexibility. It was argued in Chapter 1 that contemporaneous 
interview data are the best for deconstructing scientific 
knowledge.
A less powerful means of deconstruction is the attempt made 
to counterpose Bahcall's views on consistency and contradiction 
at different times. For instance, in 1968 Bahcall argued for 
consistency but in 1970 he claimed a contradiction (Chapter 8, 
part II). However, the temporal element introduced by this kind of 
comparison raises problems discussed in the previous section.
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Perhaps the theory and the experiment themselves changed over time 
and this 'forced' Bahcall to change his mind? Indeed it would seem 
that Watson's work on the opacity, the new measurement of and 
Davis reporting lower results, did all combine to have this effect.
The view that contradictions can be socially negotiated has 
been suggested by Travis (1980b). Travis used examples from his 
study of the 'memory transfer' controversy to show that experimental 
evidence could be presented to be either consistent with or in 
contradiction with certain theoretical hypotheses (e.g., that 
memory transfer is mediated by RNA or proteins). The view that 
consistency and contradiction are both socially negotiated was 
also taken by Pinch and Colliiis(1979) and Collins and Pinch (1982).
By the study of arguments over the conpatibility of parapsychology 
and orthodox science, we were able to show that both the conclusions 
that the two areas were compatible and that they were incompatible 
could be legitimately defended.
The thrust of all these arguments which attempt to deconstruct 
consistency and contradiction is that logic itself cannot resolve 
scientific disputes. It seems that it cannot be decided whether 
we have a case of p or not-p because the p-ness or not-p-ness is 
itself subject to interpretative flexibility. The interpretative 
flexibility at the heart of demonstration of logical contradiction 
has been illustrated by Roger Brown in his criticism of Festinger's 
cognitive dissonance theory.^ Brown points out that the two 
statements:
Man will in the near future reach the moon
Man will not be able to leave the earth's atmosphere
are not (as Festinger claimed) contradictory. This is simply because 
'someone might figure out a way of moving the earth close to the moon
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so that we could step across without leaving our familiar atmosphere' 
(Brown, 1975: 595). Although this is implausible, it is not 
impossible. Thus, Brown showed that a paradigm case of contradiction 
is defeasible by the application of sufficient imagination. In 
principle, the willingness to be sufficiently imaginative is no 
different from the preparedness of scientists to challenge ceteris 
paribus clauses. Such challenges may seem implausible but there 
seems to be nothing in logic to prevent them from being made. Logic 
is no more a gucirantee of veracity in scientific argument than 
experiment and theory have been shown to be.
The extension of the argument concerning the socially negotiated 
character of consistency and contradiction which is taken up in 
Pinch (1980a) (in Appendix II) takes us into some new territory.
This is because much of the argument centres on a technical stati­
stical criterion (the so-called 'three-sigma' level of significance) 
with which consistency and contradiction can be assessed. The 
deconstruction of'this statistical criterion illustrates that 
statistical rules of thumb are in themselves no guarantee of 
veracity. Such criteria are shown to exhibit the interpretative 
flexibility with which we are by now familiar. The appeal to statistics 
is no more an appeal divorced of social processes than the appeal 
to experiment, theory and logic.
The conclusion to the paper presented in the Appendix (Pinch, 
1980a) is commensurate with the view argued by MacKenzie that the 
sociology of knowledge can be extended into mathematical areas, 
such as statistics. MacKenzie (1978), in his study of the con­
troversy between Yule and Pearson over the correct way to 
associate nominal variables, was able to deconstruct this area
4of statistics by showing the plausibility of each side's argument.
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The focus of MacKenzie's argument and that in Pinch (1980 a)is, 
however, different. MacKenzie deconstructed statistical theory 
as it was being developed. That is, statistics were treated as an 
object of investigation in the sociology of knowledge in the same 
way that the development of solar-neutrino physics is the object 
of attention of the present study. However, my focus on statistics 
has been on their application in physics. Thus the arguments 
documented may bear very little resemblance to the concerns of 
statistical theory.^ In that this is one of the first attempts 
to deconstruct statistics used in a modern physical science it 
is perhaps of some interest.
The Social Deconstruction of the Standard Solar Theory
The deconstruction of the theoretical prediction (discussed 
earlier) is not the same as the deconstruction of the standard 
theory itself. For instance, in the debate between Bahcall emd 
Sears over averaging procedures, it was not the standard theory 
which was at issue. They both agreed that the standard theory 
(and the concomitant standard physics) was to be used - they disagreed 
rather over the best prediction which this theory generated.
However, the standard theory itself must be deconstructed if we 
are to carry through the full aims of the relativist programme.
The deconstruction of the standard theory was attempted in 
Chapter 9. In order to deconstruct the standard theory, the now 
familiar technique of finding someone who does not support the 
standard theory and showing the plausibility of their arguments, 
was followed. The case was made specifically with reference to 
Rouse's non-standard approach to solar models. It was shown that 
scientifically it was very difficult to fault his arguments. Apart
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from the consideration of Rouse's work, some of the more general 
criticisms which can be levelled at the standard theory and the 
standard physical assumptions of nuclear physics and neutrino 
physics have been documented in Pinch (1981a) in Appendix 11.^
This paper, thus, carries the deconstruction task further.
The deconstruction of scientific theory has been shown in many 
other studies. For instance, in my earlier study (Pinch, 1977) 
of Bohm's work in quantum mechanics I attempted to deconstruct 
the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics by showing the 
plausibility of Bohm's hidden-variable interpretation. Similarly, 
Harvey's (1980, 1981) efforts to show the plausibility of local 
hidden-variable theories is a means by which the standard inter­
pretation of quantum mechanics can be deconstructed. Pickering's 
(1980) recovery of the plausibility of the colour hypothesis is 
another exemplary study in the deconstruction of scientific theory. 
Deconstruct!vism
If we are to take our concerns as 'deconstructivists' seriously, 
then at some point the picture of scientific knowledge as a whole 
which is emerging must be considered. In this final section on 
the deconstruction of scientific knowledge, I would like to use the 
theoretical response to Davis's result to illustrate some of the 
broader consequences of deconstructivism.
As pointed out in Chapter 9, Rouse's theoretical approach was 
only one of many alternatives to the standard theory. If we are 
prepared to believe that Rouse's theory is scientifically plausible, 
then we seem to be obliged to believe in every alternative to the 
standard theory and, of course, the standard theory itself. This 
might seem to leave us with a bizarre picture. In its most dramatic 
form, it means we must entertain a Sun with a central black hole
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and a Sun with no fusion reactions at all. They are both equally 
viable possibilities.
This picture does not, however, have unpalatable consequences 
as long as the distinction between the scientist's and the analyst's 
world views is drawn. A scientist must necessarily impute reality 
to only one theory in order to proceed. Hence, most scientists 
will reject all the theoretical possibilities (such as are listed 
in Table 9.1), except perhaps for the standard theory or their own 
cherished theory.  ̂ There is thus no difficulty for scientists 
because they only grant ontological status to, at most, one theory. 
There is also no difficulty for the sociologist. The above situation, 
where several alternative scientific realities must be seriously 
entertained, is no more than an extreme case of what we as decon­
struct! vists must always expect. The myriad of physical possibilities 
revealed by the theoretical reaction to Davis's result simply 
indicates the vast number of physical realities and ontologies which 
are permitted by the social construction of reality. As long as the 
sociologist treats reality as being socially constructed, there is 
no great ontological problem in different (and often seemingly 
incompatible) realities being considered possible.
In a sense, the solar-neutrino result of Davis has merely 
acted as a stimulus for scientists to exercise their collective 
imaginations and their abilities to construct reality in different 
ways. It is merely a stimulus because all these possibilities 
(and many more whidi we do not have the imagination to perceive) 
must have resided in run-of-the mill nuclear physics, astrophysics 
and neutrino physics before Davis's result was known. In other 
words, if anyone had been imaginative enough (or perhaps perverse 
enough) all these scientific possibilities could have, in principle.
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been produced before Davis's result was known.
Similarly, it can be argued that in any area of what looks 
like solid knowledge (as stellar-evolution theory appeared to be 
before the Davis result) such potentialities exist. It is just 
that most of the while such possibilities are not realised even 
to the limited extent which we have seen in this area. The theor­
etical response to Davis's result is thus very illuminating to 
the sociologist. It brings us a glimpse of the 'Pandora's Box' 
which resides behind what seems to be for most of the time solid 
reality. For instance, who would have thought before Davis's 
experiment that there was a black hole in the middle of the Sun?
If we are willing to grant the plasticity of the Sun perhaps other 
areas of seemingly hard-and-fast reality will become less immutable 
to sociological explanation.^
Thus, I would argue that the deconstructivist sociology of 
science (as proposed in Chapter Dprovides us with a self-consistent 
world view. The world view is analogous to that possessed by 
physicists (such as Heisenberg), who base their conclusions on
9the foundations of quantum mechanics. According to their view 
of quantum mechanics, reality consists of a world of potentiality 
which is only actualised by the famous 'collapse of the wave function'.
For the deconstructivist, the natural world is treated as a world 
of potentiality which may be constructed in an infinite number of 
ways. In practice, only a few of the myriad potentialities are 
actualised. Similarly, in quantum mechanics, only one state, of the 
infinite number of possible states of a system is ever observed.
The deconstructivist is in some ways like the physicist who writes
wave functions for the possible states of the system. The deconstructivist
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must show some of the possible states of reality before they are 
actualised away.
In order to understand why only some realities get constructed, 
we must now move on to the second task of relativistic sociology 
of science - the social construction of scientific knowledge. In 
other words, we need to show sane of the social processes which have 
led to reality being ascribed to, for instance, Davis's results, 
but reality being denied to, for instance. Rouse's theory.
The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
Before considering the construction of specific pieces of 
scientific knowledge encountered in this thesis, I will first 
consider the social construction of scientific knowledge more generally. 
The difficulties of producing a general account of why some knowledge 
claims in science succeed and others fail should not be underestimated. 
It is clear from the case studies that have been carried out, even 
within the narrow confines of modern physics, that the social 
processes of science are extremely conplicated. Simple answers, 
such as that the successful ideas are aligned with the dominant 
ideology, dominant class interests or powerful institutions, are 
simply not adequate. There can be little doubt that the delineation 
of the social processes of knowledge construction within today's 
scientific establishment calls for subtlety in the analysis. It 
also calls for ideas which are capable of capturing the complexity 
of the processes we wish to explain. Within the new sociology 
of scientific knowledge such ideas (as, for instance, discussed in 
Chapter 1), have tended to evolve along with the case studies. 
Unfortunately, because the theoretical categories used have tended 
to be embedded in the empirical work, they are often not easily 
generalisable.
391.
As a means of attempting to make the present study less narrow,
I will express the findings in terms of a general schema for the 
analysis of the social construction of scientific knowledge. This 
general schema, which I shall refer to as the 'interest-credibility 
model' , is a fairly ccxnplicated model of scientific activity. I 
make no apologies for this. It seems, as emphasised above, that if 
we are to do justice to the complexity of modern science, then only 
ideas which are capable of expressing a variety of social processes 
will be adequate. The 'interest-credibility model' is drawn from 
two closely aligned ways of explaining social processes in science 
which have emerged from recent work. The two areas of explanations 
are respectively, 'interest models' and 'credibility models'. I 
will discuss each in turn.
Interests and the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
Much of the interest in 'interest models' seems to have stemmed
from Barry Barnes's (1977) book Interests and the Growth of Knowledge,
and, in particular, the use to which Barnes puts .certain ideas
drawn from Habermas. The general role of interests is illustrated
by the following passage, where Barnes writes:
...knowledge has the character of a resource, communally 
exploited in the achievement of whatever interests the 
actors decide. And precisely because of this, knowledge 
is always primarily linked, in its generation and initial 
evaluation, to an interest in prediction and control.
(Barnes, 1977:16).
It is clear from Barnes's writings that the primary interest of
scientists is the instrumental interest of prediction and control.
Further illumination on the issue is to be found in Barnes's
and MacKenzie's (1979) article, 'On the Role of Interests in
Scientific Change'. They write, concerning scientists'methods of
evaluating paradigms:
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They [scientists i assess their potential as resources in 
the pursuit of instrumental interests... (Barnes and 
MacKenzie, 1979:52).
Barnes and MacKenzie also identify social interests which are closely
related to instrumental interests. They write:
The situational patterns of instrumental interests...are 
generally in turn related to a set of social interests.
Often...this set of social interests is simply part of 
the esoteric organisation of science itself...This may 
generate certain shared esoteric or social interests: 
interests in the resolution of a certain particular set 
of puzzles and problems; in the continuance-in-use of 
central techniques, competences and theoretical structures; 
in the uncovering of areas of applicability for such 
techniques, competences and structures; perhaps in the 
maintenance of the group's image as a specialism with 
notable existing achievements; certainly in the availability 
of continuing opportunity for activity and the exercise 
of skills by members of the group. (Ibid: 53).
They go on to write:
Such social interests serve to particularise the 
instrumental interests which prestructure the evaluations 
of the group....(Ibid: 53).
Barnes and MacKenzie point out that instrumentally related interests,
such as those just outlined above, are not the only interests possible
and that 'more general social interests' (Ibid: 54) can also
affect scientific evaluation.
As the interest literature has developed, it seems that it
has become usual to refer to these 'more general' social interests
- interests which derive from the wider social and political arena.-
as the social interests. This certainly appears to be the way in
which Shapin uses the term in his (1979) study of the Edinburgh
phrenology debates. Likewise, MacKenzie (1978), in his study of
the Yule-Pearson controversy, identifies social interests with the
wider social and political milieu and, in particular, the changing
social structure in Britain at the time. It seems that the
instrumentally related social interests described above by Barnes
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and MacKenzie which are 'internal to science' are to be identified
inas 'cognitive' rather than social interests.
Pickering (1980) in his study of the charm-colour debate in 
particle physics also seems to use interest models in the sense 
of interests internal to science(i.e., cognitive interests).
Pickering combines the Kuhnian term'exemplar* with interests.
He writes:
An exemplar is an example for some particular group - the 
group which has established the preceding body of practice..
One can speak of the group or groups having expertise relevant 
to the articulation of some exemplar as having an 'investment' 
in that expertise, and as a corollary, as having an 'interest' 
in the deployment of their expertise in the articulation of 
the exemplar. An 'interest' then, is a particular constructive 
cognitive orientation towards the field of discourse.
(Pickering, 1980: 109).
Having shown the sorts of factors which constitute interests, 
it next has to be asked how such interests are relevant to the 
construction of scientific knowledgeClearly, if interests in 
some sense pre-determine scientific evaluation, then those knowledge 
claims which are evaluated as 'false' must fail to intersect with 
predominant interests. Unfortunately,Barnes, MacKenzie and Shapin 
do not use interests specifically to show why some knowledge claims 
succeed and others fail. Their concern has been more to understand 
scientific activity in general and in particular how interests can 
be used to explain such activity - that is they show how different 
interests are manifest in different knoweldge claims. For example, 
the scientific differences of Yule and Pearson are identified 
with the possession of different cognitive interests which ultimately 
might be linked with different social interests. Similarly, Shapin 
is concerned to identify the different social interests of 
phrenologists and professional anatomists. Pickering is more 
adventurous in this regard, in that be offers an account of the demise
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of the colour research programme. According to Pickering, the 
failure of colour is to be explained by its failure to become 
entrenched in the practices of the theoretical high energy physics 
community. In other words, the colour protagonists, unlike the 
charm protagonists, were not able to construct any exemplars which 
intersected with the interests (and practices) of other theoretical 
groups (for more discussion of this case, see Chapter 1).
The modus operandi of interest explanations for the construction 
of scientific knowledge would thus appear to be as follows. Those 
pieces of knowledge which are successful (i.e.,which beccxne con­
sensual facts or theories of the natural world) intersect with the 
presence of pre-existing interests. Conversely those knowledge 
claims which die do not intersect with any pre-existing interests, 
or at least if they do, these interests are not as powerful as 
those with which the successful claim intersects. This last 
caveat is necessary because it would seem from the writings of 
Barnes and MacKenzie (1979) on the variety of interests embodied 
in scientific practice that it is impossible to conceive of claims 
being put forward which do not interesect with any interest what­
soever. As I read Barnes and MacKenzie, interests are the essential 
goals which motivate all scientific activity. In view of the 
many possible types of interest which can be identified, it seems 
that some sort of notion of a hierarchy of interests is required if 
we are to e^lain fully why some claims are successful and others ; 
fail. Although advocates of interest approaches do not specify 
explicitly what this hierarchy consists of, it would seem that narrow 
instrumental interests , as produced by the over-riding interest in 
prediction and control, are probably the predominant interests in
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modem science. Pickering's account of the demise of colour, 
tjius translated, should perhaps be that the colour protagonists 
were not able to intersect successfully with the predominant 
interests of other theoretical groups in prediction and control, 
such interests being embodied in the different pre-existing theore­
tical practices.
Given the above (brief and no-doubt over-simplified) account
12of what is meant by 'interest explanations' we next need to 
ask how such explanations fit in with the concerns of the present 
work. The first point to be made is that the wider meaning of 
interest as 'social interest' (an interest reflecting political 
and social processes which arise outside of the scientific communityX 
is not relevant to the present focus on processes internal to science. 
The term 'social interest' is perhaps most suitable for the goals 
of the third stage of the relativist programme - the demonstration 
of the impact of wider social and political processes on the content 
of scientific k n o w l e d g e . I n d e e d ,  those case studies which have 
found the notion of social interests most useful have all been 
located in just the sorts of areas where we might expect wider 
social and political processes to have a part to play. That is 
before the professionalism of modern science (Shapin's study of 
phrenology) and at a time of paradigm incommensurability (Barnes 
and MacKenzie on the Yule-Pearson controversy).
The narrower meaning of interest as 'cognitive interest' would 
appear to be more promising. It is clear that many of the applications 
of interests described by Barnes and MacKenzie (1979) cover just 
the sort of scientific activities upon: which I wish to focus.
For instance, many of the activities encountered within this thesis 
fall within the category of interests which ensure the 'availability
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of continuing opportunity for activity and the exercise of skills
by members of the group' (Barnes and MacKenzie,1979:53). In the
context of the development of solar-neutrino astronomy, the pursuit
of funding by the Caltech and Davis groups can be seen as an interest
which ties in with the 'availability of continuing opportunity'.
Indeed, as has been stressed repeatedly, the pursuit of instrumental
interests by the Caltech group and by Davis lies at the heart of
their collaboration.
The interest model thus seems suited to describe some of the
activities encountered in the present research. However, before
showing its fruitfulness in more detail, I briefly want to discuss
another approach to the social construction of knowledge which also
promises to be useful. This approach is the so-called 'credibility
model', as outlined by Latour and Woolgar (1979).
Credibility and the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
Let us start by recalling part of an earlier quote taken
from the writings of Pickering. It was noted by Pickering that:
One can speak of groups [of scientists] ...as having an 
'investment' in that expertise, and as a corollary^as 
having an 'interest' in the deployment of their expertise... 
(Pickering, 1980:109).
The association of the economic term 'investment' with the notion of
'interests' has not only been made by Pickering. The seime association
has been made by Law. In a recent paper on sedimentology he writes:
Crudely, the agent is seen as constructing action by selecting, 
manipulating or transferring his resources in accordance 
with his interests. In the context of science such resources 
include knowledge acquired through scientific training, as 
well as 'reputation'. Interests are partially related to 
scientific resources. Thus, evei^thing else being equal, 
the scientist will utilise his resources to produce a return 
in.i the form of knowledge which may be exchanged for prestige, 
financial reward, or other commodities. Scientific action 
is thus structured in terms of the likely forthcoming rewards 
and the extent of prior investment in terms of given resources. 
(Law, 1980:16).
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The current interest in 'investment'notions has stemmed largely
from the study made by Latour and Woolgar (1979) of the day-to-day
14activity in a modem scientific laboratory. In order to make
sense of inter-relationships between individual scientists, groups 
of scientists, the laboratory as a whole, and other scientific 
laboratories, within the overall context of the production of 
scientific knowledge, Latour and Woolgar found it useful to intro­
duce the notion of 'cycles of credibility'. This idea stems from 
the reward system of science outlined by Hagstrom (1965) and from 
the economy of scientific authority outlined by Bourdieu (1975).^^ 
Latour and Woolgar suggest that it is 'credibility' which scientists 
invest. Such investments are made in a market in which there is a 
demand for credible information. Credibility, it seems, can take 
on different forms and individual scientists can be described as 
being caught up in a 'credibility cycle' whereby different forms of 
credibility are converted one to the other (a typical cycle is show 
in Fig. 10.1). Thus, the activity of producing scientific results 
enhances a scientist's stock of credibility. The production of 
credible results enables the scientist to get more resources, such 
as funding and equipment, which can, in turn, be converted into more 
credibility by producing yet more results. Scientists can thus be 
seen as investing their previously acquired credibility in the hopes 
of getting a return by producing credible information. In this 
view, knowledge is to be seen as a resource of previously acquired 
credibility.
If scientists are engaged in a struggle to maximise their 
credibility, then we can expect them to exploit the specialisation 
of modem science to further their investment strategies. By the 
formation of partnerships, it is possible for individuals or groups
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Fig. 10.1 (From Latour and Woolgar, 1979)
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This f igure r e p r e s e n t s  th e  c on v e r s i o n  b e t w e e n  o n e  type of capi ta l  and  
a n o t h e r  which is n e c e s s a r y  for a sc i e n t i s t  to m a k e  a move in the  
sc ient if i c field.  The d ia g ra m  sh o w s  t h a t  the  c o m p l e t e  ci rc le  is the  
ob je c t  of th e  p r e se n t  ana ys i s ,  r a the r  t h a n  any o n e  pa r t i cu la r  sec t ion .  
As with mo ne ta ry  cap i t a l ,  t h e  s ize  a n d  s p e e d  of co n v e rs io n  is the  
ma jor  cr i t er ion by which  the  ef f ic i ency of an  o p e r a t i o n  is e s t a b l i s h e d .  
It sh ou ld  be no ted  tha t  t e r m s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to  di f fe ren t  a p p r o a c h e s  
(for exa mple ,  e c o n o m i c  an d  ep i s t e m o lo g ic a l ) ,  a re  un i t ed  in th e  
p h a s e s  of a s ingle cycle.
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with quite different areas of expertise to come together to make a 
joint investment. Latour and Woolgar mention several cases where 
one group gives money and equipment to another group in the expecta­
tion that they will produce results that are of use to the first 
group. This enables both groups to boost their credibility.
One of the most attractive features of the credibility model, 
like the interest model, is that it describes the sort of activities 
central to the present concerns. For instance, scientists' attempts 
to raise funds, publish, pursue careers and enter into partnerships 
with other scientists, are all activities described within the credi­
bility model - they are also the sort? of activities described 
throughout this thesis. Given this potential fruitfulness, how 
can it help us to understand why some scientists get their knowledge 
claims accepted whilst others fail? Although Latour and Woolgar 
and Law do not consider this question directly, I would suggest 
that the modus operandi of the credibility explanation is veiry 
similar to that of the interest explanation. That is, those 
scientists who are successful are those who have acquired the largest 
amount of credibility, or have had the largest amount of credibility 
invested in them, whilst those that fail have not been able to 
accumulate sufficient credibility.
It is possible to see interest models and credibility models 
as aspects of the same general type of explanation. The focus of 
Latour and Woolgar on the internal workings of science seems ripe 
for connection with the pursuit of narrow instrumental interests 
which Barnes and MacKenzie associate with internal scientific 
activity. I suggest that we regard the credibility model as pro­
viding a detailed account of structures and processes whereby
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particular interests become manifest in scientific activity. Thus, 
the pursuit of any particular form of credibility (and remember it 
can take on many forms, such as, for example, funding and reputation) 
can be said to correspond to one of the subset of instrumental 
interests identified by Barnes and MacKenzie. In other words, 
the pursuit of a particular form of credibility is the pursuit of 
a particular cognitive interest.
This means of treating interests has the advantage of locating 
interests firmly in the practice of s c i e n t i s t s . B e c a u s e  scientists 
make investments of credibility in the hope of a future return 
there is a temporal constraint on them maintaining am interest 
until that investment is realised. And, of course, as further 
investments in the technique are made the interest grows. This 
means that interests develop along with investments of credibility 
and hence along with scientific practice itself. Without scientific
practice and activity there can be no interests. Thus, interests
are not to be viewed as abstract entities dissociated from 
scientific practice; they are defined by such practice.
One final reason why notions of investment and career consider­
ations of scientists are such a fruitful way of describing modern 
science is that scientists themselves often think explicitly in 
these terms. This was discovered by Latour and Woolgar in their 
study and my own interview data are replete with such examples 
(see, for instance, the quotes from Bahcall on p.2 03 and p.2 2 2)* 
Often respondents would talk about their work as being a good or 
bad 'investment' and assess options explicitly in terms of invest­
ments and career considerations.
In bringing together interest models and credibility models in 
the above way, I have no doubt done violence to the intentions of
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the proponents of such i d e a s . H o w e v e r ,  it seems to me that they 
can be usefully combined as a way of describing and perhaps under­
standing the details of scientific activity and as a way of attempt­
ing to explain why sane ideas meet with success and others fail.
The efficacy of the combination of interest and credibility can 
be judged fron the following sections where I attempt to account 
in more detail for the social construction (and destruction) of 
knowledge in solar-neutrino astronomy. The proof of the interest- 
credibility pudding is, as always, in the eating1 
The Social Construction of Experimental Knowledge
The main object of this section will be to try and account for 
the experimental activities described in the previous chapters and, 
in particular, to show the potential of the interest-credibility 
model as a means for understanding such activity. The culmination 
of the account will be an attempt to explain some of Davis's 
success in getting his experimental claim accepted as a fact of the 
natural world. Although the main focus will be on experimental 
activity, the involvement of the theorists and the relationship 
of Davis with them, will also be discussed. As mentioned before, 
the acceptance of Davis's result can only be understood in terms 
of this relationship. The detailed material of relevance to the 
argument has already been presented (in Chapters 2,3,5,6 and 7). 
Here, I will merely be paraphrasing some of the argument and 
expressing it in terms of the interest-credibility model.
One of the main themes of the argument made in earlier chapters 
was that Davis's research programme has throughout been orientated 
towards the narrow experimental goal of detecting neutrinos.This 
research goal can be described as his main 'interest'. This interest 
does not seem to be connected with any obvious wider 'social'
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interests. However, it can be seen to have arisen from a combination 
of other pre-existing interests. It will be recalled that Davis's 
involvement in neutrino detection commenced in the early 1950's 
when he came to Brookhaven as a chemist. Dodson, his departmental 
chairman, pressurised him into working on something nuclear - 
mainly because the Brookhaven nuclear reactor was just becoming 
available for research purposes. Davis's training as a chemist 
constituted one pre-existing interest. Dodson's interest in building 
up a group of nuclear chemists (chemists that could produce credible 
information for the large nuclear-physics group at Brookhaven, and 
in turn, exploit the physicists' facilities) was another important 
pre-existing interest.
It was frcan these combined interests that Davis commenced 
his neutrino-detection programme. Having made continual investments 
in neutrino detection throughout the 1950's, it can be seen that 
by 1956 this interest was part and parcel of Davis's professional 
identity. This interest defined the types of experiments he 
did and his involvement with such experiments defined his interest. 
However, it would seem that by 1956, Davis's career had reached 
an impasse. The major^part of his work in the 1950's had
been in the development of the chlorine-37 neutrino detector. His 
investment in this particular technique had shown some return with 
the results of the reactor experiments. He had produced credible 
information which was of some use to theorists and experimenters.
In particular, he had finally refuted the theory that the neutrino 
and antineutrino were identical, and the four-component neutrino 
theory. Both these theories were already unlikely possibilities 
and thus Davis confirmed the theorists's expectations. Also, his 
experimental result at Savannah River was useful to Reines for it
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enabled him to conclude definitely that he had observed neutrinos. 
However, having largely completed his work at nuclear reactors, 
and not having detected anything, Davis, in 1956, had to find 
another source of neutrinos to which his technique could be applied.
If he could^ not find such a source his previously acquired credi­
bility with this technique was in danger of not being put to use 
in further investments.
The only source available that he might be able to detect with 
this type of equipment was neutrinos from the Sun. Hence, it would 
seem that the only way he could further his interests was by 
mounting a solar-neutrino detection experiment. The problem 
Davis faced, however, was that it did not seem that there were 
enough detectable neutrinos to warrant the rest of the scientific 
community investing the large sums of money needed for such an 
experiment. In other words, it did not seem likely that such an 
esqperiment would produce any information which would be of use 
to anyone else; that is, it did not seem likely until 1958.
The events of 1958 were of crucial significance because
they got the theorists involved with Davis's programme. With
the new developments in nuclear physics which indicated the 
0
importance of B neutrinos in the Sun, the nuclear astrophysicists 
immediately realised that Davis's experimental plans could potent­
ially be used to confirm their theories • The nuclear astrophysicists 
goal was to test whether the energy source of stars was nuclear.
This was the assumption upon which many of the advances in stellar- 
evolution theory and theories of the origins of the elements had 
been based. Although these theories could be tested in many 
indirect ways, and they seemed to hang together as a body of 
knowledge, no direct test of the key assumption of nuclear-energy
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generation, had been possible. The direct test provided by the 
detection of solar neutrinos would thus serve to confirm a wide 
body of theory. The nuclear astrophysicists aims, to use solar- 
neutrino detection as a means of testing their theories, can be 
described as their 'interest' in the solar-neutrino project.
There is some evidence to indicate that the nuclear astro­
physicist's involvement may also have served another 'interest'/, 
namely to bolster the image of nuclear: astrophysics as a proper
'hard'science. It will be recalled that nuclear physicists such 
as Goldhaber regarded astrophysics in general as a 'loose' area 
because astrophysicists could not make the precise quantitative 
tësts familiar from other areas of physics. The precise prediction 
and test made possible by a solar-neutrino experiment could thus 
be seen as an opportunity to improve the image of astrophysics, 
and perhaps convince other 'hard nosed' scientists that it should 
be taken seriously.
Although the nuclear astrophysicists and Davis both had 
different instrumental interests in the project, these interests 
were of mutual benefit to each group. Davis would have a rationale 
for doing the experiment and nuclear astrophysicists would have a 
way of testing their theory. If a 'deal' could be struck between 
the two groups then the credibility of both groups would be enhanced. 
Davis, with the support of the nuclear astrophysicists, would stand 
more chance of getting funding for his experiment and hence the 
opportunity to further his credibility, and the nuclear astrophysicists 
would have an opportunity to test their theories - a test, which, 
if successful, would undoubtedly enhance their reputation as producers 
of credible information.
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As we saw in Chapter 3,the origins of the 'deal' lay in Fowler's
exchange of correspondence with Davis in 1958. In these letters
Fowler acknowledged Davis's abilities as an experimenter,pointed
to the importance of the experiment for the theory, and offered to
help him with getting funding. As subsequent events unfolded, the
key role of the Caltech group in getting funds for the project
became clear. Not only did they provide the predictions which
justified the experiment but they interceded directly with inportant
individuals who had a role to play in the funding decision. They also
helped publicise the experiment, which again was useful in the attempt
to get funding. Davis, in turn, kept the Caltech group informed
of his progress and he continued to strive towards showing the
e:q)erimental feasibility of the project. After the project was
funded, the theoreticians and Bahcall in particular, continued to
be closely associated with the project. Indeed, at one point
Bahcall's involvement was such that he became the 'house theorist'.
By this stage (1966), Bahcall had struck up a close relationship
with Davis. As Bahcall himself acknowledged, the carrying out
of the experiment became vital to the advancement of both their
careers. Their 'interests' and joint investments of credibility
had by now become intertwined with personal relationships and even
18psychological states of mind. Thus, between 1958 and 1967, a
successful partnership had been struck up and the nuclear astro­
physicists had invested heavily in Davis's project.
When Davis got his result in 1967, we saw that other chemists 
and neutrino-experimenters were immediately convinced that he 
was correct. This was largely because of Davis's pre-existing 
credibility - he was known after a lengthy experimental career to
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be the leading expert with this technique. The nuclear astro­
physicists, and in particular, Bahcall, were initially sceptical, 
but they did not push their scepticism into a full-blooded public 
denunciation of the experiment. As we saw, Bahcall for a time 
expressed serious worries to Davis that he was not interpreting 
the experiment correctly. The report of even lower results by 
Davis, in 1972, seemed to give fresh impetus to the nuclear astro­
physicists' worries. Several such worries were expressed informally 
to Davis at the Irvine conference. However, again, no public 
denunciation resulted. By the time Jacobs's attack appeared, in 
Nature in 1975, Davis seemed to have largely carried the day.
The reason Davis has been able to maintain his credibility 
in the face of the nuclear astrophysicists' scepticism, lies, I 
believe, in his pre-1967 partnership with the nuclear astrophysicists, 
From the very start Davis was aware of what the Caltech group 
had invested in the project and he realised that the partnership 
entailed that he should make a special effort to convince them he 
had got it right. His strategy, as we have seen, was to be 
deliberately open with the data (all his data were mailed to the 
Caltech group); to encourage nuclear astrophysicists to visit the 
e3q>eriment and 'see it for themselves'; to take seriously all the 
theorists' criticisms, no matter now bizarre they seemed; to go 
far beyond the normal call of experimental duty and test unlikely 
possibilities; to be 'cool' under pressure and not to get anta­
gonistic towards any of his critics; and, finally, to make no strong 
claims about the theoretical consequences of his result - claims 
which might upset the astrophysicists. The astrophysicists on 
their part, have, as mentioned above, not done anything publicly
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to discredit the experiment. That is to say, although they have
had reservations they have not, in general, taken any action which
might cast doubt upon Davis's credibility as an experimenter. In
short, the relationship entailed in the partnership pre-1967 has
not been broken. As Davis himself puts it:
This all started out as a kinda joint thing...and if you 
start that way you tend to leave these little boundaries 
in between. So I stayed away from forcing any strong opinions 
about solar models and they've never made much comment about 
the experiment....
The claim of the argument here is that it was the pre-existing 
interests, investments of credibility and social relationships 
which were important for the success of the experiment. If these 
interests, investments and relationships had been different then 
Davis's experiment would perhaps not be treated as seriously as 
it has been. In a way the large investments of resources (in the 
shape of expertise, time and money - i.e.,credibility) in Davis's 
experiment virtually guaranteed that the result would be taken 
seriously. This, however, does not mean that after 1967, what­
ever action Davis took did not matter. Because he found a result 
which was threaten, ing to the credibility of the theorists he had 
to fight hard to maintain his own credibility.
Davis's strategy of carrying out a programme of experimental 
tests of his apparatus - tests which he largely considered to be 
a waste of time in terms of his narrow experimental goals - illustrates 
again the importance of ritualised rationality in science (see 
Wynne, 1976 and Collins, 1981b). It was not enough for Davis simply 
to present his experimental results, he hàd to work long and hard 
to convince the theorists of his claims. A result, such as that of 
Davis, which threatens to overthrow previous investments of 
credibility, is clearly much harder to get accepted than a result
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which everyone expects. As an extreme example, it was found in the 
parapsychology study (Collins and Pinch, 1979, 1982) that the most 
trivial experiments were unquestionably and immediately accepted 
when they showed the paranormal did not exist. Such results, 
of course, fitted in with the previous credibility structure. 
Similarly, if Davis had found the result which the theorists had 
predicted, we can assume that his result would have been accepted in 
1968 and he would not have had to embark upon his lengthy programme 
of experimental tests and refinements.
The solar-neutrino case is particularly interesting in terms 
of models of the social construction of scientific knowledge because 
it seems to present a puzzle. On the face of it, we would not 
expect that a reshilt which caused so many theoretical problems 
would ever be accepted. Certainly, this is the reading to be 
got from Pickering's (1980) study. Although Davis's result might 
still lose credibility, and, as we have seen, it took a long time 
to win acceptance, it has, nevertheless, done remarkably well.
The explanation for the success which has been given (i.e., the 
importance of the partnership with the Caltech theorists) is thus 
of some interest, generally, for it is an explanation of how it 
is possible for radical innovations to occur in science. We are 
badly in need of such explanations. Of course, Davis's achievement 
may prove not to be particularly radical, as the consequences of 
his result may not be particularly great. However, it does seem that 
the first stage of any successful radical innovation in science must 
involve getting a theoretically-unexpected result accepted even if 
that result is then ignored.
In view of the complex of interests which are possible in science
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we would be wise not to claim too much for this case. It does
seem though, that if an experimenter finds a result which conflicts
with theory he stands a better chance of getting it accepted if
he has already established the backing of a powerful group of theorists.
However, it is quite possible that, even without such backing, an
experimenter might be successful. Certainly the ability to test a
theory can, in its own right, generate new interests, as Harvey (1981)
has shown. We do not yet know enough about the hierarchy of interests
in modem physics to conclude which interests are the predominant
ones. The above case is suggestive, but studies of other cases are
needed. In particular, we need to look at cases where an experimenter
produces a theoretically unexpected result and fails to get it
accepted. Perhaps the pre-existing interests, investments and
19relationships will be shown to be important there too.
The Social Construction of Theoretical Knowledge
There are two aspects of the social construction of theory 
to be considered. Firstly, there is the social construction of 
the theory itself. Secondly, there is the social construction 
of the theoretical prediction. Each aspect will be discussed in 
turn. Again, the interest-credibility model will be shown to 
be fruitful.
The social construction of the theory is in one sense a non­
issue since we do not yet know what the explanation for Davis's 
results will be (we do not even know if a special explanation 
will be needed). However, Davis's results have produced a phenomenon 
which warrants some sociological explanation. Despite his results, 
astrophysics, nuclear physics and neutrino physics go on much as 
before. Nobody has, for instance, given up stellar-evolution theory
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because of the solar-neutrino problem. The standard theory and 
concomitant physical assumptions still hold to all intents and 
purposes.
The interest-credibility model provides a straightforward 
account of this state of affairs. In view of the interests and 
investments made and still being made in the standard theory - 
investments which bring constant returns - there is no reason to 
give up. If the standard theory had reached an impasse and did 
not provide any new areas of experimental and theoretical practice, 
or puzzles could not routinely be solved, then there might be 
reason to abauidon the theory. At the moment all the astrophysicists 
I spoke with could happily earn their'bread and butter'scientific 
credibility by using the standard theory.
Ironically, Davis's results have actually enabled most respondents 
to boost their credibility. By exploring non-standard solutions but 
not placing any belief in them (see Chapter 9), respondents have 
f urthered their credibility by producing yet another scientific 
publication.
In view of the interests associated with the standard theory
it seems unlikely, at the moment, that Davis's results will lead to
theoretical chcinge. However, we would be foolish to predict that 
this will always be the case. New interests could easily arise which 
would make such an upheaval possible.
The above scenario bears close parallels with Kuhn's (1971) 
account of how anomalies (findings which do not fit in with a current 
paradigm) are treated. Such anomalies are to all intents and purposes
ignored. The interest-credibility explanation does take us a little
beyond Kuhn, however, for it gives an explanation of why anomalous
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results do not overthrow standard theory (i.e., scientists have no 
need to invest in them). Also, we have seen that the Kuhnian scenario 
is not quite correct - at least in this case. The veritable 
theoretical industry which the result generated (i.e.,the large 
number of papers offering explcinations) is not expected in Kuhn's 
account. The interest-credibility model can account for this 
phenomenon in terms of scientists being instrumentally orientated 
and thus being happy to publish a paper which they do not really 
believe in. In the Kuhnian paradigm model it is difficult to see 
why so many theoretical e:jq>lanations should be attempted.
The social construction of the theoretical prediction can also 
be understood in terms of the interest-credibility model. Indeed, 
the separation of prediction from the theory draws attention to the 
suitability of such an explanation. A prediction, unlike the theory, 
is produced in a particular context for particular purposes. The 
argument to be presented here is that the solar-neutrino predictions 
expressed the over-riding interest of the nuclear astrophysicists 
in getting a solar-neutrino experiment performed in order that they 
might test their theories. Before showing how this interest 
was manifest, let us first ask what it means to say that the 
theoretical prediction is socially constructed.
It has been pointed out several times already that the pre­
dicted neutrino flux at any time is dependent upon a number of other 
experimental and theoretical inputs. Such inputs are, of course, 
themselves socially constructed. In view of the prediction being 
derived from these socially constructed elements, cannot we then 
say that this shows that the prediction itself can be seen as a 
social construct? We can say this - but this is not a very interesting
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thing to say. For,although all the inputs are socially constructed, 
once consensus has emerged as to what each value is emd how each 
sub-theory should be constructed, then the inputs are fixed. It is 
as if Bahcall was the perfect computer who was fed all the data 
and theories, ranu the programme, and gave the one possible numerical 
answer. In this picture there certainly seems to be little room for 
interests to have any effect. Bahcall, however, as we have seen, 
was not a computer! He was a young scientist who worked long and 
hard on the predictions and who fervently campaigned to get Davis's 
experiment supported. And, when Davis got his low result it was 
Bahcall, more than anyone, who had to face the consequences. 
Furthermore, as we have also seen, the input data upon which the 
prediction was based were not in themselves fixed for all time.
Values changed and often the data (i.e., S-factors for cross-sections) 
had to be interpreted before they were fed into the prediction.
Also, there was interpretative flexibility in how the best prediction 
was to be derived from the model calculations (i.e.,disagreement 
over averaging technicjues) . In view of this, the production of a 
solar-neutrino prediction can be described as a process in which 
it is possible to exercise interpretative licence. In other words, 
the predicted flux at any time is not necessarily an immutable 
number 'forced' upon the theoretician by the natural world.
If there is such licence for the theoretician making the pre­
diction is it possible that Bahcall's interests and those of his 
colleagues in nuclear astrophysics could have had some effect on the 
generation of the prediction at any one time? It was claimed above 
that the nuclear astrophysicists could be identified as having an 
interest in getting a solar-neutrino experiment performed and 
thereby testing their theories. How might such an interest affect
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the prediction? We know that, in order to convince Goldhaber and 
others of the merits of such an experiment, a sizeable theoretical 
prediction was needed. In view of this, it seems possible that the 
theoreticians' 'interest' in getting the experiment performed could 
have led them to exercise interpretative license and produce a large 
prediction. That this may have been the case for Bahcall's 1964 
prediction was argued in the latter part of Chapter 4.
Let us extend the argument by asking how the successful funding 
of the experiment in 1964 would be likely to affect the prediction. 
Clearly, the 'interest' in getting the experiment funded is no 
longer operative. However, it will be recalled that the overall 
purpose was to test the theory. I suggest that this aspect, of 
testing the theory and hence ensuring the accuracy of the prediction, 
became the predominant theoretical interest after 1964. This interest 
was manifest in Bahcall's and others' activity in measuring parameters 
much more carefully and than before; their concern over
the uncertainty in Z; and a general emphasis on possible uncertainties 
(see Chapter 6).
Finally, we need to ask how the appearance of Davis's results 
in 1967 affected the prediction. I suggest that with the appearance 
of Davis's results the whole basis of the partnership between him 
and the nuclear astrophysicists was put in jeopardy. After all, 
the basis of the partnership was that each group should be able to 
produce credible information for the other. In particular, it now 
seemed that Bahcall's reputation for producing credible information 
was at stake (see Chapter 8, Part I). I suggest, that, in order to 
try and save some of his credibility, Bahcall immediately started 
to look for ways to lessen the impact of Davis's results. By again 
exercising interpretative license, he was able to produce lower
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predictions and also emphasise the consistency of theory and experi­
ment (see below). It is his attempt to maintain credibility that 
accounts for the dramatic fall in the prediction around about 
1967-8 (see Chapter 8, Part I and Fig. 1.1).
One last aspect of the social construction of the theoretical 
prediction should be mentioned. The recent increase in the prediction 
(see Fig. 1.1) has happened just at the time when the arguments 
over the funding of second-generation experiments has occurred.
As was pointed out in Chapter 8, Part II, a clear contradiction 
;jetween the prediction and the experiment was one of the main planks 
of Bahcall's argument for the funding of new experiments. In view 
of this, it could be said that interpretative license was once more 
being exercised in order to 'push' the predictions upwards and 
justify the new experiments.
Several caveats must be made about the above account. Firstly, 
and most importantly, the argument is not completely watertight.
As emphasised in the section on the social deconstruction of the 
theoretical prediction, restrictions on data and on the author's 
competence at making numerical computations has meant that the 
recovery of the full interpretative flexibility possible in the 
theoretical prediction for all predictions considered has not been 
possible. This means we do not know exactly what the interpretative 
license is at any one point. All that can be suggested is that 
there are some occasions when it is possible to exercise interpretative 
license. This means that we can merely point to possible trends 
(upwards or downwards) in the prediction and changes in emphasis in 
its general certainty. Questions such as,'Why did Bahcall not make 
an even larger prediction in 1964?' and 'Why did he not actually 
bring about agreement between theory and experiment in 1967, rather
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t h w  near agreement?' cannot be answered. It just is not possible 
to say what the quantitative constraints on the interpretative 
license (in terms of numerical values of the prediction) were .
Another point to be emphasised is that no implications of 
deceit or anything similarly disreputable is implied by the above 
argument. Indeed, the nuclear astrophysicists interest in bringing 
about a crucial test of their theory would be regarded in some 
circles (Popperian) as action of the highest scientific merit. 
Certainly the exercise of interpretative license is part and parcel 
of all scientific activity when it is viewed as social activity.
It should not be misconstrued as a psychological trait or something 
peculiar to Bahcall or to theorists in general.
One last point to be made concerns the detailed evidence for 
the argument. As stressed at the end of Chapter 4, the evidence 
often leaves much to be desired. I have tried, where possible, to 
use evidence from correspondence files rather than interviews since 
it seems that this particular topic is peculiarly sensitive to the 
distortions which retrospective interview data can produce. Thus, 
looking back with hindsight, it is easy to say that Bahcall's 1964 
prediction must have been exaggerated since the prediction has 
since come down. In other words, previous science is judged by 
today's science, and we know the problems this can raise. However, 
it was striking how many respondents drew my attention to the 
significance of the phenomenon of the decrease in the theoretical 
prediction over the years. Several explicitly made the point that 
pre-1964 theorists had pushed the prediction up to get the experiment 
funded and that post-1967 they had lowered the prediction to try and 
save their embarrassment.^^ One scientist made this point as part
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of a vitriolic comment on the field as a whole, but most scientists 
commented on it in the spirit of 'Here is something that will 
interest you: isn't that a bit of a laugh?' That so many
respondents viewed the developments in this way, is a source of 
encouragement that the argument here is essentially correct.
If we were talking, in this section, about only one prediction,
I do not think the argument would be convincing. However, to see 
all the changes in the predictions correlating with the interests 
over such a long period does seem to be very suggestive as to the 
social construction of the theoretical prediction.
The Social Construction of Consistency and Contradiction
In this section, I want to show very briefly how the interest- 
credibility model might account for the differing views of consistency 
and contradiction encountered. In many ways this section overlaps 
with, and is an extension of, the preceding one.
As was pointed out above, Bahcall's emphasis on consistency 
between theory and experiment in 1967-8 could be understood as part 
of his efforts to maintain his credibility within the partnership. 
Bahcall argued that there was no contradiction between theory and 
experiment because the appearance of a contradiction might seriously 
jeopardise his credibility. Although Bahcall's views were challenged 
by Iben (see below), he was largely able to maintain his credibility. 
Indeed, his award, a few years later, of the Warner Prize, and a 
Chair at the Institute for Advanced Study, would suggest that his 
credibility had, if anything,increased.
As we saw, in Chapter 8, Part I, within a few years Bahcall 
was himself arguing that there was a contradiction. Bahcall's sub- 
secpient emphasis on the 'contradiction viewpoint' is perhaps not
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unconnected with his long-term interest in getting solar-neutrino 
experiments performed (in this case, second-generation experiments). 
These experiments will undoubtedly provide further opportunities 
for him to enhance his credibility. Thus it would seem that the 
social construction of contradiction can also be explained by the 
interest-credibility model.
Although the detailed evidence for the above argument is to 
be found in Chapter 8 and Pinch (1980a) (and many of the reservations 
of the previous section apply here also), I think enough has been 
said to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the interest-credibility model 
as a means of explaining different views of contradiction and 
consistency.
The Social Destruction of Knowledge
In this final section, I would like briefly to look at the other
side of the coin to social construction - social destruction. Social
destruction is in principle similar to social construction. The only
difference is that we have to explain the social construction of
failure rather than success.
The first case of failure I would like to look at is the only
case of overt controversy encountered in the solar-neutrino field.
This was Iben's attempt, in 1967, to argue that Davis's results
were in conflict with Bahcall's prediction (see Chapter 8, Part I).
Iben, as we saw in Chapter 4, had crossed swords with Bahcall
back in 1963. He had been reluctant to let Bahcall use his stellar-
evolution programme for work on the Sun - a problem Iben considered
to be of little interest in contrast to the advanced stages of
stellar evolution. After Iben left Caltech for MIT, in 1964, he
7had had very little to do with solar neutrinos. His work on Be - 
capture, mentioned in Chapter 6, arose almost by accident. He had
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set the calculation as a problem for a class and, in the process of 
making the calculation, discovered the significance of bound- 
electron capture. Iben (interview material) told me that he was 
amused to make this discovery because it slightly reduced the 
predicted flux whilst he felt all Bahcall's work tended to push 
the flux upwards.
When, in 1967, Iben saw Bahcall going back (as he regarded it) 
on his prediction, he saw an opportunity to make a speedy invest­
ment. As a stellar-model specialist, it would not involve him 
with too much extra work to run some models which could be used 
for solar-neutrino flux predictions. Iben, unlike Bahcall, had 
little credibility staked in the earlier predictions. He had only 
played a small part in the Caltech calculation of 1963 and, as we 
saw, he played that part reluctantly. Thus, Iben had little to 
lose by finding a contradiction between prediction and experiment, 
and there was a real chance he could make a credible contribution 
since he could point to the need to consider more drastic theoretical 
options than Bahcall had yet considered.
As was pointed out in Chapter 8, Iben's work has had very
little impact. This was partly because Bahcall was one of the
referees for his papers and was able to hold up their publication .
By 1967, the field of solar-neutrino theory was largely dominated
by the Caltech group with most of the significant developments
21coming from either Fowler or Bahcall. This intellectual domination 
was inseparable from institutional domination and it was very 
likely, for instance, that journal editors would send papers on 
solar neutrinos to someone at the Caltech group to referee. This 
institutional dominance no doubt played a part in the difficulties 
which Iben faced in trying to challenge Bahcall's views.
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Iben's own decision not to pursue the battle further, in effect 
meant that the controversy did not become a full-blooded confront- 
atior> and that Bahcall was able to continue his dominance over the 
theoretical work. Bahcall's own switch to the contradiction position 
shortly afterwards made any further pursuit of the controversy rather 
pointless, anyway. However, Bahcall's eventual agreement with Iben 
has not meant that Iben has been vindicated. Most respondents seemed 
genuinely puzzled as to what the controversy had been about and 
certainly no-one perceived Bahcall's changing views as a volte-face.
What the Bahcall-Iben confrontation draws attention to, is the 
important point that institutional resources in science accompany 
accumulations of credibility. For instance, institutional affiliation, 
cuid control of information (via refereeing) are both part of 
the territory over which the battle for credibility is fought.
Bahcall's strong institutional position which accompanied his 
investment strategy, meant that .institutional resources
such as refereeing, worked to his favour. In other words, positions o& 
matters of science and institutional positions go hand 
in glove. Iben's weaker position in regard to
institutional resources perhaps accounts for his failure to make 
much impact.
There are two other episodes of social destruction encountered 
that warrant discussion. Although these two cases involve substantively 
very different scientific issues, the social processes of rejection 
are essentially similar. I refer to the rejection of the work of 
Jacobs (Chapter 7, Part II) and of Rouse (Chapter 9). Both scientists 
managed to get their views into the literature (after some difficulty)» 
however,their work caused very little stir. They met the fate of
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'implicit rejection' (Collins and Pinch, 1979). That is to say, no 
great effort was mounted to show why the^ were wrong. Their views 
were just allowed quietly to pass unnoticed.
In order to try and understand the reception (or rather the 
lack of it) of the ideas of Jacobs and Rouse, we should first con­
sider the type of idea they were putting forward. Essentially both 
scientists were being negative - they were disagreeing with what 
other scientists did. Jacobs claimed Davis's experiment was wrong 
and Rouse claimed that everyone who did stellar-evolution calcula­
tions did them incorrectly. The problem posed by the negative
thrust of their work is that it is difficult to see what other 
scientists could do with it. Davis was already testing the 
possibility that Jacobs suggested; short of becoming chemists 
themselves there seemed to be little Jacobs's colleagues could do 
in terms of active experimental or theoretical work. Similarly 
Rouse's attacks on the basic methods of stellar-evolution theory 
offered no active research programme since most people considered 
Rouse's goals of deriving both the radius and the luminosity in 
such calculations to be hopeless. Furthermore, both Jacobs and 
Rouse were attempting to undermine a vast amount of work. If Jacobs 
was correct then all the effort gone into the theoretical interpre­
tation of Davis's result, not to mention Davis's experimental 
programme, would have been futile. Similarly, the whole industry 
of stellar-evolution was challenged by Rouse's claims. In short, 
a lot of pre-existing interests and investments of credibility 
were at stake.
In terms of the interest-credibility model, it could be said 
that, as well as challenging the credibility of many scientists, 
Jacobs and Rouse were not offering any opportunity for scientists
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to make investments in their ideas and hence obtain credibility 
by that route. After all, there is very little credibility to 
be obtained from publishing a paper agreeing that 'so and so has 
got it wrong'. In this sense then, implicit rejection can be seen 
to be most likely to occur when there is a failure to produce 
credible information (that is information which can be used by 
anyone else).
Implicit rejection is a very effective way of rejecting 
knowledge claims. The danger that is run in explicitly attacking 
anyone is that, by attacking them, it is also being said that they 
are important enough to be attacked. Total silence is a far 
more effective strategy of making certain a person's work is not 
taken up. And, after all, what matters ultimately is, not saying 
publicly that 'so and so has got it wrong', but rather that no-one 
should invest in the 'wrong' ideas.
Of course implicit rejection does not always work; eventually 
it might have to be shown explicitly what is wrong. However, it has 
a much better chance when the proponent, whose work is being rejected, 
is in an institutionally weak position. In view of the dominance 
of the field by institutionally powerful groups such as the Caltech 
nuclear astrophysicists, and in view of the institutionally weak 
position of both Jacobs and Rouse (as outlined in Chapters 7 and 9), 
it seems unlikely that Jacobs and Rouse could attract much attention 
and thus they could be safely ignored. The difficulty of challenging 
the dominant interests and investments in the solar-neutrino field 
should not be underestimated. After all, if Iben, who was a full 
professor at MIT and an acknowledged expert in stellar-evolution 
theory, could not successfully mount such a challenge then we can 
see what little chance Jacobs and Rouse had.
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In summary then it can be said that the interest-credibility 
model sheds light on some of the social processes of the rejection 
of knowledge claims. In particular, it draws attention to the 
importance of institutional resources which accompany investments 
of credibility and it also provides a means of understanding 'implicit 
rejection'.
Some Reservations Concerning Interest-Credibility Models and the 
Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
Clearly whether or not it is thought that the interest-credibility 
explanation offers anything to increase our understanding of the 
above episodes depends on the detailed material presented in earlier 
chapters. It seems to me that it is a useful way of making sense 
of the developments in solar-neutrino astronomy over a twenty-year 
period. The reason why interest-type and investment-type explanations 
are so fruitful in the context of the present work is because they 
take as their target the detailed internal workings of science 
and furthermore they show the workings over a period of time. Invest­
ments take time to reach fruition and interests take time to form.
It is these sorts of explanations of detailed scientific activity 
over a (not necessarily lengthy) period of time which are most 
needed if the second stage of the relativist programme is to be 
carried through.
The interest-credibility model, like all sociological models,
is not immune from criticism. One argument made against this type
of model is that it is not capable of explaining how scientific
revolutions occur since there seems to be no obvious reason why
scientists should ever,en masse, overthrow their previous investments 
22of credibility. This criticism is perhaps not so germane in the
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context of the present work where the episodes described are not of
the revolutionary type. However, it seems that, in principle, the
model could describe why revolutions occur. Perhaps, for instance,
the narrow technical interests described in this work are replaced
by wider social interests at a time of revolution and these lead
to the previous investments being overthrown. Another criticism
levelled at this type of model is that it tends to do too much -
that is,an interest and an investment ae. found to account for 
23everything. This, however, need not always be so. Because in­
terest-credibility explanations apply to local contexts they depend 
very heavily on detailed empirical studies for their reference.
Indeed, they often appear to be descriptive vehicles for re-describing 
empirical episodes. But, as more and more empirical, and in particular 
comparative, studies are carried out, it should be possible to 
develop some notion of a hierarchy of interests. When this is 
carried out, interest-credibility explanations should lose some of 
their present 'unfalsifiable' character. Even without a hierarchy 
of interests the interest-credibility model is valuable as a des­
criptive device. It draws attention to particular processes and 
activities in science and gives a means whereby comparisons can at 
least be made.
Afterword
Throughout this work there has been a tension between the 
concerns of history and those of sociology. This tension appears 
not only in the domain of aims and methods (as discussed in Chapter 
1) but also as a matter of style. The historical style tends, on 
the whole, to be narrative, as opposed to the more analytical style 
favoured by sociologists. No claim is made here to have resolved
424
such tensions. However, it is hoped that, by a careful delineation 
of the aims and methods of the work, and, in particular, the 
separation of the two tasks of social deconstruction and social 
construction at least these particular tensions have not been left 
implicit. Unfortunately very little can be done about the tension 
in style. It is inevitable that some parts of this work which 
historians find intriguing may seem tedious to the sociologists 
and vice versa.
If the work has been successful then it should have illuminated 
our understanding of science as a social phenomenon. At the very 
least it should have provided a detailed account of how theory and 
experiment can interact together in one historical instance. Whether 
this study is 'just another (perhaps special) case' of science as a 
social phenomenon or whether it has wider implications depends very 
much on which of the tasks of social deconstruction and social con­
struction is being considered. The social deconstruction of facts, 
theories and predictions is, by its nature, a universal phenomenon 
and this case is another illustration of the phenomenon. However,
I would argue that it is not 'just another case' since all attempts 
to deconstruct knowledge within the modern physical sciences play 
a strategic role in the sociology of knowledge as a whole. Short 
of mathematics and perhaps logic itself, such cases are notoriously 
the hardest in which to show the fruitfulness of the sociology of 
knowledge. No -one is surprised that parapsychological knowledge 
can be deconstructed but they do tend to notice when it is modem 
physics which is being dealt with.
The difficulty of deconstructing scientific knowledge in a 
prestige area like modern physics should not be underestimated.
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This difficulty is exacerbated when the scientists whose knowledge 
is being deconstructed are generally regarded to be amongst the 
world's best physicists. The deconstruction of Davis's and Bahcall's 
claims would not be possible without the generous help they have 
provided me throughout the study. It might seem perverse, therefore, 
to claim that their work can be understood as a social phenomenon* 
However, the reading o f  social' as being 'somehow less them solid' 
is a misreading. The veracity of Davis's claims and Bahcall's 
claims are not diminished one iota by the arguments presented here. 
Both Davis's and Bahcall's work have produced correct results in the 
most profound sense.
The findings on the social construction of facts, theories and
predictions may- have a more limited relevance than the findings on
social deconstruction. The lengthy and involved interaction of the
theorists and the experimenter which is the main characteristic of
the field may well be atypical. I certainly do not know of any
other case like it. This means it is possible that the detailed
mechanisms and social processes operating in this case, may only
apply to this case. However, by attempting to explain such
processes in terms of a general model - the interest-credibility
model - the relevance to other cases should be more apparent.
Indeed, as pointed out, there are several cases already where
similar ideas have been shown to bear fruit. That having been said,
it seems imperative for more studies to be carried out which directly
compare the present findings with other cases where there is conflict
24between experiments and theory. Such comparisons are underway!
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER TEN
1. For instance, Bahcall's calculation of the neutrino absorption 
cross-sections seems a promising case to take.
2. Tnus, in Pinch (1980a) the main data are quotes drawn from interviews,
3. See, Brown (1965), and L. Festinger, H.W. Riechen and S.C.
Schachter, When Prophecy Fails, New York: Harper Row, 1956.
4. MacKenzie did much more than this. As will become apparent
in the section on the social construction of knowledge, he also 
identified differing cognitive and social interests associated 
with Yule's and Pearson's work.
5. The arguments are not even framed in terms of standard
statistical theory - I am grateful to Donald MacKenzie for
drawing my attention to this point.
6. The section of the paper which deals with uncertainties in the
radiochemistry can be regarded as bolstering the arguments
already presented on the social deconstruction of the experiment.
It should be noted that the aim of the (1981a) paper was to 
deconstruct knowledge; hence the emerging consensus over 
Davis's experiment was not important to the aims of that paper.
7. This is assuming the scientist has decided he/she knows enough 
to reach firm conclusions. It is always possible that he/she 
can say 'we just don't know yet'.
8. Perhaps it is even possible that 'the moon is made of green
cheese'. This example was raised by Barry Barnes at the 
conference, 'New Perspectives in the History and Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge', Bath University, 27-29 March,1980. ,
Bames argued that it was patently ridiculous for the 
sociologist to take such a belief as this seriously. This
is consistent with his views (e.g., Barnes, 1974) concerning 
the 'normalcy' of belief. However, Collins and Cox (1976, 1977) 
have pointed out that in some extreme cases, whether or not 
such deviant beliefs are treated seriously leads to very 
different kinds of analysis being pursued (see also. Law, 1977).
In this case, if we treated the belief that the Sun is made 
of black holes as a patently false scientific belief then we 
would have been led to a very different type of analysis.
By extension, in Rouse's case, we would have had to treat him 
in terms of the sociology (or more probably, psychology) of 
delusion. However, perhaps Barnes's point is that the 'moon 
is made of green cheese' is just not likely to be encountered 
as a serious belief put forward by any scientist. This 
obviously is true, but there is an important point of 
principle at stake here. If some beliefs cannot be entertained 
because they are not put forward by scientists, this raises 
problems with all hypothetical arguments put forward by 
sociologists to try and deconstruct knowledge, (e.g., my 
hypothetical argument concerning Jacob's possible response to 
the Cl^G test in Chapter 7). Barnes would presumably have to say 
that these arguments too, are ridiculous.
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9. See W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1958. For an attempt to describe the view 
of reality implied by quantum theory see Collins and Pinch 
(1982) - especially Chapter 4.
10. MacKenzie (1978: 48) defines 'cognitive interests' as referring 
to 'those aspects of the actual or potential application of 
theories which "feed back" into theoretical development by 
structuring scientists' construction and judgement of theories', 
It seems that this is a subset of the type of narrow interests 
which Barnes and MacKenzie identify as instrumental interests
'internal to science'.
It is unfortunate that the label 'social' is now used to refer 
to interests arising from the wider social-political sphere.
The narrow 'cognitive interests' are equally social,(as 
Barnes and MacKenzie, 1979, point out), in that they are 
embodied in the practices of social actors.
11. Two other studies in which interests form the explanatory 
vehicle are: D. MacKenzie and B. Bames, 'Scientific Judgement: 
The Biometry-Mendelism Controversy' in Barnes and Shapin 
(1979: 191-210), and J. Desin, 'Controversy over Classification: 
A Case study from the History of Botany', in Barnes and 
Shapin (1979:211-30).
12. A sizeable literature seems to be developing on 'interest 
explanations' . See for example, Woolgar (1981); B. Barnes,
'On the'Hovii » and 'Whys' of Cultural Change', Social Studies 
of Science, 11, 1981, 481-97; D. MacKenzie, 'Interests, 
Positivism and History', Social Studies of Science, 11,1981 
498-503; and, S. Woolgar, 'Critique and Criticism: Two 
Readings of Ethnomethodology' Social Studies of Science, 11, 
1981, 504-14.
The exchanges between Barnes, MacKenzie and Woolgar have 
occurred too recently for me to include any extended discussion 
here. Many of the issues, as Barnes points out, are ultimately 
standard philosophy of social science issues relating to 
explai^ions. It is assumed here that, like scientists, we 
can pursue our explanations without constantly having to look 
over our shoulders to see what philosophers (and ethnomethodo- 
logists) make of the work.
13. However, as Shapin (1979) points out, the expunging of social 
interests from the work of the professional anatomists might, 
in itself, point to a powerful social interest predominant
in all professionalised science.
14. For similar work, see K. Knorr, 'Producing and Reproducing 
Knowledge: 'Descriptive or Constructive', Social Science 
Information, 16, 1977, 669-96.
15. For an attenpt to apply Bourdieu's ideas see Pinch (1977).
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16. This conception of interest seems to overcome some of the 
difficulties over whether or not interests are psychological 
attributes (see the debate between Woolgar, Barnes and 
MacKenzie referenced in note 12). In this view, interests 
are to be seen to be part and parcel of scientists's 
activity.
17. The connection between interests and investments, as already 
mentioned, is maintained in Pickering's (1980) study. Also, 
the connection seems to be implicit in Harvey's (1981) 
'plausibility model' (see Chapter 1). It seems to me that the 
dynamic notion of interests, as arising With scientific 
practice, is consistent with Harvey's notion of plausibility.
For instance, in the timing-hypothesis case plausibility 
increased once it was clear that the hypothesis could generate 
scientific practice (i.e.. Aspect's experiment). In other 
words, an interest developed in the timing hypothesis. Harvey 
also draws attention to the importance of 'gaining access to 
equipment and funds' (ibid: 104). What is not clear in Heirvey's 
work (and in Pickering's) is exactly how investments, equipment 
and funds, connect with interests and plausibility. I suggest 
that the interest-credibility model makes this clearer.
18. For example, Bahcall referred to 'his emotions' depending in 
large part on his having got the prediction correct (see p.2 0 2 ) .
19. Pickering's (1981b) study of quark detection is very suggestive 
and seems to indicate the importance of theoretical interests. 
However, the sociological conclusions are not drawn out.
Harvey's (1980, 1981)study can be interpreted as showing the 
difficulty of establishing an experimental result, the 
implications of which overthrow. - interests and investments
in dominant theory. Collins's (1975, 1981b) studies of the 
Weber affair are not really suitable for comparison because 
Collins did not look at the role of the theorists.
20. One or two respondents went on to point out that this was 
unlikely because of the sudden increase in the prediction 
in 1970 (see Fi/g. 1.1), stimulated by Watson's work on the 
opacity. Of course, by this point Bahcall was switching 
allegiance to the contradiction viewpoint anyway, so the 
'interest' in a lower flux was not as strong. Also, it is 
cimusing to note that this increase later went away (in 1973) 
when it was discovered that Watson had made a mistake in his 
earlier opacity computations.
21. The role played by the Caltech group in the field was indicated 
by my interview sample. Of 17 nuclear astrophysicists interviewed 
14 had at some stage in their careers worked with Fowler at 
Caltech.
22. This argument originates with H.M. Collins in conversation.
23. Ibid!
24. T.J. Pinch. 'Cognitive Consensus: A Comparative Study', This
is an SSRC-funded project which compares several cases of recent 
experimental results in physics which clash with theory. One 
case is the acceptance of Davis's results.
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APPENDIX I
The Data for the Study
As in any piece of research in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, before fieldwork could be undertaken it was first 
necessary to become familiar with the technical knowledge culture 
studied. In this case most of the relevant technical literature 
(including semi-popular articles) was collected and read before 
interviewing commenced. The sample of scientists selected for 
interview was based on the reading of this literature. All 
scientists who had made significant contributions to the field 
(both experimentally and theoretically! and who were accessible 
within the logistics of the project were included in the sample.
In addition, a number of scientists who had been only peripherally 
involved (such as those who had suggested, in passing, a theoretical 
solution to the solar-neutrino problem) were included. The sample 
was extended after fieldwork commenced as my attention was drawn 
to other potential respondents (snowball sampling). This led to 
the inclusion within the sanple of officials who had been respon­
sible for the funding of Davis's experiment. Interviews with the 
following respondents were tape recorded:
L. Alvarez. University of California, Berkeley, November 15, 1978.
D. Arnett, University of Chicago, November 8, 1978.
J. Bahcall, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton , October 20,21, 
and December 4, 1978.
C. Barnes, California Institute of Technology, November 20, 1978.
J. Barnothy, Evanstown, Chicago, November 8, 1978.
H. Bethe, Cornell University, October 27, 1978.
D. Clayton, Rice University, Houston,November 29, 1978.
R. Davis, Brookhaven National Laboratory, October 23,24, December 
6, 1978.
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P. Demarque, Yale University, October 19, 1978.
A. Dodson, Brookhaven National Laboratory, October 23, 1978.
M. Dwarakanath, Bell Labs., New Jersey, December 5, 1978.
W. Fowler, California Institute of Technology, November 21, 1978.
M. Freedman, Argonne National Laboratory, November 9, 1978.
M. Goldhaber, Brookhaven National Laboratory, October 23, 1978.
D. Gough, Institute of Theoretical Astronomy, Cambridge, November 15,1979.
H. Hill, University of Arizona, Tucson, November 23, 1978.
I. Iben, University of Illinois, Urbana, November 6, 1978.
K. Jacobs, Bell Labsv, New Jersey, December 5, 1978.
K. Lande, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, November 31, 1978.
S. Lubow, University of California, Los Angeles, November 22, 1978.
Leona Marshall-Libby, University of California, Los Angeles,November 22,1978.
E. Parker, University of Chicago, November 8, 1978.
A. Poskanzer, University of California, Berkeley, November 15, 1978.
H. Primakoff, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, November 31,1978.
R. Raghavan, Bell Labs., New Jersey, December 5, 1978.
F. Reines, University of California, Irvine, November 21, 1978.
R. Rood, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, November 29, 1978.
C. Rouse, La Jolla, San Diego, November 18, 197 8.
E. Salpeter, Cornell University9. October 27, 1978.
R. Sears, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, October 30, 1978.
M. Schwarzschild, University of Princeton, December 4, 197 8.
W.R. Sheldon, University of Southampton, May 14, 1979.
E. Spiegel, New York, October 26, 1978.
T. Tombrello, California Institute of Technology, November 20, 1978.
R. Ulrich, University of California, Los Angeles, November 22, 1978.
W.D. Watson, University of Illinois, Urbcina, November 6, 1978.
W. Whaling, California Institute of Technology, November 20, 1978.
C. Wheeler, University of Colorado, Boulder, November 13, 1978.
A. Wolfendale, The Royal Society, London, October 10, 1980.
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A typical interview would last for two hours. However, some 
interviews lasted much longer and were continued over lunch and, 
on some occasions, well into the evening. All the above interviews 
were transcribed in full. Quotations by the above respondents which 
appear in the text are drawn verbatim from these transcripts.
In addition, several unrecorded interviews took place. These 
were with the following respondents:
R. Kavanagh, California Institute of Technology, November 17, 1978.
J. Pomeroy, interview conducted by telephone,December 7, 1978.
G. Ragosa, Department of Energy, Washington, November 30, 1978. 
Virginia Trimble, interview conducted by telephone, November 14, 1979, 
A. Van Dyken, interview conducted by telephone, November 30, 1978.
In the case of all these non-recorded interviews copious notes 
were taken.
Kavanagh was the only respondent who refused to be tape 
recorded.
Apart from the above formal interviews, many informal conversa­
tions with respondents took pièce during the course of the research. 
In particulcur, I had very helpful informal interaction with Davis 
and his group and with John Bahcall. Often this informal inter­
action was continued over a period of several days. The extent 
to which I became immersed in the field can be judged from the 
fact that on one occasion I was trusted to act as a courier for a 
tape of data which I carried from the Homestake gold mine (where 
Davis's experiment is located) back to the East Coast.
These informal interactions have helped shape many of the 
ideas presented in the study. In general, respondents were very 
forthcoming in interview. However, there is evidence that when 
asked which field was responsible for the solar-neutrino discrepancy.
451.
respondents were cautious because of the 'public inquisitor' role 
which I was perceived to have in connection with this topic (see 
Pinch, 1981a in Appendix II).
An additional source of data was my correspondence with 
respondents. I would like, in particular, to acknowledge corres­
pondence with:
J. Bahcall; R. Davis; R. Dodson; T. Jenkins (Case Institute 
of Technology); R. Rood; C. Rouse; D. Schramm (University of 
Chicago), R. Stothers (NASA Goddard, New York); C. Wheeler.
Correspondence amongst respondents formed another important 
source of data. I was given access to the complete solar-neutrino 
correspondence files of the following scientists:
J. Bahcall; R. Davis; W. Fowler; C. Rouse.
From these files about 500 items were copied. Many 
of the letters were circulated amongst the various participants , 
thus copies of letters sent from Davis to Bahcall were found in 
Fowler's files. in addition, letters between other scientists 
of particular relevance were often to be found in the files of 
the above scientists (particularly Bahcall's and Davis's files).
Many other scientists also gave me pieces of correspondence 
relevant to the study.
One, particularly useful, source of data has been the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, Chemistry Department file on solar neutrinos.
I was given access to this file by the kindness of R. Davis and 
R. Dodson. The existence of this file was due to Dodson's fore­
sight. The file had a note in it written by Dodson which said:
'Save for History of Science'. Another useful source of corres­
pondence was the solar-neutrino file housed at the Department of 
Energy; I was given access to this file by G. Ragosa. For security 
reasons I was not allowed to copy this file, but I was allowed
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to make detailed notes on the correspondence it contained.
Apart from correspondence, I was given copies of other pieces 
of printed matter. These included: referees' reports, funding 
proposals, conférence presentations, early drafts of papers and 
other unpublished material. Another important source of data has 
been the proceedings of two informal conferences held on solar 
neutrinos (Reines and Trimble, 1972, and Friedlander, 1978a and b). 
These conference presentations, although'informal' are no substitute 
for interview data, since they are still public occasions. Also, 
these conference proceedings are sanitised. Often, contentious 
points are edited out and actual remarks re-written by participants 
when they see the transcripts of what they said.
One final important source of data has been the recent article 
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APPENDIX II con t.
THE THREE-SIGMA ENIGMA
Trevor J. Pinch





Paper presented to the ISA-PAREX Research Committee 
Meeting, Burg Deutschlandsberg, Austria,
September 26-29, 1980.
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In a previous paper (The Sun Set: The Presentation of
Certainty in Scientific Life)^ it was argued that the assessment
of certainty in science was essentially a social process. The
argument was illustrated by reference to my sociological study of
2solar-neutrino science - a field which has been dominated by one
outstanding problem (the 'solar-neutrino problem'). This is the
clash between the theoretical prediction of the neutrino flux
emitted from the sun by hydrogen fusion and the results of an
3experiment designed to detect this flux. It was found that,
in response to the 'trouble' caused by this result, scientists
tended to claim that one or more of the various sub-fields within
solar-neutrino science were uncertain enough to allow for the
discrepancy between theory and experiment.Given the range of views
of certainty available, it was not possible to conclude that any
area of solar-neutrino science was more certain than any other.
The certainty of solar-neutrino science seemed to be a matter for
4social negotiation.
One of the difficulties of the previous paper was that 
scientists' assessments of certainty were made across whole disciplines 
and specialXL^iJ, It might be thought that the issue of scientific 
certainty can more appropriately be investigated in the context of 
individual scientific results - especially as, in many such cases, 
statistical argument and prcÆ»ability theory can be brought into 
play to produce a precise meaning of certainty. In other words, 
statistics in itself might be enough to settle the issue of 
certainty in science.
In this paper, I hope to extend my previous conclusion by 
showing that even a comparatively narrow statistical issue dissolves
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into a complex web of interpretation and negotiation. In order
to do this, I draw again upon my study of solar-neutrino science.
In this case, I focus on a matter right at the heart of that
field - how scientists assess the significance of the discrepancy
between theory and experiment. In short, I will be looking at the
constitution of the solar-neutrino problem itself.
The Solar-Neutrino Problem - November 1978
The empirical basis of my study arises from a fieldwork trip
to the U.S. in November 1978, during which most of the scientists
who had worked on the solar-neutrino problem were interviewed.^
Shortly before Qiy fieldwork the latest values for the theoretical
and experimental flux of neutrinos were presented at a solar-
neutrino conference.^ These results are shown in Figure (1).
It can be seen that the most up-to-date theoretical value was
given as 4.7 ± 1.5 SNUs (solar-neutrino units or 'snews' - 1 SNU 
-36equals lO neutrino absorptions per target atom per second).
The average experimental value was given as 1.6 ± 0.4 SNUs. The 
error bars on the experimental value are at one standard deviation 
from the mean (known as one-sigma error bars). The meaning of the 
error on the theoretical value is less clear-cut, as we shall see 
below. In general this theoretical error cannot be determined 
in a straightforward manner because of the large number of experi­
mentally determined parameters (and their associated errors) which . 
go into the theoretical calculation.
I showed a graph similar to Fig. (1) to most of the solar- 
neutrino scientists with whom I talked. I was particularly interested 
in their assessment of whether or not the discrepancy was significant. 































The most common view was that the data indicated that a significant
and serious discrepancy existed. Examples are the following:
I think it's a major discrepancy. I mean, if you consider 
a science seriously, as stellar evolution is considered 
now - one of the soundest parts of astrophysics - and get a 
discrepancy like that. The whole thing is wrong, it's just 
disastrous.
Well I would regard being 3 sigmas off as just being a 
disastrous discrepancy within the framework of the theory 
of this particular problem. [ By '3 sigmas' the respondent 
means that the gap between the upper bound of the experimental 
value, 2 SNUs, and the lower bound of the theoretical value,
3.2 SNUs, is three times the one-sigma error, 0.4 SNUs, 
on the experimental valueJ.
On the other hand, the following comments suggest another viewpoint -
that the discrepancy is not significant:
There are some people who regard this problem as a very 
serious problem...Working in astrophysics I am used to large 
discrepancies between theory and observation, and often 
discrepancies that are much larger than this. And we just 
have to live with them to a certain extent and they clear 
up eventually...But after all, the discrepancy now is down 
to a factor of three.
The accumulating data, which is still so scant as to contain 
a large statistical uncertainty...is no longer entirely out of 
line with the theoretical predictions. The most optimistic -
i.e./the lowest - predicted value is only three sigmas from 
the mean observational value. What confidence do you place 
on a one in a hundred possibility?
This comment is particularly interesting because doubt is cast
on the significance of the discrepancy by an appeal to the three-
sigma level of significance. This claim, that the discrepancy is .
non-significant because it is 'only three sigmas' (hereafter
referred to as the 'three-sigma argument'), forms much of the
subject matter of this paper.
The three-sigma argument seems to provide a straightforward
technical means by which the significance of the discrepancy
can be decided. By treating a three-sigma gap between theory
and experiment as non-significant, the respondent implies that we
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need to know with a greater certainty than 99% that the discrepancy 
is a real one. The three-sigma significance level, like significance 
tests in the social sciences, provides a means by which a real 
effect can be distinguished from error.
In order to understand the basis of the three-sigma argument, 
it will be necessary to briefly discuss the nature of error in 
general in physics.
Systematic and Random Error
In physics a distinction is usually drawn between two possible 
classes of error - systematic error and random error. Systematic 
errors arise in a series of measurements or calculations in a 
uniform way. Such errors are very often constant or at least 
vary over time in a regular manner. Provided the cause of the 
error is known its effect can usually be taken into account.
Random errors, on the other hand, are, by definition, unpre­
dictable random fluctuations in results. Such errors, being un­
predictable, cannot be corrected for in individual cases. However, 
their effect can be taken into account for many cases, such as 
a series of measurements, by the use of probability theory.
The two classes of error are not well defined and it is 
difficult to specify in advance which particular systematic 
and random errors might be encountered. The problem is parti - 
cularly acute when novel physical measurements are attempted, as 
with the solar-neutrino experiment. In such cases it is often not 
clear just what the likely sources of error are. Thus, if there 
is a discrepancy, a variety of explanations as to its cause are 
possible. The following three explanations form the main 
candidates;
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(1) The discrepancy is caused by one or more (unknown) systematic 
errors.
(2) The discrepancy is caused by one or more randcxn errors,
(3) The discrepancy is not caused by any error but is in fact a 
'real' effect.
In addition, there is always the possibility that some combination 
of the above explanations is the cause of the discrepancy. For 
instance, there may be a small real effect coupled with systematic 
and random errors.
It seems that the three-sigma argument provides a means of 
assessing the likelihood of explanation (1) - the possibility of 
systematic error. If the discrepancy is no larger than three 
sigmas then the most likely cause is one or more systematic 
error. This can be seen clearly from the following formulation of 
the argument:
One knows from experience that if you don't have three 
sigmas or more distinction there, you'd better watch out 
because Nature plays dirty little tricks on you. All you 
need is a small systematic error in here somewhere and 
the whole thing goes down the drain.
It should be noted, that even if there were a larger discrepancy
than three sigmas it need not necessarily signify a real effect
(explanation (3)). There is still the possibility of random error
(explanation (2)). We shall return to the discussion of random
error below, but it is important to remember that the distinction
between the two classes of error is not absolute and that remarks
made concerning the assessment of systematic error often apply
equally to the assessment of random error.
The Application of the Three-Sigma Rule
Those scientists who expressed the view that the discrepancy
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was not significant at the three-sigma level often felt justified 
in using this criterion because of their previous experience - 
either in physics in general (as some of the above comments 
indicated) or in the context of this particular problem. A typical 
comment was:
There is always the chance that there has been systematic 
errors made. We've seen that in this field in the past, you 
see it in all kinds of fields...And physics is full of cases 
where two standard deviations in the long run turns out to 
be due to some systematic unknown error.
Apart from appealing to their own experience, some respondents
felt that it was appropriate to apply the three-sigma rule because
it paid to be 'cautious' or 'conservative'. The need for caution
is clear when it is considered that a lot of time and energy may
be wasted trying to solve a 'pseudo' problem. As one respondent
remarked, when referring to a possible avenue of exploration
which might solve the problem:
It's so difficult and because it takes so much work, that's 
why you need something more than 3 sigmas to convince yourself 
there, isreally a discrepancy. If there is a 10 sigma 
discrepancy and you're convinced there are no systematic 
errors,then you're willing to think bold. But if there is 
three sigmas are you going to go out and make a fool of 
yourself... and then five years later people will say 'Oh it 
was just the statistics, there's only a sigma and a half 
discrepancy now.' No you're not going to do that. It wouldn't 
be good science.
How scientists view the risks will depend on a variety of 
circumstances and it is likely that risk assessments will differ 
from individual to individual. For instance, if a scientist 
happens to have a technique or approach which can easily be applied 
to the problem then the risks involved will be reduced. On the 
other hand, if a lot more work is required, as in the case above, 
then a greater risk is entailed.
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It is already clear that whether or not the three-sigma 
argument is found to be compelling is likely to depend on a range 
of contingent factors. In particular a scientist's previous 
experience and competences could both be important. Thus far, it 
does not seem as though scientific opinion on the significance 
of the discrepancy is likely to be forced one way or the other.
An integral part of the view that the discrepancy was not 
significant was the belief that the signifi cance of the discrepancy 
had been exaggerated by some scientists. This belief was closely 
connected with the recent attempts by some solar-neutrino scientists 
to get funding for new experiments. These experiments are likely 
to be very costly (one estimate is $25 million ) and part of the 
argument put forward for funding them has been based on the out­
standing discrepancy discovered by the present experiment. Clearly, 
if the present discrepancy is considered to be non-significant, 
this particular argument for fiTnding is in danger of becoming a 
non-starter. The following extract of interview material refers 
to Titus, a scientist who is a well-known exponent of the view 
that the solar-neutrino problem is a serious discrepancy:
I believe that in their enthusiasm for getting support for 
these experiments, which are, after all, very expensive, 
some people have overdone the problem.
Overdone it?
Picture this as a worse crisis than I feel it is. Maybe for 
Titus it is a very serious problem.. .Some times one gets the 
impression that he has kept the problem alive...There is a 
little bit of showmanship involved...It's showmanship to make 
sure the agencies will keep supporting experiments.
Similar motivations were attributed to Titus to another respondent:
People like Titus and others are firmly committed to the 
enormous discrepancy...
Why are Titus and others committed to the discrepancy?
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...I think some of them have a feeling...that if they don't
claim there is a discrepancy you see they can't justify
the gallium experiment [this is one particular new experiment].
It would be wrong to give the impression that the scientists
who made these comments did not themselves support the funding of
new experiments. Both were careful to stress their support.
Indeed, the respondent quoted immediately above, who criticised
Titus for trying to justify new experiments by arguing there was a
serious discrepancy, felt that the lack of a clear discrepancy
was a better justification:
I think one has to justify [ the gallium experiment] on more 
honest grounds. Namely the thing is very muddy, for some 
reason the experiment doesn't give a clean answer...Let's 
stop pronouncing the answer based on this data...Let's go 
out and do the crucial experiment.
It is clear that both views of the significance of the dis­
crepancy can be used in the attempt to secure new funding. There 
is perhaps here a lesson for sociologists to learn in the art of 
fund-raising - physicists are, after all, very successful at it!
A more serious point is the degree of interplay which exists 
between remarks on funding and remarks concerning the gravity of 
the discrepancy. It seems that scientists do not make any firm 
separation between the two areas. The need to fund new experiments 
is an integral component of the argument over the assessment of 
significance.
It would appear from the discussion so far that the assessment 
of significance resides in a far wider set of concerns than a 
first insipection of Fig. (1) would suggest. The significance or 
not of the discrepancy is to be found not in the data shown there, 
but in the interpretative apparatus brought to bear upon the data. 
The three-sigma argument is part of this interpretative apparatus.
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If the three-sigma argument is to be compelling then other scientists
must share the same set of wider concerns which go into this
particular interpretation of Figure (1). If scientists have
different concerns then, with sufficient interpretative skill, they
may be able to produce rival interpretations - interpretations which
will indicate the defeasibility of the three-sigma argument. It is
to such rival interpretations that we now turn.
Counters to the Three-Sigma Argument
It has already been mentioned that most respondents regarded
the solar-neutrino problem to be a very serious discrepancy indeed.
Naturally such scientists were concerned to question the legitimacy
of the three-sigma argument. Most were aware of the argument
and recognised that three sigmas was a widely applied level of
significance. Most were happy to acknowledge the validity of
this level of significance. Dissent is, however, possible. For
instance, the following comment was made by the eminent stellar-
evolution theorist, Martin SchwarzschiId, at the recent U.S. solar-
7
neutrino conference:
I myself, in my personal life, would take much higher risks 
than are implied by two sigmas. If I am really after 
something, I take even a one-sigma risk. The modern habit
of requiring three sigmas, I don't understand at^all - it seems
to be the habit of old men with bad experiences.^
Clearly, given this view the three-sigma argument is likely to
have little appeal. Most respondents, however, did not favour
this means of avoiding the argument - they were prepared to accept
that three sigmas was the appropriate significance level. They
gave other reasons as to why the three-sigma argument did not
show the solar-neutrino problem to be a non-significant discrepancy.
Two general ways around the argument emerged. One view was that the
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solar-neutrino problem was exempt from the three-sigma rule.
The other main way to avoid the argument was the view that the
discrepancy was actually larger than three sigmas anyway. I will
look at each of these arguments in turn.
The Solar Neutrino Problem is Exempt
Several reasons were given as to why it was inappropriate to
apply the three-sigma argument to this case. In general the
unique character of the experiment was cited. It was felt that
the importance of this particular experiment warranted further
investigation of the discrepancy, despite it being only three
sigmas in magnitude. One reason given was that measurements
made on the Sun were of special relevance:
I wouldn't in the least say at this stage 'Oh well, there 
is no discrepancy. What the heck, a factor of three, forget 
it'. Not at all. I think that the Sun is a star of great 
importance. It's a prime astrophysical target and we had 
better be able to understand it in all the gruesome detail 
we can manage.
One respondent felt that the unique nature of the experiment required
a novel interpretation of systematic errors which meant that the
three-sigma argument should not be applied. As he told me:
In a fundamental experiment like this one you should not 
apply the three-sigma rule because the whole question is 
what is the systematic item that we are overlooking. And in 
that sense if one says that at the three-sigma level the 
discrepancy is only marginally significant, I think all one 
says is that there is something unrecognized. In this case 
the unrecognized systematic error is the whole scientific 
point.
In other words, because the experiment is of such fundamental import, 
the resolution of the discrepancy is in itself bound to be of 
significance. Therefore this is a significant discrepancy!
This view contrasts with that held by those who argue that 
the discrepancy is non-significant. For them the explanation in 
terms of systematic errors is likely to be fairly mundane and
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not worth pursuing in detail. They stress the non-uniqueness of 
the situation by comparing this experiment with other cases where 
three-sigma discrepancies existed but which later went away.
It can be seen that the three-sigma argument does nothing 
to resolve the debate over the significance of the discrepancy, for 
assessments of significance seem to depend on the importance 
attached to the experiment in the first place. What are trivial 
systematic errors for one scientist become the whole scientific 
point of the enterprise for another.
The Discrepancy is Larger than Three Sigmas
The thrust of this argument was centred on the theoretical 
prediction of 4.7 SNUs. As has been mentioned already the error 
to be attached to this number is a matter of scane contention. Most 
respondents treated the error bars as defining a possible range 
of uncertainty in which the theoretical value could lie, but did 
not regard them to be normal one-sigma error bars. They reasoned 
that it was actually more likely that the true theoretical value 
was larger than 4.7 SNUs. In other words, the error bars had a 
skewed probability distribution that made a larger value than
4.7 SNUs more probable. This interpretation of the error was 
basdd on the history of the theoretical prediction. The variation 
over the years is shown in Figure (2). They felt that the downward 
tendency in the predictions, since the first experimental results 
were available, was caused by theorists 'pushing' their theory
to the limit in order to try and bring agreement with the experiment. 
An 'unbiased' theoretical value would actually be larger than
4.7 SNUs, and thus give a larger discrepancy than three sigmas.






People when they push things, they push them in one direction.
So that while now I think you could get a number which is 
down to 3.5 or something at the one percent confidence level, 
you could also get a number at the one percent confidence 
level that would be around nine.
The view that the theoretical value is more likely to lie above
4.7 SNUs provides an effective counter to the three-sigma argument:
You can see a genuine discrepancy between the theory and the 
data...The theoretical result ̂ 4.7 SNUs ]... is the lower bound... 
You can easily push the models to push it up.
A related view was that the rate of decrease of the theoretical 
prediction over the years had got less and it had now reached a 
point where it was starting to level out or asymptote. For this 
reason it was felt to be unlikely that the gap would decrease 
sufficiently to solve the problem. The remaining gap was therefore 
that much more significant. The following comments reveal such 
an attitude:
The slope is decreasing, the rate of change with time...It's 
now beginning to reach an asymptotic limit.
Well the thing is these things always asymptote... The chances 
that there is some sleeper [ systematic error] that's going 
to change things...are pretty small.
These responses to the three-sigma argument further illustrate 
the complexity of the issue. Factors such as the motivations of 
scientists (the theorists' pushing their theories to agree with 
the experiment), the history of this problem, and generalisations 
drawn from the history of other problems(the asymptotic shape of 
theoretical-prediction curves over time), are all part of the 
assessment of significance and the evaluation of the three-sigma 
argument. What at first sight might seem to be a narrow technical 
issue capable of resolution by statistics has been shown to depend 
on a whole web of wider assumptions and interpretations. If the 
appropriate interpretation is made, the three-sigma argument can
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be avoided. The argument does not force the conclusion that the 
discrepancy is non-significant - it is a matter for negotiation. 
Random Errors
In the final section of this paper I return again to the issue
of random errors. The point was made earlier that it is difficult
to separate comments referring to the possibility of systematic
error from those referring to random error. However, in some
cases respondents's remarks did seem to be addressed exclusively
towards random error. As random errors can be treated by probability
theory, it might be thought that the assessment of the discrepancy
in terms of random error alone is a more straightfoward business.
From the comments I received it did not seem that this was so.
Several respondents felt that the discrepancy shown in Fig.
(1) could not arise from random effects. Typical comments were;
The chance statistically that Davis would get 4.7 SNUs... 
is very small.
I think the formal probability of an error still being there 
that exceeds three sigmas is ridiculously small. I do not 
think that that is really what we scientists proceed on.
However, not everyone agreed that three sigmas were enough to
rule out the possibility of random effects. As one respondent
told me:
Once the random error gets four or five sigmas then experience 
shows it's probably correct, provided there are no systematic 
errors...If that [ Fig. (l)]|were five or six sigmas..I would 
say that's a clear-cut discrepancy.
As well as possible differences over the appropriate level of 
significance to take, there is also the problem of how much data 
is needed to make a discrepancy significant. As one respondent 
commented:
What a three-sigma discrepancy means depends on the amount 
of data you've got. If you have got three data points and
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you formally calculate sigma and you are three sigmas away, 
so what? What does that mean? If you have got a million 
data points and you are three sigmas away, then you're a 
long way away. If you've got thirty five data points and 
you're a long way away. I'm not sure what that means... 
it's intermedi ate.
This comment would seem to touch on a problem which has arisen with
0
the use of significance tests in general. If a sufficiently large 
sample of a population is taken it is always possible to boost 
the significance of a small effect (as in statistical demonstrations 
of purported ESP effects). This means the sample size (or in this 
case the amount of experimental data) can be a key issue.
Another issue which has arisen is what the appropriate stati­
stical analysis for data from a low-counting experiment such as 
this should be. It seems there are several alternative statistical 
procedures available which give slightly differing results. For 
instance, a Bayesian analysis of the data has produced an experi­
mental value of 2.2 ± 0.3 SNUs - which means the size of the dis-
9crepancy is diminished.
Questions of statistical nuance apply to the analysis of the 
theoretical error as well as the experimental error. The possi­
bilities of producing different sizes of theoretical error according 
to the statistical assumptions employed are indicated in the following 
pair of comments. In both cases it is felt that the errors on the 
parameters fed into the theoretical calculation could be combining 
in a non-Gaussian way. However, the first comment implies that 
this would lessen the severity of the discrepancy, whilstl the 
second comment indicates that such an analysis would make the 
discrepancy worse!
If the errors were conspiring rather than adding in a 
Gaussian way...Things like that do happen... I would 
suspect that a factor of three is not really a bad miss.
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I think the error in the predicted neutrino flux at the 
earth is not at all Gaussian....i.e., I think there is still 
a real problem even though formally you might now say the 
standard model is 4.5 plus or minus 1.5; there is likely 
still a real disagreement with the observations even though 
it sort of doesn't look like it.10
It would seem that the fine details of the statistical arguments
concerning the random errors on both the theoretical and experimental
values are far frcm being settled.
Respondents in general tended to regard the above questions
of statistical nuance as being rather beside the point. A not
atypical attitude was the following:
These statistical arguments are very difficult to assess.
You can calculate probabilities, but the probability depends 
very much on the question you ask.
This particular respondent felt that unless you could actually see
an effect upon visual inspection of the data, it probably was not
worth taking seriously. As he told me:
Basically you can use statistics to measure things but if 
you want to be able to know whether a thing exists, you 
have to be able to look at it and see it basically...The 
best probabilists and statisticians in this university... 
have this attitude.
In the case of the solar-neutrino discrepancy, he felt that Fig. (1)
showed a clear discrepancy without any need to apply statistical
argument:
You can look at these formal error bars [ on the experimental 
data]...OK and the theory is up here...There's only one 
[experimental] point up there. How can these [ experimental! 
numbers represent what's up there? No way whatever, they're 
all down there. So either there's a systematic error or there's 
a discrepancy.
Statistical issues were considered to be beside the point by many 
respondents. It was felt that if the existence of the solar- 
neutrino discrepancy depended on the details of statistics then it 
was not worth taking seriously anyi>̂ ay!
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Of course, if the demonstration of the discrepancy depends 
more upon the visual impact of data, rather than upon statistical 
argument, then the question arises as to whether data can be 
presented in such a way as to exaggerate or diminish the appearance 
of discrepancy (the choice of scales will be of some importance). 
This, in itself, is a fascinating issue but not one which can be 
pursued further here.
Summary
The message of this paper has been that statistical argument 
does not necessarily provide a means of settling the problem of 
certainty in s c i e n c e . S t a t i s t i c a l  arguments, like other 
arguments, are a matter for negotiation. In particular, we have 
seen that the question of the significance of the solar-neutrino 
problem has not been settled by the appeal to statistical argument. 
The assessment of significance in this case seems to have been a 
thoroughly social process in the sense that different perceptions 
and interpretations of significance are to be had. Of course, just 
because statistical arguments are defeasible in this case does not 
mean that such arguments cannot be used in a routine way in the 
rest of science. One suspects that in most areas the interpretative 
license available in solar-neutrino science does not exist. Agree­
ment over statistical matters is likely to be reached in most 
sciences - and will presumably be reached eventually in this area 
too.
One final implication of this paper lies in the social 
12sciences. All too often the attitude taken towards statistics
there is that they can always be used in the apply-the-rules, 
crank-the-handle, re ad-out-the-an sw er, 'next-problem-please', 
sense. Such an attitude is frequently founded on the belief that
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statistical practice in a 'hard' science, such as physics, is always 
like this. It is indeed ironic that it is within physics that a 
case of the negotiated character of statistical inference should 
come to light.
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